MILITARY

1. English text of Japan's surrender offer: (JBB)

Early today (Greenwich time) the Japanese Foreign Ministry instructed its representatives in Stockholm and Bern to transmit Japan's surrender offer to the four principal belligerent countries, stating that it was sending an English, as well as a Japanese, text. The English text, which for some reason was not transmitted.
TOP SECRET
ULTRA

until several hours later has now been received; it corresponds in every particular to the English version broadcast by Domei this morning. The essential sentence reads as follows:

"The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the Joint Declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26 1945 by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and China, and later subscribed by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler."

2. **Surrender message conveyed to Swedish** (JBB) **Foreign Minister:** Japanese Minister Okamoto has reported that he delivered the Japanese surrender offer to the Swedish Foreign Minister for transmission to the Soviet and British Governments at 11:45 a.m. today (Stockholm time). Okamoto stated that he had not yet received the promised English text from Tokyo, but that "since this matter permits not a moment's delay" he had delivered a provisional translation of the Japanese version.

-2-

TOP SECRET
ULTRA
3. **Japanese report of Russian military operations in Manchukuo:** Yesterday afternoon Japanese Ambassador Yamada in Harbin sent the following "extremely urgent" message to Tokyo:

   a. "At about 2 p.m. on the 9th, parachute troops were dropped by 12 Soviet planes in the vicinity of Wu-ch’ia-kou on the railroad close to the Outer Mongolian-Manchukuan frontier at about 46°50' N, 120°15' E and Pai-lang on the same railroad at about 47°10' N, 120°10' E. We greatly distrust the underground units of both Manchukuan and Mongolian factions."

   b. "Manchukuan police officials discovered that officers of a [presumably Chinese] nationalistic group and certain other persons met in Mukden on the night of the 5th and discussed plans for mustering a force composed of 500 coolies, antiaircraft defense units, etc., and then attacking the Japanese forces stationed in that city. Then, the ring-leader of the plot, and 11 other persons were arrested."

   c. "Public order is being maintained."

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**TOP SECRET**

**ULTRA**
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An earlier message from Yamada is also available describing Russia's opening ground and air operations in Manchukuo; it is in general accord with the first Russian communiqué on the subject.
POLITICAL

1. Vinogradov's reaction to Berlin decisions: (200643WMM)

A 7 August report from French Ambassador Maugras in Ankara includes the following:

"I was struck during a long conversation with my Soviet colleague [Ambassador Vinogradov] by his excited tone... The [Berlin] Conference must be considered in Moscow as a great success for him to draw so much confidence from it.

"For the first time I heard him say that his Government could not allow the satisfactions which it expects from Turkey to be delayed very long. And when I mentioned the risk of an armed reaction on the part of Turkey he replied: 'Not if the Big Three are in agreement.'"

2. French comment on Bevin's appointment: On (200643JPS)

28 July—two days after the announcement of the British election results—French Ambassador Massigli in London reported the following to Paris:

"Yesterday Churchill expressed to me his conviction that nothing would be changed in British foreign policy, and the press today opportune-ly recalls that several times in the..."
last month Mr. Bevin has stated publicly that foreign policy should be placed above party conflicts.

"Mr. Eden, who had just been visited by his successor, praised him highly to me this morning. He assured me that he had found himself in agreement with [Bevin] in the councils of the Coalition Government and that he had absolutely no doubt about the continuity of British foreign policy.

"In my opinion, however, there is this difference: Mr. Bevin will not put up with [the interference] in the conduct of foreign policy which [Eden] tolerated. The Foreign Secretary himself will really be the one to direct foreign policy; in this connection the forthcoming establishment of a periodic Council of Foreign Ministers will strengthen his means of action.

"As far as we are concerned, I have always found in the new Foreign Secretary a clarity of thought and an expressive frankness which allow those with whom he speaks to form an excellent
idea of the position he is taking. The fact re-
mains, however, that Mr. Bevin lacks a general
knowledge of the files, and, in the course of the
past weeks, he has not been preparing himself
for his position since--according to information
from a very good source--he himself had not fore-
seen the victory of his party."
1. **Franco-Soviet economic relations:** As previously noted, on 20 July Foreign Minister Bidault advised Ambassador Catroux in Moscow that the negotiation of a Franco-Soviet commercial agreement might take place in two or three months (DS 26 July 45). In a message of 7 August, Catroux has now reported the following:

"The Foreign Commissariat has just informed me that the Soviet authorities are ready to start commercial negotiations with us right away. They would, however, reserve for a later date consideration of the French plans for economic cooperation in Eastern Europe. The reconstruction of the Eastern European countries is being studied at the present time, but countries other than France and Russia are also concerned in this study."

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On 4 August Catroux had reported asking Vice Commissar Dekanozov to confirm the information furnished by Ambassador Bogomolov in Paris with respect to "the general approval supposedly given by the Soviet Government to the French plan for economic cooperation in the reconstruction of the eastern countries". Dekanozov had apparently stated that he was "not conversant with the matter, but had shown some interest."

He has no information about the nature of the French "plan".
MISCELLANEOUS

1. More French reports on Berlin Conference:
On 4 August French Ambassador Mazzigli in London sent
the following to the French Foreign Ministry:

"I am sending you a summary of the impres-
sions on the Potsdam Conference gathered at
the Foreign Office by my associates and myself.

"The discussions were extremely laborious, to
say the least, and the solution of most of the
questions will have to be sought by the Council of
Foreign Ministers—the establishment of which
represents the most notable, if not the only,
progress made during the meeting.

"The British delegation, as usual, found
Marshal Stalin more accommodating than his staff;
this explains why the British are rather reserved
in their evaluation of those few results which
were obtained. After Yalta it was necessary to
lower one's tone; will it not be so after Potsdam?

"President Truman revealed himself to be a
precise man, and, unlike his predecessor, unwill-
ing to leave certain questions unsettled. Mr. Byrnes,
on the other hand, was rather diffuse."
"The British Government is pinning its hopes on the Council of Foreign Ministers. No proposal seems to have been put forward regarding the program of the September meeting. In the view of the Foreign Office, however, the Italian question should be the first one broached."

A message of 8 August from Ambassador Catroux in Moscow includes the following:

"I found British Ambassador Kerr extremely reserved concerning the issues which the Berlin communiqué did not mention. He gave me only his general impression; it was distinctly optimistic (and ordinarily he is not optimistic where the Soviets are concerned).

"According to Ambassador Kerr, the Conference took place in an atmosphere of cordial understanding. The new Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, made a great impression on Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov; he knew how to speak to them appropriately.

"For the first time," concluded the Ambassador, "I returned to Moscow with confidence."

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

CARTER W. CLARKE
Brigadier General, GSC
Deputy Chief, MIS

TOP SECRET
ULTRA
SUPPLEMENT TO DIPLOMATIC SUMMARY, 10 AUGUST 1945

At 0710 Z on 10 August (six hours after sending the surrender offer to Rome and Stockholm) Foreign Minister Togo filed the following circular message for transmission to the Japanese Mission in Stockholm and presumably elsewhere:

"The Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo came to see me on the 10th saying that he acted on instructions from his Government; he read to me a statement concerning the Soviet Union's endorsement of the Potsdam Declaration and the existence of a state of war with Japan. (This statement was the same as the one made to Ambassador Sato by Molotov, as broadcast over the radio.)

"I said in reply: 'It is very strange that the Soviet Union should declare the existence of a state of war without replying to our request for its good offices in restoring peace.'

"The Ambassador replied that the position of the Soviet Union was clearly set forth in the Government's declaration, etc.

"I then informed the Ambassador of the contents of the Imperial Government's note, given in my circular 648 [Japanese version of surrender offer], and presented him with a copy of the English text, saying that we had already arranged to have the note..."
transmitted to the Soviet Government through the Swedish Government, but that we desired him also to transmit it to his Government, if he had no objections.

"I said also: 'Your Excellency is well aware of the position of the Japanese Royal Family: You know that the position of the Emperor in Japan is indivisible from the Japanese people. Our understanding of the meaning of the Potsdam Declaration on this point is ---- [two words uncertain]. Accordingly, I believe there will be no difficulty about the Governments of the United Nations agreeing to this."

"The Ambassador said that he had no authority to receive our proposal, but that he would agree to send it on, on his personal responsibility and on condition that there was no difficulty about transmitting it to his Government."
Supplement No. 2 to Diplomatic Summary, 10 August

At 1055 Z, on 10 August, Foreign Minister Togo sent the following message to the Japanese Ministers in Switzerland and Sweden:

"With reference to my circular instructing the two Ministers to convey Japan's surrender offer to the Swiss and Swedish Governments:

"We assume that your representations to the Government to which you are accredited were made with the English version of the surrender offer. Therefore, I should like you to handle it as the legal text. We are handling the Japanese version as the translation and are correcting it to conform to the English version. Please take whatever steps may be necessary in accordance with this."

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