12 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Estimate of Japanese Situation for Next 30 Days

1. During the period 12 August - 12 September 1945, three courses of action are open to the Japanese:
   a. To drag out negotiations for the purpose of securing more favorable terms;
   b. To reject the last Allied proposal and continue hostilities; or
   c. To accept the Allied proposal.

2. Success in protracting negotiations would strengthen the position of the present Japanese government and the Emperor; would tend to save face and minimize Japan's complete military defeat; and would create a more favorable situation within Japan to reconcile conflicting positions of various groups. It would be interpreted in Japan as a victory for Japanese diplomacy and as an indication of weakness on the part of the Allies. Protracted negotiations are contrary to Allied best interests and should not be permitted. Japan now has the initiative.

3. a. Should Japan reject the last Allied proposal and continue hostilities, her naval and air forces are generally impotent except for suicide employment against Allied shipping. Japanese suicide air and naval elements, if rigidly conserved and successfully hidden out until the decisive moment, have a considerable capacity for inflicting damage on Allied transports and naval craft incident to a major landing. Such attacks cannot be decisive in the face of Allied superiority. With Allied knowledge of Japanese suicide dispositions, intentions and tactics, counter measures should materially reduce damage.

b. Large, well disciplined, well armed, undefeated Japanese ground forces have a capacity to offer stubborn fanatic resistance to Allied ground operations in the homeland and may inflict heavy Allied casualties. With maximum employment, the overwhelming preponderance of Allied air and naval forces will materially reduce the effectiveness of the Japanese ground forces. Japanese stock piling has established food and munitions in all areas of expected invasion in sufficient quantities
to support operations for from about four to six months despite expected serious disruption of Japanese rail, road and water transport systems. Adverse weather and heavy cloud cover during the next month may reduce somewhat the effectiveness of Allied air power in disrupting the Japanese rail and road system. Allied air power should have the capacity to preclude or delay seriously the movement of reserves from adjacent Japanese mainland areas to likely invasion areas. Atomic bombs will not have a decisive effect in the next 30 days.

b. The surrender offer by the Japanese government will soon be known to the Japanese military services and people. It will cause a serious loss of face and confidence. Although Japanese leaders will appreciate that it constitutes official acknowledgment that Japan has no hope for victory, it can be utilized by Japanese military leaders to secure an even more fanatical resistance on the part of her military forces. Economic and social conditions in Japan will steadily deteriorate, but there will be enough food to sustain the will of the Japanese people to continue resistance. Effective Allied propaganda action will inform the Japanese of further military reverses during the next 30 days in Manchuria and China and combined with continued Allied attacks on Japan proper will make the futility of continued resistance progressively more evident to the Japanese people despite fairly successful efforts by the Japanese government to keep facts from the home front.

4. a. Should Japan accept the Allied proposal, the Japanese government and Emperor will attempt to save face before their people by emphasizing the futility of resisting the atomic bomb and the combined armed might of the rest of the world. Surrender will be accepted with oriental stoicism and resignation as justifiable and necessary. In general, the Japanese military services, particularly the navy, will obey the command of the Emperor to surrender. There will be dissident military and civil elements who will clash violently with the Japanese government that accepts surrender.

b. In the main islands, most Japanese will seek face-saving devices to shield the Emperor from the effects of surrender and will be generally resigned at least outwardly, toward the occupation forces. Continued armed resistance of some irreconcilable military forces is probable and must be provided against. The Japanese Emperor may abdicate leaving the Crown Prince as the nominal ruler. Should this occur, he might be controlled by a Regency designed to serve as a buffer between the occupying forces and the Emperor. The Regency would have to reconcile the opposing views of two groups, one of which would advocate the sabotage, delay and impeding of the occupying forces to the maximum extent short of direct opposition, and the other which would advocate acceptance of the new era and its exploitation by the Japanese as a revolutionary step to advance Japan toward greater power such as occurred after Perry's landing. The outcome would depend largely on the unity, farsightedness and manner of imposing the Allied will on Japan.
c. In Manchuria, the Japanese generally will obey an Imperial command to surrender. There will be elements which will resist the Russians to the death. Many Manchurians will immediately turn against the Japanese and will hasten their total defeat. Japanese will surrender to Russians rather than Manchurians.

d. Japanese in Korea will not surrender to Koreans. Koreans will assist the Allies, but certain fanatical groups may attempt to wreak vengeance on disarmed Japanese and may be expected to seize Japanese property and institutions. The Japanese will retain control until Allies in strength are present to receive surrender.

e. The conflict between the Chinese central government and communists, the lack of firm control of its own forces by the central Chinese government, the paucity of communications and the long-range interests of Russia and Great Britain make it virtually impossible accurately to foresee what will occur in China in the next 30 days. Even if directed by the Emperor to surrender to the Chinese, face, food and fear for personal safety will be powerful influencing factors in Japanese action. Chaotic conditions will unquestionably develop unless Allied surrender terms for Japanese forces in China evaluate these factors and direct procedures effectively to meet them.

f. In the southern regions, the Japanese will obey an Imperial command to surrender to Allied representatives in mass and no serious difficulties are to be expected.

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