



## ELEVEN POSSIBILITIES FOR PENTAGON PAPERS' "11 WORDS"

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
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Washington, D.C., July 12, 2011 - What were the 11 words the government didn't want you to see?

The aspect of the [June 13 release of the full Pentagon Papers](#) that has received the most attention is perhaps the U.S. Government's attempt to keep under wraps 11 words on one page that had in fact been in the public domain since the government edition of the Papers was published by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) in 1972. At the eleventh hour the censors, after intervention by National Archives and Presidential Library staff, abandoned that idea and left the words in the text, thus avoiding drawing attention to them. Still, speculation has been rife about what the "11 Words" were.

Classification authorities were quite right—from the standpoint of protecting secrecy—to leave the text as it stands. This makes it impossible to know what bit of the Pentagon Papers was at issue, and with the 11 Words embedded in more than 7,000 pages of text, identifying them precisely poses a huge challenge. Because the 11 Words were originally declassified long ago, there is nothing to highlight them, and the mass of the text makes it difficult just to review the material. Only speculation is feasible.

In keeping with the numerical motif, the National Security Archive here offers 11 possibilities for the meaning of the 11 Words. There were two criteria for selection: that the information seemed somehow significant, and that it *not* figure among any of the newly declassified passages.



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In the news

["Finding The Secret 11 Words"](#)

By Sam Roberts  
The New York Times  
July 24, 2011

["After 40 Years, the Complete Pentagon Papers"](#)

By Michael Cooper and Sam Roberts  
The New York Times  
June 7, 2011

["A Guessing Game Over 11 Secret Words"](#)

By Michael Cooper  
The New York Times  
June 9, 2011

**1. CONSIDERING A COUP AGAINST NGO DINH DIEM IN AUGUST 1963 (IV. B. 5, p. iv):** The analyst explains two broad views in USG, that (1) there was no realistic alternative to Diem or (2) that war against NLF could not possibly be won with Diem in power. Text continues, "The first view was primarily supported by the military and the CIA both in Washington and in Saigon." [In this possibility, the knowledge being protected would be agreement between CIA and the military on defending Diem's rule. Presumably the deletion would preserve the general public impression that more sophisticated CIA views about Vietnam always differed from military ones. The problem with this approach is both that the early identity of views is apparent in a multitude of other evidence, and also that there is different evidence showing the CIA helping the Kennedy administration identify potential South Vietnamese leaders other than Diem.]

NARA (2011)

House Armed Services Committee (1972)

Gravel Edition (1971)

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 1.3  
NSD Program Number: NND 61156, Rev. 08/04/2011

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and, if after Diem had been given an opportunity to rid himself of Nhu and fit not, then, as was the possibility that Diem himself meant to proceed. This message was to be transmitted to the generals, and Diem was to be warned that the most he could expect was to be removed from the general, but that it was futile to present Diem with an ultimatum he would only ignore and not that might tip off the palace to the coup plan. Lodge proceeded to lay out only the general's. They were told that the U.S. could no longer support a regime which included Nhu, but that Diem was still to be supported. This was communicated to the general on August 27. The President and some of his advisors, however, had begun to have second thoughts about withdrawing support, and with a little hesitation on whether the coup would succeed, and if it did, what kind of government it would bring to power. As it turned out, Washington's anxiety was, for a moment, the plot was premature, and after several uncertain days, its demise was finally recognized on August 31.

Thus by the end of August, we found ourselves without a leadership to support and without a policy to follow in our relations with the DRV. In this context a month-long policy review took place in Washington and in Vietnam. It was fundamentally a search for alternatives. In both places the issue was joined between those who saw no realistic alternatives to the Diem and those who wanted to get on with by removing our support and communication with Diem and those who felt that the war against the VC would not possibly be won with Diem in power and preferred therefore to push for a coup of some kind. The first view was primarily supported by the military and the CIA both in Saigon and in Washington, while the latter was held by the U.S. Mission, the State Department and members of the White House staff. In the end, a third alternative was selected, namely to use pressure on Diem to get him to remove himself, and to support Diem's representative. Through September, however, the debate continued with growing intensity. Practical considerations, such as whether Diem would be able to remove himself and the effect of Diem's removal on the morale of the U.S. forces, were also considered. The decision was made on the assessment of how seriously the political deterioration was affecting the war effort.

In the course of these policy debates, several participants pursued the logical but painful conclusion that if the war could not be won with Diem, and if his removal would lead to political chaos and also jeopardize the war effort, then the U.S. should really be facing a more basic decision on either an orderly disengagement from an irretrievable situation, or a major escalation of the U.S. involvement, including the use of U.S. combat troops. These prophetic minority voices were, however, raising an important prospect that the Administration was unprepared to face at that time. In hindsight, however, it is clear that this was one of the lines in the history of our Vietnam involvement when we were making fundamental choices. The option to disengage honorably at that time now appears an attractively low-cost one. But for the Kennedy Administration

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NARA 2011 Release, IV. B. 5, p. iv.

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HASC Ed. IV. B. 5, p. iv.

204 Gravel Edition/The Pentagon Papers/IV. B. In this context a month-long policy review took place in Washington and in Vietnam. It was fundamentally a search for alternatives. In both places the issue was joined between those who saw no realistic alternatives to Diem and those who wanted to get on with by removing our support and communication with Diem and those who felt that the war against the VC would not possibly be won with Diem in power and preferred therefore to push for a coup of some kind. The first view was primarily supported by the military and the CIA both in Saigon and in Washington, while the latter was held by the U.S. Mission, the State Department and members of the White House staff. In the end, a third alternative was selected, namely to use pressure on Diem to get him to remove himself, and to support Diem's representative. Through September, however, the debate continued with growing intensity. Practical considerations, such as whether Diem would be able to remove himself and the effect of Diem's removal on the morale of the U.S. forces, were also considered. The decision was made on the assessment of how seriously the political deterioration was affecting the war effort.

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2. SIMPLE ID of a CIA DOCUMENT (IV. C. 1, p. 23): Relates to the Temporary Duty (TDY) Group sent to South Vietnam to study conditions in the post-Diem period. Apparently two (of three) cables sent were attributed to it mistakenly but were actually from CIA's chief of station in Saigon. "The 'Initial Report of CAS Group Findings in SVN,' dated 10 February 1964 began by acknowledging that the group activities had been temporarily disrupted by the Khanh coup." [This excision would represent an attempt by the CIA censors to protect the identity of a particular document, supposedly shielding it from FOIA requests. The problem with that strategy is that the several cables referred to, which contain the substance of the study group report, have been declassified for many years. "CAS" in this text stands for "Controlled American Source," a euphemism used in Vietnam for the CIA.]

NARA (2011)

House Armed Services Committee (1972)

Gravel Edition (1971)

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3  
NND 448748; NND 448749; NND 448750

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anything resembling a TDY inquiry might have brought about morale problems that it was well to avoid. The review of the code was that formalized coordination of intelligence stood the chance of stifling or concealing minority dissent. It was indeed the basic mission of the group to set up checks. But in the context to which this system of checks were to be coordinated with the system as a whole, it raised leading some part of its independence of the accepted view. And it had been the accepted view that had been proved wrong.

By the time full agreement was reached on the terms of reference for the team, the team was already in Saigon. A month later it submitted a report outlining the situation in Viet Nam at about the same time that the CAS station chief submitted two other evaluations which were apparently for a time mistakenly attributed to the TDY team. These evaluations caused much consternation within the country team to indicate that interpretation of intelligence and situation appraisals remained the team's primary task. The "Initial Report of CAS Group Findings in SVN," dated 10 February 1964 began by acknowledging that the group activities had been temporarily disrupted by the Khanh coup of 30 January (which will be described later), and did not attempt to report on the covert source checks before covert source checks could be established to insure the system of a new TDY team. The first appraisal, therefore, was expressly based solely on a review of the reporting system then in use, both American and Vietnamese. The first appraisal, therefore, was expressly based solely on a review of the reporting system then in use, both American and Vietnamese. The first appraisal, therefore, was expressly based solely on a review of the reporting system then in use, both American and Vietnamese. The first appraisal, therefore, was expressly based solely on a review of the reporting system then in use, both American and Vietnamese.

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NARA 2011 Release, IV. C. 1, p. 23

HASC Ed. IV. C. 1, p. 23

3. COVERT ATTACKS ON NORTH VIETNAM (IV. C. 1, p. 83): Discussing what the U.S. might do under various conditions as of mid-June 1964, the analyst writes: "The proposed 'Elements of a Policy That Does Not Include a Congressional Resolution' consisted largely of an elaboration of covert measures that were already either approved or nearing approval. This included RECCE-STRIKE and T-28 operations all over Laos and small-scale RECCE STRIKE Operations in North Vietnam after appropriate provocation." [This is an interesting candidate for the 11 Words for two reasons. First, it reminds the public that Washington was set on air strikes against North Vietnam earlier than usually remembered—a fact that has become obscure over time. Second, and most important from the standpoint of war powers, it shows that the administration believed it had the authority to initiate bombing operations without any congressional action at all. These 11 Words, if this was the actual candidate language, would be of primary interest to the White House. In the sentence quoted, "Recce" is a shortened form for "reconnaissance," and T-28 is a type of propeller-driven fighter-bomber.]

NARA (2011)

House Armed Services Committee (1972)

Gravel Edition (1971)

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3  
NND 448748; NND 448749; NND 448750

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Target No. 33 - Dong Hoi Barracks  
36 - Viet Tu Lu Army Barracks  
39 - Chap Le Army Barracks  
52 - Vinh Army Supply Depot E  
71 - Ben Tuy Port Facilities

All of these preparations came to a head at the end of January, when a tentative decision had evidently been reached in Washington to authorize resumption of the DESOTO Patrol on or about 3 February. A JCS directive to that effect went out to CINCPAC on 28 January, 28/ regarding CINCPAC to issue the necessary Operational Plan, covering a two destroyer Patrol Group with on-line Crypto RATT and Star Shell illumination capabilities. Interestingly, the instructions were explicit to the effect that the Patrol shall not be provocative, with the Patrol Group remaining 30 nautical miles from both NVN mainland and Hainan Island and South of 16 degrees North latitude. The Patrol was to continue for a period of three days, during which time SP-2 aircraft with searchlight and flare support were to be used to illuminate the area. Instructions also called for careful investigation and clarification, and a Combat Air Patrol to be on immediate call during darkness. Instructions also called for carefully disseminating the Patrol from OPLAN 34A operations in and over the Gulf of Tonkin 18 hours before, during, and 18 hours following completion of the Patrol.

Rules of engagement, in the event of attack, were as follows:  
a. The Patrol ships and aircraft are authorized to attack with the objective of insuring destruction of any vessel or aircraft which attacks, or gives positive indication of intent to attack, US Forces operating in International waters or airspace over International waters.  
b. In event of hostile attack, the Patrol ships and aircraft are directed to fire upon the hostile attacker with the objective of insuring destruction. Ships are authorized to pursue the enemy to the recognized three mile territorial limit. Aircraft are authorized but prohibited to pursue hostile territorial waters (three miles) against surface vessels and into hostile air space (includes DRV, Hainan Island and Malacca Strait) against aircraft which were necessary to achieve destruction of identified attack forces. Ships and aircraft will continue their actions to the attacking ships and/or aircraft.

In the days following, attention centered on plans for the reprisal strike. A number of last-minute changes were made in the targets that had been recommended by CINCPAC and the JCS, in order to reduce the risk of aircraft losses and to reduce escort requirements. The launching date for the DESOTO Patrol was the 1st of Feb from the 1st to the 7th of February, and the JCS asked CINCPAC to re-order its reprisal targets

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NARA 2011 Release, IV. C. 3, p. 17

HASC Ed. IV. C. 3, p. 17

4. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) EQUIPMENT REVEALED (IV.C.3, p. 17): Analysts describe the instructions issued for an electronic monitoring mission called a DE SOTO Patrol to be sent into the Tonkin Gulf in early February 1965. They note that The Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed U.S. Pacific commanders to structure their operations plan "covering a two destroyer Patrol Group with on-line Crypto RATT and Star Shell illumination capabilities." [This possibility would be consonant with NSA predilections for deleting anything that concerns its activities, even though the agency itself has

declassified the fact of the presence of NSA detachments on DE SOTO Patrol destroyers. The likely rationale would be that "on-line Crypto RATT" identifies a particular communications device, a secure-line radio teleprinter. The device would have been in the suite of the NSA van placed on one of the destroyers. The problem with this redaction is that when the National Security Agency in 2008 declassified a mass of materials pertinent to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, one of those items identified all equipment in the NSA vans, including the actual designation of this device.]

NARA (2011)

House Armed Services Committee (1972)

Gravel Edition (1971)

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3  
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2014

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Target No. 33 - Dong Hoi Barracks  
36 - V15 (in US Army Barracks)  
39 - Chuay Le Army Barracks  
42 - Vinh Army Supply Depot B  
71 - Ban Thuy Port Facilities

All of these preparations came to a head at the end of January, when a tentative decision had evidently been reached in Washington to authorize resumption of the DESOTO Patrols on or about 3 February. A JCS directive to that effect went out to CINCPAC on 28 January, 28J, requesting CINCPAC to issue the necessary Operational Plan, covering a two destroyer patrol group with on-line Crypto RATT and Star Shell illumination capabilities. Interestingly, the instructions were explicit to the effect that the "Patrol track shall not be provocative, with the Patrol Group remaining 30 nautical miles from both NVN mainland and Hainan Island and south of 20 degrees North latitude." The Patrol was to be continued for a period of three days, during which time OP-2 aircraft with searchlights and flare capability were to support the Patrol Group during hours of darkness by assisting in contact investigation and clarification, and a Combat Air Patrol was to be airborne in the vicinity of the Patrol during daylight and to be on immediate call during darkness. Instructions also called for carefully dissociating the Patrol from OPLAN 34A operations in and over the Gulf of Tonkin 48 hours before, during, and 48 hours following completion of the Patrol.

Rules of engagement, in the event of attack, were as follows:

a. The Patrol ships and aircraft are authorized to attack with the objective of insuring destruction of any vessel or aircraft which attacks, or gives positive indication of intent to attack, US forces operating in international waters or air-space over international waters.

b. In event of hostile attack, the Patrol ships and aircraft are directed to fire upon the hostile attacker with the objective of insuring destruction. Ships are authorized to pursue the enemy to the recognized 12 mile territorial limit. Aircraft are authorized to pursue hostile territorial waters (three miles) against surface vessels and into hostile air space (includes DRV, Hainan Island and Mainland China) against attack aircraft when necessary to achieve destruction of identified attack threats. Ships and aircraft will confine their actions to the attacking ship and/or aircraft.

In the days following, attention centered on plans for the reprisal strike. A number of limitations changes were made in the target list. It was recommended by CINCPAC and the JCS, in order to reduce the risk of aircraft losses and to reduce operational requirements. The launching date for the DESOTO Patrol was postponed from the 3rd to the 7th of February, and the JCS asked CINCPAC 29J to re-order its reprisal targets

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

NARA 2011 Release, N.C. 3, p. 17

Target No. 33 - Dong Hoi Barracks

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TOP SECRET - Sensitive

HASC EA IV.C. 3, p. 17

The Air War in North Vietnam, February-June 1963 299

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Option (See	Strike	Flak	CAP	Total
Top 33 Dong Hoi Barracks	24	8	40	72
36 Vinh Barracks	24	8	40	72
39 Chuay Le Barracks	40	12	4	56
Total	80	28	16	124

Gravel Ed., III, p. 279

5. ACTION AGAINST CAMBODIA (IV. C. 6 (b), p. 38): Describing proposals by U.S. Pacific theater commander Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp in early 1967, the Pentagon Papers analyst quotes text from Sharp's cable identifying one major problem as the North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia and discussing potential countermeasures. In the course of his dispatch Admiral Sharp notes "it is understood that a Joint State, Defense and CIA committee is considering this problem." [The eventual U.S. solution—which dragged Cambodia into the war without actually solving the sanctuary problem, was to invade Cambodia in the spring of 1970. This deletion would have the effect of disguising how early in the war the U.S. was considering such measures.]

NARA (2011)

House Armed Services Committee (1972)

Gravel Edition (1971)

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3  
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2014

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Outlining, he reviewed various programs (MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN, DANIEL BOONIE, SEA DRAGON) and the detailed plans to broaden them, but once more the Pacific commander returned to the subject of the sanctuaries:

"The problem of sanctuaries has been mentioned several times. Those in NVN and Laos are limited sanctuaries since they are subject to air attacks, albeit, with certain restrictions. The sanctuary in Cambodia, however, is complete. It would appear appropriate to undertake actions at an early date aimed at persuading the Cambodian leadership to adopt a more neutral position. Pursuant to a request by DOD it is understood that a Joint State, Defense, and CIA committee is considering this problem. It is hoped that recommendations from this group will be forthcoming at an early date which will indicate positive measures which may be taken. The importance of Cambodia as a sanctuary and as a source of supplies, particularly rice, cannot be overemphasized. The enemy must get on with a strong program to inhibit this use of Cambodia, preferably by non-belligerent political and diplomatic means. If we do not achieve the required degree of success by these means then we must be prepared in all respects to use the necessary degree of force to attain our objectives.

"In summary, the problem of countering infiltration of enemy forces into DRV is just one aspect of the total military problem in SEASIA. While infiltration cannot be completely stopped by direct military action, it can be made costly and its effectiveness blunted. The enemy's prodigious efforts to provide air defenses and to equip damaged LDC's are strong evidence of the effectiveness of our air campaign in NVN, Laos and DRV. Increasing interdiction of his supply system, especially by closing his ports, would be the most effective measure we could take against his capability to infiltrate. Additionally, shifting Rolling Thunder emphasis to attack selective target systems should have a significant impact upon his will to continue support to the insurgency in DRV. The more successful our operations become in NVN and Laos, the more the enemy will seek to make of his supply sources and channels in Cambodia. To achieve our objectives in SEASIA our current strategy, a combination of carefully balanced military programs must be pursued in close coordination with political, economic, and sociological programs."

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

NARA 2011 Release, IV. C. 6 (b), p. 38

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TOP SECRET - Sensitive

HASC EA, IV. C. 6 (b), p. 38

413 Gravel Edition/The Pentagon Papers/IV, IV

C. Focusing the enemy into restricted coastal operations. D. Providing security for the SVN population to prevent imprisonment and to assure their economic, social, and political development.

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The next day, attention shifted to a ground anti-infiltration program when General Westmoreland came in with his PRACTICE NINE Requirements Plan, the study of his map and legends requirements to implement the barrier plan outlined a month earlier. The cover memorandum on the plan prepared by the JCS made a determined case against the proposed time frame (a target date of 1 November 1967 had been set), and argued for providing the additional forces from outside resources rather than relying upon commitment of security forces already programmed for use elsewhere in the 1967 Campaign Plan. In light of the anticipated manpower draw-down within South Vietnam, the plan was relatively sound.

COMUSMACV was protesting plans already approved and rolling second

6. BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM (IV. C. 7 (a), p. 53): The Pentagon Papers analysts paused in their narrative at intervals to assess the effects of bombing North Vietnam. In their discussion of the aerial campaign's status at the end of 1965, the analysts noted "Of 91 known locks and dams in NVN, only 8 targeted as significant to inland waterways, flood control, or irrigation." [There has been a lively debate in the United States as to whether U.S. forces sought to encourage flooding in North Vietnam. This is usually timed as having occurred in 1972 and formulated as "bombing the dikes." The U.S. Government position has been—despite some evidence to the contrary—that no measures of this kind were ever taken and that damage to dikes, if any, must have been inadvertent. The issue is complicated in that U.S. air commanders would have regarded bombing of dams and locks associated with North Vietnamese waterborne supply movements as legitimate military targets. On the other side is the fact that destruction of dikes and levees is listed as a general option in the 1967 bombing volume as well. However, this text indicates intent related to a specific number of targets, and that North Vietnamese water control mechanisms were targeted from very early in the air campaign known as Rolling Thunder.]

NARA (2011)

House Armed Services Committee (1972)

Gravel Edition (1971)





TOP SECRET

2250, December 13, 7 p.m., from Saigon, CI 2250

(A) Since Luyn's return from Paris, his open opposition to Qat has underscored Dien's decision to appoint Qat Minister of Defense. On 11 December Dien informed Fishel as follows: six of seven cabinet members consulted by Dien have voiced strong opposition to Qat. Generals Phuong (Cao Dai) and Soai (Hoa Hao) have declared they will withdraw from government and threaten open rebellion if Qat appointed. Because of location Hoa Hao territory, Dien purports to fear General Soai might cut off rice supply of Saigon-Cholon, block road and waterway traffic through coastal areas and in Hoa Hao area in Hue area and split up Viet Cong army which in present condition could not (repeat not) handle situation. Dien fears also comparable action might be taken by Cao Dai forces, including possible moves against government in Saigon and vicinity.

(B) Dien told Fishel that he had informed Phuong and Soai that Americans wanted Qat as Defense Minister. The Generals replied, "a responsible American should speak for the Americans." Hence Dien asked Fishel to transmit these "facts" to me, saying if I repeat or "some other person" can convince Phuong and Soai not (repeat not) oppose actively the appointment, Dien will appoint Qat at once. (A next meeting of the body, we must admit). If such leaders persist in their opposition, Dien says he would be inclined to appoint Deputy Minh to Defense Minister and give him full authority and responsibility over armed forces.

(C) I am quite convinced that Dien and brothers Luyn and Thu are afraid to turn over control of armed forces to Qat or any other strong man. They may also fear Qat as potential successor to Dien and hence are doing everything they can to keep him out of any post in government. With General Hinh fired and General Vy replaced as Chief of Staff by spineless General Ty, Dien has fairly effectively seized control of army. I doubt Dien would delegate real authority to Hinh, but would retain meddling hand on details to defendant O'Daniel's training mission and effective development of armed forces.

(D) Through Colonel Lansdale's group and CIA, I am canvassing attitude of sect leaders and members of their alleged threats. Depending on Lansdale's findings, I will consider (1) proposing to Qat a direct US-French approach to General Soai, who Qat has said will bar to French pressure; (2) having Lansdale suggest to Soai that with Qat in defense all rice for armed forces would be purchased from Hoa Hao (this was hint dropped some time ago by Qat as means of buying off Hoa Hao); (3) sending emissaries to Soai, Phuong and Cao Dai Pope (Phan Cong Van) making clear that any rebellion would lead to WITHDRAWAL ALL AMERICANS AND UNACCEPTABLE victory for the Viet Minh who would certainly not (repeat not) tolerate private empire of Hoa Hao or Cao Dai.

(E) I realize disadvantages of forcing Dien to accept "American choice"

812

1. ELEMENTARY

DISPATCH

1484 2011 Release V. B. 3 (c)

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812

1. ELEMENTARY

DISPATCH

1484 Ed, Book 10, p. 111

NOT PRINTED  
IN  
GRAVEL EDITION

11. NSA INTERCEPTION OF SOVIET LEADERS' TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS (VLC.3 (1), p. 61-62): This possibility for the intended deletion is as intriguing as it is misconceived. In February 1967, in the course of a Johnson administration peace feeler known as SUNFLOWER, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson made certain representations in President Johnson's behalf to Soviet leader Alexei Kosygin. Kosygin promptly reported the approach to his colleague Leonid Brezhnev by encrypted telephone: "at 9:30 a.m. today according to a telephone intercept Kosygin called Brezhnev and said [there was] a great possibility of achieving the aim." [This redaction would presumably be intended to shield an NSA intercept program from the Russians. The idea that any such aim could be accomplished is unrealistic for a number of reasons. First, syndicated columnist Jack Anderson wrote about this NSA program as early as 1971. Second, this statement occurs in the middle of a passage that similarly reveals the NSA knew—undoubtedly also from interception—which ciphers Kosygin was using in written communications (the "President's Cipher"), and could identify by their length in specific numbers of code groups the resultant cables into and from the Soviet embassy in Hanoi. In other words, there was much more to protect in this passage than the telephone intercepts. Third, the diplomatic volumes were not part of the 1972 declassification. When a version of the diplomatic volumes was declassified, in 1978, this passage was permitted onto the public record in its entirety. In fact, the whole set of revelations was published in 1983, when historian George C. Herring edited a version of these volumes, *The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983, p. 468-9). Fourth, the same language was again released in 2003 when the U.S. government fully declassified the diplomatic volumes.

NARA (2011)

House Armed Services Committee (1972)

Gravel Edition (1971)

TOP SECRET - SOURCE

Presumably two co-chairmen would continue to be in touch with each other. It would be helpful if communication could express support of two co-chairmen for 1972 and 1973 accords and agreement that any differences arising out of these accords should be settled by peaceful means.

END TEXT

RUOK (Text from White House).

STATE 133721 (to Embassy London), 2/10/67, Sent 0210, 13 Feb 67.

We plan announcement tomorrow about noon EST as follows:

RUOK QUOTE

As you know, the South Vietnamese Government announced on the 11th that its forces and those of other nations assisting South Viet-Nam would resume normal operations during the day on February 12. This resumption was in accordance with the truce period announced by the South Vietnamese Government some weeks ago. As the South Vietnamese Government had made clear in early January and again last week, it was prepared to discuss extension of the truce period at any time. There was no response to this offer.

During the Tet period, bombing and other military operations against North Viet-Nam were also suspended. This suspension was continued for short additional period in order to avoid any possibility that earlier resumption would be misconstrued in relation to Mr. Kosygin's visit to London. Operations have now been resumed. END QUOTE

Press here is already printing large number of speculative stories that continued suspension is due to Kosygin's visit. We assume press will eventually reach correct conclusion that we did not wish to make any announcement of added suspension in order to avoid implication of putting pressure on London decisions.

RUOK (drafted by J. P. Walsh)

February 11, 1967

On February 11, Cooper reported that at 0955 London-time Wilson and Brown had queried Kosygin as to whether he had received an answer from Hanoi. Kosygin replied in the negative but said he was still trying (London's 6/96).

On the same day, Cooper reported that he had been told in the Foreign Office that: (a) between 3:00 a.m. and 3:17 a.m. London-time (13 February), three priority "President's Cipher" telegrams were sent from the Soviet

1484 2011 Release V. C. 3 (1)

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State Department 1976 Redaction  
V. C. 3 (1)

NOT PRINTED  
IN  
GRAVEL EDITION

TOP SECRET - MURKIN

delegation in London to Moscow; (b) at 9:30 a.m. today according to a telephone intercept Knight called Brewster and said "a great possibility of achieving the aim, if the Vietnamese will understand the present situation that we have passed to them, they will have to decide. All they need to do is to give a confidential declaration"; (c) Brewster confirmed that Knight's telegram to the Vietnamese had been sent (London's 6500). NSA also reported that the North Vietnamese transmitted a 200-group message from Hanoi to Moscow at 1505Z (1109 GMT); also a 500-group message was transmitted to Hanoi from Moscow at 0500Z (0500 GMT). Thompson was informed of these developments (State's 135053).

STATE 135758 (to Ambassador London), TH/2414, Sect 0707, 13 Feb 67  
Literally Eyes Only for Amb Bruce from Walt Rostow

The following was transmitted to 30 Downing Street at 130250 A.M. EST.  
We have considered the case for further delay to receive a message from Hanoi beyond 10:00 a.m. British time, which you suggested.

I have gone into this with my senior advisors and, after carefully considering your suggestion, the problems you presented, and the problem here -- including the morale of our uniformed men -- we are extending the time by 6 hours. This is as long as we believe is advisable.

I am sure you would want to know that our Joint Chiefs, CDMCAF, and General Westmoreland have unanimously opposed the Tet and other truces and extensions thereto -- not only on the grounds of troop morale but because of the cost in human lives. We will wait, then, for information that may be forthcoming until 11:00 a.m. Washington time -- 4:30 p.m. your time. Military operations against the North will be permitted to resume between 11:00 a.m. and noon our time.

In making this decision I bore in mind Moscow's and Hanoi's problems of transmittal too. We I also was conscious of the fact that they have had the possibility of responding to essentially this message for the 3 months since we gave it to the Poles and you gave it to the Russians; and the 5 days since it was transmitted direct to Hanoi and also given by you to Knight.

If there is any interest in some such A-b proposition, there has not until it - been ample time for them either to agree or to come back with a counter-proposal.

Your gallant last minute effort -- which I consented to -- is one on which they must move. On receiving it they must be either ready to

NRMA 2011 Release VI. C. 3 (1) ©

TOP SECRET - MURKIN

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I have gone into this with my senior advisors and, after carefully considering your suggestion, the problems you presented, and the problem here -- including the morale of our uniformed men -- we are extending the time by 6 hours. This is as long as we believe is advisable.

I am sure you would want to know that our Joint Chiefs, CDMCAF, and General Westmoreland have unanimously opposed the Tet and other truces and extensions thereto -- not only on the grounds of troop morale but because of the cost in human lives. We will wait, then, for information that may be forthcoming until 11:00 a.m. Washington time -- 4:30 p.m. your time. Military operations against the North will be permitted to resume between 11:00 a.m. and noon our time.

In making this decision I bore in mind Moscow's and Hanoi's problems of transmittal too. We I also was conscious of the fact that they have had the possibility of responding to essentially this message for the 3 months since we gave it to the Poles and you gave it to the Russians; and the 5 days since it was transmitted direct to Hanoi and also given by you to Knight.

If there is any interest in some such A-b proposition, there has not until it - been ample time for them either to agree or to come back with a counter-proposal.

Your gallant last minute effort -- which I consented to -- is one on which they must move. On receiving it they must be either ready to

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February 13, 1967

On February 13, Cooper reported that at 0705 London-time Wilson and Brown had earlier Knight as to whether he had received a message from Hanoi. Knight replied on the matter but said he was still trying (London's 6599).

On the same day, Cooper reported that he had been told in the Foreign Office that: (a) between 1:00 a.m. and 3:15 a.m., London-time (13 Feb 67), three priority "breakdown" cipher telegrams were sent from the Soviet

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delegation in London to Moscow; (b) at 9:30 a.m. today according to a telephone intercept Knight called Brewster and said "a great possibility of achieving the aim, if the Vietnamese will understand the present situation that we have passed to them, they will have to decide. All they need to do is to give a confidential declaration"; (c) Brewster confirmed that Knight's telegram to the Vietnamese had been sent (London's 6500). NSA also reported that the North Vietnamese transmitted a 200-group message from Hanoi to Moscow at 1505Z (1109 GMT); also a 500-group message was transmitted to Hanoi from Moscow at 0500Z (0500 GMT). Thompson was informed of these developments (State's 135053).

The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War  
The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers

EDITED BY GEORGE C. HERRING

University of Texas Press, Austin

As noted at the outset it is impossible for anyone other than the censors to know what the 11 Words in fact are. The above suggestions should be considered as no more than possibilities. Of these selections, those regarding the Diem coup, the covert attacks on North Vietnam (in two possibilities), the considerations of Cambodia, and the first approval of U.S. airstrikes, are relevant to debates about legal authorities to make war. Aside from their historical importance, there seems little reason for the imposition of secrecy. The case that concerns CIA assessments of bombing North Vietnam, and that of the Agency's role in Diem's 1955 powerplay are about the CIA's image and role. The selection that concerns bombing of North Vietnam's dams and levees would represent the censors' intervention in an historical controversy.

The most straightforward application of secrecy doctrines is represented in several of the possibilities, specifically the identification of a particular CIA document, the mention of a defector as a source for another CIA report, the mention of a National Security Agency (NSA) secure communications system, and that of the NSA telephone intercepts of Soviet leaders. In each of these cases the claim to secrecy has been mooted by the passage of time, the declassification of other records that do not form parts of the Pentagon Papers, or the fact that American adversaries already knew of the relevant information.

I offer two selections as my best guesses for the 11 Words. First is the possibility the CIA is continuing to try and disguise its 1955 involvement with Diem. This is inconvenient in that it reveals the Agency laying the groundwork for a course that would later diverge from official policy, calling its responsiveness to authority into question. My second possibility concerns the NSA equipment, mainly because that organization has a tendency toward reflexive secrecy, and likely paid little attention to having previously released the same information.

One aspect of this 11 Words business is that whoever sought to suppress the information must have had some expectation that preserving secrecy was actually possible. This would seem to rule out any material that appears in the Gravel edition of the Pentagon Papers. As it turns out, nine of eleven of these items—including the NSA equipment—do indeed figure in the Gravel edition. There are two exceptions. One is the mention of NSA radio telephone intercepts, but this has been public since 1978 and was published in 1983. The only exclusion that did not form part of Gravel and did not appear elsewhere is the item concerning CIA machinations with Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon in 1954-1955. I therefore conclude that the Saigon CIA material is the best candidate for the 11 Words. It appears in Book 10 of the HASC edition of the Papers at page 812.

What these suggestions show above all is the arbitrary and even silly operation of the secrecy system. In case after case the censors would have been protecting information the disclosure of which threatens no damage to the national security of the United States—the actual criterion for classification. Any damage would have occurred in 1972 when these materials were published. It did not. Furthermore, Agency image and interests do not equate to the national security of the United States. Excisions that attempt to minimize the attention that might be drawn to aspects of the history of the Vietnam war that now seem embarrassing, controvert self-image, or seem inconvenient in the light of current political debates should not be taken for national security secrets that merit protection.