

DOWNGRADED TO

**UNCLASSIFIED**

CRC 322 — Vol. II



Bob Mahoney  
7-0831

**U.S. NAVY RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL  
INCIDENTS AND CRISES, 1955 - 1975 (U)  
Vol. II - Summaries of Incidents and Responses (U)**

**CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES**  
1401 Wilson Boulevard  
Arlington, Virginia 22209  
**Institute of Naval Studies**

**By: Robert B. Mahoney, Jr.**

**July 1977**

**Prepared for:**

**OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH**  
Department of the Navy  
Arlington, Virginia 22217

**OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (Op96)**  
Department of the Navy  
Washington, D.C. 20350

**CLASSIFIED BY:**  
DD254 15 Apr 1977, N00014-76-C-0001. Subject to  
the General Declassification Schedule of Executive  
Order 11652. Declassify on 31 December 1983.

**CONFIDENTIAL** DOWNGRADED TO  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

02 032202.00

**"NATIONAL SECURITY  
INFORMATION"**

**Unauthorized Disclosure Subject  
to Criminal Sanctions.**

**Headings, footnotes, and table/figure subjects are  
unclassified unless explicitly designated otherwise.**

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER CRC 322 - Vol. II	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) U.S. Navy Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1955-1975 (U) Vol. II - Summaries of Incidents and Responses (U)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
7. AUTHOR(s) Robert B. Mahoney, Jr.		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Center for Naval Analyses 1401 Wilson Boulevard Arlington, Virginia 22209		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) N00014-76-C-0001
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Office of Naval Research Department of the Navy Arlington, Virginia 22217		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Op96) Department of the Navy Washington, D.C. 20350		12. REPORT DATE July 1977
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 110
		14. SECURITY CLASS (of this Report) Confidential
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE General Declass. Schedule
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES This Research Contribution does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy.		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) aircraft carriers, amphibious operations, crisis, crisis management, conflict, emergencies, foreign policy, international incidents, international relations, marine corps, military strategy, naval operations, politico-military affairs		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Over the period 1955-1975 the Navy and Marine Corps played an active role in U.S. crisis management diplomacy, responding to 99 international incidents and crises, exclusive of the Vietnam War. This paper provides a summary history of these operations, focusing upon major trends in the Navy's operations over the 21-year period. Particular emphasis is given to the employment of major projection forces (aircraft carriers and amphibious units) in these responses. Brief descriptions of the 99 incidents and responses are also presented.		

DD FORM 1473  
1 JAN 73

EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE  
S/N 0102-014-6601

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

<sup>7</sup>Contributors: Jill M. Hill, Judith C. Erdheim

<sup>20</sup>Volume I is an unclassified volume, pending approval for public release, entitled "Survey of Navy Crisis Operations."

DECLASSIFIED  
7/22/1990

300

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Appendix C - Summaries of incidents and responses, 1955-1975 .....	C-1 - C-90
Appendix D - Additional events which are not included in the main list of responses .....	D-1 - D-9
Appendix E - Projection operations .....	E-1 - E-4
Appendix F - USN and USMC responses to international events, 1919-1939 ...	F-1 - F-7

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

**APPENDIX C**  
**SUMMARIES OF INCIDENTS AND RESPONSES**  
**1955-1975**

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

## APPENDIX C

### SUMMARIES OF INCIDENTS AND RESPONSES 1955-1975

This appendix presents brief descriptions of the 99 Navy and Marine Corps responses to international incidents and crises analyzed in the body of the paper. The summaries are presented in chronological order.

Sources are cited in the summaries in abbreviated form (e.g., "Gilmore", Bendix", "Selected Analysis"). These abbreviations and the full citations are presented at the end of the section.

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE C-1

NAVY RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS AND CRISES, 1955-1975

<u>Date response began</u>	<u>Response/incidents</u>
1954	
Aug	Vietnam evacuations*
1955	
Feb	Tachen Islands
1956	
Feb	Red Sea
Mar	Jordan
Jul	Pre-Suez
Oct	Morocco
Oct	Suez War
Nov	Post-Suez
Dec	Cuban Civil War
1957	
Apr	Jordan
Jun	Haiti
Jul	PRC-ROC
Aug	Syria
Dec	Indonesia
1958	
Jan	Venezuela
May	Lebanon
Jun	Lebanon
Jun	Quemoy
Jul	Jordan-Iraq
1959	
Mar	Panama
May	Berlin Crisis
Jul	PRC-ROC
Jul	Laos
Aug	Panama
1960	
Jul	Congo
Nov	Guatemala-Nicaragua
Dec	Laos

\*This operation is included because it was underway on 1 January 1955.

TABLE C-1 (Cont'd)

<u>Date response began</u>	<u>Response/incidents</u>
1961	
Feb	Gulf of Guinea/Congo
Mar	Laos
Apr	Bay of Pigs
Jun	Dominican Republic
Jun	Zanzibar
Jun	Kuwait
Aug	Berlin Crisis
Nov	Dominican Republic
Dec	South Vietnam
1962	
Jan	Dominican Republic
Jan	Guantanamo
Mar	Guatemala
Apr	South Vietnam
May	Thailand
Jun	PRC-ROC
Aug	Haiti
Oct	Cuban Missile Crisis
Oct	Sino-Indian War
1963	
Jan	Yemen Civil War/Saudi Arabia
Apr	Jordan
Apr	Laos
Apr	Haiti
Aug	Haiti
Aug	Vietnam civil disorders
Sept	PRC-ROC
Sept	Dominican Republic
Sept	Indonesia-Malaysia
Nov	Venezuela-Colombia
1964	
Jan	Tanganyika
Jan	Zanzibar
Jan	Caribbean surveillance/Cuba
Jan	Panama
Jan	Venezuela

TABLE C-1 (Cont'd)

<u>Date response began</u>	<u>Response/incidents</u>
1964	
Jan	Cyprus
Mar	Brazil
Apr	Laos
Apr	Guantanamo
May	Panama
Jul	Dominican Republic
Aug	Gulf of Tonkin
(Aug)	(Vietnam/Indochina War)
Aug	Haiti
1965	
Jan	Panama
Jan	Tanzania
Jan	Venezuela-Colombia
Apr	British Guiana
Apr	Dominican Republic
Jul	Yemen
Aug	Cyprus
Sept	Indonesia
Oct	Indo-Pakistani War
1967	
Apr	Greek coup
May	Middle East War
Oct	Eilat
Nov	Cyprus
1968	
Jan	Pueblo
1969	
Apr	EC-121
Sept	Lebanon-Libya contingency operation
1970	
Apr	Trinidad
Jun	Jordan
Sept	Jordan
Sept	Cienfuegos

TABLE C-1 (Cont'd)

<u>Date response began</u>	<u>Response/incidents</u>
1971	
Apr	Haiti
Dec	Bahama Lines/Caribbean surveillance
Dec	Indo-Pakistani War
1973	
Apr	Lebanon
Oct	Middle East War
Oct	Indian Ocean
1974	
Jul	Cyprus
1975	
Jan	Cyprus
Feb	Ethiopia
May	Mayaguez
Aug	Lebanon

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)  
UNCLASSIFIED

### Vietnam Evacuations 8/1954-6/1955

Acting under the terms of the Indochina accords of 1954, the Navy and Marine Corps assisted in the relocation of civilians and materiel from North to South Vietnam. Over the course of the operation (entitled "Passage to Freedom") approximately 310,000 civilians, 88,000 tons of cargo, and 8,100 vehicles were transported. The response involved 109 ships and craft, 59 of which were from the amphibious force.

During the first three months of the operation (August through October 1954) refugees were the first priority. From November 1954 onwards the emphasis shifted to the movement of French military materiel.

The initial movement of personnel was carried out by Navy ships. Bendix lists 1 AGC, 5 AKA, 2 LSD, 2 APD, 4 LST, and 5 APA.

After October 1954 (and the shift in emphasis from personnel to materiel) many of the Navy's ships were replaced by MSTs units which carried the cargo: 4 TAP, 5 TAK, 8 LST, and 1 LSD. In addition, the Navy forces on the scene included:

- (logistical support force): 7 AO, 3 AF, 1 AK, 1 AE, 2 ARS, 1 AKA, 2 DE;
- (patrol force): 1 AV, 4 DD, 2 patrol squadrons of aircraft, 1 airborne early warning detachment;
- (amphibious force): 9 LSR, 1 AGC, 4 APA, 2 AKA, 1 AKL, 4 LSD, 2 APD, 1 DE, 2 LSMR, 3 LCU.

The sources do not list any carrier forces in the response nor do they indicate the exact number of Marines involved in the operation. Bendix and Selected Analysis provide the best treatments.

### Tachen Islands 2/1955

In January 1955 the People's Republic of China began to bombard the Tachen Islands which were held by Nationalist Chinese forces. In early February the government of the Republic of China decided to evacuate several of the islands. U.S. assistance was requested.

U.S. naval personnel evacuated ca. 15,600 civilians and 11,000 military personnel plus military cargo from the islands. No PRC opposition to the operation was encountered. The evacuation commenced on 8 February and concluded on 13 February.

TF 76 was the amphibious evacuation force: 1 AGC, 4 APA, 2 AKA, 2 LSD, 2 APD, 1 AKL, 2 LSMR, 1 DE, 9 LST, 3 LCU.

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED

Carrier forces standing by during the operation included TG 70.4 (1 CVS plus 4 DDE) and TF 77 (5 CVA plus 1 CA, 14 DD, 2 DDR, and 1 VW detachment).

Other naval forces in the operation included:

TG 70.5 (mine group): 1 LST, 1 DE, 4 AM;  
TF 72 (Formosa Patrol force): 1 AV, 4 DD;  
TF 73 (service forces): 7 AO, 3 AF, 1 AKA, 1 AE, 1 ATF, 2 ARS, 1 AKS, 2 DE;  
TF 75 (surface strike force): 2 CA, 1 DDR, 3 DD;  
TF 79 (evacuation force troops).

Cable and AACU cite 5 carriers in the operation. Bendix provides the most detailed treatment of the response and was employed to list the order of battle. Selected Analysis summarizes portions of the response.

Kalicki provides an excellent analysis of this crisis which locates it within the context of American-Chinese interactions in the post-Korean War period.

#### Red Sea 2-8/1956

Part of the U.S. response to increasing tensions in the Middle East (which centered around the Suez Canal) included the establishment of a destroyer patrol in the Red Sea. This patrol involved a variable number of surface combatants. The core force appears to have consisted of two destroyer types. CVAN-70 lists the operation. Bendix discusses the response in the context of the subsequent Suez Crisis (see below).

#### Jordan 3-5/1956

The announcement of the Egyptian-Czechoslovakian arms deal on 27 September 1955 led to increased American concern regarding events in the Middle East. Of particular interest to the U.S. was the possibility that the Soviet Union (and/or domestic Communist elements) might exploit regional tensions and domestic instabilities to the benefit of the USSR. The U.S. was particularly concerned with the survival of the regime of Jordanian King Hussein.

The British had maintained their influence in Jordan by means of a \$20 million subsidy to the elite Jordanian Arab Legion (a predominantly Bedouin force which was the principal pillar upon which the monarchy rested) and by seconding to it the Commander of the Legion, British Lieutenant General Glubb. In 1955 Britain had attempted to stabilize the region by the formation of the Baghdad Pact, which later became CENTO.

During this period King Hussein was subject to cross-pressures. On the one hand he wanted to reduce his dependence on foreign (particularly British) support. On the other,

he had to be concerned about factions within his nation that might oppose his regime (against which foreign support by Western powers might be valuable, if not essential).

In late 1955 Britain invited Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact. This invitation was met by rioting within Jordanian cities and the fall of a number of parliamentary governments. On 8 January 1955 the U.S. Technical Air Center in Amman, Jordan was set on fire by rioters. The U.S. Consulate in the Jordanian section of Jerusalem was stoned. Jordan did not join the Pact.

During this same period, continuing border tensions with Israel compounded the King's problems.

On 2 March 1956 the King responded to these pressures by removing Glubb from the command of the Jordanian Arab Legion. This cut off the British subsidy. At the same time the King began to move his foreign policy into accord with that of Egypt (George and Smoke suggest that this was due to strong domestic pressures within Jordan and to his need to replace the British subsidy (p. 329) ). One might fairly characterize the King's actions as an attempt to buy time. The net result was that the regime survived, only to face a serious crisis in April-May 1957 (see below). The formation of a new cabinet government on 22 May 1956 effectively ended this crisis.

Very little information is available concerning the Navy's role in the U.S. response. Bendix and AAGU indicate that a response took place in May. AACU indicates that the attack carriers Coral Sea and Randolph were among the Sixth Fleet units deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean at this time.

Bendix indicates that surface combatant and amphibious forces also participated in the response. Unfortunately, no source details the units involved. One BLT is the best estimate for the amphibious force.

Political information is contained in a number of sources: Eisenhower, Butterworth, A Select Chronology...Middle East, and the New York Times. AACU and Bendix are the best sources for Navy operations during this period.

#### Pre-Suez 7-10/1956

Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal on 26 July. Tensions immediately rose in the Eastern Mediterranean as France and the United Kingdom protested against this action and began preparations for military operations.

In mid-August, as tensions continued to increase, elements of the Sixth Fleet were moved east to within 48 hours of Suez. The carriers supporting this operation were Coral Sea and Randolph.



The initial amphibious force in the theater consisted of PHIBRON 4 and BLT 2/8. On 2 September this force was joined by BLT 3/2. The Mediterranean tour of 2/8 was extended on 5 September and re-extended on 16 September. BLT 2/8 was released from the Mediterranean on 8 October. Marine forces in the Mediterranean were under the control of the First Provisional Marine Force Headquarters.

The Marine force was embarked on 1 AGC, 2 APA, 1 AKA, 1 APO, and 1 LSD.

In mid-September the U.S. undertook political initiatives to ease tensions. These efforts included attempts to form a Suez Canal Users Association to ensure that Western interests were protected. The level of tension in the area appeared to subside and the fleet dispersed in mid-September.

The best coverage of the response is found in Hill (CRC 262). Additional information is contained in AACU.

#### Morocco 10/1956-2/1957

In response to increasing French-Moroccan tensions which were believed to threaten the U.S. Naval Air Station at Port Lyautey, a reinforcing company of Marines was air-lifted to the Station to augment local defenses. This unit (from the 2nd Marines) moved from Camp Lejeune to Port Lyautey in 44 hours.

While Port Lyautey faces the Atlantic, the operation is best understood in the context of events taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean during the period (particularly the tensions centering around the status of the Suez Canal). **Selected Analysis** provides a succinct summary of the response.

#### Suez War 10-11/1956

On 29 October Israel attacked Egypt. On 30 October the United Kingdom and France joined in the invasion and issued an ultimatum to Egypt that would have resulted in their forces reoccupying the Suez Canal. The United States opposed the invasion. The American military response took two forms.

The first was a presence mission in the Eastern Mediterranean. The initial attack carrier force consisted of the Coral Sea and Randolph. Surface combatants included 2 CA, 13 DD, 4 DDR, and 6 DE. On 31 October the CVS Antietam joined the Sixth Fleet.

The second response took a more specific form: the evacuation of endangered Western nationals. Preparations for the evacuation began almost immediately (29 October) following an initial alert on the 28th. On 1 November the evacuation force reached Alexandria; on 2 November a UN force was evacuated from Gaza. Additional evacuees were removed from Haifa.

CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED

- (U) Both evacuations involved elements of BLT 3/2. The Alexandria operation removed 1,536 persons on 1 APA, 1 AKA, 1 LSD, and 2 DD. The other evacuation force (at Haifa) consisted of 1 APD and 2 destroyers. It removed 550 persons.
- (U) As is often the case during a major crisis, other Navy and Marine forces throughout the world were alerted and/or redeployed. Since these forces did not deploy to the immediate area of the crisis, they are not counted as part of the response (in the narrow sense of the term) in volume one.
- (U) This portion of the Suez Crisis effectively ended with the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel, Britain, and France on 6 November. For the next Suez Crisis response see the Post-Suez entry below.
- (U) The best coverage of the crisis is contained in Hill (CRC 262). Bendix, Selected Analysis, and AACU also provide good coverage.

Post-Suez 11-12/1956

- (U) Following Hill (CRC 262), the International Incidents project distinguishes between the U.S. response to the Suez War, where the actions of the United Kingdom, France, and Israel were the focal points for the response, and the 'crisis within the crisis' which involved the actions of the Soviet Union.
- (U) On November 5th the Soviet Union sent threatening diplomatic notes to Israel, the United Kingdom, and France. A separate note to the United States proposed that Soviet and American warships cooperate in bringing hostilities to an end. In the UN Security Council the Soviets proposed the creation of a joint Soviet-American force that would intervene if the French and British did not cease operations within 12 hours.
- (U) Egyptian President Nasser requested the assistance of the Sixth Fleet to forestall Soviet intervention. On the same day as Nasser's request (6 November) the ceasefire took place.
- (U) On November 7th Washington received reports that the Soviets would transit 6 ships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. On the same day the USSR began to recruit 'volunteers' to serve in the Middle East.
- (C) Responding to the possibility of Soviet intervention, the CNO directed on 7 November that:
- a carrier task force composed of 2 CVA, 1 CA, and 1 destroyer division should sail from the U.S. to the Western Pacific; on arrival, a force of the same composition would sail from WESTPAC to the MIDEASTFOR area;

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

- a carrier task force (TF 26, with two attack carriers) operating in the Atlantic was to be directed to the Azores;
- the SOSUS system was to be alerted;
- and that forces should maintain readiness to execute emergency war plans. (Hill, CRC 262, pp. 72-73.)

(U) Surveillance operations in the Mediterranean were intensified. The principal Navy units involved were two attack carriers (Coral Sea and Randolph), a CVS (Antietam), 2 CA, 13 DD, 4 DDR, 6 DE and 4 SS. The amphibious force consisted of 2 APA, 1 LSD, and 1 LPD with BLT 3/2 embarked.

(U) On November 8th Soviet aircraft were reported in Syria. On the same day tensions were exacerbated with the report that a MiG had shot down a British aircraft over Syria. By this point the Sixth Fleet was on full alert status.

(U) Tensions intensified on the 10th when the Soviets announced that 'volunteers' would be sent to join Egyptian forces unless the aggressors (Israel, the United Kingdom, and France) withdrew from Egyptian territory. Tensions continued at a very high level until the 15th, when UN forces were brought into Egypt to serve as a 'buffer' between the Egyptians and the invaders' forces.

(U) The Sixth Fleet was removed from 24 hour alert status on 13 December.

The best sources for information is Hill (CRC 262).

#### Cuban Civil War 12/1956-1/1959

(U) This is the period of Castro's final campaign. During this period there were intermittent deployments of Navy and Marine forces in the area (particularly to Guantanamo) motivated by a concern for the safety of U.S. citizens within Cuba.

(U) The most significant event took place in October 1958. On 23 October the State Department requested the evacuation of 59 U.S. nationals from the Cuban port of Nicaro. On the 24th the Kleinsmith (APD-134) conducted the evacuation without incident. During this operation the Roosevelt and two destroyers stood by further out to sea as a contingency force that would have supported the operation if their assistance had been required.

(U) Bendix, AACU, and Selected Analysis cover various facets of the operation.

CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

Jordan 4-5/1957

In the preceding Jordanian Crisis (3-5/1956), King Hussein had removed General Glubb from command of the Jordanian Arab Legion and had reduced British influence in his nation. Parliamentary elections held in October 1956 resulted in victories for pan-Arab and leftist parties.

Tensions between these parliamentary forces and the King led to the April-May 1957 crisis. The King was alarmed by what he saw as increasing Egyptian influence in Jordan. He was also concerned with the willingness of the parliamentary government to recognize the Soviet Union. During the course of the crisis he expressed concern over the threat posed to Jordan (i. e., his rule in Jordan) by 'international communism' (see George and Smoke, pp. 329-333 for a critical assessment of Soviet involvement (and non-involvement) in Jordan at this time).

On 15 April the King dismissed the Nabulsi cabinet, thereby precipitating a civil struggle for power in which his forces opposed some of the parliamentary leaders and elements of the Jordanian armed forces. Urban demonstrations supporting the dismissed government took place from 22 through 24 April.

Following the deterioration of the Jordanian situation in mid-April, Presidential Press Secretary Hagerty held a press conference on 24 April in which he indicated that President Eisenhower regarded the independence and integrity of Jordan as a matter of vital concern to the United States.

On the 25th the King installed a royalist government which declared martial law and took actions against the King's opponents. On the same day major elements of the Sixth Fleet deployed towards the Eastern Mediterranean to demonstrate American support for the King. On the 27th, the U.S. announced a \$10 million dollar military aid grant to Jordan. The fleet remained in the Eastern Mediterranean until 3 May, by which time the King and his supporters had the situation under control.

The \$10 million grant had special significance. After the King cut off British influence in the 1956 crisis, the British no longer subsidized the Royal armed forces. A substitute subsidy involving assistance from Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt had been arranged in January 1957, but only the Saudi government actually made a contribution. This failure on the part of the Egyptian and Syrian governments was a major challenge to the King's rule in Jordan. Correspondingly, the U.S. grant (while relatively small, as foreign assistance grants go) had symbolic and practical importance out of proportion to the amount of money involved.

C-12

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

The carrier force in the Sixth Fleet operation included the CVA Forrestal and CVS Lake Champlain.

Surface forces in the operation included the BB Wisconsin, 2 CL, 4 MSO, and at least 9 DD (sources differ as to the exact number--this is a conservative estimate).

The amphibious force consisted of 1 embarked BLT, 1 AGC, 3 AK, 2 APA. It was stationed off of Beirut, Lebanon during the operation.

Eisenhower's memoirs and George and Smoke provide succinct summaries of the political events during the crisis. Bendix, AACU, and the CINCNELM Command History provide the best information concerning the composition of the Navy's force in the response. Cable and Gurtoy also provide valuable information concerning the response.

#### Haiti 6/1957

In 1950 Haitian General Paul Magliore staged a coup and took power in Haiti. At the end of his term in the Presidency (December 1956) Magliore attempted to resign as constitutional ruler while retaining power as de facto chief executive. His efforts resulted in a general strike. He was forced into exile by the Haitian Army.

This left open the question of who was to rule in Haiti. After some bargaining between factions, a provisional government was formed under interim President Daniel Fignole on 26 May 1956.

Unfortunately this did not settle the succession question. On 14 June this government was overthrown by a coup led by Major General Antoine Kereau.

During June the U.S. responded to this 'inter-regal' uncertainty in the form of a theater alert involving amphibious and surface units. Regrettably, while both Bendix and CVAN-70 cite the response, neither provides any detailed information concerning the Navy forces involved in it (i.e., the exact units in the operation). Bendix does indicate that carrier units were not involved in the operation. It is quite likely that the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron, which played such a major role in subsequent crises in the area, was part of the response force.

After the Kereau coup, elections were set for September. Following a campaign marked by violence, Francois Duvalier was elected President. U.S. dissatisfaction with his regime and tensions between Haiti and the Dominican Republic were the cause of subsequent U.S. responses to events in Haiti.

Bendix covers the Navy's actions in summary overview. The major political events can be found in the New York Times and CPRI.

12 PRC-ROC 7-9/1957

Many sources dealing with American-Chinese political-military interactions since the Korean War focus on two major crises (Tachen Islands 1954/1955 and Quemoy 1958) while paying relatively little attention to other incidents involving the U.S. and PRC. Among these less emphasized cases are:

PRC-ROC	7-9/1957
PRC-ROC	1/1959
PRC-ROC	6/1962
PRC-ROC	9/1963.

This relative lack of coverage extends to the official sources employed by the International Incidents project. While each of the four cases listed above is cited as a U.S. military response involving Navy activity in at least one source, no source covers the responses in detail. As a result, the entries for these four responses unquestionably underestimate the magnitude of the Navy's activity in support of U.S. policy (particularly in the case of the contributions made by surface combatant and amphibious/Marine forces).

Some students of Chinese-American interactions have put 1957 into an 'inter-crisis' period between the 1954/55 and 1958 Crises, (e.g., Kalicki). While this is, in some senses, a fair characterization, it fails to capture all of the tensions which existed at this time.

In May 1957 the U.S. announced that nuclear-capable Matador cruise missiles would be introduced into Taiwan. In June, a build-up of Chinese forces opposite the off-shore islands was reported and U.S. decision makers were concerned about the possibility of an invasion of either the offshore islands or Taiwan. In response, Navy forces were deployed to the vicinity.

Accurate information is available only for the carrier force participating in this response. Over the period July through September five attack units participated in the response: Kearsarge, Lexington, Yorktown, Hancock, and Bon Homme Richard. All five units were not in the Western Pacific at the same time. The maximum presence consisted of 3 units in September, with the Kearsarge in-chopping and replacing the Hancock on Western deployment.

The best sources for information concerning this period are files maintained at the U.S. Navy History Division's Operational Archives, unclassified files collected by the Brookings Institution, and Kalicki's account of U.S.-PRC interactions from the Korean War through 1958. CVAN-70 cites the response.

Syria 8-12/1957 13

Syrian-American relations began to deteriorate with Syria's claim (on 13 August) that it had uncovered and foiled a U.S. supported plot to overthrow the Government of Syria.

A few days later the Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army (perceived by the U.S. as a moderate) resigned. This change of command, coupled with reports of Soviet arms shipments, led to a suspicion on the part of U.S. decision makers that Communists might have taken effective control of the Government. (For a summary of U.S. perceptions consult Eisenhower, pp. 196-204).

As a result of these events, Syria's relations with neighboring states (particularly Turkey) deteriorated.

U.S. decision makers perceived this turn of events as the second 'test' of the Eisenhower Doctrine (see the Jordanian Crisis of 4-5/1957 entry for the previous application of the Doctrine). The U.S. made immediate assurances to neighboring states that it would support them against external aggression. It also urged them to take collective action to support one another against possible threats to their security from Syria.

The U.S. moved aircraft to Turkey and deployed the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean.

There was no enthusiasm for collective action on the part of regional powers.

By September-October the crisis centered around tensions along the Turkish-Syrian border. At this point the Soviets made two symbolic responses to the crisis. The first consisted of verbal statements. A Soviet source (Ovsyany et al., 1975: 300) emphasizes a Soviet Government declaration of 3 September that the USSR would not remain indifferent to developments that might lead to an armed conflict in the Middle East. Western sources (e.g., Eisenhower, p. 203) tend to emphasize an 8 October interview with Krushchev by James Reston which contained threats directed against a possible Turkish attack against Syria.

The second Soviet response took the form of a port visit by Soviet combatants. A Sverdlov cruiser and Skoryy destroyer called at Latakia from 21 September through 1 October (CNA Port Visit File). This port call has been emphasized in Soviet writings. It is the first 'official' (political) Soviet port visit to a non-European country cited in a Soviet compilation of the Soviet Navy's official visits (Tarichanov and Ovanesov, 1974).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)~~

In mid-October Syria brought the issue of regional tensions to the United Nations. The UN did not take action. Over the following two months tensions gradually eased and the crisis ended.

In response to these events the U.S. voiced its support of Turkey, a NATO ally. The military component of the response involved the deployment of the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean from 21 August to 16 December and the redeployment of aircraft from Western Europe to Adana, Turkey.

During this period TG 65.9 (a two destroyer patrol in the Eastern Mediterranean) was established. After the termination of the response on 16 December, this force remained in the Eastern Mediterranean and was increased to four destroyer types.

Three amphibious forces participated in the response. Through the first week in September, the force consisted of 1 BLT embarked on 1 ACC, 2 APA, 1 AKA, 1 LSD, and 1 APD.

During the second week of September this force out-chopped and was replaced by the Fourth Provisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force. This unit consisted of 1 CVS (apparently in an LPH role), 1 ACC, 3 APA, 3 AKA, 3 APD, 3 LSD, 4 LST, 1 ASSP, and 5 DE. The unit's deployment in the Mediterranean was extended due to the crisis. The CVS departed on 21 October. The remainder of the force left by 6 November. It was replaced by BLT 1/6 embarked on 1 AGC, 1 APA, 1 AKA, 1 LSD, and 2 LST.

In addition to the CVS deployed with the amphibious force, three other carrier units participated in the response. Another CVS (plus escorts) deployed to the Sixth Fleet in October and November. This unit carried out operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. AACU cites two attack carriers as participants in the U.S. response: Randolph and Roosevelt.

No systematic information is available concerning the roles played by surface combatants in the operation.

The best source for political information is Eisenhower. Gurtov has a critical treatment of the response. The best source for details on the Navy forces and their activities is the CINCNELM (Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean) Command History, supplemented by AACU and Bendix.

#### Indonesia 12/1957-6/1958

There were a number of revolts against the authority of the Sukarno regime during this period. Gurtov provides an assessment of the broad spectrum of U.S. involvement in Indonesia at this time.

G-6  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~



The proximate cause for the response was concern for the safety of the lives and property of Americans residing in Indonesia, particularly on the island of Sumatra.

BLT 3/3 stationed at Subic Bay was alerted to be ready to move on four hours notice as part of TF 71, the contingency evacuation force. The Princeton was directed to Subic to receive 20 helicopters of HMR-162 by transfer from Gunston Hall.

TF 71 consisted of the Princeton, supporting ships, and a MEB composed of elements of the 3rd Marines plus HMR-162. It sailed from the Philippine Islands on 10 December 1957 for the South China Sea, to a point approximately 500 miles north of Sumatra.

Later in December Marine units 1/3 and 2/3 were returned to Okinawa and 3/3 (designated at the Task Force BLT) returned to Subic. During the first week of January 1958 3/3 was joined at Subic by Provisional MAG Alpha. On 1 March 1/3 replaced 3/3 as the standby BLT.

By June the central Indonesian government had contained the rebellions and the standby force was disestablished.

The Princeton was a CVS serving in an LPH role during this operation. It was formally reclassified as an LPH in March 1959.

The CVA Hornet was diverted for a few days to a position in the South China Sea in response to the crisis. It is not clear when this operation took place--probably in February or March. The Hornet was converted to a CVS in June 1958.

During this same period the U.S. was asserting its right of innocent passage through the Lombok and Mahassai Straits which had been claimed as territorial waters by Indonesia. CNA RC 220 cites this aspect of the response. Selected Analysis, AACU, and files at the Operational Archives, U.S. Navy History Division provide the best coverage of the response.

#### Venezuela 1-5/1958 16

U.S. armed forces responded to domestic unrest within Venezuela. The unrest (and the response) peaked on 13 May when a mob attacked the motorcade carrying Vice President Nixon from an airport to Caracas.

On the same day two companies of 1/6, 2nd Marine Division, were alerted at Camp Lejuene for airlift to Guantanamo, Cuba. They arrived on the 14th and embarked on the Boston. Another company plus 25 helicopters embarked on board the Tarawa off of Onslow Beach on the same day. The alert was cancelled on 15 May. The departure of the Vice President on the 14th eliminated the need for an alert.

In addition to the Navy and Marine Forces, two Army companies of airborne infantry were moved from Ft. Campbell, Kentucky to Puerto Rico. Their alert was cancelled on the 15th.

Selected Analysis provided the best coverage of USN/USMC actions. AWC covers the Army response.

16 Lebanon 5/1958

On 15 May Lebanese President Chamoun informed the U.S. ambassador that Syrian partisans had entered Lebanon and that U.S. assistance might be requested on very short notice. This information followed the earlier (8 May) outbreak of large scale civil violence in Lebanon. One of the targets of this violence was the USIA office in Beirut.

In response to the situation in Lebanon, the relief of BLT 1/8 by 2/2 was cancelled. Both were organized into the 2nd MarProvFor. Their contingency position was approximately 50 miles off of Beirut.

On 20 May RLT-2 was alerted at Camp Lejeune. It was to be prepared to embark on 4 days notice for the Mediterranean.

In mid-May the U.S. announced that it was rushing police equipment that had been previously ordered to the Lebanese government.

By June an ASW group had been added to the Sixth Fleet. The best estimate of the carrier force available is 2 CVA, 1 CVS.

By 1 July reports showed that there had been no massive infiltration of forces from the UAR to Lebanon. This eased concerns and most of the fleet left the immediate area, with BLT 2/2 holding in a position approximately 100 miles from Lebanon and with 2 DD's just over the horizon from Beirut.

Selected Analysis, AACU, and RC 153 cover the response. Selected Analysis is the best source for amphibious forces. Dragnich (RC 153) provides the best coverage of the political events taking place and the way in which the operation presaged the subsequent intervention in Lebanon (see below).

17 Lebanon 6-10/1958

By early June the Sixth Fleet had returned to normal operations following the May contingency response to events in Lebanon. In mid-June the situation in Lebanon took a turn for the worse with serious rioting in Beirut. On 14 July Lebanese President Chamoun

requested U.S. assistance. On the same day there was a coup in Iraq which removed a pro-Western government and appeared to U.S. leaders to pose a direct challenge to U.S. interests in the region. This coup appears to have heavily influenced the U.S. decision to intervene.

Following the decision to intervene on the 14th, the first BLT (2/2) landed on 15 July. BLT 3/6 landed on the 16th. BLT 1/8 landed on the 18th. BLT 2/8 was airlifted in on the 19th. These four BLTs made up the Second Provisional Marine Force.

Amphibious ships included 2 AGC, 1 ADA, 4 APA, 3 AKA, 3 LSD, 2 LST, and 1 DDR in TF 61.

TF 60 (the attack carrier force) included 2 CVA (Saratoga and Essex) plus 2 CA and 2 DD.

The ASW force (TF 66) was made up of 1 CVS (Wasp) and 1 DD and 7 DE.

There were an additional 12 DD and 3 DDR in the surface combatant forces. Eight MSO made up the mine force.

Bendix, Selected Analysis, AACU, Ides, and Dragnich (RC 153) cover facets of this response. RC 153 is the best source.

Quemoy 6-12/1958 10

The Republic of China made a major commitment to the defense of the offshore islands, stationing a third of its Army on them.

In late July U.S. intelligence noted that PRC forces in southeastern China (opposite the Quemoy Islands group) had been augmented.

The PRC began to shell the islands on 23 August, raising the possibility that they might be cut off from Taiwan. In addition, a possible invasion by PRC units was feared.

The U.S. response included a major show of force designed to deter possible PRC actions.

The Seventh Fleet had been augmented due to the Lebanon Crisis (see previous entry). On August 25th the force consisted of 4 CVA, 1 CVS, 3 CA, 36 DD/DDE, 5 DE, and 7 SS. ?

On the 26th of August a Marine amphibious group at anchor in Singapore was directed to sail. It appears that approximately 2,400 Marines were in the area over the course of the crisis.

One message was sent to the PRC in the form of a joint U.S. -ROC amphibious training exercise carried out on Taiwan (see Howe, p. 218 and p. 247).

MAG 11 (with three fighter squadrons) went from Japan to Taiwan to provide back-up air defense fighter support for the Seventh Fleet and escort flights for ROC resupply to Quemoy. This unit arrived in September. In the same month MAG 13 flew from Hawaii to Japan to fill the spot vacated by MAG 11. MAG 11 returned to Japan in the April of the following year.

The WestPac carrier force in mid-August consisted of the CVS Princeton and the attack units Hancock and Shangri-La. During September four additional CVA units moved into the Western Pacific area: Midway, Essex, Bennington, and Lexington. The best estimate of the maximum force available in the response in the first week of September is 1 CVS (Princeton) and 5 CVA (Hancock, Shangri-La, Lexington, Essex, and Midway). The Bennington subsequently replaced the Hancock, which moved to the Eastern Pacific.

During the course of the crisis the U.S. engaged in a number of significant military moves. Elements of the Seventh Fleet provided escort to ROC resupply vessels, remaining outside of the 3-mile territorial limit (but entering within the 12 mile zone claimed by the PRC). The U.S. provided the Nationalist Government with light amphibious ships that could run the artillery blockade (notably LVTs). The U.S. carried out a publicized amphibious landing exercise on Taiwan as a signal to the PRC of its resolve. In addition the U.S. provided the ROC forces with nuclear capable 8-inch howitzers that were emplaced on Quemoy Island. There was no direct military engagement with the PRC's forces.

Tensions eased with a ceasefire on 6 October. On 20 October the PRC resumed the bombardment of the offshore islands, but on an every other day schedule that did not seriously interfere with their access to supplies. This effectively ended the crisis.

Bendix, Ides, Selected Analysis, AACU, and the CINCPAC Command History cover the response. Howe and Kalicki provide excellent unclassified accounts of the response.

Jordan-Iraq 7-12/1958 19

Western leaders believed that the coup in Iraq which had influenced America's decision to intervene in Lebanon might also affect the regime of Jordan's King Hussein. In response to Hussein's request British paratroopers were sent to Jordan on the 17th and 18th of July, immediately following the initiation of the U.S. landing in Lebanon.

While this is clearly a British operation, Bendix and Ides list an American response in conjunction with it. Neither provides detailed information. Both indicate that only surface combatant forces were involved.

The best estimate at this point is that one or both units in TF 65.9 (a 2 DD Eastern Mediterranean patrol force) were redeployed in conjunction with the British operation). These were the most logical surface combatants to have been involved.

It is an unusual operation in that neither Bendix nor Ides list any participation by projection forces in the response (neither carriers nor amphibious units). This is quite singular for a response in the Mediterranean.

Panama 3-5/1959 70

On 25 April a small force consisting of approximately 90 persons landed on Panama's Caribbean coast. It was believed that this force might have been involved in a plot to overthrow the government of Panama. It was also believed to have contacts with Castro's government in Cuba.

In response the U.S. offered the Panamanian government small arms that had been stockpiled in the Canal Zone. Additionally, a surveillance patrol (1 DD and 1 MSO) was established off Panama's coast to deter additional landings. This force was on station by 30 April. It returned to normal operations on 4 May.

On 1 May the invaders surrendered. Approximately 80 Cubans were in the invasion party.

Bendix provides the best coverage of the operation. No amphibious or carrier forces were involved.

Berlin Crisis 5-9/1959 21

This was the "Berlin Deadline" Crisis. It followed the 1948 Berlin Blockade Crisis and preceded the 1961 Berlin Aide-Memoire Crisis.

In the autumn of 1958, the Soviets began to express concern regarding the introduction of nuclear armed missiles onto West German territory. In a 10 November speech, Khrushchev denounced the 'remilitarization' of the Federal Republic of Germany. He also stated that it was an appropriate time for the East German regime to begin to handle access to Berlin.

On 27 November Soviet diplomatic notes were sent to the three Western powers in Berlin and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. They called for negotiations to turn Berlin into a 'free city' and stated that if negotiations did not produce

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)  
UNCLASSIFIED

an acceptable agreement within a half year, the Soviets would turn control of access to Berlin over to the German Democratic Republic.

Needless to say, these statements raised apprehensions in the West that a possible replay of the 1948 Crisis might be in the making.

In actuality, there was no immediate major crisis. The Soviets soon modified their stance and indicated that it was sufficient that negotiations on the status of Berlin begin within a half year. Eventually even this requirement was dropped and the issue was held in abeyance, pending the Soviet-American summit scheduled for 1960 (which was subsequently cancelled due to the U-2 incident).

However, there was Soviet harassment during this period. From April through September 1959 the Soviets interfered with the transit of supply trains to West Berlin. These actions helped to prompt a U.S. military response.

Bendix, Ides, CVAN-70, and AACU cite a Navy response over the period 5-9/1959. Ides lists only surface combatants in the reaction. All other sources cite attack carrier forces in addition to surface combatants.

While there was a general alert of Navy forces throughout the world, the most immediate response took place in the Mediterranean where elements of the Sixth Fleet were brought to an advanced state of readiness and deployed in an alert posture. Given that the Sixth Fleet CVA force still had a major role in SACEUR's scheduled program, this was an important military-political signal to the Soviet Union, an indicator of U.S. determination.

During May 1959 (the original 'deadline' month) when the response initiated, the Sixth Fleet carrier force consisted of Intrepid and Roosevelt. When the response terminated on 30 September (with the end of Soviet harassment along the access routes to West Berlin) the CVA force was composed of Saratoga and Essex.

George and Smoke provide the best summary of the political events during the crisis (pp: 390-413). Bendix and AACU give the best treatment of the Navy's actions during the response.

PRC-ROC 7/1959 72

As is the case with three other responses involving the People's Republic of China, it is difficult to obtain information concerning this operation (see the entry for PRC-ROC 7/1957).

CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) As before, the best information is available for the carrier force. Over the period 5-10 July, the attack units Ranger and Lexington conducted operations focused on the PRC in the vicinity of Taiwan. There is no information available concerning the roles played by amphibious and surface warfare forces in this operation.

(C) It is not clear why this response took place. There are two major (nonexclusive) possibilities. The first is that it may have been related to U.S. operational activity off the coast of China. During this period 'Medlar' electronic intelligence flights were conducted using unescorted aircraft. On 16 July a P4M carrying out one of these assignments was attacked by two MiG aircraft (nationality unspecified) while 40 miles off the Eastern coast of North Korea. The tail gunner was injured and the plane damaged. The flight was aborted and the plane flew to Miho Air Force Base in Japan. Both CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT Command Histories cover this event.

(U) The second possibility is that the response may have been to tensions between the Republic of China and the People's Republic. The CINCPAC Command History indicates that there were a number of aerial engagements between the two sides during 1959. The most significant battle cited took place on 6 July when ROC F-86F fighters engaged 12 MiG types and downed 2 of the PRC aircraft. The U.S. may have been reacting to one of the earlier engagements which might have exacerbated ROC-PRC relations.

(U) The response is cited in CVAN-70. Information concerning the carrier force is available in files maintained at the U.S. Navy History Divisions' Operational Archives. Unclassified files on this subject are also maintained at the Brookings Institution. The CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT Command Histories provide summary treatments of U.S.-ROC-PRC interactions during this period.

Laos 7-10/1959 27

(U) Two significant events occurred in Laos in July 1959. The first was the Laotian government's request for U.S. civilian technicians to assist in the training of the Royal Laotian Army. The second was an offensive by Pathet Lao forces along the North Vietnamese border. In early August the Laotian Government declared a state of emergency in five provinces; this was extended to the entire nation in September. Also in September the Government of Laos requested the United Nations to send an emergency force, claiming it was the victim of North Vietnamese aggression. Pathet Lao military activity subsided in mid-September. A UN fact finding committee's report had no real effects.

(U) In mid-July elements of the Seventh Fleet were deployed near the Vietnamese coast for possible intervention in Laos. Contingency plans involved the employment

of a Marine RLT with two battalions that would have been airlifted to Laos. Some Marine airplanes were placed on a CVA to provide escort for the airlift. The augmentation force for the landing would have been 1 brigade from the Army's 25th Infantry Division. After tensions subsided, the Seventh Fleet returned to normal operations on 11 October.

Amphibious forces included approximately one and one half BLT's, 1 Marine helicopter squadron, and 9 amphibious ships.

The carrier force consisted of 1 CVA. It was accompanied by 1 CL and 5 DD. Bendix, Ides, and AACU provide the best coverage.

Panama 8-11/1959 24

The incident consisted of civil disorders in Panama.

The response was a very low level effort involving only surveillance operations conducted by surface combatants. After Castro's accession to power this was a very common type of response in the Caribbean/Central American region. The goal was to isolate domestic disorders from Cuban influence.

Little information concerning this response is contained in the sources. Both Bendix and Ides provide some data.

Congo 7-11/1960 25

The former Belgian Congo (presently known as the Republic of Zaire) became independent on 30 June. The new central government headed by Kasavubu and Lumumba encountered immediate opposition. In the first week of independence elements of the Army revolted. Belgian troops re-entered the Congo in an attempt to restore order and bolster the central government. There was widespread civil disorder in this period.

On 11 July Moise Tshombe, premier of Katanga province, announced that Katanga was seceding from the Congo. On 14 July the UN Security Council unanimously voted to send a UN force to the Congo.

The initial U.S. response involved the CVS Wasp. This unit was dispatched to the Congo to assist in the evacuation of Western nationals. It arrived on station on 8 July, approximately 1 week after receiving orders. It carried one Marine company, 8 helicopters, and 6 C-1A aircraft. The Wasp was not required to assist in evacuations but did provide logistical support to UN forces. On 15 July the Wasp was joined by a fleet oiler.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

This force was directed to operating areas in the South China Sea on 1 January. After the situation in Laos stabilized, the units were directed to withdraw from the South China Sea on 6 January.

The best coverage is provided by Gilmore, who relies on the CINCPAC Command History. Bendix, AACU, and Ides also cover facets of the operation.

28  
Gulf of Guinea-Congo 2-3/1961

In early February the Amity I task force provided troop lift for UN forces in the Congo. The LSD Hermitage and LST Graham County ferried Guinean troops from Matadi, Congo to Conarky, Guinea. The transit was conducted from 2-8 February.

On 12 February the situation in the Congo took a turn for the worse as former premier Lumumba was assassinated. Civil unrest continued.

As the situation in the Congo deteriorated, the Amity I force was re-routed to the area on 5 March, apparently at the request of the U.S. Ambassador. The force consisted of 2 DD, 1 LSD, and 1 LST. On 7 March it was directed to continue its originally scheduled voyage to Capetown, South Africa for a goodwill visit.

The Amity I force consisted of the Gearing (DD-710), Vogelgesang (DD-852), Hermitage (LSD-34) and Graham County (LST-1176). The Marine force embarked on the two amphibious ships appears to have been a 600 man BLT (-).

The Amity cruises are described in the Congo 7-11/1960 entry. Bendix, Gilmore, and Selected Analysis cover this response.

29  
Laos 3-6/1961

Due to the deteriorating position of government forces in Laos, elements of the Seventh Fleet were directed to the South China Sea.

Units responding included the Lexington and Midway (both attack carriers). Bennington (a CVS) was ordered to a point 100 miles off of Thailand from which it could provide helicopter support, if required.

The units were ordered into position on 21 March. While on station they conducted reconnaissance missions over Laos. When ceasefire negotiations got underway in Laos and the general situation stabilized the alert status of the force was relaxed on 13 June.

Amphibious forces appear to have included a special landing force of 1 BLT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

The situation in the Congo remained unsettled even after the arrival of the UN force. During the remainder of the year the USN supported the UN effort by providing transportation (sealift) for UN force contingents. For example, in September 1960 the APA Bequar carried 1098 Indonesian troops from Djarkarta to Matadi, Congo. In October Whitfield County (LST-1169) and Windham County (LST-1170) carried 590 Malay troops from Singapore to Matadi.

Due to the continuing crisis in the Congo and because of apprehensions that similar crises might engulf other Subsaharan African nations that had reached (or were soon to reach) independence, in November 1960 the U.S. initiated the first of a series of "Amity" cruises. These cruises usually involved two destroyers and two amphibious types. The missions of the cruises were (i) to further the People-to-People program through a series of port visits, (ii) to conduct training exercises with the forces of Third World nations, (iii) to be in a position to conduct military operations to support U.S. diplomatic objectives and to evacuate endangered Western nationals. The Amity I force consisted of Gearing (DD-710), Vogelgesang (DD-862), Hermitage (LSD-34), and Graham County (LST-1176).

Selected Analysis, Ides, Bendix, Gilmore and the CINCLANTFLT Command History cover this operation.

#### Guatemala-Nicaragua 11-12/1960 20

At the request of both nations, President Eisenhower ordered the Navy to establish a patrol off of their Caribbean coasts to guard against possible infiltration. This was one of many instances during the period in which the Cubans were believed to have ties to domestic insurgent organizations.

The patrol force was on station by 14 November. It included 1 CVA (Shangri-La), 1 CVS (Wasp), 5 DD, 3 DDR, and 1 patrol squadron. The force was removed on 10 December.

No amphibious forces were involved in the operation.

The response is covered by Bendix, Ides, AACU, and Gilmore.

#### Laos 12/1960-1/1961 27

The U.S. responded to the capture by insurgent Pathet Lao forces of strategic positions on the central plain of Laos.

Navy units responding included 2 CVA (Lexington and Coral Sea), 1 CVS (Bennington), plus 13 DD. Amphibious forces included 1 BLT, 1 APA, and 1 LSD.

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

Gilmore provides the best coverage of the operation, using the CINCPAC Command History. Some sources combine this response with the earlier (12/1960-1/1961) Laotian response.

Bay of Pigs 4-6/1961 30

Cuba was unsuccessfully invaded by American trained and supported Cuban exiles on 17 April. By 20 April Cuban forces had decisively defeated the exiles.

It is extremely difficult to obtain information concerning the Navy forces which were in the area and the roles (if any) that they played in conjunction with the operation.

The Navy's response is cited in a number of standard sources (e.g., Bendix and Ides) but none of these provides a highly detailed account of the operation. CVAN-70 testimony notes U.S. silence concerning American naval operations in the Caribbean and Western Atlantic during the Spring of 1961 (p. 361).

It appears that at least 1 BLT was standing by during the operation. The CINCLANTFLT Command History notes that the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron maintained a 48 hour reaction time to Cuba during 1961. Hunt mentions the LPH Boxer in his account of the operation. Both Bendix and Ides cite amphibious forces; Ides indicated that 1 BLT was involved in the USN response.

Bendix and Ides state that surface combatants were redeployed for the response but don't provide enough information to indicate which units were involved.

CVAN-70 materials indicate that carriers (plural) were involved in operations during the Spring of 1961; this could be taken to mean that more than one unit participated in the Bay of Pigs response. Johnson (p. 189) states that two carrier task forces were standing by during the landing, each with one carrier. Thomas (p. 1361) names the Essex as one of the carriers and contends that fighters from this ship appear over the battlefield at one point in the operation. The best estimate at this point is that at least two carriers were involved. It is further assumed that both were attack units. This estimate is consistent with the size of the force marshalled in the 6/1961 Dominican Republic response (see below).

After the invasion, it appears that USN units remained in the vicinity as the U.S. attempted to ensure that the captured exiles were not abused by the Cuban government and tried to negotiate terms for their release. The exact point where this aspect of the response terminated is not certain. The initiation of the 6/1961 Dominican Republic response is a logical breakpoint.

31 Dominican Republic 6/1961

General Rafael Trujillo ruled the Dominican Republic from 1930 to 1961. During the last few years of his rule the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations were opposed to his regime because of domestic repression within the Dominican Republic and due to Trujillo's support of rebel activities in other Central and Latin American nations. With U.S. support, the Organization of American States applied diplomatic and economic sanctions against the regime. In 1960 the U.S. increased its pressure by placing a special fee on Dominican sugar imports.

Trujillo was assassinated on 30 May 1961. The U.S. goal was to ensure that a new political order took power in the Dominican Republic.

On 1 June the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron was on station off Ciudad Trujillo, (Santo Domingo). Two additional amphibious squadrons soon joined the deployment.

The carrier force off Hispaniola included the attack units Intrepid and Shangri-La and the CVS Randolph. Surface combatants included Newport News, Boston, and Northampton plus destroyer types.

The force was alerted for action on 1 June. The first units were in position on that day. The main force was on station by 4 June.

As the domestic situation within the Dominican Republic stabilized, the alert was cancelled on 10 June. The forces remained in the area and phased into an exercise ("Axle Grease") which took place from 14-17 June.

This is the first of two responses to events in the Dominican Republic in 1961. See also the 11/1961 entry. The CINCLANTFLT Command History, Gilmore, and AACU are the best sources for the Navy's response. Lowenthal provides a succinct summary of the political context.

32 Zanzibar 6/1961

The Amity II cruise was conducted from 15 March to 15 September 1961. Like the Amity I cruise (see the entries for the Congo, 7-11/1960 and 2-3/1961) it provided a presence force that could respond to evacuations and other contingencies.

The units in the Amity II force included the Spiegel Grove (LSD-32), York County (LST-1174), Jonas Ingram (DD-938), New (DDE-818), and Chewaucan (AOG-50). A Marine landing force and six helicopters from HMR 262 were embarked on the amphibious ships.

This force moved to the vicinity of Zanzibar in response to rioting on the island. The safety of the U.S. space tracking station on the island was a principal concern. This was a presence response; no projection took place.

CVAN-70 states that carrier forces were alerted for this response. There is no evidence for this in the other sources for the response (e.g., Bendix, which lists only amphibious and surface warfare units).

Selected Analysis, Bendix, and the CINCLANTFLT Command History are the best sources for information.

Kuwait 6-7/1961 33

Kuwait became independent on 19 June. Shortly thereafter, Premier Kassem of Iraq stated that Kuwait had been improperly withheld from Iraq when the nation of Iraq had been created in its present-day form following WWI and that Iraq intended to peacefully annex Kuwait.

On 30 June Kuwait requested assistance from the United Kingdom. British ships which were part of the UK Persian Gulf Command were already in the vicinity. Royal Marines landed within 24 hours.

The Amity II cruise off the coast of East Africa was interrupted on 4 July and the ships were directed to sail to the vicinity of Aden to serve as a contingency force for the Kuwait Crisis. This order was cancelled on 7 July and the ships returned to normal Amity operations until the end of the Amity II deployment in mid-September.

The Amity II force consisted of 2 DD, 1 LSD, and 1 LST plus embarked Marines. The force is described in the Zanzibar 6/1961 entry. The Amity cruise operations are described in the Congo 7-11/1960 response entry.

Selected Analysis and Bendix provide good coverage of the events.

Berlin Crisis 8/1961-5/1962 3A

Following the cancellation of the May 1960 U.S.-Soviet summit meeting, the USSR waited for the inauguration of a new U.S. Administration before renewing its demands pertaining to the status of Berlin (see the Berlin 5-9/1959 entry for a summary of the previous Berlin Crisis).

President Kennedy and Premier Krushchev met at Vienna in June. Krushchev repeated some of the Soviet demands made during the previous Berlin Crisis and presented an aide memoire which proposed turning Berlin into a 'free city' with access to be under the control of the German Democratic Republic's government and having the two Germanies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

negotiate with one another to achieve unification. Should these negotiations fail, the note proposed having each Germany sign separate peace treaties with the Big Four powers. The note did not contain a definite deadline.

Kennedy rejected these terms. In July he publicly asserted that Western rights in Berlin should be retained while indicating that the U.S. would be willing to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union. He also requested Congressional authorization for a build-up of U.S. forces.

As tensions continued, on 13 August German Democratic Republic forces established barriers along the border between the two sectors of Berlin. In response, the U.S. sent reinforcements to the Berlin Brigade. General Lucian Clay was appointed as on-scene commander of U.S. forces in Berlin. There were a number of tense moments as forces confronted one another along the Berlin Wall in September and October.

As with the previous Berlin Crisis, this crisis had no single end point. Tensions gradually abated, assisted by negotiations at the foreign minister level which initiated in September and which were followed by the exchange of private correspondence between U.S. and Soviet leaders.

The Navy's response in support of national policy took three forms. The first was an augmentation of forces. The July-August mobilization involved 33 reserve ships and approximately 8,000 Naval Reserve personnel. An additional 2,800 officers and 24,000 enlisted men had their tours of duty in the Navy extended because of the crisis.

The second aspect of the response took place in the Mediterranean. Elements of the Sixth Fleet were placed in alert status for the duration of the response. Carrier units affected included the Roosevelt and Forrestal (in August 1961) followed by the Independence and Intrepid, which were in turn succeeded by the Saratoga and Shangri-La.

Finally, during the course of the crisis one CVS group was moved to the Northeast Atlantic. Bendix states that this group deployed to the region for possible employment in the harassment of Soviet naval operations. This would have been a countermove directed against Soviet pressures in and around Berlin. AACU states that the ASW group was moved to counter a potential Soviet submarine threat in the region. The group included 1 CVS and 7-8 destroyer types.

George and Smoke (pp. 414-446) provide a good summary of the major political events during the crisis. Information on the Navy's activities during the response can be found in AACU, Bendix, and Gilmore.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

Dominican Republic 11-12/1961 35

This is the second of two U.S. responses to events in the Dominican Republic in 1961 (see the entry for 6/1961).

In November 1961 there was a political crisis in the Dominican Republic when two brothers of the slain Trujillo returned to Santo Domingo. It was believed (both in the U.S. and the Dominican Republic) that this presaged an attempt to return control of the country to the faction that had ruled under the slain dictator.

On 18 November Secretary of State Rusk warned that the U.S. would not 'remain idle' if the Trujillos attempted to re-establish the dictatorship.

Dominican President Balaguer took action to ensure his regime's survival on the 18th. He declared a state of emergency and took personal control of the armed forces.

In mid-November the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron was deployed off Ciudad Trujillo. Additional forces arrived by the 19th. Included in this force was the attack carrier Roosevelt. Surface forces included 1 CL and 5 DD. VMA 224 participated in the response.

Operational activity included "Seagull"--a demonstration force in front of Ciudad Trujillo including an amphibious force feint directed at the beach and "Wave High"--a fly over of A4D's from the Roosevelt outside of Dominican territorial waters but within sight of spectators on the shore.

After a great deal of negotiation, the various factions within the Dominican Republic came to agreement and created a Council of State to provide interim rule for the country. This agreement was concluded on 19 December. The Navy's response ended on that date.

CINCLANTFLT Command History, Bendix, Selected Analysis, Gilmore, Cable, AACU, and Lowenthal cover various aspects of the response.

Unfortunately the political settlement was short-lived; see the Dominican Republic 1/1962 entry.

South Vietnam 12/1961-8/1962 36

During this period the U.S. increased its military involvement in Vietnam. For example, the first major contingent of U.S. Army troops arrived in December 1961.

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

In December the Navy established a coastal patrol to control infiltration. This force (consisting of MSO units from Mine-sweeping Division 73) was in operation in the vicinity of 17°N by 22 December.

On 18 March a southern patrol was established in the Quo Phoc area, utilizing destroyer escorts from Escort Squadron 7. U.S. participation in the southern patrol terminated on 26 May 1962. The northern MSO patrol terminated on 1 August 1962.

No carrier or amphibious forces appear to have been involved in the operation.

The CINCPACFLT Command History and Gilmore provide the best coverage of the operation. It marks a major turning point in the Navy's involvement in the Indochinese conflict.

#### Dominican Republic 1/1962 31

The previous U.S. response to events in the Dominican Republic (11-12/1961) had ended when it appeared that the various factions within that nation had resolved their differences. Events in January 1962 demonstrated that appearances could be deceiving. On 18 January a coup ousted the regime and Rafael Bonelly was proclaimed President. He served in that capacity until elections were held in December 1962 and Juan Bosch became President.

In response to this event, a Navy force deployed to waters south of Santo Domingo. Included in this force were COMSECONDFLT in the cruiser Little Rock and the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron with an embarked BLT. All units were in position for a planned show of force operation within six hours. Part of the show of force would have included a fly-by of an attack squadron from Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.

The Joint Chiefs cancelled the deployment of 19 January, apparently because the U.S. was satisfied with the course of events in the Dominican Republic.

The best coverage of the response is contained in the CINCLANT Command History. Gilmore provides an unclassified summary of the response.

#### Guantanamo 1-8/1962 32

Navy forces in and around the base were augmented in response to a particularly serious period of harassment. This was a period of high tension between the abortive Bay of Pigs landing and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Significant events included the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States in February and Cuban firing at a USN plane on 30 August.

CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED



There were intermittent periods of tension at the base. A major response took place in July, when it was feared that the security of the installation might be threatened in conjunction with Cuban celebration of the 26th of July revolutionary holiday. The Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron deployed to the Guantanamo operating area on 25 July. Major air demonstrations were conducted over the base on the evening of the 25th. The alert was terminated early on the 27th.

Bendix and the CINCLANT Command History cover aspects of the response.

Guatemala 3/1962 2,4

Student rioting occurred on 13 March. This was followed by the outbreak of more general civil disorder. In response, the U.S. established a precautionary deployment off of the coast of Guatemala. The CVA Midway was one of the units on patrol.

Amphibious units included the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron (with 1 BLT) including the LPH Valley Forge.

These units were on station by 17 March. On 19 March the government of Guatemala declared a 30-day state of siege which effectively ended the civil unrest. The Navy patrol was terminated on the 22nd.

AACU, CINCLANT Command History, and Gilmore are the best sources.

South Vietnam 4/1962-8/1964 40

On 15 April 1962 a Marine company embarked on the LPH Princeton arrived in Saigon. It was the first USMC advisory unit to arrive in the Republic of Vietnam.

Its arrival denoted a qualitative change in Navy/Marine Corps operations in South Vietnam. From April 1962 onward there was a continuing series of low level reactions to events within Vietnam. Had specialized MACV sources been employed, the number of 'incidents' (counting each instance in which the USN or USMC participated in an operation as one event) that would have been generated would have been so large as to dominate the list of Navy responses since 1955.

To avoid this, the present entry encompasses all operational activity in or primarily directed at events in South Vietnam from the first landing of the Marines to the beginning of the Vietnam War (dated from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 10 August 1964), with the exception of the responses to civil disorders prior to the overthrow of the Diem Government in 1963 and the Tonkin Gulf response of early August 1964. Navy responses to events in other nations in the region (e.g., Thailand 5-8/1962 and Laos 4-5/1963) are not affected by this action.

CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT Command Histories provide the best overall summaries of U.S. operations during this period.

*A1* Thailand 5-8/1962

Following major victories by Pathet Lao forces in Laos which moved their units closer to the Thai border, and at the request of the government of Thailand, the U.S. carried out an administrative landing of Marine forces in Thailand.

The first USMC units were alerted on 10 May. The landing took place on 17 May, (some sources say 16 May). The force landed in Bangkok and moved by air to Udorn between 17 and 20 May in C-130 and C-124 aircraft.

Approximately 3400 Marines were involved in the landing.

The amphibious force included 1 LPH (Valley Forge), 1 APA, and 1 LSD.

The CVA Hancock was in the area to provide close air support, if required. The CINCPAC Command History also has 1 CVS in the area.

The first units alerted included BLT 3/9 and HMM 261, then undergoing training as SLF, Seventh Fleet in the Gulf of Siam.

MAG VMA 332 was alerted at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan on 12 May.

The 3rd MEU was activated on Okinawa on 16 May and directed to carry out the operation. On 17 May the 3rd MEU landed at Bangkok. It consisted of 3,426 Marines from VMA 332, HMM 211, and BLT 3/9.

On 25 May a UK RAF fighter detachment joined the operation. It was followed by small air and ground detachments from Australia and New Zealand on 29 May.

On 29 June orders were received for the first phase of withdrawal. On 1 July the recall of 1,000 Marines was announced; these units were transferred from Udorn to Bangkok on 28-31 July. Final departure was completed by 7 August.

Bendix, Ides, Selected Analysis, Cable, Gilmore, and AACU cover the operation.

*A2*  
*all or just 1000?*

PRC-ROC 6/1962

As is the case with some other responses involving the PRC, it is difficult to obtain detailed information on the U.S. forces responding in this incident. Unlike some

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

of the other cases, however, the reasons for the U.S. response are known. (See the PRC-ROC 7/1957 entry for a description of data problems.)

(U) In 1962 China was in a vulnerable position. The 'Great Leap Forward' fell short of the mark. The Chinese standard of living had deteriorated. Chinese leaders were correct in perceiving that they were in a relatively vulnerable position.

(U) Allen Whiting (at the time employed within the Far Eastern Division of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research) notes that the Chinese felt that they were threatened from three sides, (pp. 54-76).

(U) In South Asia they were engaged in a series of border disputes with the Republic of India that would ultimately culminate in the Sino-Indian War.

(U) Along their border with Southeast Asia, they were concerned with the U.S. intervention (in May 1962) in Thailand.

(U) In East Asia, along their sea border with the Republic of China and the offshore islands, tensions were rising. In April and May the level of ROC raids from the offshore islands conducted against the mainland sharply increased. More critically, during the same period the Nationalist Government appears to be preparing for its long awaited invasion of the mainland. Special invasion taxes were announced and forces were mobilized. U.S. actions during the Spring of 1962 were interpreted by the PRC as indicating that the U.S. might be supporting the increased level of raiding and the impending invasion: well-publicized joint maneuvers were carried out by the U.S. and ROC Navies in February and March and there were a number of visits by American military personnel to Quemoy.

(C) Moreover, in early April the U.S. initiated a series of 'DESOTO' patrols along the coast of China (a point not noted by Whiting but covered in the CINCPACFLT Command History). These patrols involved individual destroyer types. Their dual missions were to collect intelligence and to provide 'a mild form of harassment' (CINCPACFLT, Annual Report 1961-1962, p. 12).

(U) Given these sets of events, the PRC leadership elected to take some preventive countermeasures. In early June there was an unpublicized redeployment of Army troops to Chekiang and Fukien provinces opposite the offshore islands. More than 100,000 men were added to the already substantial forces stationed in that region.

(U) After these units were in place, the PRC began to make public statements concerning the dire consequences that would follow if the U.S. supported a Nationalist invasion--citing the precedent of the Korean War.

C-35  
UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

(U) The U.S. immediately responded through a number of channels, emphasizing that while America supported the ROC, it did not (and would not) support the use of force against the mainland by ROC units. This defused the immediate crisis.

(C) U.S. diplomacy during this period was supported by the movements of Navy ships. Unfortunately records are incomplete and the precise units involved cannot be identified. Carriers may have been involved. The only definite information available (from Gilmore) is that on 9 June the DDR McKean began a five day surveillance patrol (probably a DESOTO operation) along the Chinese coast.

(U) Whiting gives the best summary of the situation.

Haiti 8/1962

(U) In early August U.S. decision makers were apprehensive concerning potential civil disorders in Haiti.

(U) In response the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron (with 1 BLT embarked) was positioned for possible employment. A 2 DD patrol was established in the Gulf of Gonave. The carrier that would have supported the contingency operation was the Forrestal. The alert was cancelled on 14 August.

(U) The CINCLANT Command History, Gilmore and AACU cover the response.

Cuban Missile Crisis 10-11/1962

(U) As might be expected, given that this was the most notable crisis since World War II, there is an almost overwhelming amount of information available concerning American activities during this response. Rather than attempt to summarize all of this material (much of which is readily available in either the public record or command histories), only a summary outline of the response will be given here.

(U) The first Soviet MRBMs reached Cuba in early September. Sites for IRBMs were under construction. At the same time (and most critically for the subsequent U.S. response), the Soviets had operational SAM sites in western Cuba, the area in which the missiles were located.

(U) An immediate U.S. concern at this point, prior to the discovery of the missiles, was the possibility that a U-2 might be downed by the SAMs. The 1 May 1960 U-2 incident involving Francis Gary Powers' flight over the Soviet Union was very much in the minds of U.S. decision makers. This concern was reinforced when a U-2 that had been provided to the Republic of China was shot down over the People's Republic of China on 9 September. A decision was made to avoid possible incidents by not conducting flights in the vicinity of the SAM facilities in western Cuba.

As a consequence, the USIB National Intelligence Estimate of September 19th concluded that offensive missiles were not deployed in Cuba (George and Smoke, p. 478).

After additional information concerning the possible presence of missiles in Cuba came to the attention of policy makers, flights were resumed. The first successful overflight on 14 October produced solid evidence that missiles were present in Cuba.

This discovery inaugurated a week-long period during which policy options were considered. Once a policy had been settled upon, President Kennedy made a public announcement of the Quarantine on 22 October.

Soviet Premier Krushchev announced on 28 October that the missiles would be removed. On November 7th he stated that the missiles had been removed. President Kennedy lifted the blockade on 20 November.

The U.S. employed the period from the discovery of the missiles (14 October) until the announcement of the Quarantine (22 October) to marshal tremendous forces in the region.

Both Western and Soviet public accounts of the response state that approximately 180 Navy ships were involved in the operation (Allison, p. 127; Ovsyany, p. 172).

Eight carriers were in the response. The attack carriers were Enterprise, Independence, and Saratoga. The CVS units were Essex, Lake Champlain, Randolph, Wasp, and Lexington. The Lexington had been recently converted from the CVA category (10 October 1962) and carried an attack air wing for at least part of the response. The standard Navy Department citation for the operation (e.g., CVAN-70 testimony) lists the carrier force as 3 CVA and 5 CVS, a practice followed in the International Incidents project's lists.

The amphibious force included 4 LPH units: Boxer, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Thetis Bay. There were approximately 60 amphibious types in the response. Had an invasion of Cuba been required 28 MSTs vessels were available to support the amphibious force.

A 5000 man Marine force was in position within 48 hours. A MEB of more than 10,000 (the 5th MEB) sailed from the West Coast in less than 96 hours. Approximately 45,000 Marines would have been involved in the landing operations had that contingency option been selected. Four Marine Air Groups were in the region.

During the early part of the crisis amphibious forces evacuated approximately 3,200 civilians from the base at Guantanamo.

Surface combatants in the response included 1 CLG, 2 DLG, 5 DDG, 2 DDR, and 49 DD.

Virtually every source has something to say concerning the crisis. Allison and George and Smoke provide good unclassified treatments. Their bibliographies are good introductions to the available literature. Command Histories, and Bendix provided the information presented on the Navy's forces in the response. Selected Analysis has a good summary of Marine activities during the response.

X Sino-Indian War 10-11/1962

Possible Navy involvement in responses to this war is almost completely ignored by the standard sources. This is quite reasonable. The period in which the Navy's reaction took place (19-20 November) was also the time in which the Cuban Missile Crisis blockade was lifted.

Dennis states that the Navy responded to the crisis but does not provide any detailed information. The Command History collection for the period is incomplete.

The best source is Maxwell (1970: 411) who states that Indian Prime Minister Nehru requested U.S. fighters for possible combat operations against the PRC. In Maxwell's words:

"In response, an American aircraft carrier was dispatched from the Pacific towards Indian waters; but the crisis passed twenty-four hours after Nehru made this appeal, and the aircraft carrier turned back before it reached the Bay of Bengal."

Alan Whiting (at the time Director of the Office of Research and Analysis, Far East, INR, Department of State) cites Maxwell's account in his book (1975: 167), thereby adding to its credibility.

While it is admittedly one of the shortest responses on record (cut short by the Chinese announcement of a ceasefire), it is, nevertheless, one of the most interesting cases from a political-military perspective. For one thing it denotes a marked change in Indian behavior (previously noted for affirmations of independence and opposition to superpower military presence in the Third World). Additionally it could have evolved into a direct U.S.-PRC confrontation, possibly one involving military conflict.

X Yemen Civil War/Saudi Arabia 1-7/1963

On 27 September 1962 elements of the Yemeni Army staged a coup against the

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

Royalist Government. This initiated the Yemen Civil War. Saudi Arabia supported the Royalist faction. Egypt (then known as the United Arab Republic) backed the rebellious Republican faction.

Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic relations with the UAR on 8 November 1962.

In 1963, as the civil war continued and relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAR deteriorated, the U.S. deployed tactical units in and around Saudi Arabia. The goals behind these deployments were to deter the UAR from attacking targets in Saudi Arabia, to deter the UAR from conducting air operations over Saudi territory, to demonstrate U.S. support to the Saudi government, to augment the Saudi's air defense capabilities, to counter what was seen as an increase in the UAR's prestige and influence in the Middle East, and to promote a settlement of the Yemeni conflict.

The U.S. military response took two forms: an Air Force deployment of tactical fighters and other aircraft (Operation 'Hard Surface') and a Navy patrol in the Red Sea augmented by periodic port visits to Saudi Arabia.

There had been a short term deployment of USAF F-100D fighters on 15-18 November 1962. In January plans began to be formulated for a more extended deployment.

Destroyer types visited the Saudi ports of Jidda, Ras Tanura, and Yenbo in January and February.

As tensions continued to mount in the region, CINCSRIKE, CINCNELM, and USCINCEUR were advised to be prepared to send 8 F-100D aircraft from the U.S. to Jidda on short notice.

UAR planes raided the Saudi port of Qinzan on 3 March.

On 8 March the Joint Chiefs directed USEUCOM to send 2 destroyers to the Red Sea to augment COMIDEASTFOR's forces which had been there since earlier in the month. Two MIDEASTFOR destroyers took up patrol stations in the vicinity of Jidda and Zagrat on 9 March. The two Sixth Fleet destroyers arrived on station on the 12th. This patrol, which was the most significant Navy contribution to the response, lasted until 25 April when it was discontinued at the direction of the Joint Chiefs and the two destroyers in the augmentation force returned to the Sixth Fleet.

On 7 April, the UAR, Syria, and Iraq announced that they were forming a federation. While ultimately nothing came of this, it appeared at the time to denote an increase in the UAR's power and influence in the region and a corresponding decline in the regional standing of the UAR's rival: Saudi Arabia.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

In response to the report of the federation, the President made a public statement on 8 May indicating that the U.S. would oppose aggression in the region (whether direct or indirect) and would do so both through the United Nations and unilaterally.

The advance USAF party was given orders on 19 April. On 6 May it arrived in Saudi Arabia. Included in the group were a C-130 communications aircraft, an air rescue team, and logistical aircraft. Additional communications units were deployed on 12 May.

The President approved the deployment of the tactical USAF element on 13 June. It included 8 F-100D, 3 KB-50 tankers, and 2 C-130 support aircraft. The President indicated that the unit was to arrive about the time of (but not prior to) the arrival of a UN observer team in Yemen. This team arrived on the scene in the period 13-17 June.

On 9 June the Saudis reported another UAR raid on Qizan.

The tactical USAF unit arrived at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on 5 July. Its rules of engagement specified that UAR aircraft which intruded into Saudi air space were to be escorted out by using harassing tactics if at all possible and that the intruders were to be fired upon only if they initiated combat.

The force remained in Saudi Arabia for the remainder of the year. The major psychological impact appears to have been in July.

Elements of MIDEASTFOR continued to make port visits. Perhaps the most significant was the deployment of the CVS Essex (plus 1 DD and 1 AVP) to Jidda on 30 October for an ASW and firepower demonstration. Previous Navy Department treatments of the Yemen response do not include this port visit in the actual response (e.g., CVAN-70 testimony, p. 164).

The best sources for operation are the USCINCEUR Command History, the MIDEASTFOR Command History, and Gilmore.

Jordan 4/1963

On 7 April the governments of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq signed an agreement in Cairo to create a new United Arab Republic that would combine the three nations. This agreement closely followed coups in Iraq (8 February) and Syria (8 March). While ultimately nothing came of this agreement (at least insofar as the creation of a single nation-state was concerned), it did at the time appear to enhance the power and prestige of Egypt at the expense of other nations in the region which the U.S. was supporting (notably Saudi Arabia and Jordan; see the Yemen 1-7/1963 entry).

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
UNCLASSIFIED



At the same time there was political instability within Jordan. On 21 April the Jordanian cabinet fell, following rioting by pro-Egyptian elements within Jordan. King Hussein appointed a caretaker government on 22 April and moved to stabilize the situation.

In response to the April situation within Jordan, elements of the Sixth Fleet sortied and steamed towards the Eastern Mediterranean. The Enterprise and Bainbridge proceeded ahead of the main force and were within air strike range in less than 24 hours. From this position the Enterprise could have served as a staging point and/or refueling station for aircraft from the CVA Saratoga which followed. Amphibious forces in the response included TF 61/62 with BLT 3/2 embarked. When U.S. decision makers perceived that a serious crisis was not going to materialize the force was returned to normal operations. The entire operation lasted for approximately two days.

Aspects of the response are covered in AACU, Bendix, and the Sixth Fleet Command History.

Laos 4-5/1963 AB

After Pathet Lao forces had inflicted serious defeats on the neutralist faction in Laos (driving them from their strong points on the Plaine de Jarres), U.S. forces deployed to the area.

The carrier force included the Ticonderoga and the Ranger, both attack carriers. This force was accompanied by 1 CA and 5 DD.

The amphibious force consisted of approximately 1 BLT carried by the Princeton (LPH 5) and 2 other amphibious ships.

A ceasefire agreement was reached on 21 April. The forces returned to normal Seventh Fleet assignments on 5 May.

Bendix, Gilmore, and AACU provide information.

Haiti 4-6/1963 A<sup>9</sup>

A number of events increased tension in Haiti:

- on 16 April the government announced it had uncovered a plot to overthrow the Duvalier regime;
- on 23 April, as tensions continued to mount, Haitian forces entered the embassy of the Dominican Republic and seized 22 Haitian exiles who had sought asylum there;

- on 26 April, following threats of military action by the Dominican Republic, Haiti released the exiles and withdrew police from the embassy;
- on 28 April Haiti broke diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic;
- the U.S. withdrew a 30 man USMC training detachment from Haiti on 29 April;
- on 3 May Haiti declared martial law;
- on 8 May U.S. citizens were evacuated from Haiti;
- when President Duvalier refused to give up office at the end of his legal term, the U.S. broke diplomatic relations on 17 May;
- on 3 June when the situation stabilized (and with Duvalier still holding power) the U.S. resumed diplomatic relations.

The U.S. military response included the CVA Shangri-La accompanied by 1 DLG, 3 DDR, 2 DDG, 2 DD, and 4 MSO.

The amphibious force included 1 LPH (Boxer), plus 1 AKA, 1 APD, 1 LSD, and 1 LST. It carried HQ, 6th MEU; BLT 2/6; Prov MAG 40 (-); and HMM 264. VMA 533 of the 6th MEU was deployed to Guantanamo.

Backup amphibious forces included the 4th MEB embarked on the LPH Thetis Bay; HQ Company (-) 6th Marines, HMM-265, and A/1/8. BLT 2/2 was alerted for airlift.

A landing force was not put on shore. Navy ships evacuated 2,279 civilians on 8 May.

During the crisis the UK deployed 1 DD and 1 DE; the French deployed 4 destroyer types.

Bendix, Selected Analysis, Gilmore, and AACU cover the operation.

#### Haiti 8/1963

Following the previous Haitian Crisis, the Dominican Republic provided assistance to Haitian rebels who opposed the Duvalier regime.

Groups of Haitian exiles invaded Haiti on 5 and 15 August.

On 6 August the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron sailed to the Gulf of Gonave. It was on station by 8 August and withdrawn on 22 August.

The amphibious force consisted of 1 LPH (Boxer), 1 AKA, 1 APD, 1 LSD, and 1 LST. Marine forces embarked included 1 MEU (formed around BLT 2/2).

The only carrier connected with the operation was the CVA Forrestal which was alerted for the response.

The Haitian government easily defeated the rebels.

The Dominican Republic government which had provided support to the rebels was itself overthrown in September (see below).

Selected Analysis, Bendix, AACU, and Gilmore cover facets of the operation.

Vietnam Civil Disorders 8-11/1963 51

The U.S. responded to a series of domestic disturbances in South Vietnam which culminated in the coup overthrowing President Diem.

Carrier forces in the contingency response included the attack units Hancock and Oriskany.

Amphibious forces included the LPH Iwo Jima carrying an estimated 1 BLT.

Gilmore and AACU are the best sources; Bendix also covers the operation.

PRC-ROC 9/1963 52

As is the case with other incidents involving the People's Republic of China, only partial information is available concerning this operation (see the entry for PRC-ROC 7/1957).

On 20 September the CVA Hancock was directed to move to a position off Taiwan in anticipation of a PRC bombardment of the offshore islands. It appears to have been in position on the 22nd and to have departed from the station (en route to Yokosuka) on the 24th.

The PRC-ROC tensions that prompted this response may have been engendered by the level of ROC raiding activity directed at the mainland. Gilmore's entry for 20

August 1963 notes a ROC source's announcement that there had been 15 Chinese Nationalist landings on the mainland since May of that year.

As is the case with some other responses, no information is available concerning the possible participation of amphibious or surface combatant types in this action.

Gilmore notes the initiation of the operation. Additional information is contained in files maintained at the Navy History Center. Data is also available in unclassified files maintained at the Brookings Institution.

This is the last entry in the International Incidents project's files in which the PRC was the principal target for U.S. actions (excluding engagements which were related to the Indochinese War). The fact that this is the last incident involving China may be related to a shift in U.S. diplomatic policy which took place in late 1963/early 1964 in which the U.S. attempted to reduce the level of tension between the People's Republic and the U.S., (see Seymour (1976: 269) for a brief discussion of American diplomatic overtures during this period).

53 Dominican Republic 9-12/1963

On 25 September a coup overthrew the government of President Bosch. This occurred during a period when the U.S. government was extremely concerned with the overthrow of Latin and Central American governments by military coups.

The U.S. suspended diplomatic relations and cut off economic aid. Additionally the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron was alerted for the response. This unit was formed around the LPH Boxer and would have conducted operations with 1 BLT as the basic Marine force.

The alert was cancelled on 14 December.

Selected Analysis and Bendix provide the best coverage.

54 Indonesia-Malaysia 9-12/1963

The Federation of Malaysia was created on 16 September. The Sukarno regime in Indonesia laid claim to some of Malaysia's territories and conducted a guerilla war in Sabah and Sarawak, provinces of the new Malaysian government that were located on the island of Borneo (the lower portions of which were Indonesian).

The Western responses to Indonesian activities was primarily carried out by the United Kingdom (with assistance from other Commonwealth nations such as Australia). However, there were some demonstrative actions taken by the U.S. to support the Federation.

One of these was the visit of the AV (seaplane carrier) Salisbury Sound to Singapore from 29 November until 17 December with the commander of the Seventh Fleet Patrol Force embarked. Singapore was at that time one of the component members of the Malaysian Federation.

One attack carrier was in the region during the period: the Hancock through early December followed by the Midway. No other forces appear to have been directly involved.

AACU and Bendix provide the best information.

Venezuela-Colombia 11/1963 55

CINCLANT aircraft conducted surveillance for ships believed to be carrying arms to the FALN revolutionary movement in Venezuela. The destination of the ships was believed to be a point near the Venezuelan-Colombian border.

The operation appears to have commenced on 9 November. On 13 November aircraft of Task Unit 81.7.7 spotted the probable target and ended surveillance after notifying the Venezuelan Navy.

No carriers, surface combatants, or amphibious forces appear to have been involved in the response.

Gilmore provides the best coverage; Bendix also lists the operation.

Zanzibar 1/1964 56

On 12 January a rebel movement overthrew the regime in Zanzibar. Civil disorders accompanied this action.

On 13 January the U.S. DD Manley evacuated 54 U.S. citizens and 36 nationals of other countries. It was accompanied by HMS Owen and RFA Hebe in this operation.

Many sources omit this operation. Gilmore provides coverage.

No amphibious or carrier forces appear to have been involved in the response.

Ironically the evacuees were conveyed to Dar es Salaam Tanganyika (see below).

CONFIDENTIAL

(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

57  
Tanganyika 1/1964

After the Manley carried evacuees from Zanzibar to Dar es Salaam, it headed north towards Aden.

On 20 January there was an army mutiny in Tanganyika. The Manley was directed to return there for possible evacuations.

On 25 January British forces landed in East Africa and put down the mutiny. No additional evacuations were required.

Hankinson provides an excellent summary of the British operation in East Africa. Gilmore cites the USN response.

Caribbean Surveillance-Cuba 1-4/1964

58  
Gilmore provides the best summary of this operation:

"As a result of possible arms smuggling and related tensions under Cuban sponsorship, two DE-type ships supported by maritime air as a quick response force for surveillance/intercept operations were stationed in the southern Caribbean. The mission of this force included the conduct of ship operations and traffic surveillance to facilitate unilateral and bilateral operations if directed. The work of the force was terminated 14 April 1964." (entry for 15 January 1964).

For the most part the International Incidents project lists operations of this sort in conjunction with the names of the country or countries that were the presumed targets for Cuban activity (e.g., the earlier reference to Venezuela). Since this was a special patrol oriented more towards the source of the arms traffic than the targets it is being carried as a separate operation. Bendix cites this operation. It subsumes the Yucatan Channel entry found in Bendix.

59  
Panama 1-4/1964

On 9 January the Government of Panama suspended diplomatic relations with the United States. This followed serious rioting in the Canal Zone (triggered by a dispute concerning the flying of the U.S. and Panamanian flags) which left 4 U.S. soldiers and 20 Panamanians dead.

At the time the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron was in the area to conduct jungle warfare training. A BLT was embarked. This unit remained in the area until 18 February.

C-46

CONFIDENTIAL

On 18 February this unit was relieved by another amphibious squadron with the 8th MEU embarked. This unit included the LPH Guam. The second force remained in the area until 10 April.

On 3 April the U.S. and Panama reached political agreements and resumed diplomatic recognition.

The best available information indicates that only amphibious forces were involved in the response.

Selected Analysis, NMCC, Bendix, and Gilmore cite the operation and the political events which lead to the response.

Venezuela 1-11/1964 60

During this period Cuba was believed to be supplying Venezuelan rebels with arms and personnel. The U.S. established special surveillance patrols in response.

Only VP aircraft and surface patrol units were involved in the operation. The patrol terminated on 7 November after observing more than 200 vessels.

Bendix, Gilmore, and the CINCLANTFLT Command History cover the response in summary.

Sometimes this response is divided into a number of separate sub-responses. It appears that it was one continuous operation with intermittent levels of activity as targets for observation presented themselves.

Cyprus 1-10/1964 61

Major U.S. involvement in the Cyprus Crisis began in late January when the United Kingdom indicated that it was no longer prepared to attempt to manage the crisis by itself.

During an earlier period of communal tension (27 December 1963 through 6 January 1964) a Sixth Fleet destroyer had been stationed off the island.

The U.S. response (and the crisis) fell into a number of phases.

The first phase took place in January and February. After renewed conflict between Turkish and Greek factions occurred on the 21st of January, elements of the Sixth Fleet were deployed to the vicinity.

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

A surface combatant patrol was established off the northwest coast of the island. This force was on station by the 25th and usually consisted of a single DD or DDG.

An amphibious squadron was on station from 27 January through 6 March.

These were contingency evacuation forces. The destroyer was ca. 12 nautical miles from the island; the amphibious group approximately 120 nautical miles away.

During late January a Turkish invasion of the island was feared. To prevent this the U.S. engaged in diplomatic initiatives. Beginning on 9 February George Ball went on a mission to Athens, Nicosia, and Ankara.

During this period there was no military evacuation. However, beginning on 4 February, U.S. citizens were evacuated via chartered commercial airliners.

The second phase of the crisis took place in March. Although the UN Security Council had voted on 4 March to establish a peacekeeping force on the island, fighting continued. On the 10th through the 13th Turkey alerted its forces and appeared to be preparing for an invasion.

At this time the Navy forces included PHIBRON 4, the destroyer patrol off the north coast, and a carrier group formed around the Enterprise on station approximately 250 miles south of the island.

The situation stabilized somewhat with the arrival of the UN force. Its first contingents arrived on the 14th and the force went into operation on 27 March.

The third phase of the crisis took place in June. There was evidence that Turkey planned an invasion. The U.S. political response took the form of a sharply worded diplomatic note from President Johnson to the Government of Turkey warning of the repercussions that would follow from an invasion and the second Ball mediation mission to the region.

Forces on station from 5 to 7 June included 1 DD on the surface patrol and the Enterprise group stationed within 8 hours of the island. Tensions abated on the 7th.

In July Dean Acheson attempted to mediate the crisis. His plan was rejected by the Government of Cyprus.

The final phase of the crisis took place in August. Following attacks on Turkish Cypriot villages, Turkish aircraft attacked Greek Cypriot positions on Cyprus. These attacks took place on the 7th through the 9th.

C-48

**CONFIDENTIAL**



On 8 August a CTG formed around the Roosevelt was on its way to a holding position 100 miles west of Cyprus. It and its escorts operated on this station until relieved on 29 August by the Forrestal. At the same time the destroyer force was on 3 hour reaction status.

Tensions eased with a ceasefire on the 10th. Agreement on the role to be played by the UN force on the 22nd of October also helped to stabilize the situation.

The requirement for a CTG was cancelled on 2 September; the destroyer patrol terminated on 16 October.

Generally one attack carrier was involved in the intermittent deployments during the course of the response.

The basic amphibious force consisted of 1 BLT, 2 APA, 1 AKA, 2 LSD, and 1 LST. BLT 3/2 and PHIBRON 6 were relieved on station by BLT 1/8 and PHIBRON 4 on 6 February.

The north coast patrol force usually consisted of a single destroyer type (DD or DDG).

Gilmore, Bendix, Ides, NMCC, Command Histories, and AACU cover facets of the response.

#### Brazil 3-4/1964      6-2

Following domestic unrest (which culminated in a military coup) a Navy force including the CVA Forrestal moved off Santos, Brazil. This unit was on station from 31 March to 3 April.

On 2 April President Goulart was deposed and Mazzilli sworn in as the new President of Brazil.

Gilmore covers the operation.

#### Laos 4-6/1964      6-3

Following an abortive coup attempt by rightist Royal Laotian forces on 19 April, Pathet Lao units made increased gains in their civil conflict against other factions.

On 21 April the Kitty Hawk and 3 destroyers were directed to a position within 48 hours of Danang.

On 18 May carrier aircraft began low level aerial reconnaissance missions over Laos.

On 7 and 8 June Navy planes flying reconnaissance missions were shot down over Laos. In retaliation on 9 June the U.S. flew air strikes against Pathet Lao anti-aircraft positions. Constellation and Kitty Hawk were the attack carriers involved.

On 21 May the standing carrier presence at Yankee Station was initiated.

Amphibious forces were definitely in the region during this period but do not seem to have been involved in this operation.

The response is covered in the NMCC Operational Summary, CINCPAC Command History, Gilmore, AACU, and Bendix.

b11  
Guantanamo 4-7/1964

This was one of the more serious periods of Cuban harassment. On 27 April there were indications that the government of Cuba intended to have demonstrations take place along the perimeter of the base.

The Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron (including the LPH Boxer and 1 BLT) was deployed to the base during the period 1-7 May. An increased state of readiness at the base continued through July.

A continuing problem from 6 February through 30 July was water; the Cubans had cut off the water supply in February. On the latter date the first desalination plant became operational.

Selected Analysis, Bendix, and Gilmore are the sources for this response.

b5  
Panama 5/1964

The U.S. was concerned that violence might accompany the Presidential elections in Panama.

On 7 May the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron (including 1 LPH and 1 BLT: see preceding Cuba 1-7/1964 entry) was directed to redeploy from Guantanamo to the vicinity of Panama, remaining out of sight of land. It arrived on 10 May and remained until 20 May.

The election was held on 10 May and the results certified on the 13th.

No carrier forces appear to have been involved in the response.

Selected Analysis covers the response.

Dominican Republic 7/1964 66

On 24 July the Navy began 4 days of special patrol operations designed to detect Cuban activities (e.g., arms shipments) directed at the Dominican Republic.

Only surface and air patrols were conducted. There is no evidence that amphibious and carrier forces participated in the response. Gilmore and Bendix cite the operation.

Gulf of Tonkin 8/1964 67

On 2 August North Vietnamese MTBs engaged the USS Maddox. The Maddox and aircraft from the CVA Ticonderoga sank two of the patrol boats and damaged a third.

On 4 August the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy were again engaged; two patrol boats were sunk. The Ticonderoga provided CAP.

Retaliatory strikes against the North Vietnamese mainland were announced by the President on 4 August. On 5 August they were carried out by aircraft from the Ticonderoga and Constellation. This was operation 'Pierce Arrow'.

The International Incidents project dates the beginning of the Vietnam/Indochina War from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which followed these attacks on 10 August 1964.

Bendix and the CINCPACFLT Command History cover the operation.

(Vietnam/Indochina War 8/1964-3/1975)

The beginning of U.S. involvement is defined by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 10 August 1964. The end is defined by the final evacuation from Saigon, 29 April 1975.

Haiti 8/1964 68

On 7 August CINCLANT initiated a two-day surveillance operation designed to locate a ship that was believed to be connected with Haitian rebel forces.

The response involved surface and aerial patrols; no carriers or amphibious units were involved.

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

Bendix, CINCLANT Command History, and Gilmore are the sources for this response.

69 Panama 1/1965

On 7 January USCINCSO began to prepare forces in anticipation of possible rioting that might accompany the first anniversary of the 9 January 1964 riots (covered in the Panama 1-4/1964 entry above). Most of the preparations involved the Canal Zone police force and the Army Brigade stationed in the Zone.

However, on 9 January USNAVSO had 1 LST dedicated to the contingency operation. It was on 1 hour sailing notice on the Pacific side of Panama. This LST remained on alert on 10 January, when some of the other forces were released from full time alert status. On 12 January this LST (as well as most of the other forces which had been alerted) was released to normal operational activity.

This operation is covered in the NMCC.

70 Tanzania 1/1965

The 18 January 1965 (p. 13) entry in the NMCC Operational Summary states:

Following the expulsion from Tanzania of Consul General Carlucci and Deputy Chief of Mission Gordon, the Department of State requested that USS Richard K. Kraus (DD-849) be directed to take station within 10 hours reaction time and out of sight of land for possible evacuation of U.S. nationals from Tanzania. The JCS directed CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA to alert COMIDEASTFOR to the possibility of an evacuation mission from Tanzania but indicated no change in schedule of port calls.

Because of fuel requirements, COMIDEASTFOR directed the Kraus to proceed from Tamatave to Diego-Suarez for fueling and then to proceed to the 10-hour reaction station. The Kraus departed Diego-Suarez at 170250 EST and was estimating arrival on the 10-hour arc at 172330 EST.

The Department of State cancelled the requirement for the mission at 171122 EST, and the Kraus was directed to resume normal operations.

This was the third evacuation contingency operation involving Tanzania in two years; see the earlier operations involving its two component parts: Tanganyika 1/1964 and Zanzibar 1/1964.

CONFIDENTIAL

British Guiana 4/1965 72

Air and surface patrols were undertaken in response to domestic violence. The violence was believed to be related to Cuban activities in the country.

On 11 April Navy aircraft located a Cuban ship (Bahia de Neutivatis) which was believed to be carrying arms to rebel forces within British Guiana. Surveillance was held until HMS Rothsay arrived on the scene.

No amphibious or carrier forces were involved in the response.

Bendix and Gilmore cite the operation.

Venezuela-Colombia 1-4/1965 71

Another instance in which patrols were conducted by VP aircraft and surface combatants in the Caribbean to identify clandestine arms shipments and movement of personnel.

No amphibious or carrier units appear to have been involved in the operation.

Bendix and Ides cite the operation.

Dominican Republic 4/1965-9/1966 73

The U.S. responded to civil conflict in the Dominican Republic. Initial actions involved the evacuation of U.S. nationals; later acts were directed at maintaining order and assisting in the establishment of a stable political climate in the country. Draper has a good (critical) assessment of the political aspects of the operation.

On 25 April 1965 the U.S. embassy indicated that a landing might be required to protect American lives and conduct evacuations.

By noon on the 26th an amphibious force was on station south of the island 12 hours off of Santo Domingo. This force consisted of the 6th MEB (formed around BLT 3/6 and HMM 263) and was embarked in an amphibious force consisting of the LPH Boxer plus 1 LPD, 1 APD, 1 LSD, and 1 LST. An additional AKA was on the northern side of the island.

Evacuations commenced on the 27th. By the 30th ca. 2,400 evacuees had been removed by the amphibious force.

As the situation continued to deteriorate, elements of the 6th MEU (2 companies plus battalion HQ) landed on the 28th. Additional elements of the MEU followed on the 29th. By the end of the 29th approximately 1,500 Marines were in the Dominican Republic.

Army airborne units began to deploy on the 30th. By 1 May a total of 1,580 Marines and 2,262 Army troops were on the island.

The U.S. force on 5 May included 10,210 Army troops, 6,924 Marines (organized into a 4 BLT 4th MEB plus PROV MAG 60) plus a Navy force on station which included 6 destroyers, 2 attack cargo ships, 3 amphibious transports, 2 amphibious assault ships, 3 amphibious landing ships, and 2 minesweepers. Additional forces alerted for the operation included 1 CA, 1 CVA, 1 CVS, and 11 DD.

On 7 May Army LTGEN Palmer was designated as the commander of U.S. forces and the Navy commanded JTF was dissolved. On 23 May the Inter-American Force was created with Brazilian General Panasco Alvim as commander; Palmer served as his deputy.

By 6 June 1965 all Marine forces had been withdrawn. This did not end Marine participation in the response; the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON 10) remained on alert.

The Navy force supporting this operation (TF 124) was dis-established on 25 September 1965. The Navy continued to support the operation by providing contingency forces.

The most significant contingency response came in January 1966. Dominican Republic Provisional President Godoy published a decree which assigned a number of leading officers (both loyalists and rebels) to foreign attache positions on 6 January. Inter-American Force troops assumed a state of increased readiness. The 1 BLT Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron (underway to Guantanamo on 7 January) was part of the contingency force which was not required to go into action as events settled down by the 10th.

On 28 June 1966 U.S. forces began to be withdrawn from the country. The operations of the Inter-American Force ended on the 20th of September 1966.

Carrier forces in the operation included 1 CVA and 1 CVS.

The LPH units which participated in the course of the response were the Boxer, Guadalcanal, and Okinawa.

The NMCC provides the best running account of the operation. All of the major sources have something to say concerning it.

Yemen 7/1965-11/1967 74

Bendix contains an entry for a 7-8/1965 Yemen response which involved MIDEASTFOR surface combatants carrying out presence and surveillance missions. July and August 1965 were critical months in the Yemeni civil war. Egyptian President Nasser and Saudi King Faysal agreed to convene a conference of Yemenis from all factions to establish an interim government prior to the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen. This entry encompasses the earlier Bendix one and draws upon additional source materials available at the Operational Archives of the U.S. Navy Historical Division (the Bendix study's survey of operational activity ended in August 1965).

The U.S. response to the Yemen civil war involved both international facets of that conflict. On the one hand it bore on U.S. support for Saudi Arabia in its competition with Egypt. This competition took place both in Yemen (as each backed different Yemeni factions) and throughout the Middle East. The other facet of the conflict related to the problems the United Kingdom encountered in its Southern Arabian Federation, as the Republican faction in Yemen (S'ana) supported rebel movements in what was to become the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, (also known as South Yemen and Yemen-Aden).

The conference of Yemeni factions referred to in the first paragraph met from 23 November to 24 December 1965 without coming to agreement. The failure of the conference led to renewed tensions between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Government was concerned about the possibility of Egyptian attacks. The Saudis requested increased American ship visits to Saudi Arabia and pressed for early delivery of HAWK air defense missiles and air defense aircraft. MIDEASTFOR visits and presence in the area in the period through April 1966 helped to alleviate Saudi fears.

Through early 1967 the situation remained critical, with the Saudi Government reporting Egyptian attacks on Saudi towns. The settlement of the Saudi-Egyptian crisis over Yemen appears to have been due, in large part, to Egypt's defeat in the June 1967 War. On 31 August 1967 the Egyptians and Saudis agreed to the terms for the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Yemen. The actual withdrawal was initiated in September. The situation in Southern Yemen changed with its achievement of independence in November 1967.

The destroyers of MIDEASTFOR were the principal military policy instruments employed by the U.S. in this response.

The best sources for information concerning this response are files maintained in the Operational Archives of the U.S. Navy History Division, MIDEASTFOR Command Histories, Bendix, and (for some of the major political events) "A Select Chronology... Middle East."

75

Cyprus 8/1965

The 1964 Cyprus Crisis had ended without resolving the major issues that had caused communal tensions on the island, notably the status of the minority Turkish Cypriot community.

In late July the Government of Cyprus (predominately Greek Cypriot) announced changes in the electoral system, the extension of the term of office of President Makarios, and the dismissal of Vice President Fazil Kutchuk. The Turkish Cypriot community protested these actions.

On 3 August the Government of Turkey, acting to protect the interest of Turkish Cypriots, brought the issue of the constitutional changes to the attention of the UN Security Council.

On 10 August the Security Council called upon all sides to the conflict to avoid taking any actions that might exacerbate the crisis.

While tension increased on the island, the crisis had very little effect. It is of far less significance than the 1964, 1967, 1974, and 1975 Cyprus Crises.

Both Bendix and Ides cite the response without covering it in detail.

Both indicate that carrier units were involved in the response. It appears that the two CVAs in the area alternated as the contingency unit. The CVA force consisted of the Shangri-La and Roosevelt. The CVS Randolph, which was in the Mediterranean during part of the period, does not appear to have played a role in this response.

The amphibious force is cited by both sources as a factor in the U.S. response. TF 61/62 consisted of BLT 2/2 embarked on 2 LSD, 2 APA, 1 AKA, and 1 LST.

While the details of the operation are sketchy, it appears to resemble the 1967 response more than the 1964 one in that elements of the fleet did not close to the immediate area.

Bendix, Ides, and Cyprus Crisis files maintained at the U.S. Navy History Division are the best sources for information.



CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

Indonesia 9/1965-7/1966 76

On September 30th there was an abortive rebellion involving elements of the Indonesian Communist Party and the Indonesian Army. The relationship of Indonesian President Sukarno to this coup is uncertain (Van Der Kroef provides a good summary treatment of what is known about the coup; a CIA research study ("Indonesia-1965, The Coup That Backfired") gives a detailed account.

After the failure of the coup there was a massive purge of members of the Indonesian Communist Party. In addition, President Sukarno began to lose power to the Indonesian military.

President Sukarno yielded to an Army ultimatum and turned over authority to General Suharto on 12 March 1966. In late July a new cabinet was formed which was headed by Suharto. While effective power was in the hands of Suharto, he was not formally named President of Indonesia until March 13, 1967.

Very little is known concerning the U.S. response to this coup and its aftermath. The CINCPAC Command History for 1965 indicates that an amphibious task force was standing by as a contingency evacuation force over the period 2-9 October (the period of serious fighting following the initial coup attempt). It is not clear which amphibious forces in the Seventh Fleet were involved in this operation. The most obvious candidate units are:

- 76.2.1, 2 APA, 2 LSD, and the LPH Iwo Jima (and)
- 76.2.2, 2 AKA, 1 APA, 3 LSD plus COMPHIBRON 5.

<sup>9-16</sup>  
Indo-Pakistani War 10-11/1965 77

On 11 September, 1 AVP and 1 DD from MIDEASTFOR left Bahrein en route to Karachi, Pakistan. They were sent as a contingency evacuation force in response to the war, which had broken out in the first week of September. Their ETA was set at 1500 hours (EDT) on the 14th. They were directed to remain out of sight of land once arriving on station.

On the 15th, USAF planes evacuated U.S. civilians from West Pakistan. A comparable operation was flown in East Pakistan on the 19th.

On the 21st the MIDEASTFOR evacuation contingency force consisted of 1 AVP and 2 DD. They were directed to take stations within six hours reaction time of Karachi in case additional evacuations were required.

C-57

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

On the 27th the force was reduced to 1 AVP and 1 DD and the reaction time was increased from 6 to 48 hours.

On 5 October the two ships were released to return to regular operations.

The NMCC provides the best coverage of the operation.

78 Greek Coup 4/1967

The military coup took place on 21 April.

In response a carrier group (formed around the CVA America) was immediately dispatched to the Ionian Sea. Its missions included (1) a show of force, (2) possible helicopters evacuations of personnel, (3) possible evacuation of special weapons and associated personnel, (4) the maintenance of communications links with U.S. diplomatic stations on Cyprus.

A ready posture was maintained in the eastern Ionian Sea until 13 May after a significant reduction in forces on the 26th of April.

Two amphibious groups were in the Mediterranean to conduct PHIBLEX 10-67 at Aranci Bay, Sardinia. This exercise lasted from 18-20 April. The force consisted of Regimental Landing Team 6 with units of BLT 3/8 and BLT 1/6. Amphibious squadrons 12 and 6 provided the lift for these units.

These two amphibious groups were included in the contingency task force. Their primary mission was to be prepared to assist in the evacuation of weapons and personnel.

The best sources for the operation are the Sixth Fleet Command History and the NMCC.

79 Middle East War 5-6/1967

On 13 May Egypt positioned its forces on the Sinai border. Israel mobilized in response. On 18 May the UN peacekeeping force was removed.

On 22 May Egypt announced that the Gulf of Aqaba was to be closed to Israeli shipping. This initiated the most serious pre-war phase of the crisis.

The Marine BLT in the Mediterranean remained on liberty in Naples until 25 May when it went to Malta for a previously scheduled training exercise. U.S. decision makers on the scene considered this to be a major crisis management signal (consult Howe, p. 70).

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

By 29 May the carriers Saratoga and America were on station off Crete. At the same time the CVS (carrying a CVA airwing) Intrepid was held off of Libya on the 24th to indicate that it was not part of a crisis response. The Intrepid transited the Suez Canal on the 31st, en route to SEASIA.

The destroyer Dyess transited the Canal on 2 June, joining 2 DDs from MIDEASTFOR in the Red Sea.

British operations during the period resulted in the positioning of British CVAs on either side of the Suez Canal: the Hermes off Aden by 31 May and the Victorious off Malta by 24 May.

The war commenced on the 5th of June. Initially the fleet was held back to indicate American non-involvement in the fighting.

The first significant fleet movement occurred on 6 June. The U.S. and Soviet Union differed as to the form that a ceasefire agreement should take. In the words of Howe (p. 95):

As it happened, the Sixth Fleet carrier task forces had begun speeding at twenty knots in a southeasterly direction in order to vary their position while still maintaining a neutral posture with respect to the Arab-Israeli war. The ships were under orders to remain at least 200 miles from the area of conflict, and proceeded to a position about 100 miles southeast of Crete....Although this change of position was ordered on the initiative of local commanders, the movement represented a timely underlining of American determination.

By noon on 7 June the carriers had returned to the vicinity of Crete.

The USS Liberty incident took place on 8 June. ?

The second major fleet action was orchestrated at the Washington level. On 10 June the Syrian's situation had become hopeless. In response the Soviets escalated their rhetoric. In reaction the President ordered a high speed movement of the carrier force from the vicinity of Crete towards Syria. This lasted from 9:30 am to 1:00 pm Washington time. A ceasefire agreement on the Syrian front was reached at approximately 12:30 pm.

Final hostilities ended on 11 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

The amphibious force stationed off of Malta during the response was formed around BLT 1/6. The Sixth Fleet amphibious complement during this period included 2 APA, 1 AKA, 2 LSD, and 1 LST.

Howe gives the best overall treatment of the response. Selected Analysis and the Command Histories also provide good coverage.

#### Eilat 10/1967

On 21 October the Israeli destroyer Eilat was attacked by Egyptian ships and struck by 2 surface-to-surface missiles while on patrol 13 nautical miles northeast of Port Said. Two hours after the initial attack the Eilat was struck by a third missile and sunk.

In response CINCUSNAVEUR ordered two CVA task groups (formed around the FDR and Saratoga) to assume positions west of the 25th meridian and 100 miles north of the African coast.

It is possible that the Navy's response was influenced by an erroneous report that a second Israeli ship had been sunk. The two-hour time interval between the attacks on the Eilat led to the erroneous report.

The NMCC provides good summary coverage of the operation as it was perceived at the time.

#### Cyprus 11-12/1967

On 15 November there was renewed communal violence on Cyprus. This led to a contingency deployment of certain elements of the Sixth Fleet in anticipation of possible evacuations. Throughout the response Sixth Fleet units remained away from the island to avoid creating the impression that the U.S. was siding with one of its NATO allies to the detriment of another. The principal contingency force from 15 through 20 November included the CVA Roosevelt, 2 DD, and the amphibious group formed around BLT 1/2.

Alert status was relaxed on the 20th as negotiations were being conducted.

The Vance mission arrived in Turkey on the 23rd. Following a Turkish rejection of proposals a second contingency deployment took place. This involved 1 CVA (Roosevelt) and 2 DD in the vicinity of Greece.

C-60

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

On 28 November Vance worked out an agreement that was acceptable to both Greece and Turkey; this eased tensions.

On the 29th Cypriot Archbishop (and chief of state) Makarios rejected the terms of the agreement. After his ultimate accession to its terms on 4 December the crisis passed.

The preponderance of the fleet was released from contingency status on 6 December; the final units were released on the 8th.

The amphibious group was a factor in planning through it; like all other units, remained clear of the immediate vicinity of Cyprus. It consisted of BLT 1/2, 2 APA, 1 AKA, 1 LSD and 1 LST.

There was an evacuation of U.S. citizens conducted by commercial aircraft on the 24th. There was no direct military involvement in this evacuation though the forces were available in the area if they had been required.

Various facets of the response are covered in Ides, NMCC, Gilmore, and Command Histories.

#### Pueblo 1-3/1968

The Pueblo was captured on the 23rd of January. No U.S. forces were in a position from which they could rescue the ship before it was taken into Wonsan harbor.

On the 24th TG 70.6 (consisting of the CVA Enterprise plus 1 DLG and 4 DD) was directed to Korea. By the end of the 24th it was on station south of Korea and east of Japan.

On the 29th of January 1 CA joined the Enterprise group. On the same day TG 70.0 (CVS Yorktown plus 6 DD) and TG 77.7 (CVA Ranger plus 3 DD) were en route to join the Enterprise group off of Korea.

The Ranger group arrived on the 31st, joining the Enterprise off of the eastern coast of Korea.

The Yorktown group was in a position off Pusan Korea by the 2nd of February.

On February 6th the Enterprise was directed to go through the Tsushima Straits, remaining within 12 hours of the Korean operational area.

C-61  
UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

On February 16th, COMCARDIV ONE transferred from the Enterprise to the Ranger; the Enterprise went to Yankee Station.

On 1 March the CVS Kearsarge relieved the CVS Yorktown, which went to Yankee Station. The CVA Coral Sea replaced the Ranger on 5 March. On 22 March the carrier commitment to the region ended; there were intermittent deployments after that point but no standing CV force.

On 22 December 1968 the crew of the Pueblo was released.

#### EC-121 4/1969

On 15 April a U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane was shot down by DPRK fighters over the Sea of Japan. SAR operations were immediately initiated. The Navy's contribution to this effort included two destroyers.

On the 15th Secretary of State Rogers requested the Soviet Union's assistance in the SAR effort. A Soviet force in the area (1 DD and 1 DLG) was cooperative. It recovered debris from the EC-121, allowed a USAF plane to fly low over the DLG to photograph the material, and transferred it to one of the U.S. destroyers.

SAR efforts terminated on 19 April.

TF 71 was activated, drawing units from SEASIA. By the night of 18-19 April it had gathered in the Bashi Strait on its way north. It consisted of 3 attack carriers (Ticonderoga, Ranger, and Enterprise), 1 CVS (Hornet), 1 CG, 1 CA, 2 CLG, 2 DLG, plus 17 other destroyer types.

By 21 April it was in the Sea of Japan. The bulk of the force operated in the area until the 26th. The Enterprise plus escorts remained for 10 additional days.

No operations were conducted against the territory of the DPRK during the course of the operation.

Command Histories and the NMCC provide the best coverage.

#### Lebanon-Libyan Contingency Operations 9-11/1969

A coup overthrew the Libyan monarchy on 1 September. On the same day USCINCEUR directed his subordinate commanders to review plans for noncombatant evacuation and other contingencies. Commands were advised that no implementing actions were to be taken.

C-62  
CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED

At the same time there was some concern that the coup might have been related to a major Soviet naval exercise which took place off Egypt. Jesse Lewis (pp. 73-78) provides an unclassified evaluation of this argument.

The Libyan coup was immediately successful. The U.S. extended diplomatic recognition to the new regime on 7 September.

At the same time conditions were very unsettled in Lebanon. On 22 October Lebanese Prime Minister Karami resigned in response to protests against his use of the Lebanese Army to inhibit the use of Lebanese territory by Palestinian forces carrying out attacks against Israel.

In response, on 23 October USCINCEUR began to evaluate contingency plans for possible Lebanese operations.

The situation in Lebanon continued to deteriorate. On 23 October a 300-man Syrian force was reported to have entered Lebanon. On 24 October serious fighting occurred in the Lebanese city of Tripoli.

On 27 October planning was expanded to include Libya as well as Lebanon as a target for contingency operations. Through at least 19 November planning involved both nations, as events in Lebanon were seen to have possible repercussions for Libya.

On 2 November Lebanese and Palestinian forces agreed upon a ceasefire.

Three Navy forces participated in the contingency response. Over the period 26-30 October these were:

CTG 60.1 located east of Crete and 450 n.mi. from Lebanon formed around the CVA Kennedy, CLG Little Rock (with COMSIXTHFLT), 2 DDG, and 5 DD;

Amphibious TG 60.1 located near Soudha Bay Crete consisting of PHIBRON 4 (1 LPA, 1 LKA, 2 LSD and 1 LST) plus 1 embarked BLT;

CTG 60.2 consisting of the CVA Saratoga, 1 CG, 1 DLG, and 5 DD. On 26 October this force was located in the Tyrrhenian Sea and was prepared to conduct operations off either Libya or Lebanon. From the 28th to the 30th this force was moved (at night and under EMCON conditions) to a new holding position between Sicily and Crete which brought it closer to both nations.

Information on the operation is contained in the NMCC, Command Histories, and Gilmore.

CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED

Trinidad 4/1970

(U) The Government of Trinidad and Tobago declared a state of emergency on 21 April in response to civil unrest and a mutiny involving approximately 80 troops of the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment stationed at Teteron Bay, Trinidad. The Caribbean Ready Group was ordered to sail to the vicinity of Trinidad, staying 3-4 hours away from the island and out of sight of land. It's mission was to serve as a contingency force for the evacuation of U.S. nationals. At the same time, the U.K. frigate Jupiter also headed toward the area.

(U) On 22 April a U.S. arms shipment was delivered to the government by aircraft.

(U) The amphibious force arrived on station on the 23rd. By the 24th the government had the situation under control. The force was released from the operation on the 27th.

(U) The initial response force consisted of 1 DLG plus the amphibious group: BLT 3/2 and HMM 261 embarked in the Guam (LPH 7), 1 LKA, 1 LSD, and 2 LST. The DLG was released from the operation on the 23rd.

(U) No evacuations were conducted. No additional Navy forces appear to have been involved in the operation.

(U) NMCC provides excellent summary coverage.

Jordan 6/1970

(U) The first of two Jordanian Crises in 1970. The American response focused on evacuation contingencies.

(U) On 9 June the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) held 32 hostages in a hotel in Amman; 14 Americans were among those held. In addition, on the same day there was an unsuccessful assassination attempt against King Hussein. There was fighting between government and Palestinian forces in Jordan.

(C) Contingency plans formulated on 10 June envisioned the use of the CVA Forrestal (then located near Crete) to provide air cover. It could provide support within 12-24 hours. Army units would have provided the landing force.

(U) On 10 June the Assistant U.S. Army attache in Jordan was killed by Palestinian forces. Because of this (and due to continued fighting) the Secretary of State gave Embassy Amman discretionary authority to evacuate U.S. citizens.

C-64

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

(C) A detailed plan for operations in Jordan was set forth on 11 and 12 June. It envisioned support of an Army landing force by Navy units at 33°N/33°E: CVA Forrestal plus escorts. The force (TF 60.1) was on station on the 12th. Scheduled participation in exercise Dawn Patrol was cancelled.

(U) Tensions eased somewhat on the 12th. The PFLP released its hostages. Chartered commercial airlines with Red Cross markings evacuated 154 non-combatants to Beirut. Because of tensions in Lebanon the evacuees proceeded immediately to Athens. On the 13th other chartered flights rescued additional U.S. civilians.

(U) While the situation in Jordan abated, tensions flared in neighboring Lebanon. On 12 June demonstrators burned the Jordanian Embassy in Beirut. The ability of the GOL to protect ca. 6,000 U.S. citizens in Lebanon was questioned by U.S. authorities.

(U) The operational plan for Lebanon grew out of the one formulated for Jordan. The major change was the inclusion of TF 61/62 with an embarked BLT. In a single landing this force could conduct the bulk of the evacuation. The BLT had begun an amphibious exercise in Greece as part of NATO Exercise Dawn Patrol on the 13th. Reembarkation would take 12 hours; transit to Beirut added another 50 hours.

(U) The carrier Forrestal remained in the Eastern Mediterranean as the ready carrier. The CVA Roosevelt substituted as the host for the Secretary of Defense's visit of 17 June.

(U) Tensions in Lebanon abated on the 15th. On 17 June forces were returned to normal force reaction times.

(U) The limited Marine role in the initial phase of the contingency response appears to have been due to a shortage of helicopters. The amphibious force in June consisted of 1 BLT embarked on 1 LSD, 1 LKA, 1 LPA, 1 LPD, and 1 LST.

(U) The best source for information is the USCINCEUR Command History.

#### Jordan 9-10/1970

(U) This is the more significant of the two Jordanian Crises in 1970.

(U) Because of rising tensions in the region, elements of the Sixth Fleet were put on alert on 3 September.

(U) On 6 September commercial airliners were hijacked and taken to Dawson Field (another hijacking took place on the 9th). This was done by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. American citizens were among those held.

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

The CVA Independence was moved to 33°N/33°E on 9 September. At the same time USAF medical evacuation planes were moved to Turkey.

On 11 September the PFLP began to release hostages. (The final hostages were released on 29 September.) At this point the relative emphasis in U.S. planning began to shift from evacuation contingencies on the order of those envisioned in the preceding Jordanian Crisis to operations designed to support the government of Jordanian King Hussein.

From 9 through 11 September there was fighting in Jordan between Palestinian and Jordanian forces. In response, an additional carrier task group was moved east. By the 15th Navy forces in the Eastern Mediterranean included 2 attack carriers (Independence and Saratoga) plus an amphibious group (TF 61/62) consisting of BLT 2/2 embarked on 1 LPA, 1 LPD, 1 LKA, 1 LSD, and 1 LST.

Two significant events took place on 16 September. President Nixon was quoted by the Chicago Sun-Times as saying that the U.S. would intervene if the GOJ was seriously threatened and King Hussein initiated his offensive against Palestinian forces located in Jordan. Serious fighting broke out and continued on the 17th.

On the 18th Syrian intervention began, under the pretext that the forces crossing the border were Palestinian (and not Syrian).

There was an immediate U.S. response. The CVA Kennedy was directed to move from the Atlantic to the Eastern Mediterranean. In CONUS, elements of the 8th MAB (BLT 1/2 and HMM 365) were directed to proceed to the Eastern Mediterranean; LPH Guam was in this party.

The U.S. response continued on the 19th, with deliberately visible troop movements in Germany and the alerting of the 82nd Airborne Division in the U.S.

The major Syrian intervention took place on the 20th. The Jordanian Army fell back. On 21 September the Jordanian city of Irbid fell.

An all-out Jordanian counterattack on the 22nd routed the Syrians who were pushed out of Jordan on the 23rd and 24th.

On the 25th the Kennedy arrived on station in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Guam arrived on 1 October (after entering the Mediterranean on 29 September).

The President made a visit to the Mediterranean on the 28th of September.

C-66

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

By 5 October only 1 carrier was on station in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Soviets viewed this crisis with great seriousness. In the words of Zhurkin (in The U.S.A. and International Political Crisis, p. 50): "The crisis threatened to become the most critical confrontation since the time of the Caribbean crisis in 1962."

The best coverage is provided by the USCINCEUR and Sixth Fleet Command Histories. Kalb and Kalb provide some of the political details.

#### Cienfuegos 9/1970-6/1971

From July 1969 through April 1974 the Soviet Union deployed a variety of submarines and submarine tenders to Cuba. These deployments were viewed with great seriousness by U.S. decision makers as being possible violations of the post-Cuban Missile Crisis 'understanding' concerning the placement of 'offensive' weapons systems in Cuba.

Major Soviet deployment included:

- an initial deployment in July 1969 involving Foxtrots;
- two Foxtrots and an Echo II visiting Cienfuegos in May 1970;
- the deployment of a tender and two barges associated with the servicing of nuclear submarines in August 1970;
- the February 1971 deployment of a November class submarine;
- a May 1971 deployment of an Echo type sub;
- a Golf type in April 1972; and
- a Golf visit to Cienfuegos in April 1974.

Probably due to the political sensitivity of the response, little information is available concerning the Navy's actions in this operation. Some information is available for the period September 1970 through June 1971. During this period it was standard practice to have 1 DER off of Cienfuegos Cuba plus one or more destroyer types following the Soviet vessels on their deployments in the Caribbean. For example, on 18 February the force consisted of 2 DD, 1 DER. In addition, Navy planes provided surveillance during the deployments.

There is no evidence that carrier or amphibious forces were alerted or deployed in response to the Soviet operations.

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

The major U.S. response appears to have been on the diplomatic level--the reaching of a high level understanding with the Soviet Union concerning the deployments. This took place in late 1970/early 1971.

Gilmore covers some of the deployments. Blechman and Levinson cover the Soviet deployments in detail and discuss the political response.

#### Haiti 4-5/1971

Haitian President Francois Duvalier died on 21 April. He was succeeded as chief of state by his 19 year old son Jean-Claude. The U.S. was concerned that this situation might be exploited by Haitian exiles and/or Cuban forces.

In response a surface patrol (involving 2 frigates) was established in the Windward Passage. The two units were on station from 22 April through 6 May. Some aircraft remained on patrol until May 28th.

Additionally BLT 2/3 (located in the U.S.) was alerted and carried out a contingency reaction drill on 22 April. This unit did not sail.

Gilmore and Selected Analysis cover the operation.

#### Bahama Lines/Caribbean Surveillance 12/1971

On 15 December the SS Johnny Express (a Panamanian registry ship owned by the Bahama Lines Company) was fired upon and seized by a Cuban naval vessel in Bahaman territorial waters near Little Inagua Island. The Johnny Express had been en route to Miami from Haiti. The ship was hit by machine gun fire and rammed by the Cuban vessel (an SO-1 class subchaser). Three were believed to have been wounded including the Captain (who was believed to be a U.S. citizen). The ship was taken under tow by a Cuban tug to Baracoa, Cuba.

In response CINCLANT alerted 2 destroyers and several F-4 and F-8 aircraft. One destroyer (Perry) was sent to conduct surveillance. The U.S. Coast Guard dispatched SAR/surveillance planes and helicopters to the scene and alerted two cutters at Guantanamo Bay.

Later in the same month Cuban gunboats seized the Layla Express, another ship operated by the Bahama Lines Company.

To protect the three remaining ships of the line operating in the Caribbean, the Navy provided surface and air patrols. These involved 1 DD, 1 DER, and P-3 aircraft.

C-68

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

NMCC and Gilmore provide coverage.

Indo-Pakistani War 12/1971-1/1972

The Bangladesh War began on 3 December. On 7 December the head of the UN relief mission in Dacca, East Pakistan/Bangladesh cabled New York and indicated that evacuation of foreign civilians by means of carrier based helicopters might be required.

On 8 December Amphibious Group Alpha (formed around the LPH Tripoli) was directed to move from Okinawa to the vicinity of Singapore in anticipation of a possible Indian Ocean deployment. The Tripoli off-loaded some of its Marine contingent to make room for possible evacuees. The amphibious force arrived off Singapore on 13 December.

On 10 December TF 74 was formed from units on Yankee Station. This force was based on the CVAN Enterprise. During the Indian Ocean deployment the Enterprise was accompanied by 1 DLG, 2 DDG, and 4 DD.

On 12 December the Royal Air Force evacuated Western nationals from East Pakistan/Bangladesh, thereby eliminating the requirement for an American evacuation operation.

Task Force 74 entered the Indian Ocean on 15 December. Its missions appear to have been to demonstrate American opposition to the Indian attack on Pakistan and to deter any attempts by India to follow up on its victories in East Pakistan with an all out assault on West Pakistan. Initially the task force moved to a point half-way up in the Bay of Bengal. During this period (prior to the termination of the war) Soviet naval units stayed away from the USN units.

The war in the east ended on 16 December. TF 74 headed to Point Charlie off Ceylon. The war in the west ended on 17 December.

Following the end of the fighting, Soviet naval units in the Indian Ocean began to move closer to the U.S. force.

The task force left the Indian Ocean on 8 January and was disestablished on 10 January.

RC 220 provides the best coverage of the operation and was used in the construction of this summary. RC 220 has an extensive discussion of U.S.-Soviet naval interactions during the deployment. Gilmore, Selected Analysis, Ides, and Command Histories also provide information concerning the response.

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

Lebanon 4-6/1973

(U) During April there was fighting between Lebanese army units and Palestinian forces located in Lebanon. On 3 May the Yarmuk Brigade (made up of Palestinians who had fled to Syria following the 1970 Jordanian Crises) entered Lebanon. Lebanese officials contacted the U.S. Embassy asking about possible American support for the Government of Lebanon.

(C) On 3 May evacuation contingency plans were reviewed. On 4 May USCINCEUR reported his contingency plans to the JCS. The Navy's contribution would have included the 32nd MAU (then conducting training at Timbakton); this unit would have taken 45 hours to reembark and arrive off Beirut. The CVA Forrestal could be on station 150 n.mi. off Beirut within 26 hours. The CVA Kennedy would require 67 hours to arrive on station.

(U) On 4 May a cease-fire was announced. The Yarmuk Brigade withdrew into Syria.

(C) Because the situation remained unpredictable, planning continued. The Navy's contribution (under these plans) would have involved an augmentation force from LANTCOM of 1 CVA group and 1 MAB (plus amphibious lift). The entire set of contingency plans and operations was entitled "Fluid Drive".

(U) Contingency plans were developed for a number of scenarios ranging from the evacuation of Western nationals by commercial airliners or the USAF in a permissive environment through combat operations designed to seize Beirut International Airport for evacuations and/or to support the government of Lebanon.

(U) On 7 May the situation within Lebanon deteriorated; the Government declared martial law. On 8 May the prime minister resigned. On the same day Lebanese Army forces began to assault refugee camps. A new cease-fire came into effect on the 8th.

(U) Because the Beirut airport was closed, an amphibious landing option was added to the U.S. contingency plans.

(U) On 9 May the situation stabilized. A joint Lebanese Army-Palestinian forces committee met and agreed on measures to improve the effectiveness of the ceasefire.

(U) Reaction time forecasting for the contingency force continued through the end of June.

(U) The best coverage of this operation is contained in the USCINCEUR Command History.

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

Middle East War 10-11/1973

Fighting broke out between Israel and Egypt and Syria on 6 October.

Admiral Zumwalt's account of the crisis indicates that the Sixth Fleet was initially directed to maintain a "low profile" and to avoid any actions that might be construed as indicating that the U.S. was preparing to take an active role in the hostilities (1976: 432+).

Initial U.S. planning centered around evacuation contingencies in Libya and Lebanon. Evacuation planning was soon expanded to include all nations in the region. While there were threats to American citizens and other U.S. interests in the region (e.g., the 18 October seizure of the Beirut branch of the Bank of America by leftists), military evacuations were not required. On 20 October The State Department arranged for the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Egypt via chartered Greek commercial shipping. Embassy personnel were evacuated via commercial transportation from Kampala, Uganda in early November. NMCC reports in early October pay particular attention to the evacuation contingencies. Planning in the second week of October envisioned the possible off-loading of TF 61 amphibious ships for this purpose. An LPH (Guadalcanal), 1 LCC, 2 LSD, 2 LPD, and 2 LST were available for this purpose.

Initially three major Navy forces were located in the Mediterranean. TF 60.1 (CVA Independence plus 1 CLG, 2 DLG, 1 DE, 1 DEG, and 1 DD) sortied on short notice from Athens and was on station south-east of Crete by 8 October. TF 60.2 (CVA Roosevelt plus 2 DLG, 1 DDG, and 1 DE) left Barcelona on 8 October and moved to the Tyrrhenian Sea. Elements of TF 61/62 (1 LCC, 1 LSD, and 1 LST) were off Crete by 8 October.

On 13 October these forces were in the same positions. The amphibious force (TF 61/62) now consisted of the LPH Guadalcanal, 1 LCC, 2 LSD, 2 LPD, and 2 LST. One Marine Amphibious Unit was embarked.

Also on 13 October, the CVA Kennedy was en route to a holding area 100 miles off of Gibraltar (it had left Northern European waters on 11 October).

On 15 October destroyer types were stationed in the Mediterranean along the path of U.S. resupply flights to Israel. Planes from the CVA Independence provided support for the flights in the Eastern Mediterranean.

By 16 October the principal Navy forces were:

TG 20.1 (CVA Kennedy, 1 DDG, 2 DD) en route to holding area off Gibraltar;

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

TG 60.1 (CVA Independence, 1 CLG, 3 DD) off Crete;

TG 60.2 (CVA Roosevelt, 2 DD) off Sicily;

TF 61/62 (LPH Guadalcanal, 1 LCC, 2 LSD, 2 LPD, 2 LST) off Crete.

The Kennedy group arrived at its holding position on 18 October. On the same day, six destroyer types from TG 60.1 and 60.2 were deployed along the track of Israel-bound resupply aircraft to provide surveillance or assistance as required.

From 19 through 24 October A-4 aircraft were flown from CONUS to Israel. The planes were staged through the Azores and the CVA Roosevelt operating south of Sicily. When necessary the CVA Kennedy (100 miles off Gibraltar in the Atlantic) and the CVA Independence (off Crete) also provided assistance.

On 22 October it appeared that the crisis might end. The United Nations Security Council arranged for a cease-fire in place. Egypt agreed to its terms on the same day, Syria on the 24th.

Unfortunately there were almost immediate charges of cease-fire violations, involving the encircled Egyptian Third Army and the Egyptian city of Suez.

On 24 October the LPH Iwo Jima entered the Mediterranean carrying a reinforcing Marine force for the crisis operations.

Also on the 24th, the U.S. merchant ship LaSalle received fire across the bow from an unidentified warship (believed to be Egyptian) in the vicinity of Jabal Al Tai Island in the Red Sea. The French destroyer Bourdais answered the SOS. There were no casualties and the LaSalle departed from the area under its own power.

Because of the cease-fire violations, on 24 October Egyptian President Sadat requested the United States and the Soviet Union to provide forces to enforce the cease-fire.

Early on the morning of 25 October the U.S. went on alert. Possible unilateral intervention by the Soviet Union was feared (Zumwalt, 1976 provides an account of some top level U.S. leaders' perceptions at this time). U.S. forces went to DEFCON III alert status. The Kennedy group was directed to leave its holding area and enter the Mediterranean. The Roosevelt group was ordered east to join the Independence. The 82nd Airborne Division in CONUS and various Army troop units in Europe were placed on alert.

C-72

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

CINCSAC and CINCONAD reverted to normal DEFCON statuses on 26 October.

On 27 October Israel reported that both the Suez and Golan Heights fronts were quiet for the first time since 6 October.

By 28 October, all major Navy forces were gathered off Crete:

TG 60.1 (CVA Independence, 1 CLG, 1 DD, 1 DG, 1 DE);

TG 60.2 (CVA Roosevelt, 1 DLG, 1 DDG, 1 DE);

TG 60.3 (CVA Kennedy, 1 DLG, 1 DDG, 1 DD);

TF 61/62 (LPH Guadalcanal, LPH Iwo Jima, 1 LCC, 1 LSD, 2 LPD, 2 LST, 2 DD, 1 DDG, 1 CLG, 3 DE). (Marine forces included the 32nd MAU and 34th MAU plus HMM 261 and HMM 264).

TTG 100.1 (2 DD, 1 DDG, 1 DE) chopped to the Sixth Fleet on 29 October, arriving on station in the vicinity of Crete on 2 November.

On 31 October USEUCOM (less the Sixth Fleet) went off DEFCON III status.

On 2 November the three carriers and the amphibious force remained off Crete.

By 5 November one carrier (Independence) had left the station to go in-port at Athens. TF 61 was split. TU 61.7.1, consisting of 1 LPH, 2 LPD, 1 LSD, 1 LST, 1 DE, plus the embarked 32nd MAU and HMM 264, was in the training anchorage at Souda Bay. TU 61.7.2, made up of 1 LPH, 1 LCC, 1 LSD, 2 LST, 2 DD, 2 DE and the 4th MAP (34th MAU and HMM 261), was on the south side of Crete not far from the two carriers remaining on station.

On 9 November the Independence group (60.1) rejoined the other carriers off Crete while TU 61.7.1 was en route to the Gythion training anchorage.

Israeli and Egyptian representatives met to sign a cease-fire on 11 November. The initiation of the exchange of POWs on 15 November indicated that the cease-fire was holding. A UN force had been created as a buffer between the two sides. Three carriers and half of the amphibious force remained on station off Crete up to this point.

The Roosevelt went to Athens on 15 November.

The Sixth Fleet resumed its normal DEFCON status on 17 November.

C-73

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

On the next day, the Kennedy group began its transit out of the Mediterranean, finally outchopping on 22 November.

By 19 November only 1 CVA and 1 LPH were on station off Crete.

The best sources for information concerning this crisis response are:

Barbara A. Gilmore, Chronology of U.S. Naval Events, 1973, Operational Archives, U.S. Navy History Center.

National Military Command Center, Operational Summary.

New York Times and New York Times Index

USEUCOM Command History, 1973.

Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch, New York: Quadrangle, 1976.

#### Indian Ocean 10/1973-4/1974


Following the beginning of the October War and the initiation of the oil embargo, TG 77.7 entered the Indian Ocean on 30 October. The force consisted of the CVA Hancock, 1 DLG, 1 DDG, and DE in the Carrier/Screen Unit and 1 DE and 1 AO in the support unit.

The Hancock was the first of four major capital ships in a continuous series of deployments in the Indian Ocean. This account will focus on the activities of these four task groups (MIDEASTFOR units were also active during this period). The deployments focused on four points: Ash (near the entrance to the Persian Gulf, Gam and Awl (near the entrance to the Red Sea), and Spa (near the Seychelles). The approximate locations of these points are shown below in figure 1.

On 31 October the force was directed to increase its speed. On 1 November it was directed to proceed beyond the originally designated holding area off of Ceylon to Point Ash near the entrance to the Persian Gulf.

On 2 November the Hancock and 1 DE pulled ahead of the remainder of the screening units. The Hancock arrived at Point Ash on the 6th; the remaining units arrived by the 7th. The reason for the carrier's sudden movement ahead of its escorts is not known.

On the 18th the group departed from Point Ash for Point Gam near the entrance to the Red Sea. On the 19th the force was diverted (for unknown reasons) and returned to Point Ash.



**FIG. 1: MAJOR DEPLOYMENT AREAS**

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)  
UNCLASSIFIED

On 22 November 2 DE moved to Bandar Abbas to participate in MIDLINK 73.

On 25 November the Task Group departed Point Ash for Point Gam in coordination with the movement of the SS James. The CTG proceeded behind the James to avoid giving the impression that it was escorting it. Surveillance and training sorties were flown. On the same day the Oriskany and TG 77.5 departed Subic Bay en route turn-over with the Hancock and TG 77.6.

The James entered the Red Sea on the 26th. On the 28th it diverted to Jidda to pick up additional cargo. The Hancock and company remained at Point Gam.

On 29 November 1 DDG and 1 DE passed through the Bab al Mandeb en route a three day port visit at Massawa; the Hancock remained near Point Gam. These two units returned without incident on the 4th of December.

An incident involving the Soviet fleet took place on 4 December. As an oiler (AO Ashtabula) was preparing to service a DDG near Point Gam, a Soviet Petya frigate (pendant number 802) crossed its bow with a gun mount trained on the oiler. The Ash-tabula broke off and then maneuvered back to service the DDG.

The entire party departed Point Gam on the 5th of December to rendezvous with the Oriskany group. This took place off India on the 8th. The new group consisted of the CVA Oriskany, 1 DLG, 1 DDG, 2 DE plus support ships. It moved towards Point Ash. After arriving on the 10th it conducted surveillance operations.

On the 15th it went south to conduct port calls. The CVA, 1 DDG, 1 DE, and 1 AOR went to Mombassa; a DLG and DE visited at Victoria, Seychelles. Units returned to Point Ash on 3 January. Meanwhile the DLGN Bainbridge, the third major capital ship in the series of deployments, transited the Malacca Straits on the 26th of December.

Oriskany left Point Ash to meet Bainbridge on the 3rd of January. With Bainbridge was 1 DEG.

Bainbridge left Point Ash on 16 January for Point Spa near the Seychelles. It arrived on 18 January and conducted surveillance operations. It left for Point Gam on the 22nd.

The Bainbridge group arrived at Point Gam on 26 January. Due to weather conditions it moved to Point Awl on the 28th. The force left for port visits on the 1st of February. The Bainbridge was back on station at Point Ash on 9 February.

C-76

CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

On 12 February it departed for Point Awl. Before it arrived, a ship in its company (DEG Schofield) suffered a propulsion casualty (on the 14th) and was towed by Bainbridge until repairs were effected on 15 February. The Bainbridge then went on patrol at Point Awl. On 20 February it left for Point Spa, arriving on the 23rd.

On the 24th it transited east for turnover with the fourth major capital ship: Kitty Hawk. Turnover took place on 2 March. With CVA Kitty Hawk in TG 77.7 were 1 DDG and 2 DE. This group transited to Point Ash. On 6 March a Hormone helicopter from the Soviet space vehicle recovery ship Dikson conducted surveillance of the task group.

The force reached Point Ash on the 13th. It left for port visits on the 17th. It returned to Point Ash on 1 April.

The oil embargo was lifted on 18 March.

The Kitty Hawk group left en route to Singapore on 14 April and transited the Malacca Strait on 21 April. This terminated the continuous series of major capital ship deployments in the western Indian Ocean.

In July a new group formed around the CG Chicago entered the Indian Ocean. This group left approximately 1 September.

On 9 November the CVA Constellation plus 2 DDG and 1 DE departed Singapore for participation in MIDLINK 74. On the 24th the Constellation conducted operations in the Persian Gulf. It operated in the Gulf for approximately 36 hours. This operation was not part of the MIDLINK exercise. It coincided with President Ford's visit to Vladivostok. The force departed the Indian Ocean in early December.

The NMCC provides the best coverage. Gilmore has a very good unclassified treatment of the response.

#### Cyprus 7-8/1974

On July 15th a coup overthrew the government of Cypriot President Makarios. In response the CVA America was held at Rota (it had been scheduled to leave the Mediterranean and return to Norfolk) and the CVA Forrestal was held at sea in the Central Mediterranean near Crete (it had been scheduled to return to Athens). The America was held at Rota until the 28th. TF 61/62 was south of Crete.

The major forces in the response on 19 July were:

C-77

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- CTG 60.1, CVA America in Port Rota, escorts in port throughout the Mediterranean; 2.5 days @ 30 knots from Cyprus, 4 days @ 20 knots;
- CTF 60.2, CVA Forrestal plus 2 DLG, 1 DD, 3 DE, off Crete; 21 hours @ 20 knots from Cyprus;
- TF 61/62, LPH Inchon, 2 LPD, 1 LSD, 1 LST plus the 34th MAU, off Crete; 20 hours @ 20 knots from Cyprus. (The 34th MAU included BLT 1/8, HMM 162, and Logistic Support Unit 34).

Turkish forces invaded the island on the 20th. There was immediate combat with Greek Cypriot units. By the 21st both CTG 60.2 and TF 61/62 were operating immediately south of the island.

Acting in response to a request from the U.S. Ambassador, the Sixth Fleet evacuated civilians from the British Sovereign Base at Dhekelia, Cyprus on 22 July. Elements of PHIBRON 8 conducted the operation. Marine helicopters lifted 384 U.S. citizens and 82 nationals of other countries to other PHIBRON 8 ship operating 20 to 40 miles south of the island. The LPD Coronado then carried the evacuees to Beirut. The carrier Forrestal operated at a greater distance from the island providing cover for the evacuation, which did not encounter opposition.

A cease fire took effect on the island at 10:00 a.m. EDT on the 22nd.

The Greek military government resigned on the 23rd.

Also on the 23rd, a British task force evacuated ca. 2,000 civilians from the vicinity of Kyrenia on the north coast of Cyprus. Helicopters carried the evacuees to the HMS Hermes, the destroyer Devonshire, and the frigates Rhyl and Brighton. The Hermes then carried 219 of the evacuees to the British Sovereign Base at Akrotiri Bay from which they were transferred to the USS LPD Trenton and carried to Beirut.

(U) New fighting broke out between the Turkish force and Greek Cypriots on the 23rd.

(U) Caramanlis returned from exile and was sworn in as the premier of the new Greek government on the 24th.

(U) On the same day the LPD Trenton moved to the British Sovereign Base at Dhekelia and received an additional 85 evacuees. Accompanied by the DE Blakely it then moved to Beirut, offloading the refugees on the 25th.

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

(U) A significant action took place on the 24th. The LPH Inchon joined 1 DLG, 1 DDG, 1 DEG, 1 AOE and 1 AE at a point southeast of Crete. The commander of TF 62 transferred to the Coronado. The Inchon carried HMM 162 and elements of BLT 1/8. The force was established as the "Logistic Evacuation Group" TG 63.1. It was formed for special evacuation contingency operations.

(C) The sources do not indicate what the precise mission of this force was. It is possible that it involved special weapons in Greece and Turkey. Amphibious forces had been alerted for this purpose in the April 1967 Greek Coup response (see above). The placement of the force (off Crete) is consistent with this interpretation, as is a statement in the Sixth Fleet Command History indicating that weapons withdrawal contingency plans were a matter of great concern during the crisis (see p. III-7).

(U) By the 25th the situation in Cyprus had calmed to the extent that the U.S. Embassy was discouraging further evacuations. TF 61/62 (elements of the 34th MAU plus 2 LPD, 1 LSD, 1 LST) were off the south shore of the island. CTG 60.2 was to the southwest, at a greater distance.

(U) By the 25th 526 Americans and 254 nationals of other nations had been evacuated.

(U) The America left Rota to transit to Norfolk on the 28th. The Independence entered the Mediterranean (with 2 DD and 1 DE) and transited east.

(U) By 1 August there were two CTGs in the vicinity of Crete, plus the special logistical evacuation force (TG 63.1). TF 61/62 held off Cyprus.

(U) The situation had eased by the 4th. Although there were reports of sporadic fighting on Cyprus, the major fleet units had moved west. CTG 60.1 remained east (off Crete). All other units (CTG 60.2, TG 63.1, TF 61/62) were in the vicinity of Italy.

(U) Turkish forces on Cyprus began a major offensive on 14 August. On the same day Greece announced that it was withdrawing from NATO's military command.

(U) The fleet responded immediately to the offensive. Units headed to sea. By the morning of the 15th the Independence group was off Crete (CTG 60.1) with TG 63.1 nearby. TG 61/62 was moving to the vicinity. CTG 60.2 was at sea off Sardinia.

(U) Tensions abated with the end of the Turkish offensive on the 16th.

(U) Roger Davies (American Ambassador to Cyprus) was killed on 19 August. On the same day both CTGs operated south of Crete. TF 61/62 was off Italy. TG 63.1 was on the north side of Crete. Normal operations were resumed on the 22nd. By the 23rd

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

the Independence was en route to Naples and the Forrestal operated in the Eastern Mediterranean.

A PHIBLEX had been scheduled in Greece for the period 3-9 September. The Greek government cancelled this exercise on the 31st of August.

On 2 September the Forrestal group was en route to Rota. By 5 September the Independence was the sole carrier group in the Mediterranean.

The best sources for the operation are the NMCC, the Sixth Fleet Command History and Gilmore.

#### Cyprus 1/1975

On 17 January, following the British government's decision to permit the evacuation of ca. 8,500 Turkish Cypriot refugees from the British Sovereign Base at Akrotire, Cyprus, there were violent Greek Cypriot demonstrations. These took place at the Sovereign Base and at the British High Commissioner's Office and the American Embassy in Nicosia.

In response, the Joint Chiefs ordered a precautionary deployment of a carrier group to a position 150 nautical miles southwest of Cyprus. Its mission was to serve as a contingency evacuation force. In addition, units of TF 61/62 were alerted for possible evacuation duty.

Carrier Task Group 60.1 was in position by the 19th. It included the Saratoga, 1 DD, and 1 DDG. This force maintained a four hour response posture for evacuation contingencies. Other elements of the force (3 DD and 1 DE) were in port at Elefsis, Greece.

The amphibious force consisted of the 32nd MAU embarked on the LPH Guam plus 1 LKA, 1 LPD, 1 LSD, and 2 LST.

By 21 January the situation had quieted and the carrier force was no longer on four hour reaction status.

The NMCC and Gilmore are the best sources for this operation.

#### Ethiopia 2-4/1975

In 1952 the former Italian colony of Eritrea became a federated state associated with neighboring Ethiopia. Throughout the 1950s the Government of Ethiopia acted to reduce Eritrea's autonomy, actions which culminated in 1962 with the incorporation



of Eritrea as an Ethiopian province. Because of these actions, since the mid-1950s Eritrean movements have struggled against the Ethiopian government.

In 1974 elements of the Ethiopian Army seized control of the central government, deposing Emperor Haile Selassie.

Following some factional fighting within the military, the new provisional government rejected negotiations as a means of settling the Eritrean conflict and elected to intensify the government's campaign in the province.

As the civil war intensified, American citizens operating facilities at the U.S. Navy Communications Station in Asmara (the capitol of the province of Eritrea) were endangered.

As a precautionary measure, a contingency force consisting of the DDG Lawrence and the USNS Marias took position on 3 February. The force was in the Red Sea, approximately 120 nautical miles southwest of Massawa. It was instructed to remain at least 25 nautical miles off the Ethiopian coast.

On 4 February U.S. civilians were evacuated by commercial airliners from Asmara to Addis Ababa, the capitol of Ethiopia. Some U.S. citizens remained at the station.

While the situation in Eritrea (and throughout Ethiopia) continued to be unsettled, the Lawrence and Marias were released from their contingency station on 6 February.

Had the situation required it, additional forces could have been brought to bear. The AGF La Salle was at Bahrain. The DE Elmer Montgomery operated off of the Socotra Islands. In addition to these MIDEASTFOR units, Seventh Fleet Task Group 77.7 formed around the CVAN Enterprise and CGN Long Beach was in the Indian Ocean. It entered on the 12th of January and departed on 21 February. For most of the period it operated in the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean (including a humanitarian disaster relief response in Mauritius). However, the force did not directly participate in the Ethiopian contingency response.

During March and April the U.S. provided ammunition to the central government, using MAC flights from Ramstein Airbase to Bole Field, Addis Ababa. There appears to have been no significant Navy participation in this portion of the response.

Butterworth provides a good summary of the political histories of Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Mayaguez 5/1975

This account follows Rowan's division of the response into four days of operations, using SEASIA time unless otherwise specified.

On the first day (12 May) the S.S. Mayaguez was fired upon and seized by Cambodian gunboats. It was 60 miles off of the Cambodian coast, en route to Thailand from Hong Kong. Following seizure it was escorted to Koh Tang Island, ca. 30 miles from the mainland, arriving at approximately midnight.

The NMCC learned of the seizure from the American Embassy in Jakarta at 12053 EDT. Immediate actions taken by the U.S. included the dispatching of P3 aircraft to the scene, the alerting of elements of the Third Marine Division on Okinawa (with ca. 1,100 Marines ordered to move to Utapao Air Force Base in Thailand), and the dispatch of the CVA Coral Sea, DDG Wilson, and DE Holt to the scene.

On the second day (13 May) forces were positioned. Amphibious Ready Group Alfa was reconstituted around the Hancock (CVA-19, operating as an LPH platform for the response as it had during the SEASIA evacuations) and LPH-3 Okinawa. An attempt was made to intercept Cambodian gunboats to keep them from escorting the Mayaguez and its crew to the mainland; at least one strafing mission was carried out by USAF fighters. A helicopter crash in Thailand killed 18 members of a USAF Air Police detachment (plus 5 crew members); this unit had been scheduled to be part of the response force.

On the third day (14 May) the crew of the Mayaguez was placed on a Cambodian fishing boat which began to make for shore. It was intercepted by USAF fighters at 8:30 a.m. and the presence of the crew was reported to Washington, where the President directed that no actions be taken that might endanger the crew. After an attempt to halt the fishing boat with gas failed, the crew landed on the mainland.

By this point the principal forces that would make the response were on the scene. At 4:45 p.m. EDT the President directed that the recovery operation should take place. USAF General John J. Burns was designated on-scene commander.

The 56th Special Operations Wing at Utapao launched 11 helicopters with 227 Marines. Eight helicopters with 179 Marines went to Koh Tang Island. Three helicopters and 48 Marines went to the DE Holt from which they would board the Mayaguez.

The Holt secured the Mayaguez (which was unoccupied) by 2105 EDT.

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

Air strike operations were flown from the Coral Sea against the mainland. The first cycle was armed reconnaissance; the second struck at the Ream Airfield; the third hit the naval base at Ream.

Insertion on Koh Tang commenced at 141909 EDT and the first wave completed its arrival by 2015 EDT.

The Mayaguez crew was released and boarded the Wilson at 142307 EDT.

On the fourth day (15 May) the Mayaguez crew was transferred from the Wilson to the Mayaguez at 150025 EDT.

By 150917 EDT the final Marine force had been extracted from Koh Tang Island. The President was informed that all Marine forces had been removed from the island by 9:55 EDT.

This account of the operation is based on the NMCC Operational Summary, Gilmore, and Rowan. A more definitive treatment will be possible once the relevant Command Histories become available. A more detailed summary is contained in (CNA)76-0616. "An Outline of the Mayaguez Operation (U)," 14 April 1976, Confidential.

#### Lebanon 8/1975

The chain of events which led to civil war in Lebanon in late 1975 can be traced back to April 1974.

On 12 April 1974 Israeli forces conducted raids in Southern Lebanon in retaliation for a Palestinian raid on the village of Qiryat Shermona. Following this action, there was internal dissension within Lebanon concerning the use of Lebanese territory as a base for Palestinian raids, the proper relationship between Lebanon and the Palestinian movement, and the role that should be played by the Lebanese armed forces in reacting to Israeli attacks.

In May the Lebanese government announced that it would build up its military forces. Lebanon's first conscription law was passed.

In July and August of 1974 there was fighting between right wing Phalangist and Palestinian units.

As the country's factions began to arm, the cabinet resigned in late September, initiating what would become an all too familiar series of unstable administrations in Lebanon.

UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL

The situation was fairly stable in early 1975. The Solh cabinet had come into office on 31 October, ending the government crisis. There was some communal tension, but nothing on the scale that would soon engulf the nation.

The precipitating incident for the troubles that followed was a 13 April Phalangist attack on a bus carrying Palestinians. Three days of large scale street fighting in Beirut followed this incident. A ceasefire on 16 April provided a pause.

In May there was a cabinet crisis. The point of dissension was the way in which the government handled (or failed to handle) the fighting in the previous month. The Solh government fell on 15 May. An attempt to form a military cabinet under Rifai soon failed (Rifai resigned on 26 May).

Karmani then attempted to form a cabinet. While he was not immediately successful, the situation did begin to normalize. Normal business activity resumed in Beirut by 5 June. By mid-June there was still no cabinet and the Syrians were attempting to mediate the crisis.

On 29 June Col. E.R. Morgan (USA) was kidnapped. Though he was released unharmed on the 12th of July, this incident showed how unstable the situation in Lebanon was and the possible dangers that U.S. citizens in the country might encounter.

Karmani formed a cabinet on 1 July and the situation stabilized. Renewed communal violence (particularly in the city of Tripoli) took place at the end of the month. Despite numerous attempts to negotiate a ceasefire and/or a settlement (e.g., Syrian attempts to mediate the crisis) the conflict continued and intensified.

Some major battles (e.g., those around the Holiday Inn, Beirut) took place at the end of October. On 27 October the U.S. embassy advised U.S. citizens to evacuate their dependents.

At the same time, the U.S. indicated through public statements that it had no intention of intervening with military forces in Lebanon. It encouraged other nations to refrain from entering the conflict.

The American Embassy pared its staff and directed that the dependents of U.S. diplomatic personnel should leave the country. This was announced on 2 November. The Embassy also encouraged all U.S. citizens in Lebanon to depart.

Serious fighting continued into 1976. This account is being arbitrarily cut off at 31 December 1975.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

A full account of the U.S. response cannot be given without access to command histories which are not yet available. However, even without these materials, some of the major aspects of the response can be presented.

Early in August the CVA Kennedy operated in the Eastern Mediterranean. TF 61/62 consisted of 1 BLT embarked on the LPH Iwo Jima plus 2 LPH, 1 LSD, and 1 LST.

On 8 August the amphibious force turned over and PHIBRON 2 in-chopped. This force included the LPH Inchon, 1 LSD, 1LPD, 1 LKA, and 2 LST. During October and November this was a contingency evacuation force, with the Kennedy available as a support carrier for the operation; as is commonly the case during a Mediterranean crisis; its status as a contingency force was denoted by the attention paid in documents to its reaction time to Lebanon. For example, on 17 November the amphibious force was 88 hours from Lebanon (except for the Inchon, which would have been delayed for an additional 48 hours due to maintenance operations that were being carried out).

As of 12 November the American Embassy in Beirut reported that 99 U.S. Government employees remained in Lebanon. These workers, plus an estimated 1000 U.S. citizens in that country would have been the primary focus for any evacuation operations.

In December the CV Independence became the Eastern Mediterranean carrier.

On 11 December the MSC ship Pioneer Contender arrived in Beirut to onload the household effects and vehicles of U.S. Government employees who had been directed to leave Lebanon. The Lebanese Army provided for the ship's security during this operation.

Also on 11 December, a hydrolant issued a warning to mariners to be alert for unusual or abnormal maritime activities in the sea area off Lebanon.

The best sources at this point are Gilmore, the NDDC file at the Operational Archives, U.S. Navy History Division, and the New York Times. The first two were used to obtain data on the Navy's activities. The last was used for political information.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

REFERENCES

AACU

Operational Archives, U.S. Navy History Division, Attack Aircraft Carrier Utilization, August 1969, Unclassified.

Allison

Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little Brown, 1971.

AWC

United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, "An Analysis of International Crises and Army Involvement (Historical Appraisal 1945-1974)," 1 October 1974

Bendix

Bendix Corporation, "The Navy and Sub-limited Conflicts (U)," 30 September 1966, Secret

Blechman and Levinson

Barry M. Blechman and Stephanie E. Levinson, "Soviet Submarine Visits to Cuba," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1975, pp. 30-39

Brookings

Files collected by Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan of the Brookings Institution for a DARPA sponsored project on the use of armed force as a political instrument, 1976

Butterworth

Robert L. Butterworth, Managing Interstate Conflict: 1945-74: Data with Synopses, Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1976

Cable

James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, New York: Praeger, 1971.

Command Histories

Annual Reviews produced by Unified Commands and major Navy commands (e.g., CINCPACFLT, Sixth Fleet).

CPRI

Canadian Peace Research Institute, Milestone Events, 1945-1975, Oakville, Ontario: CPRI Press, 1975

CVAN-70

Joint Hearings, Senate-House Armed Services Subcommittees, CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier, April 1970, 91st Congress, 2nd Session

Dennis

M. F. H. Dennis, The Role of Navies in Limited War, dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1971

Dragnich RC 153

George Dragnich, "The Lebanon Operation of 1958--A Study of the Crisis Role of the Sixth Fleet (U)," CNA RC 153, September 1970, Secret

Draper

Theodore Draper, The Dominican Revolt: A Case Study in American Policy, Commentary, New York, 1968

Eisenhower

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961, New York: Doubleday, 1965

George and Smoke

Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974

Gilmore

Barbara A. Gilmore, Chronology of U.S. Naval Events, 1960-1975, Operational Archives, U.S. Navy History Division

Gurtov

Melvin Gurtov, The United States Against the Third World, New York: Praeger, 1974

Hankinson

David K. Hankinson, "HMS Centaur at Dar es Salaam," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1969, pp.49-56

Hill RC 262

Jill Hill, "Suez Crisis, 1956 (U)," CNA RC 262, April 1974, Secret

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)~~

Howe Jonathon T. Howe, Multicrisis, Seapower and Global Politics in the Missile Age, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971

Hunt Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day, New Rochelle, N.Y. Arlington House, 1973

Ides T.M. Burns and A.H. Dell, (CNA 00797.10, "Conventional Force Deployments: Appendix A, USN/USMC Force Levels and Deployments 1958-1972 (U)," 29 May 1973, Confidential

Indonesia-1965 Central Intelligence Agency, "Indonesia-1965, The Coup That Backfired," Research Study, December 1968, Unclassified

Johnson Hanes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, New York: Norton, 1964

Kalb and Kalb Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, Boston: Little, Brown, 1974

Kalicki J.H. Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises, London: Cambridge University Press, 1975

Lewis Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1976

Lowenthal Abraham F. Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, Cambridge: Harvard, 1972

Maxwell Neville Maxwell, India's China War, New York: Pantheon, 1971

McConnell and Kelly RC 220 James M. McConnell and Anne M. Kelly, U.S. and Soviet Naval Diplomacy During the Pakistani Crisis of December 1971 (U)," CNA RC 220, February 1973, Secret

C-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



NDDC file Naval Daily Duty Captain file maintained at the Operational Archives, U.S. Navy History Division

New York Times New York Times and New York Times Index

NMCC National Military Command Center Operational Summary

Operational Archives files Crisis and political-military files maintained at the Operational Archives, U.S. Navy History Division, Washington, D.C.

Ovsyany I.D. Ovsyany (ed.), A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy, Moscow: Progress, 1975

Rowan Roy Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez, New York: Norton, 1975

A Select Chronology... Middle East Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East, May 1969, first revised edition, 91st Congress, 2nd Session.

Selected Analysis Chief of Naval Operations/Commandant of the Marine Corps, "Selected Analysis of Marine Corps and Navy Amphibious Forces Requirements and Capabilities (U)," April 1972, Secret/NoForn

Seymour James Seymour, China: The Politics of Revolutionary Reintegration, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1976

Tarichanov and Ovanesov, 1974 Colonel of Justice Tarichanov and Captain 1st Rank Ovanesov, "Naval 'Representatives' of the Soviet Union," Morskoj sbornik, No. 7, 1974

The Thieu Regime...      The Thieu Regime Put to the Test 1973-1975,  
Hanoi; Foreign Languages Publishing House,  
1975

Thomas      Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom,  
1962-1969, New York: Harper and Row, 1971

Van Der Kroef      Justin M. Van Der Kroef, "The Wages of  
Ambiguity: The 1965 Coup in Indonesia,  
Its Origin and Meaning," 534-562 in Thomas  
T. Hammond (ed.) The Anatomy of Communist  
Takeovers, New Haven: Yale, 1975

Whiting      Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of  
Deterrence, Ann Arbor: University of  
Michigan, 1975

Zhurkin      V.V. Zhurkin, "The U.S.A. and International  
Political Crises," Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka,  
1975; excerpts translated in JPRS Translations  
on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs,  
29 July 1975, pp. 27-108

Zumwalt      Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch, New York:  
Quadrangle, 1976

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)**

**APPENDIX D**

**ADDITIONAL EVENTS WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED  
IN THE MAIN LIST OF RESPONSES**

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

1954

1954

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

## APPENDIX D

### ADDITIONAL EVENTS WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE MAIN LIST OF RESPONSES

This portion of the paper presents a set of 41 events that did not meet the criteria (set forth in the body of the paper) for inclusion in the main list of Navy 99 responses to international incidents and crises.

They are presented here because of their intrinsic interest as instances of political-military operations bearing on the peacetime missions of naval forces. A few cases (e.g., the RB-47 incident of 1960) have been included on the list even though the sources did not indicate any operations by naval forces in conjunction with the events. It is possible that naval forces did react to these events in ways that would be recorded only in compartmentalized sources of the type not available to this project.

Little effort was expended in researching these events. The primary source (unless otherwise specified) is Gilmore's Chronology of U.S. Naval Events, 1960-1975. Furthermore, no attempt was made to produce an exhaustive summary of events (e.g., all incidents at sea between the U.S. and Soviet Union).

Since Gilmore is the primary source, the list (presented in table D-1) begins in 1960.

TABLE D-1

#### SELECTED EVENTS NOT ANALYZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS PROJECT

<u>Event</u>	<u>Date</u>
Argentine Submarine Contact	1-2/1960
Norwegian Sea Incident at Sea	4/1960
Eastern Atlantic SSBN Tests	4/1960
U-2	5/1960
Cuba-SS Sea Poacher	5/1960
Cuba-USS Norfolk	5/1960
RB-47	7/1960
Baltic Sea/USS Barry	7/1960
Norwegian Sea/NATO Exercises Incidents	9/1960
Cuba and Buzzing of U.S. Submarine	10/1960
Cuba/Guantanamo	11/1960
Cuba/Missile Malfunction	11/1960
Santa Maria Hijacking	1-2/1961

D-1

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE D-1 (Continued)

<u>Event</u>	<u>Date</u>
Cuba/SS Western Union	3/1961
Ecuador Submarine Contact	6/1961
Anzoategui Hijacking	2/1963
Eastern Atlantic/USS Croaker Incident	5/1963
U.S. -PRC Aerial Engagements in SEASIA	4/1965-8/1967
PRC-ROC/USS O'Brien	11/1965
Palomares, Spain	1-4/1966
Cuba	2/1966
Sea of Japan/USS Banner Incident	6/1966
Cuba/Missile Malfunction	1/1967
South Africa/USS Roosevelt	2/1967
Korea -Yellow Sea/P-3 Incident	4/1967
Sea of Japan/USS Walker Incident	5/1967
U.S. -PRC	1/1968
Greenland/H-bomb Loss	1/1968
Soviet Union/Troop Transport	6-7/1968
Cuba/SS Deep Freeze	1/1970
UK-USSR Mediterranean Incident	11/1970
Sea of Japan/USS Hanson Incident	5/1971
Sea of Japan Incident	9/1971
Mediterranean/USS Saratoga Incident	10/1971
Mediterranean/USS Independence Incident	1/1971
Mediterranean/USS Seattle Incident	3/1972
Mediterranean/USS Sims and USS Pratt	3/1972
Northern Atlantic/USS Artemis Incident	9/1973
Somalia/Visit Support	6-7/1975
Dominican Republic/SS Pioneer Incident	8/1975
Mediterranean/USS Kennedy Incident	9/1975

Argentine Submarine Contact 1-2/1960

On 30 January Argentine ships and aircraft prosecuted a submarine contact in the Golfo Nuevo, approximately 630 miles south of Buenos Aires. As the search continued for the unidentified submarine, U.S. ASW equipment was flown from Norfolk to assist the Argentine Navy. Argentina announced on 13 February that a second unidentified submarine had entered the area, apparently to assist the first (which was reported to have been damaged by depth charges dropped by Argentine naval units). On 15 February U.S. Navy undersea warfare advisers were sent to assist in the search. Shortly after their arrival, Argentine authorities announced that the unidentified submarines might have escaped into the open sea.

These events preceded a Latin American good-will visit by President Eisenhower. The tour began on 22 February with Brazil as the first major stop and arrived in Argentina on the 26th. As is the normal practice, a Navy support force was on-call during the visit (1 CA, 1DD, 1 LSD, and 1 AGC). The relationship between the submarines and the visit (and/or the submarines and the level of Navy support for the visit) is uncertain.

#### Norwegian Sea Incident At Sea 4/1960

Michelson (AGS-23) was harassed by a Soviet trawler which fouled the survey gear it was towing. At the time the Michelson was conducting survey operations in company with the AGS Dutton. No injuries were reported. The incident took place on 11 April.

#### Eastern Atlantic SSBN Tests 4/1960

On 26 April the Soviet Okean class trawler Vega interfered with the operations of ATF-157 Nipmuc by maneuvering so close as to cause a near-collision. The Nipmuc was operating south of Long Island, supporting tests that were being conducted by the George Washington (SSBN-598). At one point the Vega attempted to retrieve one of the loaded test vehicles that had been fired by the George Washington. The primary source for the event is Gilmore. President Eisenhower cites it in his memoirs (1965, p. 571).

#### U-2 5/1960

A U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over the Soviet Union on 1 May. The pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was captured by the Soviets. The incident led to the cancellation of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit in mid-May. Sources do not indicate any Navy actions in response to this event.

#### Cuba-USS Sea Poacher 5/1960

On 6 May the Cuban Coast Guard cutter Oriente approached the U.S. submarine Sea Poacher in Nicholas Channel, approximately 10 miles north of the Cuban coast. The Cuban ship attempted to ram the submarine and fired 20mm tracer rounds at it. The Sea Poacher maneuvered to avoid a collision. The U.S. protested to Cuba concerning the incident on 14 May.

#### Cuba-USS Norfolk 5/1960

A Cuban Coast Guard cutter approached DL-1 Norfolk when the latter was operating approximately 10 miles north of Matanzas, Cuba. The cutter stated (by hailing) that the DL was in "Cuban waters." Gilmore indicates that the Norfolk thanked the cutter for the information and continued on course. The event took place on 11 May.

#### RB-47 7/1960

On 1 July an RB-47 was shot down by the USSR over the Barents Sea. The Soviets claimed that it had violated Soviet airspace; the U.S. insisted that it was over international waters at the time of the incident. Two crew members were captured. They were later released in the early days of the Kennedy Administration (25 January 1961). No information is available concerning possible Navy actions in response to this event.

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

Baltic Sea-USS Barry 7/1960

As the Barry (DD-963) was passing into Baltic Sea through the Kiel Canal en route to Helsinki, it was harassed by a Soviet Riga class destroyer escort. This event took place on 6 July.

Norwegian Sea-NATO Exercise 9/1960

As NATO warships assembled for exercises on 19 September, a Soviet trawler sailed into the group. It was promptly intercepted by a U.S. destroyer.

Cuba 10/1960

On 8 October the State Department protested to the Cuban Government concerning the buzzing of a U.S. submarine by a Cuban plane. The incident took place off Key West.

Cuba-Guantanamo 11/1960

American ships operating in Guantanamo Bay were subjected to low, dangerous overflights by a Cuban plane on 16 November.

Cuba (Missile Non-crisis) 11/1960

As a result of a post-launch malfunction, portions of a U.S. ballistic missile fell on Cuba. One cow was killed. The event took place on 30 November.

Santa Maria Hijacking 1-2/1961

On 22 January the Portuguese cruise ship Santa Maria was seized by Portuguese rebels opposed to the Salazar regime. The ship was operating in the Caribbean at the time of the seizure. At the request of the Government of Portugal, American and British forces searched for the vessel.

A Navy P2V located the ship off the Brazilian coast on 25 January. Surveillance was maintained until an agreement was reached with the hijackers for the ship to proceed to Recife, Brazil, for a conference with USN RADM Allen Smith, Jr. who had been designated as the operational commander of USN forces involved in the search operation. This conference was held aboard the Santa Maria (anchored in the outer Recife harbor) on 1 February. The final U.S. forces involved in the operation departed from Recife on 5 February.

Gilmore, "Naval Review 1961," and the CINCLANTFLT Command History cover the operation. The Command History is the best source.

Cuba 3/1961

A Cuban ship detained the S.S. Western Union (an American cables ship) for six hours on 31 March. The ship was held off the port of Baracoa, Cuba. It was released when the destroyer John W. Weeks and aircraft from Guantanamo Bay arrived in the area.

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
UNCLASSIFIED



Ecuador Submarine Contact 6/1961

On 30 June the Navy announced that three planes had been sent to Ecuador (at the request of the Government) to assist in the search for two unidentified submarines that had been spotted off of its coast.

Anzoategui Hijacking 2/1963

The S.S. Anzoategui, a Venezuelan freighter, was seized on the high seas by members of a Venezuelan revolutionary movement on 12 February. By 16 February a large scale air and surface search by the USN had located the ship. The hijackers entered Brazilian waters on the 18th and requested asylum. The ship put into port at Santana, Brazil on 20 February.

Eastern Atlantic-USS Croaker Incident at Sea 5/1963

The Croaker (SS-246) was approached by two Soviet Okean class trawlers on 6 May while sailing off the East Coast. The trawlers had the apparent intention of forcing the submarine to give way when it had the right of way under the rules of the road.

U.S. -PRC Aerial Engagements in SEASIA 4/1965-8/1967

During the course of the Indochinese War, the People's Republic of China claimed to have downed 9 U.S. aircraft. The U.S. confirmed some of the losses and admitted that others were 'possible'.

While the International Incidents project does not cover events which were part of the Vietnam/Indochina War, the open source citations that are available concerning these incidents are worth noting for the record. The following list is based on Whiting (1975: 178-179), supplemented by Gilmore's chronology in one entry.

U.S. -PRC AERIAL ENGAGEMENTS DURING THE INDOCHINESE WAR (1965-1967)

<u>Date</u>	<u>PRC Claim</u>	<u>U.S. Response to PRC claim</u>
(7/3/65)		(initiation of major U.S. bombing campaign)
9/4/65	Eight U.S. planes intrude over Hainan Island; U.S. planes leave when PRC aircraft scramble; U.S. planes fire 2 missiles, accidentally down 1 U.S. plane	No. U.S. confirmation
20/9/65	1 F104 downed	Confirmed by U.S.
5/10/65	1 F104 downed	No U.S. confirmation
12/4/66	1 A-3B downed	Confirmed by U.S.

<u>Date</u>	<u>PRC Claim</u>	<u>U.S. Response to PRC claim</u>
12/5/66	1 PRC Mig downed by U.S. over PRC	No. U.S. confirmation
9/9/66	1 F105 damaged	U.S. stated 'possible'
17/9/66	1 fighter damaged	U.S. stated 'possible'
24/4/67	1 F-4B downed	No U.S. confirmation
1/5/67	2 A-4B downed	No U.S. confirmation
26/6/67	1 F-4C downed	Confirmation in Gilmore; listed as unconfirmed in Whiting
21/8/67	2 A-6 downed	No U.S. confirmation

#### PRC-ROC 11/1965

On 14 November two Nationalist Chinese ships (PCE 61 and 62) engaged a force of 10 PRC PG/PT types between the Kinmen and Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait. The PCE-61 was lost during the engagement. After the engagement the U.S. destroyer O'Brien (DD -725) picked up 15 survivors and 9 bodies.

#### Palomares, Spain 1-4/1966

On 17 January a B-52 carrying four atomic devices collided with a jet tanker and crashed off the Spanish Mediterranean coast. Search commenced for a nuclear device lost in the crash. After extensive search and salvage operations, the device was located and brought to the surface by Navy units on 7 April.

#### Cuba 2/1966

The Swiss Ambassador to Cuba reported that two men in a small boat had been picked up by Cuban authorities in Cuban waters. (During this period the Swiss represented U.S. interests in Cuba.) Two Marines from Guantanamo had previously been reported missing while on a fishing trip. The report was made on 27 February. Sources do not indicate what happened to the two after the initial report.

#### Sea Of Japan-Banner Incident At Sea 6/1966

The Banner (AKL-25) and the Soviet vessel Anemometer collided in international waters in the Sea of Japan. Both ships suffered minor damage. No casualties were reported. The event took place on 4 June.

#### Cuba 1/1967

An unarmed U.S. missile was accidentally fired across Cuba on 4 January.

#### South Africa 2/1967

Shore leave for the crew of the CVA Roosevelt was cancelled due to controversy within the U.S. concerning South Africa's racial policies.

Korea-Yellow Sea P-3 Incident 4/1967

A P-3 on a flight over the Yellow Sea was fired upon by a North Korean (DPRK) ship. The plane sustained minor damage. The flight was aborted and the plane landed at Osan, Korea. No injuries were reported. Sources do not detail what response the U.S. made to this incident.

Sea Of Japan-Walker Incident At Sea 5/1967

A Soviet destroyer 'brushed' against the USS Walker (DD-517). This incident took place on 10 May during a joint USN/Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force training cruise in the Sea of Japan. There were no injuries reported. Damage was minimal.

U.S. -PRC 1/1968

The People's Republic of China charged that three U.S. planes bombed Yunnan Province on 7 January, killing and injuring Chinese civilians.

Greenland-H Bomb Loss 1/1968

A B-52 carrying four unarmed hydrogen bombs crashed near Thule, Greenland on 21 January. Nuclear materials were lost during the crash.

Soviet Union/Troop Transport 6-7/1968

On 30 June a chartered airliner carrying 214 U.S. servicemen to Vietnam strayed off course and entered Soviet airspace. It was met by Soviet fighters and compelled to land on Iturup in the Kuriles. The plane and passengers were released on 2 July.

Cuba 1/1970

On 1 January the Liberian freighter Deep Freeze's passage to British Honduras was briefly interfered with by a Cuban gunboat. The incident took place 20 miles off Cuba on 1 January.

UK-USSR Mediterranean Incident At Sea 11/1970

HMS Ark Royal and Soviet DDG-365 collided in the Mediterranean south of Greece. There was minor damage. HMS Yarmouth assisted in the search for seamen known to have gone overboard from the Kotlin during the incident, which took place on 9 November. Records so not cite any U.S. participation in the SAR effort.

Sea Of Japan-Hanson Incident At Sea 5/1971

The Hanson (DD-832) and the Soviet tug Diomed collided at sea in international waters in the Korean Strait on 5 May. The Hanson had just completed an investigation of a Soviet merchant ship towing a drydock and two Soviet tugs. One of the tugs (Diomed) reversed course, increased speed, and overtook the Hanson. Once it was in a position forward of the destroyer, the Diomed turned toward the Hanson, causing the collision. There was no serious damage to either ship and no casualties were reported. The NMCC entry for 7 May has a good summary of the event.

Sea Of Japan Incident At Sea 9/1971

A Navy patrol plane observing Soviet naval exercises in the Sea of Japan was fired upon with a white flare and tracers. The incident took place on 26 September. A Sverdlov cruiser was reported to have done the firing.

Mediterranean-Saratoga Incident At Sea 10/1971

A Soviet Kashin DLG interfered with the operations of the Saratoga (CVA-60), John King (DDG-3), and Belknap (DLG-26) by maneuvering at night within the USN formation. No damage was reported. The incident took place at night on 10 October. This was immediately prior to the initiation of negotiations in Moscow to achieve an incidents at sea convention. The negotiations ended on 22 October with an 'understanding'. The formal convention was not signed until 25 May 1972.

Mediterranean-Independence Incident At Sea 1/1972

Two Egyptian Badgers harassed a helicopter from the CVA Independence. The planes passed within 50-100 yards at an altitude of 100-200 feet. There was no damage. The incident took place on 5 January.

Mediterranean-Seattle Incident At Sea 1/1972

Seattle (AOE-3) was harassed during underway replenishment by a Soviet merchant ship (SS Pioneer Volkov). The merchant ship's maneuvers forced the Seattle to make an emergency breakaway. The event took place on 23 March.

Mediterranean-Sims And Pratt Incident At Sea 3/1972

The W.S. Sims (DE-1059) and William V. Pratt (DLG-13) were attempting to develop an underwater contact in the Mediterranean when a Soviet Kotlin attempted to shoulder the two U.S. ships aside. CPA to Sims was 50 yards during one point during the maneuvering. The incident took place on 31 March.

Northern Atlantic-Artemis Incident At Sea 9/1973

The research vessel USNS Artemis was rammed three times by the Soviet AGS Nakhodka about 265 nautical miles south of Iceland. The ship sustained damage but continued operations. The NMCC indicates that a P-3 was sent from Iceland in response to the incident (which took place on 4 September).

Somalia 6-7/1975

On 30 June AGF-3 LaSalle (MIDEASTFOR flagship) departed Bahrain for operations in support of the House Armed Services Committee delegation scheduled to visit Somalia on 6 July. In company with the destroyer New (DD-818) it provided communications and logistical support to the delegation which investigated Soviet facilities in Somalia. Permission for a port visit to Berbera during the visit was not granted by the Somali Government. By the 11th the LaSalle was enroute to Bahrain while the New conducted surveillance operations in the Gulf of Aden.

Navy vessels customarily provide this type of support for visits by American political leaders to Third World countries. Since this is a routine type of operation, actions of this variety are not included on the main International Incidents project list unless special actions are taken during the course of the operation (e.g., the reaction to the violence which threatened Vice President Nixon in the Venezuela 1-5/1958 response).

Dominican Republic-Pioneer Incident At Sea 8/1975

On 4 August a U.S. registry civilian tug (SS Pioneer) was fired upon by Dominican aircraft and subsequently boarded and seized by Dominican forces. It was ordered to Puerto Plata, Dominican Republic and then released almost immediately upon arrival. No hits were received by the tug. No personnel were injured. The ship had been mistakenly identified as a possible contraband smuggler wanted by Dominican authorities. NDDC is the source of this incident.

Mediterranean-Kennedy Incident At Sea 9/1975

On 12 September the CVA Kennedy was anchored near a Soviet ship at Kithira. For approximately two hours a Kresta II that was surveilling the carrier illuminated her with a fire control radar and trained SA-N-3 missile launchers on the ship and airborne aircraft. In response, CTF 60 placed helicopters on the line of sight between the Kennedy and Kresta and a section of CAP was placed overhead. A message was sent by flashing lights to the Kresta, calling its attention to the agreement on the prevention of incidents on the seas and requesting it to cease training the radar and launchers on the CVA. Gilmore and NDDC cover the response.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

**APPENDIX E**  
**PROJECTION OPERATIONS**

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

1952

1952



APPENDIX E

PROJECTION OPERATIONS

PROJECTION OPERATIONS, 1955-1975

Over the period 1955-1975 the Navy and Marine Corps conducted 13 major projection operations (table E-1). These took various forms: evacuations, administrative and opposed landings, advisory and peacekeeping forces, and air strikes against mainland targets.

TABLE E-1

MAJOR PROJECTION OPERATIONS, 1955 - 1975\*

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Description**</u>
Vietnam Evacuations, 1-5/1955	Navy and Marine forces evacuated refugees and carried military materiel from North to South Vietnam on 109 ships and craft.
Tachen Islands 2/1955	The U.S. evacuated Nationalist Chinese personnel from offshore islands. The operation involved an amphibious force, 5 CVAs and 1 CVS.
Suez War 10-11/1956	One BLT evacuated Western civilians from the war zone. Two attack carriers stood by during the operation.
Cuban Civil War 12/1956-1/1959	On 24 October 1958 the USS <u>Kleinsmith</u> (APD-134) evacuated American nationals from the Cuban port of Nicaro; the <u>Roosevelt</u> stood by out to sea during this operation.
Lebanon 6-10/1958	Administrative landing of 4 USMC BLTs, 15-19 June. Two attack carriers standing by during the operation.
South Vietnam 4/1962-8/1964	Marine and Navy advisors provided to RVN prior to the inception of direct large-scale U.S. involvement in the fighting.
Thailand 5-8/1962	Administrative landing of force of 3, 400 Marines on 17 May; two carriers (1 CVA, 1 CVS) standing by during operation.

TABLE E-1 (Cont'd)

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Description</u>
Zanzibar 1/1964	Evacuation of Western civilians carried out on 13 January by destroyer <u>Manley</u> and HMS <u>Owen</u> , RFA <u>Hebe</u> .
Laos 4-6/1964	Two CVAs conducted strike operations against AAW positions in retaliation for attacks on USN aircraft.
Gulf of Tonkin 8/1964	Two carriers conduct strike operations against shore installations in retaliation for attacks on USN destroyers.
Dominican Republic 4/1965-9/1966	Evacuation of U.S. citizens conducted on 27 April. Marine force landed on 28 April to assist in restoration of order. U.S. forces ashore on 5 May consisted of 4 USMC BLTS, 10,000 Army troops. Two carriers (1 CVA, 1 CVS) were alerted for the operation.
Cyprus 7-8/1974	Evacuation of Western nationals carried out on 22-23 July by U.S. and Royal navies; elements of 1 BLT conducted evacuation; 1 CVA standing by during response (two CVAs involved in later phase of the operation).
Mayaguez 5/1975	Air strikes and landing operations in response to seizure of ship; 1 CVA and company size landing party.

---

\* This is a conservative list of projection operations. It omits instances in which the Navy entered territorial waters claimed by other nations (Quemoy; Haiti, 1963); the resupply of allies or UN forces (Trinidad, Congo); instances in which U.S. forces were ashore prior to the response (in the Canal Zone and Guantanamo); and actions which were part of the Vietnam/Indochina War.

\*\* More detailed descriptions are presented in appendix C.

In considering the responses listed above, it is important to note that these were not the only instances in which projection-capable forces were 'used' in the course of responses. One implicit objective in any crisis management operation is to achieve national goals with the minimum level of force possible. In this regard the CVA and

amphibious forces deployed to cover the 8 May 1963 Haitian evacuation were 'used' in just as real a sense as were the forces employed during the October 1958 Cuban evacuation, though only the latter case enters onto the list presented in table E-1. Presence is just as 'real' as projection and, in some cases perhaps even more useful.

#### COMPARISON WITH EARLIER PERIOD OF NAVAL DIPLOMACY

One of the most striking aspects of the list presented above is the small number (13/99) of major projection operations conducted over the 21 year period. This is in marked contrast to earlier phases of American naval diplomacy that are often used to develop assessments of naval diplomacy (e.g., Cable's Gunboat Diplomacy).<sup>\*</sup> For example, during the inter-war years (1919-1939) projection of power ashore took place in 82% of Navy and Marine Corps responses to international events (33 of 40 cases). (See table E-2).

While the fleet has continued to play an active role in support of U.S. diplomacy, Navy and Marine forces have been less frequently employed (in relative terms) in over-the-beach operations. Moreover, when the types of operations conducted during the two periods are compared, other significant differences emerge.<sup>\*\*</sup>

Many of the operations during the inter-war years involved the placement of U.S. forces within a foreign territory to perform what amounted to constabulary functions. Particularly in the Caribbean and China, these functions were often performed by Marine units of surprisingly small size. There is no counterpart to this type of response in the post-1955 projection operations.

Another significant difference relates to the strategic contexts within which the operations took place during the two periods. The two Russian interventions took place during a time when the USSR was not functioning as a major power. From the end of these operations in the early 1920's until the China responses in the mid to late 1930's there was essentially no strategic component to the operations. This is in marked contrast to the post-1955 responses, where the actions of the Soviet Union and other communist states and/or the activities of domestic communist movements were major factors in a majority of the 13 responses.

---

<sup>\*</sup> James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, New York: Praeger, 1971.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Appendix F presents short descriptions of the 40 Navy and Marine Corps responses to international events which took place over the period 1919-1939.

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

TABLE E-2

PROJECTION OPERATIONS: 1919-1939

<u>Year</u>	<u>Place</u>
1915-1934	Haiti
1916-1924	Dominican Republic
1917-1922	Cuba
1919	USSR (Archangel)
1919	Honduras
1919	Turkey
1919-1922	USSR (Vladivostok)
1920	China
1921	China
1922	China
1922	Nicaragua
1922	Turkey
1923	China (Matsu Island)
1923	China (Tungshan)
1924	China (Shanghai + Tientsin)
1924-1927	China (Yangtse River)
1924	Honduras
1925	China
1925	Honduras
1925	Nicaragua
1925	Panama
1926	China
1926	Nicaragua
1927	China (Shanghai)
1927	China (Nanking)
1927	China (Tientsin)
1927	China (Pootung)
1927	China (Hangchow)
1927	Nicaragua
1928-1933	Nicaragua
1930	China
1934	China
1939	China

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
UNCLASSIFIED

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

**APPENDIX F**

**USN AND USMC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL EVENTS  
1919-1939**

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

## APPENDIX F

### USN AND USMC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL EVENTS 1919-1939

The inter-war years (1919-1939) provide one benchmark period against which more recent operations can be evaluated.

Using four sources, \* 40 Navy and Marine Corps responses to international events can be identified, as shown in tables F-1 and F-2.

Using the geographic information provided in table F-1, the regional distribution of the Navy's responses can be compared to that found in later years (table F-3).

---

\* James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, New York: Praeger, 1971;  
Harry Allanson Ellsworth, One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934, Washington: GPO, 1974 (reprint of 1934 edition);  
Senator Everett Dirksen, "Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Foreign Countries; II. Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1945," Congressional Record, Senate, June 23, 1969, S6955-S6958.  
Herbert K. Tillema, Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment, New York: Crowell, 1973, Appendix B.

CONFIDENTIAL  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

TABLE F-1

USN AND USMC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL EVENTS  
1919-1939

<u>Nation/Region</u>	<u>Year</u>
Haiti/Americas	1915-1934
Dominican Republic/Americas	1916-1924
Cuba/Americas	1917-1922
USSR/Europe	1918-1919
Turkey/Mediterranean	1919
Honduras/Americas	1919
USSR/North Asia	1918-1922
Mexico/Americas	1920
China/Asia	1920
Guatemala/Americas	1920
China/Asia	1921
Panama-Costa Rica/Americas	1921
China/Asia	1922
Nicaragua/Americas	1922
Turkey/Mediterranean	1922
China (Matsu Island)/Asia	1923
China (Tungshan)/Asia	1923
China (Shanghai + Tientsen)/Asia	1924
China (Yangtse River)/Asia	1924-1927
Honduras/Americas	1924
China/Asia	1925
Honduras/Americas	1925
Nicaragua/Americas	1925
Panama/Americas	1925
Lebanon/Mediterranean	1925
China/Asia	1926
Nicaragua/Americas	1926
China (Shanghai)/Asia	1927
China (Nanking)/Asia	1927
China (Tientsin)/Asia	1927
China (Pootung)/Asia	1927
China (Hangchow)/Asia	1927
Nicaragua/Americas	1927
Nicaragua/Americas	1928-1933
Mexico/Americas	1929
China/Asia	1930



TABLE F-1 (Cont'd)

<u>Nation/Region</u>	<u>Year</u>
China + Japan/Asia	1932
Cuba/Americas	1933
China/Asia	1934
China + Japan/Asia	1939

TABLE F-2

DESCRIPTIONS OF OPERATIONS, 1919-1939

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Description</u>
Haiti 1915-1934	Marines landed to restore order; USMC officers stay to form the Gendarmerie d'Haiti (and serve as its officer corps).
Dominican Republic 1916-1924	Marines were landed in response to civil disorders. Some Marines stayed after the main intervention to form (and serve as the officer corps of ) the Guardia Nacional Dominicana.
Cuba 1917-1922	Landing of Marines in response to civil unrest; two companies remain after the main landing as a contingency force.
USSR 1918-1919	U.S. forces land in Archangel to support British interventionary operations.
Turkey 1919	USS <u>Arizona</u> lands Marines to guard the U.S. Consulate at Constantinople during the Greek occupation of that city.
Honduras 1919	During an attempted revolution in September, Marines were put ashore to maintain order in a neutral zone that had been established to protect foreign nationals.

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

TABLE F-2 (Cont'd)

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Description</u>
USSR 1919-1922	U.S. forces land in and around Vladivostok
Mexico 1920	Destroyer <u>Thornton</u> dispatched to city of Manzanillo in response to bandit violence.
China 1920	March landing at Kiukiang to protect civilians during civil unrest.
Guatemala 1920	Landing party put ashore in April to protect Legation and cable station during civil unrest.
China 1921	Yangtse River patrols to maintain order and protect Western nationals.
Panama-Costa Rica 1921	Navy forces demonstrate on both sides of the Isthmus to deter a border war.
China 1922	Marines land in Shanghai during May in response to revolutionary violence.
Nicaragua 1922	An augmented Legation guard and other Marine forces help in maintaining order during an attempted revolution.
Turkey 1922	With the consent of the Governments of Turkey and Greece, a landing party was put ashore during September and October in the city of Smyrna to protect American citizens.
China (Matsu Island) 1923	USMC force lands during February in response to disturbances.
China (Tungshan Island) 1923	November landings of Marines in response to revolutionary violence.
China (Shanghai + Tientsin) 1923	September through November landings in response to revolution.

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

TABLE F-2 (Cont'd)

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Description</u>
China (Yangtse River) 1924-1927	Continuing series of patrols and landings during period of disturbances.
Honduras 1924	Marine force landed during election hostilities.
China 1925	Marine landing at Shanghai to protect International Settlement during civil disturbances.
Honduras 1925	Protection provided to foreigners located at LaCeiba during upheavals.
Nicaragua 1925	Marine force assists in maintaining order at request of GON.
Panama 1925	Landing of Marines in October due to riots and strikes.
Lebanon 1925	Two destroyers sent to Beirut to provide reassurance to U.S. nationals during violence in French mandate territory.
China 1926	Naval forces put ashore at Hankow in August and September during disturbances.
Nicaragua 1926	Marine force landed due to revolution.
China (Shanghai) 1927	Landing to protect International Concession during revolution; international force involved.
China (Nanking) 1927	Landing of Marines during civil war.
China (Tientsin) 1927	Landing during civil war.
China (Pootung) 1927	Landing during civil war.
China (Hangchow) 1927	Landing during civil war.
Nicaragua 1927	Marine force put into action to maintain order during disturbances.
Nicaragua 1928-1933	U.S. forces assist in establishment and maintenance of law and order.

TABLE F-2 (Cont'd)

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Description</u>
Mexico 1928	Navy force dispatched to protect U.S. citizens and property in Guayamas.
China 1930	Evacuation of Changsha.
China + Japan 1932	U.S. Asiatic fleet moves to Shanghai to protect International Concession, to assist in the settlement of Chinese-Japanese hostilities, and to ensure that the forces of the two belligerents were withdrawn from the immediate area.
Cuba 1933	Warships and Marine establish presence off Cuba to influence change of regime.
China 1934	Marines landed to protect U.S. Consulate at Foochow.
China + Japan 1939	U.S. forces land at Kulangsuto to protect International Settlement during hostilities.

TABLE F-3

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NAVY RESPONSES

<u>Region</u>	<u>1919-1939</u>	<u>1955-1960</u>	<u>1961-1965</u>	<u>1966-1975</u>	<u>1955-1975</u>
Mediterranean	3 ( 8%)	10 (37%)	3 ( 6%)	12 (55%)	25 (25%)
Americas	17 (42%)	6 (22%)	24 (48%)	4 (18%)	34 (34%)
East Asia	18 (45%)	8 (29%)	12 (24%)	3 (14%)	23 (23%)
Other regions	2 ( 5%)	3 (11%)	11 (22%)	3 (14%)	17 (17%)

A comparison of the first and last columns shows the shift in geographic emphasis over the two eras of crisis diplomacy, notably the marked increase in Mediterranean responses. This relative increase in Mediterranean operations is even more marked which the inter-war years are compared to the first (1955-1960) and third (1966-1975)

CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED  
(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

period. The regional distribution of operations during the 1961-1965 phase more closely resembles that found in the inter-war years than in the other two post-1955 phases, particularly in terms of the paucity of Mediterranean operations and the relative frequency of responses in the Americas.

CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL  
UNCLASSIFIED