

NO OBJECTION TO FULL
RELEASE 7705

DOS

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XVII. 9b

#28

IMMEDIATE
O 091419Z OCT 91
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7705
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0347

ZYUW RUEHMOA8774 2821419

FORCES OVER THE LONGER TERM, IT ONLY MAKES SENSE TO
CONCENTRATE ON POST-REDUCTION FORCES.

~~SECRET~~ SPECAT SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 28774

~~EXTS~~ DECAPTIONED DOS

GENEVA FOR NST DELEGATION

E.O. 12958: DECLASSIFIED
TAGS: PARM, PREL, UR
SUBJECT: ASD HADLEY MEETING WITH SOVIET DEPUTY FM
OBUKHOV, OCTOBER 7, 1991

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Date: MAR 24 2015
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. DURING THE VISIT OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
BARTHOLOMEW DELEGATION TO MOSCOW, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE STEPHEN HADLEY MET WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
OBUKHOV FROM 7:15 TO 8:45 P.M. ON 7 OCTOBER, TO FOLLOW UP
ON THE 6 OCTOBER BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV DISCUSSIONS OF THE
PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE MIRVED ICBMS. AT THE 6
OCTOBER BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV MEETING, GENERAL LADYGIN HAD
ARGUED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DE-MIRVING PROPOSAL WOULD
RESULT IN A 2:1 U.S. ADVANTAGE IN STRATEGIC FORCES. THE
U.S. AIM IN THE 7 OCTOBER MEETING WAS TO EXPLAIN THAT THE
U.S. ANALYSIS YIELDED A VERY DIFFERENT RESULT, AND TO
IMPRESS ON THE SOVIETS THE NEED FOR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS
OF EACH SIDE'S POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES AS A NECESSARY
PRELUDE TO ANY SIGNIFICANT POST-START FORCE
RESTRUCTURING/REDUCTIONS. OBUKHOV STRONGLY ENDORSED THE
U.S. PROPOSAL FOR SUCH DETAILED DISCUSSIONS. HOWEVER,
DISAPPOINTINGLY, NO REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET MOD OR
GENERAL STAFF ATTENDED THE MEETING. GENERALS OMEICHEV
AND LADYGIN WERE EXPECTED, BUT OBUKHOV EXPLAINED THAT THEY
HAD DECLINED AT THE LAST MINUTE. END SUMMARY.

3. PRESENT ON THE U.S. SIDE: ASD HADLEY, LTG
SHALIKASHVILI, BG CURTIN, MR. MILLER, DR. KOCH AND MR.
WALPOLE. PRESENT ON THE SOVIET SIDE: MR. OBUKHOV, MR. BY
NAMEDOV AND MR. LYSENKO.

4. ASD HADLEY OPENED BY EXPLAINING THAT THE RATIOS FOR
POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES WHICH GENERAL LADYGIN HAD
PRESENTED AT THE 6 OCTOBER BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV MEETING
WERE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE WHICH THE U.S. HAD
DEVELOPED. THE U.S. BELIEVED THERE WERE TWO POSSIBLE
SOURCES FOR THAT DIFFERENCE.

5. FIRST, THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT
THE TERM "POST-START FORCE"; FOR THE U.S., IT REFERS TO
THE FORCES LEFT AFTER THE SEVEN-YEAR START REDUCTION
PERIOD. SINCE WE ARE LOOKING AT STABILITY AND BALANCE OF

++++ FOR J5 +++++
REVIEW FOR DISTRIBUTION TO CINCS
SUBMIT JCS-DSS FORM 30 IF REQUIRED

ACTION INFO (R,M)
CJCS(1) J8(3) J5(1) SAC LO(0) SHAPE LHO(2)
SECDEF-N(1) SDIO(7) USDP-SPECIAL HANDLING(13)
USDA:AE(1) USDA:STNFSAC(1) ASD:PA(2) ASD:PAE/SOF(1)
USDP-CH(1) USDP:PD(1) DB-AC(1) DA-SA(1) VP(1) DIO(1)
DB-461(1)
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+STOC
+NATS PENTWASHINGTON DC
+HQ SAC OFFUTT AFB NE//XP//
+OSIA WASHINGTON DC
+USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO
+DNA WASHINGTON DC//OPAC/OPNA//
+HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC

6. THE SECOND POSSIBLE SOURCE FOR THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
THE U.S. ANALYSIS AND GENERAL LADYGIN'S PRESENTATION IS
THAT GENERAL LADYGIN MAY SIMPLY HAVE DELETED MIRVED ICBMS
FROM EACH SIDE'S CURRENTLY-PLANNED 1999 FORCES WITHOUT
MAKING ANY OTHER ADJUSTMENTS. THE U.S. APPROACH IN OUR
ANALYSIS WAS QUITE DIFFERENT. EACH SIDE CAN ACT NOW TO
TAKE ACCOUNT OF POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES, AND WORK TO
REDUCE ANY DISPARITIES THAT COULD EMERGE AS A RESULT OF
DE-MIRVING ICBMS.

7. ASD HADLEY PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN THAT, IF THE U.S.S.R.
DECIDED NOW TO RETAIN A SIZEABLE SSBM FORCE IN ITS
POST-START FORCE STRUCTURE, IT WOULD NOT BE PUT AT A
DISADVANTAGE IF MIRVED ICBMS WERE ELIMINATED. FOR
EXAMPLE, THE USSR COULD DECIDE TO KEEP ALL 14 OF ITS DELTA
IIS, ALL 6 OF ITS TYPHOONS, AND ALL 7 OF ITS DELTA IVS.
IF IT DID SO, THE 2:1 RATIO MENTIONED BY LADYGIN WOULD NOT
EMERGE. ALTHOUGH THE U.S. WOULD HAVE A SLIGHT ADVANTAGE
IN TOTAL RV NUMBERS, THE USSR WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT
ADVANTAGE IN NUMBERS OF SSBMS. FOR SURVIVABILITY
PURPOSES, THE LATTER WOULD BE EXTREMELY BENEFICIAL. ASD
HADLEY CONCLUDED BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE KEY POINT IS
THAT, IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH GENERAL LADYGIN'S OBJECTIONS
TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, BOTH SIDES NEED TO ENGAGE IN
A CANDID DISCUSSION OF EACH'S POST-START FORCE STRUCTURES.

8. OBUKHOV REPLIED THAT HE BELIEVED SUCH DISCUSSIONS
COULD TAKE PLACE, BUT THAT ONE ARGUMENT FROM THE SOVIET
SIDE WOULD BE THE QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S.
D-5 AND SOVIET SLEMS. ASD HADLEY AGREED THAT HARD TARGET
KILL (HTK) CAPABILITY SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE FORCE
STRUCTURE TALKS WE PROPOSE. BUT HE ADDED THAT HTK
CAPABILITY ONLY MATTERS IF USED AGAINST HARD, FIXED
TARGETS LIKE SILOS -- TARGETS WHICH WOULD BE GREATLY
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REDUCED, OR ON THE SOVIET SIDE EVEN ELIMINATED, UNDER THE
PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL. MR. MILLER ADDED THAT IT IS
INCORRECT TO ARGUE, AS MR. ROGOV DID IN A PRIVATE
CONVERSATION ON 6 OCTOBER, THAT THE D-5 WOULD POSE A FIRST
STRIKE THREAT IF MIRVED ICBMS WERE ELIMINATED. HTK
CAPABILITY WOULD BE IRRELEVANT IF THE ONLY SOVIET ICBMS
WERE SINGLE-RV MOBILES. MOBILE MISSILES IN GARRISON ARE
SOFT TARGETS, FOR WHICH HTK CAPABILITY IS NOT NECESSARY.
DISPERSED MOBILES ARE SURVIVABLE AGAINST ANY NUCLEAR
WEAPON.

9. OBUKHOV INTERJECTED THAT HE FOUND THE U.S.
PRESENTATION VERY INTERESTING. IN ESSENCE, HE SAID, YOU
ARE SAYING THAT THE U.S. AND USSR NEED TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY
ISSUES THAT WE USED TO DISCUSS ONLY INDIRECTLY, THROUGH
ARTICLES, BOOKS AND SEMINARS. ASD HADLEY RESPONDED THAT
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BELIEVES THE U.S. AND USSR NEED
TO TALK AT THIS STAGE ABOUT UNDERLYING REALITIES, NOT ARMS
CONTROL ARCANA. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON ICBM
DE-MIRVING WILL REQUIRE EVENTUAL NEGOTIATION, BUT FIRST WE
NEED INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF FORCE STRUCTURES.

10. OBUKHOV REPEATED THAT HE FOUND THE U.S. IDEAS VERY
INTERESTING, AND WOULD INFORM HIS SUPERIORS OF THE
CONVERSATION. HE REMARKED APPROVINGLY OF THE U.S.
PROPOSAL TO DISCUSS STRATEGIC FORCES AND DOCTRINES "IN
DEPTH, IN PRACTICAL TERMS". HE ALSO ENCOURAGED THE U.S.
SIDE TO DISCUSS THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE ISSUES IN UNDER
SECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW'S MEETING WITH MOD SHAPOSHNIKOV. HE
DESCRIBED SHAPOSHNIKOV AS YOUNG, ENERGETIC, AND QUICK TO
UNDERSTAND ISSUES IF THEY WERE PROPERLY EXPLAINED.

11. AT THE SAME TIME, OBUKHOV CAUTIONED THAT THE U.S.
MUST UNDERSTAND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD
HAVE VERY SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S

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PROPOSAL, GIVEN THE HISTORIC SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN ICBMS AND THE HISTORIC U.S. ADVANTAGE IN SLBMS. OVERALL, THE DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINES AND FORCES SHOULD BE AIMED AT DEFINING A COMMON GOAL WHICH WILL PRODUCE STABILITY.

12. ASD HADLEY AGREED THAT THE ISSUES WHICH OBUKHOV RAISED NEED TO BE DISCUSSED, AND THAT THE OVERALL GOAL MUST BE STABILITY. HE ADDED THAT GENERAL LADYGIN MAY OFFER SOVIET OFFICIALS ARGUMENTS WHY THE U.S. ANALYSIS DOES NOT MAKE SENSE -- BUT THE U.S. NEEDS TO HEAR THOSE ARGUMENTS TOO. OTHERWISE, THE SIDES WILL NOT BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON WHAT WILL BE STABILIZING.

13. OBUKHOV THEN SAID HE WANTED TO RAISE ONE MORE SUBSTANTIVE POINT SO AS TO UNDERSTAND U.S. VIEWS. THE U.S. ARGUES THAT MIRVED ICBMS ARE DESTABILIZING; WHY WOULD THE SAME NOT BE TRUE OF SINGLE-RV ICBMS? ASD HADLEY ANSWERED THAT THE BASIC ISSUE IS PRICE TO ATTACK. THERE IS A TREMENDOUS ADVANTAGE IN STRIKING FIRST AGAINST MIRVED ICBMS, AND NO SUCH ADVANTAGE IN STRIKING FIRST AGAINST A SINGLE-RV MISSILE.

14. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION OF THAT POINT, OBUKHOV EMPHASIZED THAT THIS CONVERSATION HAD ADDED GREATLY TO THE U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS. HE STATED THAT IT WAS A MUTUAL U.S.-SOVIET DUTY TO BECOME INVOLVED IN STABILITY DISCUSSIONS. FURTHER, HE UNDERSTOOD ASD HADLEY'S POINT ABOUT THE NEED TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS OF REAL FORCES; THE PARTICIPANTS IN THOSE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE PROFESSIONALS. THE FINAL GOAL SHOULD BE STABILITY AT LOW ECONOMIC PRICE. MR. HADLEY INTERJECTED THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ECONOMIC FACTOR FOR BOTH SIDES; IN THAT RESPECT, THE POSSIBLE SOVIET POST-START FORCE WHICH HE HAD OUTLINED EARLIER FEATURED EXISTING SSBMS, WHICH REPRESENTED SUNK COSTS.

15. MR. MILLER ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURES BEFORE START REDUCTIONS BEGIN, SO THAT IMPORTANT FUTURE FORCE OPTIONS ARE NOT FORECLOSED DURING THE REDUCTION PROCESS. OBUKHOV TOOK THE POINT, AND SAID THAT IT RAISED THE OVERALL ISSUE OF FUTURE FORUMS, WHICH THE U.S. AND SOVIET SIDES HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DISCUSS THOROUGHLY OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. ASD HADLEY SAID THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND TO HIS GOVERNMENT THAT INITIAL DISCUSSIONS OF STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE TAKE PLACE IN SMALL, INFORMAL GROUPS; LATER THE RESULTS COULD BE HANDED OVER TO A MORE FORMAL GROUP. THE START

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DISCUSSIONS OF DOWNLOADING AND NEW TYPES PROVIDE GOOD EXAMPLES OF HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES WITHOUT A SOUND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF EACH SIDE'S FORCE STRUCTURES AND PLANS.

16. OBUKHOV REPLIED, AND ASD HADLEY AGREED, THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS ON STRATEGIC FORCES IN THE FUTURE MUST BE "MORE RATIONAL, MORE CONCRETE AND MORE OPEN". WE HAVE MUCH MORE OPPORTUNITY NOW TO DECIDE THESE ISSUES QUICKLY AND RATIONALLY; WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. THE MEETING CLOSED ON THAT POSITIVE NOTE. STRAUSS BT

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Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
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Declassify: Deny in Full: _____
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Reason: _____
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