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DIM 212-91
October 1991

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Defense Intelligence Memorandum

Analysis of Soviet President Gorbachev's Responses to President Bush's Initiatives (U)

Key Judgments

SS
1.4(b), (c)

(S) The Soviets have quickly agreed to several proposals that will have minimal impact on their overall strategic nuclear capabilities and day-to-day operations. These proposals include removing heavy bombers and older silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from alert status and holding bilateral discussions on nuclear physical security and command and control.

[REDACTED]

(S) While the center is eager to pursue new negotiations to reduce weapons levels, it is not prepared to accept agreements that might prove injurious to the security of a revamped union. In contentious areas, such as President Bush's proposal to eliminate all land-based ICBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles,

[REDACTED]

(S) Gorbachev's response indicates the Soviets are ready to discuss limited nonnuclear antiballistic missile defenses. This represents a shift from the previous Soviet position of discussing only strengthening the antiballistic missile treaty to constrain further antiballistic missile development and deployment. It is not yet clear, however, how this shift in the Soviet position will substantively affect their position on the antiballistic missile treaty.

(S) The Soviets will seek to carry the current arms control momentum into future negotiations,

[REDACTED]

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Introduction

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~~(S/NF)~~ President Gorbachev responded directly to President Bush's initiatives with a set of similar unilateral and bilateral proposals. The response's tone was very positive and indicated a serious Soviet desire to respond in kind and signal greater flexibility (reflected in the decision to unilaterally cut 1,000 warheads below limits mandated under START). This flexibility also was evident in other areas, such as agreeing to discuss antiballistic missile systems. The Soviets did not accept all of the Bush proposals, such as elimination of all intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs),

JS
1.4(b), (c)



Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces

Strategic Rocket Forces

~~(S/NF)~~ *Removal of ICBMs from Alert Status* Further Soviet clarification since Gorbachev's speech indicates that the proposal to remove 503 missiles from alert status is based on their Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) declaration. In addition, they clarified earlier statements that the number of MIRVed ICBMs to be removed from alert

status is 137 vice 134, including 37 SS-17s at Yedrovo, 90 SS-19s probably deployed at Derazhnya in the Ukraine, and 10 SS-18s.

[REDACTED]

~~(S/NF)~~ For single warhead ICBM systems, the Soviets will remove from alert 326 SS-11s (according to the Soviets 126 of these missiles, probably at Olovyannaya and Teykovo, have already been taken off alert) and 40 SS-13 single warhead missiles at Yoshkar Ola.

[REDACTED]

~~(S/NF)~~ *Elimination of MIRVed ICBMs.* Despite Soviet steps to reduce the number of MIRVed ballistic missiles on alert, the Soviets did not respond directly to the U.S. proposal to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs. According to the U.S. delegation, the Soviet reaction to the U.S. proposal of no MIRVed ICBMs was a uniform, strong negative. Comments included the impression that the U.S. was seeking to gain strategic advantage, and that since the U.S. has most of its MIRVed missiles at sea, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) should be included in such a deal.

Such proposals would link deep reciprocal reductions to the Soviet concept of strategic stability while maintaining the core of their strategic force.

~~(S/NF)~~ *Restriction of Mobile ICBMs to Their Bases.*

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[REDACTED] (Soviet mobile ICBMs are launch capable whether field deployed or in garrison.) [REDACTED]

(S/NF) Some Soviet officials characterized deployment of the rail-mobile ICBM as a "security hazard to the public" and suggested that such deployments should cease. [REDACTED]

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(S/NF) *Modernization of ICBMs.* President Bush called upon the Soviets to terminate all programs for future MIRVed ICBMs and to limit ICBM modernization to a single warhead missile system. Soviet ICBM development programs currently include the SS-24 follow-on and the SS-25 follow-on. Gorbachev announced that the MIRVed rail-mobile ICBM program would not be modernized; however, a new design version of the SS-24 missile is under way and probably intended for silo deployment.

(S/NF) [REDACTED] Gorbachev stated that design work on a mobile compact-sized ICBM will be stopped, and the plan discontinued. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

~~(S/NF)~~ *Dismantlement of Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs).*
The announced removal from active duty of 3 nuclear missile submarines with 44 SLBMs reflects the dismantlement since the signing of the MOU in September 1990

[REDACTED]

The Soviet President also announced he will remove an additional 3 submarines with 48 SLBMs.

[REDACTED]

~~(S/NF/AN)~~ *SLBM Modernization.* The Gorbachev counterproposal did not include any constraints on their SLBM modernization program.

[REDACTED]

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Long-Range Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles

~~(S/NF)~~ *SLCMs and Sea-Based Tactical Nuclear Weapons.* Gorbachev's proposal to remove tactical naval nuclear weapons appears to be a reciprocal response to President Bush's offer to remove sea-based nuclear weapons, including sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), from surface ships and submarines. [REDACTED]

~~(S/NF)~~ Removing short-range antiship cruise missiles (range less than 600 kilometers), which the Soviets, initially refused to include in the politically binding agreement associated with the START accord reached on SLCMs, will reduce the quick reaction escalatory threat presented by nuclear weapons at sea. [REDACTED]

Strategic Bombers

(U) *Removal of Heavy Bombers From Alert Status.* On 30 September 1991, the Soviets announced that their bomber alert status had been reduced. In the 5 October 1991 speech, Gorbachev reiterated the earlier Soviet announcement and also stated that heavy bomber nuclear weapons would be stored in military depots and a modified short-range nuclear missile development program for strategic bombers would be canceled.

Defensive Forces

~~(S/NF)~~ *Antimissile Defense Systems/Missile Warning Systems.* Gorbachev stated that the Soviets are prepared to consider proposals from the United States on nonnuclear antimissile defense systems.

Previously, the Soviets had resisted any changes to the ABM Treaty, advocating that it should be strengthened.

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~~(S/NF)~~ *Missile Warning Centers.* Gorbachev's proposal for establishing a joint missile attack warning system had been earlier broached during the July 1991 G-7 meeting in London.

[REDACTED]

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~~(S/NF/WN)~~ *Strategic Defense Missiles.* Gorbachev responded positively to President Bush's initiative on eliminating nuclear warheads for air defense surface-to-air missile units. Gorbachev announced that this class of nuclear weapon would be withdrawn from the air defense troops and consolidated in central sites. However, he indicated that only a portion of them would be eliminated.

[REDACTED]

Reduction to 5,000 Weapons Under START

~~(S/NF)~~ Gorbachev stated that force reductions would result in a deployed START force of only 5,000 weapons rather than the accountable 6,000 limit.

[REDACTED]

~~(S/NF)~~ The Soviet force structure can be reduced to 5,000 weapons by the late 1990s through a combination of further cuts in their nuclear submarine force and ICBMs [REDACTED] and reentry vehicle downloading.

Nuclear Security

~~(S/NF)~~ *Physical Security and Command and Control.* The Soviets quickly issued a positive response to President Bush's initiative on bilateral nuclear security talks encompassing physical security and command and control issues. In his speech, Gorbachev further supported this response. The Soviets appear willing to engage in discussions and data exchanges with the United States on how security is ensured and maintained in their nuclear forces.

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French and British Nuclear Forces

~~(S/NF)~~ The Soviet's initial response indicates they are particularly concerned with including French and British nuclear forces in a new round of arms reductions.



START II

~~(S/NF)~~ Gorbachev proposed that future negotiations on strategic forces should achieve reductions of about 50 percent. This proposal signals continued Soviet interest in moving quickly into negotiations for reductions beyond START. The 50-percent figure is similar to other Soviet statements and may represent only a minor modification to their previous policy, 


Gorbachev did not specify however
period for such reductions.

Outlook

~~(C/NF)~~ Russian President Yeltsin and his advisers developed their own disarmament plan. Rather than contradicting Gorbachev's recent proposals, the Yeltsin plan mirrors Gorbachev's and calls for larger cuts in some areas (post-START force reductions of two-thirds instead of one-half and unspecified "more far reaching unilateral measures" to promote termination of fissile material for nuclear weapons).

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5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

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Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
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Reason: 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 424
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Date: **MAR 23 2016**