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TELEGRAM

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INFO OCT-21 ISD-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY EA/K:JDFORBES:JOB  
APPROVED BY EA - MR. GLEYSTEN  
O - MR. PENLETON  
DES - MR. KRATZER  
PM - MR. VEST  
S/S - FVORTIZ

NON-SECRET REVIEW

Col. A - [Signature] approved  
transmitted to OASD/C  
Col. B - [Signature] approved  
transmitted to OASD/C

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INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

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SECRET STATE 293834 T0SEC 240135

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MARTIN MCLEAN  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X6  
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 28 JUN 2036  
DATE/CASE ID: 29 JUN 2011 201002987

REF. 11652: XSDS-3

TAGS: KNUC, PARM, KS

SUBJECT: ACTING SECRETARY DISCUSSES NUCLEAR REPROCESSING  
WITH KOREAN AMBASSADOR

REF: (A) STATE 285640; (B) SEDUL 9487

1. IN ACCORDANCE PARA 4 R-F A, ACTING SECRETARY CALLED  
IN ROK AMBASSADOR MAMM DECEMBER 11 TO UNDERLINE SERIOUS-  
NESS OF U.S. CONCERN OVER ROK NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANS.  
VEST, KRATZER AND GLEYSTEN WERE PRESENT.

2. REFERRING TO RECENT MEETINGS IN SEOUL, ACTING SECRE-  
TARY STATED THAT SECRETARY HAD INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR SNEI-  
DER TO AGAIN EXPRESS USG'S SERIOUS CONCERN OVER IMPLI-  
MENTATION OF FRENCH CONTRACT. PRIME MINISTER KIM HAD  
BEEN INFORMED THAT IF WE DO NOT RECEIVE FAVORABLE RES-

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL  
APPEAL ACTION: RELEASED IN FULL  
DATE/CASE ID: 13 DEC 2011 201002987

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POUSE TO OUR REQUEST WITHIN ONE WEEK AMBASSADOR SNEIDER HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO RAISE SUBJECT DIRECTLY WITH PRESIDENT PARK.

3. EMPHASIZING IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHES TO MATTER, ACTING SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT EXISTENCE OF FACILITY IN KOREA WHICH COULD PRODUCE WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM WOULD

HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES IN THE REGION AND COULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT OUR POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS WITH KOREA. FURTHERMORE, GOING AHEAD WOULD HAVE SERIOUS EFFECTS ON OUR GOVERNMENTAL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH THE ROK, INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL OF THE KORI-2 LOAN GUARANTEE REQUEST AND REFUSAL TO AUTHORIZE REPROCESSING OF US-PROVIDED SPENT FUEL IN A KOREAN FACILITY. AT SAME TIME, WE WISH TO COOPERATE WITH ROK IN NUCLEAR AREA AND TO ENCOURAGE ALTERNATIVE OF A MULTINATIONAL REPROCESSING PLANT IN EAST ASIA.

4. HAHN REPLIED WITH REVIEW OF ROK POSITION. RATHER THAN CANCELLATION, HIS GOVERNMENT STRONGLY FAVORS U.S. PARTICIPATION AND CONTROL OF FACILITY. USG IS OVEREMPHASIZING THAT ROK RESTRAINT IN NUCLEAR AREA WILL HAVE BENEFICIAL SECURITY EFFECTS ON KOREAN PENINSULA AND NEGATIVE U.S. SUSPICIONS ARE DRIVING ROK TO ALTERNATE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS.

5. KOREA HAS DECIDED TO RAPIDLY DEVELOP NUCLEAR ENERGY TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON PETROLEUM IMPORTS, WHICH PRESENTLY COST \$1.5 BILLION PER YEAR, AND STRONGLY DESIRES TO SPECIALIZE IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE TECHNOLOGY, PARTICULARLY REPROCESSING. KOREA DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHY U.S. OBJECTS TO THESE KOREAN ASPIRATIONS WHEN U.S. HAS NOT OPPOSED REPROCESSING PLANT IN JAPAN. REFERRING TO KORI-2 DELAY, HAHN SAID HE BELIEVES U.S. IS DRAGGING ITS FEET IN SUPPLYING REACTORS TO ROK.

6. ACTING SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT REPROCESSING HAS YET TO BE PROVEN COMMERCIALY SUCCESSFUL. U.S. HAS 56 NUCLEAR REACTORS BUT NO SUCCESSFUL COMMERCIAL REPROCESSING PLANT. ROK CAN ENJOY BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR POWER

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ACQUISITION OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, WHICH IS CRUCIAL FOR CONTINUED RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH IN KOREA.

9. GLEYSTEN NOTED THAT ECONOMIC DISCUSSION WAS SUBSIDIARY TO MAIN POLITICAL ARGUMENT THAT KOREAN NATIONAL REPROCESSING CAPABILITY WOULD HAVE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES AND ADVERSELY IMPACT ON OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS. OUR REQUEST TO ROK IS TO AVOID AN ACTION WHICH WOULD BE WIDELY INTERPRETED AS A STEP TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT.

10. HAHM THEORIZED THAT U.S. MIGHT PROVIDE ROK WITH A CONCRETE FUEL FABRICATION PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD ALLOW ROKS TO CANCEL REPROCESSING DEAL. ACTING SECRETARY INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A USEFUL PROPOSAL WHICH WE COULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER, AND URGED HAHM TO PURSUE WITH HIS GOVERNMENT. HAHM THEN BACKED AWAY NOTING THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ANY INSTRUCTIONS TO PRESENT ANY SUCH ALTERNATIVE.

11. MEETING CLOSED WITH OUR REITERATION OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO AOREAN REPROCESSING PLANT QUESTION.

12. COMMENT: HAHM APPEARED TO BE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO TAKE INTRANSIGENT LINE. HE WAS BOTH DIFFUSE AND INSISTENT IN HIS ARGUMENTS. HE, AND IN PARTICULAR SCIENCE ATTACHE WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM, REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED TO TURN DISCUSSION AWAY FROM POLITICAL TO TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS. HE MADE CLEAR WE DO NOT ACCEPT KOREAN TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC RATIONALE, AND HE ALSO MADE CERTAIN THAT HAHM UNDERSTOOD BASIC NATURE OF OUR OBJECTIONS TO ROK POSSESSION OF REPROCESSING FACILITY, SISCO

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