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TELEGRAM

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file 7155R

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ACTION ACDA 17

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 0724
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0914
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0456
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0395
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1145
AMEMBASSY ROME 0601
USUN NEW YORK 1276

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
SUBJECT: CO-CHAIRMEN'S MEETING, OCT 7

REF: STATE 49458

1. FISHER SUGGESTED TO ROSHCHIN REVISION OF PROPOSED MEXICAN
ART IV ON PEACEFUL USES AS SET FORTH IN PARA 10, GENEVA 1002.
HE STRESSED THAT "DUTY TO CONTRIBUTE" FROM MEX TEXT HAD BEEN
REPLACED BY "COOPERATE IN CONTRIBUTING", REFERENCE TO

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PRODUCTION AND INDUSTRIES HAD BEEN OMITTED, AND "PARTY TO

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THE TREATY" HAD BEEN ADDED AT END. ROSHCHIN SAID HE WOULD REFER US REDRAFT TO MOSCOW.

2. FISHER GAVE TO ROSHCHIN FOLLOWING US REDRAFT OF MEXICAN DISARMAMENT ARTICLE (IV-C): "EACH OF THE PARTIES TO THIS TREATY UNDERTAKES TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT FURTHER VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS REGARDING THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND REGARDING DISARMAMENT, AND IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL."

3. ROSHCHIN OBJECTED STRENUOUSLY TO WORD "VERIFIABLE" ARGUING THAT THERE WAS NO NECESSARY REASON LIMIT FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, E.G., THERE MIGHT BE MUTUAL EXAMPLE MEASURES WHICH NEED NOT BE VERIFIED. FISHER EXPLAINED, FIRST, THAT "VERIFIABLE" DID NOT MEAN SAME THING AS INTERNATIONAL CONTROL, SINCE A MEASURE COULD BE VERIFIED BY NATIONAL MEANS AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. NATIONAL MEANS ARE USED IN CASES OF LIMITED TEST BAN AND OUTER SPACE TREATIES. SECOND, MUTUAL EXAMPLE MEASURES ARE

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NOT "AGREEMENTS," IN SENSE THAT GOVERNMENTS ARE COMMITTED AND, IN FACT, THIS WAS MADE CLEAR IN CASE OF 1964 CURTAILMENT OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL PRODUCTION BY US AND USSR. FURTHER, MUTUAL EXAMPLE STEPS WOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED BY US WORDING. ANTYASOV MADE POINT THAT NON-ALIGNED MIGHT LOOK UPON INSERTION OF WORD "VERIFIABLE" AS TRICK BY NUCLEAR POWERS. THEY MIGHT ARGUE THAT NUCLEARS WISHED PROVIDE THEMSELVES EXCUSE FOR NOT REACHING A NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT WHENEVER IT COULD BE SAID THAT A MEASURE WAS NOT VERIFIABLE IN SENSE THAT AGREED US AND SOVIET VERIFICATION COULD NOT BE WORKED OUT (E.G., COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND CUT-OFF). ANTYASOV SAID WHOLE POINT OF INSERTING OPERATIVE ARTICLE WAS TO MAKE POINTS WITH NON-NUCLEARS NOT TO RAISE SUSPICIONS. ANTYASOV ALSO POINTED OUT THAT UNDER US-PROPOSED OPERATIVE ARTICLE OBLIGATION WOULD APPLY TO NON-NUCLEARS TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS AMONG THEMSELVES REGARDING CONVENTIONAL

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DISARMAMENT, AND HE QUESTIONED DESIRABILITY THAT WE OUGHT TO IMPOSE ADDITIONAL CONDITION, OR ALTERNATIVELY A POSSIBLE EXCUSE, OF "VERIFIABLE," AS TO ANY OR ALL OF THESE MEASURES. ROSHCHIN URGED US NOT TO INSIST ON THIS WORD. FISHER

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REPEATED ARGUMENTS AND CONCLUDED BY ASKING ROSHCHIN TO REFER POINT TO HIS GOVERNMENT.

4. FISHER SAID THAT IN CONNECTION WITH OPERATIVE ARTICLE ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE RETAIN PREAMBULAR PROVISIONS. HE GAVE ROSHCHIN FOLLOWING VERSION OF PREAMBULARS: "DECLARING THEIR INTENTION TO ACHIEVE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE THE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, AND TO FURTHER THE EASING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THE STRENGTHENING OF TRUST BETWEEN STATES IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE CESSATION OF THE MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE LIQUIDATION OF ALL THEIR EXISTING STOCKPILES, AND THE ELIMINATION FROM NATIONAL ARSENALS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE MEANS OF THEIR DELIVERY PURSUANT TO A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT ANDEFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL, "URGING THE COOPERATION OF ALL STATES IN THE ATAINMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE,"

5. FISHER EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD BEEN SUBJECT CRITICIS BECAUSE ONE PREAMBULAR SAID "DECLARING THEIR INTENTION" BUT OTHER PREAMBULAR MERELY SAID "DESIRING TO FURTHER EASING

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OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION." IF PREAMBULARS COMBINED, THIS DIFFICULTY COULD BE ELIMINATED. ROSHCHIN SAID HE DID NOT HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH IDEA OF COMBINING PREAMBULARS BUT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT PRECISE CONSISTENCY OF PREAMBULARS WITH NEW OPERATIVE ARTICLE. UNDER EXISTING PREAMBULARS, WHETHER OR NOT COMBINED, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL MEASURES LIKE ELIMINATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE EXPRESSLY TIED TO GCD AND THIS HAD BEEN

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CRITICIZED. WE WOULD CONTINUE BE CRITICIZED FOR THIS PREAMBULARS WERE INCLUDED WITHOUT CHANGE. FISHER STRESSED THAT US COULD NOT ACCEPT REFERENCE TO SUCH MEASURES AS ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM NATIONAL ARSENALS UNLESS THESE WERE TIED TO GCD AS IN PRESENT PREAMBULAR. ROSHCIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS; HOWEVER, NEW OPERATIVE ARTICLE AVOIDED THIS PROBLEM. ROSHCIN RAISED FOLLOWING POSSIBILITIES: (A) MAKING LAST HALF OF COMBINED PREAMBULAR PARA CONSISTENT WITH NEW OPERATIVE PARA BY DELETING FROM PREAMBULAR PARA MENTION OF THOSE MEASURES WHICH ARE SPECIFICALLY TIED TO GCD, AND (B) LEAVING IN PRESENT PREAMBULAR ON "DECLARING THEIR INTENTION" BUT DELETING

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PREAMBULAR ON "DESIRING TO EASE TENSIONS." HE ALSO NOTED POSSIBILITY HAVING PREAMBLE UNCHANGED. ROSHCIN SUGGESTED AND FISHER AGREED THAT US AND SOV DELS CONSIDER POSSIBILITIES ON MONDAY.

GP-3. TUBBY

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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0396
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1146
AMEMBASSY ROME 0602
USUN NEW YORK 1277

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6. ROSHCHIN ALSO RAISED POSSIBILITY IN DISARMAMENT PREAMBULARS OF UTILIZING JAPANESE SUGGESTION OF CHANGING WORDS "IN ORDER TO FACILITATE" EITHER TO "THUS FACILITATING" OR PERHAPS TO "AND TO FACILITATE". FISHER SAID WE WOULD CONSIDER LATTER, BUT JAAPANESE SUGGESTION OF "THUS FACILITATING" DID NOT SEEM WELL THOUGHT OUT.

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7. FISHER GAVE ROSHCHIN US REVISION OF MEXICAN PROPOSAL ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AS SET FORTH IN

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REFTEL. FISHER SAID WE PRESUMED PREAMBULAR PARA WOULD BE DELETED. HE EXPLAINED THAT UNDER US FORMULATION CO-CHAIRMEN COULD STRESS TO NON-NUCLEARS FOLLOWING POSITIVE FEATURES; ACCEPTANCE OF BASIC IDEA OF OPERATIVE ARTICLE; ALL PARTIES, NOT JUST NUCLEARS, WOULD HAVE HAND IN WORKING OUT ARRANGEMENTS; USE OF STRONG WORD "INSURE"; AND SPECIFICATION OF LOW COST. ROSHCIN SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER.

8. FISHER INFORMED ROSHCIN THAT US PREPARED ACCEPT WITHOUT CHANGE MEXICAN PROPOSAL FOR OPERATIVE ARTICLE ON NUCLEAR FREE ZONES. ROSHCIN SAID THIS WAS ALSO SOV DEL VIEW.

9. ON TACTICS, FISHER URGED DESIRABILITY REACHING AS RAPID AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE SO THAT POSITIVE RESPONSES ON MEXICAN PROPOSALS COULD BE GIVEN WITHIN WEEK OR WEEK AND A HALF. HE SAID ENDC NEEDED THIS IN ORDER COUNTER GROWING DISSATISFACTION AND RESTLESSNESS TO MOVE TO NEW YORK.

10. ON UAR AMENDMENTS, FISHER AFFIRMED US VIEW, ON WHICH HE HAD NOW RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS, THAT US OPPOSES CHANGES IN ARTS I AND II AND THAT US WOULD LIKE TO STATE ONLY THAT

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UAR AMENDMENTS ALREADY TAKEN CARE OF TO EXTENT PRACTICAL PROBLEMS RAISED. HE ADDED WE WOULD WANT CONSULT ON STATEMENTS EACH WOULD MAKE.

11. IN RESPONSE ROSHCIN'S QUESTION, FISHER COMMENTED THAT MEXICAN SUGGESTION FOR REQUIREMENT OF 60 ACCESSIONS IN ADDITION TO NUCLEAR POWERS IN ORDER BRING TREATY INTO FORCE SEEMED TOO HIGH, AS COMPARED PERHAPS TO FORTY, AND THAT MEXICAN PROPOSAL FOR TWO NON-NUCLEAR DEPOSITARIES RAISED DIFFICULT PRACTICAL PROBLEMS.

12. ROSHCIN ASKED FISHER WHEN US WOULD BE READY DISCUSS ARTICLE III AND SECURITY ASSURANCES. FISHER REPLIED HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO SAY; HOWEVER, US HOPED COMPLETE CONSIDERATION OF NPT, INCLUDING INSERTION OF ARTICLE III, BY END OF OCTOBER. ON ASSURANCES ROSHCIN SAID USSR HAD

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DROPPED KOSYGIN PROPOSAL FROM ITS APRIL TREATY ON UNDERSTANDING CO-CHAIRMEN WOULD BE ABLE DISCUSS AND WORK OUT AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH. MOREOVER, CO-CHAIRMEN'S DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN PROMISED AT TIME OF TABLING.

13. FISHER AND ROSHCHIN AGREED TO CONTINUE CO-CHAIRMEN'S DISCUSSION OF AMENDMENTS ON MONDAY, OCT 9. GP-3. TUBBY

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