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To : The Acting Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR- Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*  
Subject: Can We Do Business With De Gaulle?

This paper is the third and last in a series of studies dealing with the problem of France's position within the Atlantic alliance, and in particular with the implications therefor of the establishment of some kind of allied nuclear force including a mixed-manned component with West German participation. The first paper estimated that President de Gaulle was likely to speed up the disengagement of France from its remaining NATO commitments if he became convinced--for example by West Germany's joining such a force--that the Federal Republic could not be looked to for support of his own ideas about the future organization of Western Europe and the North Atlantic alliance (RM REU-70, "Is de Gaulle Bluffing? December 17, 1964, (S/NFD). The second concluded that de Gaulle ran little risk of upset at home if he thus disengaged France from NATO (RM REU-72, "Domestic Limitations on de Gaulle's Foreign Policy," December 24, 1964, (S/NFD). This paper examines whether means might be found to achieve the creation of some form of alliance nuclear force without concomitantly having to accept a weakening of NATO by a resultant rupture with France. More broadly, it considers the possibility of preventing a French withdrawal from NATO--whether this would be carried out sooner, because of the establishment of an ANF, or later, because of de Gaulle's long range policy.

ABSTRACT

This paper does not answer the question asked in its title. It suggests that French withdrawal from NATO can be prevented if at all only as part of an overall "package deal" between the United States and France. The key element of this would be that the two parties agree 1) that they still had common interests on which they could collaborate (e.g., resistance to a continuing Soviet threat, opposition to German national nuclear armament); and 2) that, therefore, they would agree to disagree on other subjects (e.g., the future "organization" of Europe, the ultimate relationship between

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Western Europe and the United States) without calling into question their overarching agreements.

While emphasizing the extreme difficulty of achieving this degree of meeting of minds with de Gaulle, the paper suggests the main headings of the kind of agreement that would be necessary: 1) commitment by de Gaulle to "leave NATO alone," at least through 1969, even if an allied nuclear force is established, and, if possible, his participation in a non-proliferation agreement; 2) some US concessions to de Gaulle's "status-seeking," perhaps in a United Nations framework; 3) some degree of nuclear cooperation between the two governments; 4) a Franco-American "non-dissemination" agreement with respect to West Germany; and 5) agreement to disagree on other things--major as they are--without infringing on the preceding points.

No conclusion is reached about whether an agreement between the United States and France would, in fact, be possible on these or any other terms, or whether, if possible, would be desirable in the U.S. national interest. It may well be that the parts of this political problem are too interconnected and that each side will feel the stakes too high to permit such limited agreement. If so, we must then face the fact that nothing significant really remains of Franco-American cooperation. "Anything goes," and much will.

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The Problem. President de Gaulle's objection to the present structure of NATO and his disengagement of French forces progressively from alliance control long antedate the MLF/ANF question. As was pointed out in a paper\* written after his decision to remove French officers from the integrated SACLANT staff was made known in April 1964,

...what de Gaulle has "done" to NATO in the six years since he returned to power, and what he has failed to do in that substantial period of time, give some reason to think that his overall purpose has not been to wreck the alliance (the need for which he has constantly proclaimed), nor even to demolish its existing integrated military structure in order to implement his endlessly repeated statements that France's defense must be solely in French hands. The circumstances surrounding his most recent action vis-a-vis NATO suggest, rather, that he has these two aims: 1) to mount a slow but constant pressure on the United States and the other allies which will lead them to understand that France's participation in Alliance affairs may be diminished regularly until they are willing to agree to some restructuring of the Alliance--never set forth in detail--more to de Gaulle's liking; and 2) actually to bring about such a restructuring by unilaterally creating situations of fact in which France continues to participate in Alliance military affairs but on bases other than those of integrated commands.

The ANF/MLF problem has not provoked a wholly new Gaullist policy toward NATO; rather, it is sharpening and speeding up the policy that existed. The difference is that, arising in a new framework, the "French problem" may become acute sooner rather than later. Since this problem basically concerns the place, if any, which France is to continue to occupy in the Western alliance and its component and related institutions, answers must be looked for in terms of the purpose and nature of the alliance itself.

France and the Western Alliance. The purposes of the Western alliance have been variously conceived and observed at different times by the several members, but may be summed up in their current standing under two headings:

1. To bring together in the most effective possible manner the military resources of the members so as to deter and, if necessary, to counter Soviet aggression in Europe (and Turkey);
2. To provide a more or less permanent framework for relations among the European and North American members not only in defense but in other matters, and in particular, since 1950, to provide a "place" for West Germany which will satisfy its reasonable aspirations and contain any potential unreasonable ones.

\* Research Memorandum RFU-31, "French Military Participation in NATO," May 1, 1964 (S/NFD).

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These purposes are of course intimately intertwined, but it is useful in considering "the French problem" to distinguish between them, for policies which answer to one purpose may be more or less irrelevant to or even in contradiction with the other. In such cases priorities would be established by balancing gains on one count against losses on the other. No attempt is made here to establish a balance sheet of the plus and minus of France's role as an ally against the Soviet threat, as an actor, largely independent of its allies, on the world stage, a more or less uncooperative participant in the building of the "Atlantic community," and a mainstay of West Germany's political "rehabilitation." But it is possible to signal a number of topics that should be carefully studied in reckoning up the value of France's participation hitherto in "western alliance affairs, and the losses, if any, which its departure would entail.

Among the questions to be considered under the first heading would be:

What would be the implications of French withdrawal from NATO on the objective military position of the alliance, on the Soviet assessment of that position, and on Soviet policies which have been strongly influenced by the alliance's military posture of strength? What would be the implications of the loss of France on the military significance of US doctrines of flexible response? How would the other allies react to this withdrawal? In particular, would they--including those that might join the ANF--be more or less likely to make the efforts needed to bring their armed forces up to the level of the still unachieved NATO force goals? Assuming, as is likely, that the French asked NATO to remove its installations from France--including, notably, its headquarters\*--would the allies contribute to the substantial cost of relocating these facilities?

What, on the other hand, is France's present military contribution to the alliance worth (including its "real estate") in terms of present judgments on the nature of the Soviet threat itself and on the (small) likelihood of a Soviet attack? If France did not leave NATO, would it be possible to work out militarily satisfactory arrangements for keeping French forces available to the alliance without the "integration" that de Gaulle opposes? Do the present cooperative agreements linking de-integrated French naval forces to SACLANT and CINCCOM afford a precedent in this respect? Might de Gaulle's repeated offers eventually to coordinate French nuclear forces with NATO have any military or other significance for the alliance?

\* If SACEUR were made commander of the NATO members' joint missile force, de Gaulle could maintain that SHAPE had become in effect the command post, on French soil, for a nuclear force of which France was not a member and which had been illegally integrated into NATO military machinery without French assent. He would probably, in these circumstances, ask SHAPE to leave France. But he might do no less if, as he would say, the ANF in effect replaced NATO under some new allied commander and SACEUR remained as commander of only a shell of the former alliance.

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Under the above-mentioned "community-building" purpose of the Atlantic alliance, French withdrawal from NATO also raises important questions for intra-alliance relationships. What would remain without France would not be the same alliance minus one member but would be qualitatively different. A key point in this respect would be the role of West Germany. Since 1950 the states of Western Europe have developed institutions by which the revival of Germany was to be balanced and contained within organizations of which France was the principal other member. The European institutions--in addition to NATO itself, which Germany did not join until 1955--are a major part of the system defining Germany's place in the Western alliance. Even if, as is likely, de Gaulle does not disrupt the European communities, the political "withdrawal" of France would mean that Germany remained the principal military partner of the United States in Europe, and as such the principal continental member of the alliance.

What would the smaller allies make of this, particularly those for whom the Atlantic alliance has become an important means of "containing" Germany? Would not the disappearance of a certain sub-balance of power within the European part of the Atlantic alliance system mean that the United States would have to fill the gap itself, becoming more deeply involved in intra-European affairs? What would be the effects on these smaller allies of the anti-German campaign launched by Paris which would be likely to accompany de Gaulle's pullout, and of which there were already hints during the high point of MLF tensions in Oct.-Nov. 1964? What would be the effect of this campaign in France itself and its implications for a post-de Gaulle restoration of the old Franco-German tie? Can it be assumed that de Gaulle's successors would be able simply to return to France's empty chair in an alliance which would have moved on in the interval and in which Germany would be a yet weightier force? How would the USSR and other Eastern European countries seek to take advantage of this dissension in the West?

Preliminary Considerations In Quest of a Solution. The preceding paragraphs suggest some of the problems that are likely to arise as a result of French withdrawal from NATO. If, after study of these and other problems, the US were to conclude that some effort should be made to search for means to prevent this, the question would then arise: what would be de Gaulle's price (to call the matter by its right name) for refraining from taking the actions prejudicial to Western unity which it now seems he will take at once if the ANF/MLF comes into being (and by 1969 in any case)?

It is prudent and proper to state immediately that de Gaulle's price would at best be high - - perhaps too high for the US to consider paying. The chances of reaching an agreement with him are probably worse than they were before the MLF was conceived. Present chances of reaching such an agreement are probably a good deal less than even. The following comments are made on this basis.

It is probable, to begin with, that no persuading, no explanation of the ANF's purposes would suffice to deter de Gaulle. His stakes--the

nature of the future Europe and France's place in it--are very high. To be able realistically to entertain hope of deflecting him from leaving NATO if the force is established, an important shift in US policy would be a clear necessity. Preliminary to any discussion of actual policy adjustments by either side, it is worth considering the adjustments on what might be called the psychological level that would be called for.

The most promising approach would be for the United States to be willing to act on the assumption that some agreement with France is better than no agreement when broad agreement is impossible. Since American and French "grand designs" for the Atlantic area and for Western Europe, as presently understood, are not compatible, the questions to be answered are whether, nevertheless, there are any overarching considerations that bring the two governments together and whether, in case there are, they can devise common policies that can cope with all of their common problems.

The analogy of the course of recent East-West relations is suggestive in this respect. Pundits, in short-hand terms, have described this relationship by saying that the United States and the USSR do not agree on the ultimate state of the world which each is working to develop, but they do agree to abstain from nuclear war with each other to promote their long-term policies; therefore, they agree to compete "by other means." Do the United States and France still have enough in common to be able tacitly to agree to limit their disagreements?

One critical area in which such common interest would appear, if anywhere, is that of policy toward the Soviet Union. Can a minimum basis of political and technically adequate military cooperation be found vis-a-vis the USSR? There are certainly differences between Washington and Paris on the correct tactics to be applied to relations with the USSR; there is also competition for the decisive role of foremost Western interlocutor with the USSR over terms of an eventual German and Central European settlement. Nonetheless, the ultimate security problems posed to both the US and France by the Soviet military threat and by Soviet external ambitions would appear to provide an important foundation for American-French cooperation. Even here, a problem might arise if de Gaulle insisted on carrying into effect to the letter the anachronistic notions of "wartime cooperation" between allies that he has presented.

Related to this, of course, is the question of the function that Western alliance mechanisms are to play. If either the US or France decided that these instrumentalities were themselves to be used primarily to promote the intra-European or intra-alliance political policies of Washington or Paris, then even a minimum agreement would hardly be possible. But if it became apparent that the United States government had concluded that the present nature of the Soviet threat required an attempt to handle certain (particularly military) intra-allied relationships mainly as a function of that threat rather than in terms of "community-building" or of other intra-allied non-military relationships, de Gaulle might then judge that the US was prepared to pursue a dialogue with him on

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specifics.

The United States and France may also have another concern in common: to see that their competition does not contribute to bringing West Germany nearer to the national possession of nuclear weapons (assuming that Bonn might ever be so inclined, as it now appears not to be). It is remarkable that the US and France both consider this an undesirable prospect but that a chain of events in which both have participated has led to a situation in which the question of Germany's relationship to nuclear weaponry has become a principal international preoccupation.\* Would it be possible for the two governments to agree that this domain, like that of their cooperation against potential Soviet aggression, should be excluded from their competition?

Even if both the United States government and de Gaulle could agree that they have these common interests, an important psychological problem would still remain. Not only is de Gaulle's policy based on the idea of reducing American political influence in Western Europe, and of reducing its military presence over the next decade as a means to this end, but he seems to have a fixation that the United States is conspiratorially acting to block his success by every means. He sees the MLF or ANF as the latest American device to this end. In this atmosphere any American presentation or even offer to de Gaulle would be met with suspicion. Meaningful political dialogue has been suspended between the two governments for so long\*\* that it would seem that no business could be done between them on major issues until it is restored, i.e., until the psychological cloud that de Gaulle has spread around himself in the direction of the United States is broken through.

The illness is de Gaulle's, but the antibiotic if there is one would have to be supplied by the United States. It is easier, however, to diagnose the problem than to suggest remedies. All that can be said is that somehow de Gaulle would have to be convinced that, whatever disagreements exist between the two governments, they still have sufficient interests in common to be able to do business on the specifics of those interests. The word "specifics" is perhaps the key to such a breakthrough if one is possible. There is little use discussing abstractions with de Gaulle, such as European "integration" or the merits of integrated versus coordinated military forces. Progress would be conceivable only if de Gaulle became convinced that issues of this kind could be left aside and that bargaining could take place on precise practical questions.

\* The implications of this problem were analyzed in RM REU-46, "France, Europe and the United States: Five Months Later," June 19, 1963 (S/NFD).

\*\* This is not so say that there has been a failure of communication between the two governments. While de Gaulle puts the blackest color on American policies, he is not wrong, nor is the US government, in judging that present long range goals of each are incompatible. Political dialogue as used here means not mutual explanations, no matter how candid, but exploration of possible areas of agreement, even if within a framework of broad disagreement. Such dialogue need not preclude continued public dispute on other matters.

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Elements of a Limited Understanding? If the US government decided to try this limited approach in an attempt to persuade de Gaulle to do or abstain from doing certain things, if a dialogue were suggested to him for the purpose of seeking limited "areas of agreement" on specifics, and if he responded favorably in principle, then it would be time to outline to him the main headings of the kind of package deal that we desired.

The following examples of such main headings are fragmentary, imperfectly worked out, and unexplored as to some of their implications, favorable and unfavorable. They are meant to suggest the kind of agenda that our understanding of French policy indicates would be called for if it were Washington's considered judgment to seek a dialogue with de Gaulle, and if, beforehand, the psychological atmosphere had been cleared to facilitate the attempt to develop such a give-and-take exchange.

1. What de Gaulle Would Be Expected To Do as His Part of a Bargain

a. NATO. In general terms, subject to careful refinement, de Gaulle would be expected to take no action in NATO against the establishment of the ANF; to halt his slow withdrawal of French military forces from NATO (or at least to agree in principle and in advance to reassign them on a basis that was militarily satisfactory to the alliance); to desist from (or at least to minimize) verbal attacks on the existence, structure, and functioning of NATO; and to agree not to give notice of intention to withdraw from the Atlantic Pact when it became legally possible for France to do so in 1968 (or at the very least, not to make known any decision to give such notice until that time, and, in that case, to inform the United States thereof six months in advance of the time for giving notice in order that the two governments could carry out together, privately, a review of the possible future of the alliance). If de Gaulle would agree to this much, the problem of France's relations with NATO would not be solved, but time would be gained. After all, who knows where he, and we, and the alliance will be in 1969?

b. Non-Proliferation. In addition to these important but negative concessions by de Gaulle, it is just possible that France might agree, if the overall arrangement were sufficiently attractive, to something more positive, viz., participation in a non-proliferation agreement. The French say they do not favor the further spread of nuclear weapons, but de Gaulle has stated that he considers it nevertheless to be inevitable. In any case, de Gaulle's own determination to build a nuclear force for reasons of his own political-military policies has not been and will not be affected by the possible spur thus given to others to follow the same nuclear course. But this does not necessarily mean that he might not see some benefit in having the "five world powers" (or possibly even the four of them now in the U.N.) join in an agreement--excluding coercion on others--pledging themselves not to promote the development of nuclear forces by other nations.

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2. De Gaulle's Conditions.

a. French Status. De Gaulle's most basic political aim is to establish and secure recognition of the "independence" of France and of its status as a great power, entitled to be in on virtually all major decision-making throughout the world. His 1958 memoranda proposing what has come to be called a three-power directorate constituted a move to secure such recognition from the United States and the United Kingdom. This question remains unspoken but unfinished business for de Gaulle. Any attempt to improve relations with France would probably have to include some American "give" on this subject.

If the French were asked to buttress their claim to great power status, and if they were willing to try to justify what they consider a self-evident fact, their reasoning would run thus:

Who are the permanent members of the Security Council?  
US, UK, France, USSR, and China (properly Communist China).

Who are the nuclear powers?  
US, UK, France, USSR, and Communist China.

Who are the main powers in the Atlantic alliance?  
US, UK, France, and, to some degree, West Germany.

Who are the main powers in German affairs?  
US, UK, France, USSR, and, to some degree, West Germany.

Who are the most influential foreign powers in Africa?  
US, UK, France, the USSR, and Communist China.

Who are the main powers in Southeast Asia?  
US, UK, France, and Communist China.

What Western powers have all these claims to status?  
Exactly three: US, UK, France.

Q.E.D.

This points up the fact that much of the earlier discussion about the directorate has for one reason or another missed the heart of the issue. De Gaulle did not propose a three-power directorate only, or even mainly, within the Atlantic alliance; he seeks one over and outside it. What he wanted was to have the three Western powers with worldwide responsibilities and status make plans for joint action in all areas of the world and to have these plans

transmitted to and carried out by such regional organizations--including NATO--as might exist. The example he had in mind was the wartime relationship between the United States and the British, as he saw--and experienced--it.

US objections to establishing such a directorate are well known and need not be repeated here. But if three-power arrangements within the Atlantic alliance (which de Gaulle did not ask for) are no longer possible (that they were routine up to about 1956 is evidenced by the existence of the NATO "Standing Group") because of the assumed adverse effect on West Germany, Italy, and the smaller members, there are perhaps two possibilities of giving de Gaulle some satisfaction on the issue outside the alliance. Both are suggested in a recent speech by Prime Minister Pompidou, who noted that the five nuclear powers are also the five permanent members of the Security Council (or will be, when the United Nations eventually comes to agree with France and the UK that Peking is entitled to the Chinese seat). In the first case by fact, and in the second by the terms of the United Nations Charter, France is a member of an exclusive "club" of five "world" powers and, within these clubs, of a Western "sub-caucus" of three. Would it not be possible for the US to turn this to good account?

One possibility would be to initiate three-power Western consultations as preparation for five-power negotiations on such matters as stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Germany and the smaller members of NATO could not reasonably object too strongly to France's inclusion with the US and the UK in such talks. Then, once the three powers had acquired what might become or at least seem to become a habit of meeting on these subjects, the range of their consultations might be somewhat broadened. Some kind of regular staffing might even be established to prepare these consultations. Indeed, institutionalized assurance to France by the US and UK of advance consultation on arms control and security issues might eventually induce France to assume its vacant seat at the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference.

A broader framework for three-power consultation, and therefore one more likely to appeal to de Gaulle, could be established on the basis of a suggestion made by Harold Wilson (and by others over the years) to the effect that an annual "Summit" take place in the form of a regular meeting of the Security Council, or of its permanent members, at the heads of state or government level. It would be logical that such a session be preceded by a meeting of the representatives of the Western participants: the United States, Great Britain, and France. This meeting, in turn, might be prepared by a session of the foreign ministers of these countries some months ahead, and perhaps by the work of some kind of staff or secretariat established for the purpose.

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The details would depend in part on the nature of the East-West contact that was to be established; the more regular and organized this was to be, the more regular and organized the Western "sub-caucus" could be (which, as noted above, is not to say that the Western powers could not agree on such regular meetings without tying them to an East-West Summit). The point is that a three-power pseudo-directorate of this kind would give as little offense to Germany (which might be compensated in other ways and is not, in any case, a member of the UN) and other NATO allies as any arrangement that can be imagined, for the scale and emphasis of meetings at this level and in this framework would obviously be far wider than North Atlantic and European affairs. This, of course, is just the scale that de Gaulle asked for in his 1958 memoranda.

The word pseudo-directorate is used above to describe this arrangement because it is obviously out of the question for the three major Western powers to try to manage Western affairs in the way that de Gaulle thinks the US and the UK managed alliance affairs in World War II. It is not clear, however, to what extent de Gaulle, in his 1958 memoranda, was seeking the status which the establishment of such an arrangement would give France, and to what extent he was actually seeking three-power planning. The question cannot be answered except in practice. The foregoing outline, however, would go far toward dealing with the problem insofar as it is a question of status-seeking. But, further, there is no reason to take de Gaulle's every word at face value, or to think that what he proposed in his 1958 memoranda, or in any other form, is necessarily his last word on the subject. De Gaulle, like everyone else, knows how to ask for more than he may expect to get.

We should have no illusion, however, that if de Gaulle were given some such status satisfaction as that mentioned above, as part of a package deal with him, agreement on all issues between France and its allies will follow. Where common policies can be worked out, well and good. But de Gaulle's free-wheeling in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is related to his deeply motivated drive to convince the French people that they are the masters of their own fate and to convince allies, enemies, and others of it as well. Discussion with de Gaulle may blunt this drive to show the flag but will not end it. The justification, other than to improve the atmosphere, for exploring such an arrangement with France as that discussed here is not the hope of ending all friction but of winning de Gaulle's agreement on the other concrete items in the package.

b. Nuclear Relationships. It is out of the question that de Gaulle would agree to any NATO or "Atlantic" arrangement by which France would give up control of its independent nuclear force. If the US accepts this fact, at least for de Gaulle's tenure of office, it might be possible to arrange

for the coordination of allied nuclear forces: certain American forces, the French force, the British force while it remains nationally controlled, and, in some fashion, the ANF if it is established. Each force would remain under the entire control of its government (or, in the case of the ANF, its governing authority), but plans could be made to coordinate the utilization of each in wartime, including common targeting and other appropriate actions. The United States would assist in the targeting of the French nuclear forces in such a manner that they would be available for suitable use by the French government on its own decision. Entirely apart from the small military gains thus acquired, the benefits to the United States of the "education" that French officers could acquire in this way in the facts of nuclear life might not be negligible in the long run.

The United States would contribute to an improvement in Franco-US relations if, when entering into such a cooperative arrangement, it diminished its open criticism of the existence of the French nuclear force. In fact, now that five years have passed since the first French nuclear detonation, the force could be publicly treated in much the same way as is the UK force, without thus adversely impinging on US efforts to prevent further nuclear proliferation. In addition, and regardless of the public line taken, the US would probably find it necessary to reduce (if not to eliminate) the obstacles now raised to French purchase in the United States of materials and equipment useful to the development of the French nuclear force.

The importance of this can hardly be overestimated. De Gaulle is a great believer in the principle that acts (as he understands them) speak louder than words. No US verbal "acceptance" of the fact of the French nuclear force would mean much to him if the US continued to act in a manner which he would see as a continuing attempt to block its development and to treat France in a much less favorable way than the UK is treated in this regard. Indeed, he is quite capable of believing--and may believe now--that verbal concessions are intended to hide from him the hard fact of continued US hostility to his policies.

c. Further Nuclear Relationships. If these American concessions were not sufficient to bring de Gaulle to accept even the minimum concessions asked of him by the US, the one additional move that might be decisive would be a broader agreement on positive US nuclear assistance to France. It should be noted here that there seems little basis for the widely held view that de Gaulle would reject help for his nuclear force because he wants every nut and bolt of it to be French. The KC-135 deal in itself should refute this idea. What is critical for the French, rather, are the conditions, not the fact of outside aid.

Obviously, the more that is offered to de Gaulle in the way of assistance to his nuclear program, the more likely he will be to make concessions in return.

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No attempt is made here to catalogue the kinds of nuclear assistance that might be considered. One example is mentioned, however, because it has not received much attention in discussions of the matter. This would be assistance to France in developing tactical nuclear weapons or the outright transfer of such weapons (with warheads) to France.

As French weapons systems became less crude, French strategic doctrine might also become less crude and less dangerous. French doctrine is now determined by the narrow constraints of French possibilities. "Massive retaliation" is emphasized because it suits the very limited weaponry likely to be under French control in the next decade.\* Diversification of weaponry would no doubt lead to sophistication of strategy, bringing nuances into French doctrine which would at the least bring it somewhat nearer to American doctrine. Such diversification would also help to build up the position of the French army (at present the increasingly poor relation in the family of the French armed services) and with it, in the nature of the case, a greater influence for doctrines of flexible response. While de Gaulle would remain the arbiter of French military affairs during his tenure, there seems no reason why even he might not modify his present strategic doctrines if he possessed the wherewithal to allow it. And after his passing, the French might feel that the possession of tactical nuclear weapons would permit them to abandon exclusively national control of their costly and marginal strategic force without losing their "special" nuclear--and therefore political--role in Europe.

### 3. Germany

There is one other topic on which it would be well for the US and France to reach a minimum of agreement: Germany. This would be what might be called a bilateral non-dissemination agreement between them with respect to West Germany. Under this compact de Gaulle would accept the degree of German participation in nuclear weaponry involved in the ANF, but the parties would make clear to each other that neither would assist the Germans further down the nuclear path. This would involve no substantive change of policy on the part of the two governments, for just as the United States has made clear that the ANF would not lead on to German national nuclear weapons, so de Gaulle certainly has no intention at present of sharing control of French weapons or nuclear knowhow with anyone. What is important is that the two states agree to stick to these positions and to refrain from competing for Germany's favor by offering nuclear bait. This deal might be facilitated by a US commitment not to seek to turn the ANF into an anti-French political instrument within NATO or the Six.

\* See RM REU-2, "Notes on French Strategic Doctrine," January 15, 1965 (S/NFD).

4. Agreement to Disagree. If the United States and France reached limited agreement along the lines sketched above, they would at the same time agree to disagree on other subjects. In particular, they would understand that each would continue to pursue its own Atlantic and European policies. The difference between the situation in this case and that which will exist if there is no limited agreement is that they would pursue their competition, as stated earlier, "by other means," that is, by not drawing all subjects in which they have interests into the competition.

It would obviously be a major concession for de Gaulle to agree to pursue his European designs without calling all Atlantic military relationships into question, and in particular to swallow his fears that his courtship of West Germany would be irrevocably set back by German adherence to an Atlantic missile force. Presumably he might come to accept this--if at all--only if his interests were advanced on other fronts as outlined above.

There would also be problems for the United States in seeming to give the green light, not of course, it should be emphasized, to de Gaulle's designs, but to his pursuit of them. However, while this kind of agreement would no doubt appear to be a success for Gaullist policy, and while some difficulty with Germany and others might be anticipated from it, it would not be equivalent to "handing over" Western Europe to de Gaulle. There is no sign that the other states of the area are at all inclined to subordinate themselves to Paris, and, in fact, it is clear that the surge of sentiment among West Europeans for "independence" of the United States does not exist to the extent that de Gaulle himself and numerous writers (including many Americans) had judged.

That this should be the case at a time when East-West tensions are less sharp than in the past presents something of a paradox. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact, not only that the US provides better security against whatever threat the USSR is still thought to pose, and not only that de Gaulle's bald effort to establish French hegemony is resented everywhere in Europe, but also that most Europeans remain satisfied with a structure of inter-allied relationships marked by American leadership of the alliance. De Gaulle's challenge, by presenting a clear and unacceptable alternative, seems actually to have crystallized support among West European governments for American leadership (and also, perhaps, staved off more subtle and potentially more successful challenges).

The preparation for any such dialogue with de Gaulle as that considered here would have to include careful study of whether this kind of "payoff" to de Gaulle to keep France associated with NATO for several years, despite the establishment of the ANF, might drive other European governments into the arms of France or whether the very facts both of the ANF's establishment and of the counterbalance of the type of French "success" postulated here would not, between them, enable the United States to continue, with dexterous management of affairs, to count on the support of most of these

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governments for resisting the negative aspects of de Gaulle's European schemes and for advancing American long term goals. The point of departure of such studies would be the evident fact that, for all his power of destruction and blackmail, de Gaulle has failed signally to advance his European policies since his veto on January 14, 1963, of UK membership in the Common Market,\* and that, therefore, the US would be dealing with him, if it came to do so, from a position of immense strength.

Modalities. If it were decided to undertake any such dialogue with de Gaulle, the modalities would obviously have to be handled with utmost care, for his own susceptibilities, as we know, are remarkably acute, and those of the allies might become hardly less so in the process. The critical importance of a "psychological breakthrough" to de Gaulle has already been discussed above. This implies, probably, careful intimation to de Gaulle, with symbolic gestures, that some changes in American policy towards France might be forthcoming in certain circumstances. Without entering into the complex details of this subject, we would estimate that 1) a useful means of making known to de Gaulle that such proposals might be made, while assuring ourselves of German support for the plan, would be to maneuver the Federal Republic--already surely somewhat alarmed at the thought of France's breaking off the "reconciliation" and leaving NATO--into taking the first steps in Paris, thus using the atmosphere created during Erhard's visit on January 19-20, 1965; and 2) the substance of the package should be broached to de Gaulle by the President himself in a special meeting for the purpose. Point (2), particularly, seems an indispensable element of the psychological breakthrough discussed above.

Conclusion. This sketch of the possible terms of a limited agreement with de Gaulle is not presented as an argument for such an agreement or even for a change in the present US approach to the "French problem." It only suggests the kinds of things that de Gaulle might possibly agree to and the kinds of things that would, at a minimum, be necessary to cause him to carry out the major reversal of his policy which French tolerance of the ANF would involve.\*\*

It may be objected that it is hard to think that de Gaulle would thus limit his freedom of action in pursuit of his policies even in return for the concessions that the United States might make to him. However, this cannot be known until the US makes the attempt. On the other hand, it may be concluded that if these are de Gaulle's minimum conditions, then any

\* See RM REU-50, "De Gaulle At Bay," September 2, 1964 (S/NFD).

\*\* To the extent that momentum is not resumed in the West during 1965 towards creating an ANF, de Gaulle will not feel his policies so acutely challenged by the US and will be less tempted to early destruction of NATO machinery. To this extent, US policy concessions for achieving the type of limited agreement with him outlined here might not have to enter the picture. But these moves would still have relevance if there were a desire in Washington to improve relations with Paris, quite independently of the ANF issue, or to stave off progressive French disengagement from NATO.

question of a bargain with him would have to be dismissed out of hand, whatever the consequences, because the price for the US would be too high. This, of course, is a judgment for US policy-makers to reach.

In this connection, it is certainly true that, while it is analytically useful to distinguish among various French or US policies--e.g., towards the USSR, towards NATO, towards Germany--it is, in practice, difficult to be sure that, once it had been decided to begin bargaining, this process could be confined to only certain particular segments of selected policies. Reality may turn out to be too interconnected to permit profitable or safe exploration of this kind of pragmatic, limited approach.

If for these or other reasons a fruitful political dialogue, such as that outlined here, cannot be established between the United States and de Gaulle, then this fact should be clearly faced. It would mean that, since the two governments differ on long range fundamentals, their inability to agree on limiting their competition in pursuit of their divergent goals would almost certainly exclude even the narrowest kind of modus vivendi between them. In that case, then, "anything goes"--and it can be expected that much would.

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