

16 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President - 5:30 - 15 Apr 1963
In Palm Beach, Florida

1. ⁹⁸ [Mr. Lundahl gave a complete briefing on the latest satellite photography of the Soviet Union and both satellite and U-2 photography of Communist China.]

2. ⁹⁸ [Reviewed with the President the details of the Helms/Angleton papers covering their counter-intelligence work in the French effort to penetrate certain U. S. scientific areas. I recommended to the President that we initiate a program of misinformation, which the President approved, and Helms and Angleton were instructed to proceed. The justification for the Helms/Angleton activities were based upon intelligence received from which was confirmed by the [redacted] of a plan on the part of the SDECE to penetrate certain US scientific and nuclear installations.]

3. Discussed in some detail the Donovan negotiations in Cuba. Gave the President a copy of Miskovsky's summary of the Donovan discussions and a copy of my memorandum of April 15th on Cuba. President raised the question of Miro Cardona, stated that Cardona had misrepresented the facts. I urged that the President not involve himself personally in a public argument with Miro Cardona.

I raised the question of the possibility of working on Castro with the objective of disenchanting him with his Soviet relations causing him to break relations with Khrushchev, to effect the removal of Soviet troops from Cuba, reorient his policies with respect to Latin America, and establish in Cuba government satisfactory to the rest of the Hemisphere. I explained to the President that the Cuban problem must be solved in one of two ways; either the manner outlined above or alternatively, by bringing consistent pressure of every possible nature on Khrushchev to force his withdrawal from Cuba, and then to bring about the downfall of Castro by means which could be developed after the removal of the Soviets troops (but not before) and thereafter establish a satisfactory government in Cuba. I stated to the President that we were studying both courses of action and I had not made up my mind concerning the feasibility of either plan. The President thought both approaches should be carefully examined and suggested the possibility of pursuing both courses at the same time. In any event it was decided that we should

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SECRET EYES ONLY

keep the Donovan channel open. I advised the President that Donovan has to return to Havana at the end of the week and that I will see him privately prior to his departure.

4. The President and I talked at some length concerning sabotage in Cuba. I expressed grave doubts and pointed out the hazards from his standpoint in view of the stand-down of the hit-and-run exile operations, the danger of attribution, etc. The President seemed to question whether active sabotage was good unless it was of a type that could "come from within Cuba." I said this was very difficult and that the initial operations conceived were from the sea. I said I thought a program should be engaged in only if it was an essential building block in an agreed program to remove the Soviets from Cuba and to take care of Castro.

98

5. [Advised the President of my plans for a brief trip to Europe. Also advised him that I had delayed my departure for a few days in order to meet with the Killian Board on April 23rd. I repeated my very strong objections to the Killian Board report and that I felt the report should either be withdrawn from the Board or amended. The President urged that I not engage in a controversy over this report, he had decided not to circulate it, that only one copy was in existence, and as far as he was concerned he had dismissed the entire matter. I told the President I had not discussed the Board's report with the Board, but if they brought it up I intended to urge its amendment but would not engage in a controversy with the Board.]

98

6. [Discussed briefly the problems of Soviet leadership in the USSR and gave the President a copy of the paper on this subject.]

98

7. [Advised the President of the study of future satellite photography which I had initiated. It was obvious from our brief discussion on this subject that the use of the OXCART over Soviet territory was of great concern to him and he was most hopeful of improving satellite photography to a point where it would suffice our intelligence needs.]

98

8. [Briefly discussed the views of Mr. Kelly Johnson on the TFX and the Navy's plans to install a submarine research center on Andros Island in the Bahamas.]

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EYES ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

*Read by the
Pres 4/10 at
1:00 PM
Not returned*

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT: Donovan Negotiations with Castro

1. James Donovan returned from Cuba yesterday after a four-day visit. As a result of talks with Castro, the Americans imprisoned on the Isle of Pines are to be released on 22 April. During the intervening period Castro will observe closely American policy toward Cuba and make sure that the Red Cross deliveries are being concluded in good faith.

2. The main thrust of Donovan's discussion, however, was political and can best be evaluated by a very confidential statement made to Donovan by Doctor Vallejo, a close personal advisor of Castro who was present at the meetings. Vallejo said Castro knew that relations with the United States are necessary and Castro wanted these developed. However, there are certain Cuban Government officials, communists, who are strongly opposed, even more than certain people in the United States. These officials are under close surveillance. They have no great following in Cuba; but if they rebelled at this time, Cuba would be in chaos. He believed that Donovan and Castro could work out a plan for a reasonable relationship between the two countries.

3. Donovan had two sessions with Castro, one for five hours, the other for fourteen hours. A variety of subjects were covered including the role of Red China in world politics, the Cuban economy, and Cuba's role in Latin America. In discussing any subject Castro came around to relating it to Castro's plan for developing Cuba. Castro finds the Soviet Union useful, but Cuba under Castro he claims will never become a Soviet satellite. He emphasized that the Cuban role in Latin America depended upon Cuba's viability rather than the export of subversion.

4. Donovan has the confidence of Castro, who believes that Donovan is sincere and direct with no official ties to the United States Government. Our debriefing of Donovan is continuing.

John A. McCone
JOHN A. McCONE
Director

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EYES ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

**SECRET
EYES ONLY**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

15 APR 1963

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[[Signature]] JOHN A. McCONE

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Director

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EYES ONLY**

OLC/GC/M. MISHKOVSKY (15 APR 63)
ORIGINAL TO PRESIDENT - 15 APR 63

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