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SERIAL: (b)(3):10 USC 424		
/****** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ********/		
BODY		
COUNTRY: (U) RUSSIA (RS).		
SUBJ: (b)(3):10 USC 424 /CHECHNYA CONFLICT (U)		
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MILITARY. (b)(1), 1.4 (c), 1.4 (d)

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

DESPITE CERTAIN CONFLICTS WITHIN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP CONCERNING THE METHOD OF RESOLVING THE CHECHNYA CRISIS, THE COUNTRY'S LEADERSHIP IS COMMITTED TO NOT ALLOWING THE BREAK-AWAY OF CHECHNYA, TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PRO-RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATION THERE, AND TO USING ALL MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE GOALS.

AS A RESULT OF THE INTERVENTION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES IN CHECHNYA.

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

THEY DO NOT CONSIDER MILITARY OPERATIONS TO BE THE ROAD TO SUCCESS IN CHECHNYA (b)(1),4,4-(c),1.4 (d)

SUCH ACTION COULD INTERFERE WITH THE PROCESS OF REFORM IN RUSSIA ITSELF. (b)(1),1,4-(c),1.4 (d)

ESTIMATE THAT A POTENTIAL GUERILLA WAR IN CHECHNYA WOULD NECESSITATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND TROOPS. (b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

IT IS NOT OUT OF THE REALM OF POSSIBILITY THAT THE CURRENT DEMONSTRATION OF FORCE IS INTENDED TO ILLUSTRATE THE NEED FOR STRONG ARMED FORCES, AND TO BRING TO A HALT FORCE REORGANIZATIONS AND BUDGET REDUCTIONS WITHIN THE

THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX.

THE METHOD OF RESOLVING THE CHECHNYA CRISIS HAS
AGAIN BROUGHT TO LIGHT THE PROBLEM OF POWER IN MOSCOW
AND YELTSIN AS THE GUARANTOR OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
IN RUSSIA. WESTERN ANALYSTS HAVE AGAIN RAISED THE
QUESTION OF WHETHER IT IS WORTHWHILE TO RELY ONLY ON
YELTSIN, WHOSE DECISIONS ARE MORE AND MORE

THE INVOLVEMENT OF DEPUTY CHAIRMAN ((SOSKOVETS)), WHO IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVE OF

INSCRUTABLE, AND WHO IS EVER MORE INFLUENCED BY BEHIND-THE-SCENES POLITICIANS IN HIS DECISION-MAKING.

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HOWEVER, FOR THE TIME BEING, THERE IS NO ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO HIM. THEREFORE, WESTERN SUPPORT FOR YELTSIN WILL CLEARLY CONTINUE.

ANOTHER POLITICAL PARTY CRITICIZING RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN CHECHENYA IS THE PRO-REFORM ((SHACHRAYOV)) PARTY OF RUSSIAN UNITY AND CONSENSUS. ITS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE EMPHASIZED IN A DECLARATION THAT THE WAR IN CHECHENYA IS GROWING INTO A NATIONAL POLITICAL CRISIS, POTENTIALLY LEADING TO BLOODY CONFLICTS ELSEWHERE IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. THE DECLARATION WENT ON TO STATE THAT THE CRISIS IN CHECHENYA IS CAUSING FURTHER POLARIZATION OF POLITICAL FORCES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, POSSIBLY RESULTING IN A NEW DIVISION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY.

COMMENTS: (U) NONE.

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