

PTQ9812

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ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	INLB-01	AID-00	A-00	CA-02
	CCO-00	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	INL-01
	OASY-00	DOEE-00	DOFE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00
	EUR-01	OIGO-01	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00
	NEA-01	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OIS-01
	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
	SARB-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00
	SA-01	FMP-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRME-01
	DRL-09	G-00	/040W				

-----A0397F 041348Z /38

P 041301Z MAR 97  
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5253  
INFO AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY  
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT  
AMEMBASSY ALMATY  
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL  
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA J5//  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
DIA WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
AMEMBASSY BONN

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USMISSION USVIENNA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMCONSUL KARACHI  
AMCONSUL LAHORE  
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT  
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK  
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE

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LONDON FOR POL/TUELLER; PARIS FOR POL/RAVELING; ROME FOR  
POL/DEMPSEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/04/07

TAGS: PTER, PGOV, AF, SA, US

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: RAISING BIN LADIN WITH THE TALIBAN

REFS: A) STATE 36966;  
B) FBIS 211126Z FEB 97 LD 2102112697;  
C) ISLAMABAD 1113; D) ISLAMABAD 1745

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUSELOR THOMAS PRICE. REASON: 1.5  
(C) (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: TALIBAN OFFICIALS GAVE MIXED SIGNALS ON BIN LADIN  
TO THE LATEST DELEGATION OF US OFFICIALS TO VISIT KANDAHAR AND  
KABUL MARCH 2 AND 3. A MEMBER OF THE TALIBAN INNER SHURA, MULLAH  
EHSANULLAH EHSAN, SAID EXPULSION OF BIN LADIN FROM AFGHANISTAN WAS  
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NOT THE SOLUTION; HE SEEMED TO WANT TO BARGAIN TALIBAN ACTION  
AGAINST BIN LADIN FOR U.S. ACTION ON RECOGNITION OF THE TALIBAN  
GOVERNMENT. DEPUTY FM STANAKZAI SUGGESTED THE TALIBAN AND SAUDIS  
WERE WORKING OUT A SOLUTION TO THE BIN LADIN "PROBLEM." ANY LIGHT  
EMBASSY RIYADH CAN SHED ON SAUDI/TALIBAN TALKS ON BIN LADIN WOULD  
BE APPRECIATED. TALIBAN FM WAS ALSO REMINDED THAT THE US AWAITED  
A TALIBAN RESPONSE ON TIMING OF A VISIT TO CAMPS REPORTEDLY CLOSED  
BY THE TALIBAN. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) SA/PAB DEPUTY DIRECTOR CAMP, DRAWING ON REF A TALKING  
POINTS, RAISED OSAMA BIN LADIN WITH TALIBAN FM MULLAH MOHAMMAD  
GHAUS AND SHURA MEMBER/AFGHANISTAN BANK CHAIRMAN MULLAH EHSANULLAH  
EHSAN IN KABUL MARCH 2 AND AGAIN WITH TALIBAN DEPUTY FM STANAKZAI  
IN KANDAHAR MARCH 3. WITH STANAKZAI, A FLUENT ENGLISH SPEAKER,  
CAMP ALSO LEFT A COPY OF REF FBIS TRANSLATION OF REPORT OF BIN  
LADIN'S CALL TO KILL AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN SAUDI ARABIA BROADCAST  
FEB 20 ON LONDON CHANNEL 4.

4. (C) GHAUS MADE NO COMMENT IN RESPONSE. EHSAN, REPORTEDLY ONE OF  
THE MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE TALIBAN'S INNER SHURA, ASKED  
SOME CLARIFYING QUESTIONS. AT THE END OF THE THREE-HOUR MEETING  
WITH CAMP, ISLAMABAD POLCOUNS, AND PESHAWAR PO, EHSAN SINGLED OUT  
THE CASE OF BIN LADIN FOR A RESPONSE. EHSAN SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT  
TO UNDERSTAND HOW BIN LADIN CAME TO AFGHANISTAN; HE WAS "INVITED TO

AFGHANISTAN BY THE ENEMIES OF THE TALIBAN" BEFORE THE TALIBAN CONTROLLED THAT PART OF AFGHANISTAN. THE PRESENCE OF BIN LADIN IN AFGHANISTAN DID NOT INDICATE TALIBAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. EHSAN ASKED RHETORICALLY, "WHEN THE US SAYS BIN LADIN SHOULD BE EXPELLED FROM AFGHANISTAN, TO WHERE AND HOW SHOULD HE BE EXPELLED? THE PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED BY EXPULSIONS. BIN LADIN WAS EXPELLED FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO SUDAN AND FROM SUDAN TO AFGHANISTAN."

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5. (C) EHSAN SUGGESTED BIN LADIN DID NOT HAVE THE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION AT HIS DISPOSAL IN AFGHANISTAN TO COMMUNICATE HIS VIEWS TO FOLLOWERS IN SAUDI ARABIA. EHSAN STATED THAT THE TALIBAN DID NOT KNOW THE SPECIFICS OF EXACTLY WHERE BIN LADIN LIVED. "IF HIS PRESENCE IS LOCATED IN AREAS UNDER OUR CONTROL, WE WILL DEFINITELY IMPOSE A BAN ON HIS ACTIVITIES." EHSAN CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE TALIBAN WANTED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. MAYBE THE TALIBAN COULD START TO ADDRESS U.S. CONCERNS. IF THE U.S. DID NOT WANT EVERY AFGHAN TO BECOME A BIN LADIN, THE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AND THEN ALL OF THESE PROBLEMS WOULD BE SOLVED.

6. (C) DEPUTY FM STANAKZAI IN KABUL THE NEXT DAY, MARCH 3, WAS A BIT MORE FORTHCOMING. HE RESPONDED THAT THE TALIBAN DO NOT ALLOW THEIR PEOPLE TO ENGAGE IN TERRORISM AND SO WOULD NEVER ALLOW FOREIGNERS TO ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTS FROM AFGHAN TERRITORY. BIN LADIN HAD HAD CLOSE CONTACT WITH HEKMATYAR, SAYYAF, AND RABBANI - THE TALIBAN'S ENEMIES. "MAYBE THOSE LEADERS HAD HAD TERRORIST CAMPS, BUT WITH ALLAH'S HELP WE ARE CLOSING DOWN THOSE CAMPS." STANAKZAI IMPLIED THAT BIN LADIN, NOT ONLY WAS NOT SUPPLYING VAST SUMS OF MONEY TO THE TALIBAN AS SOMETIMES ALLEGED, BUT WAS BEING FED BY THE TALIBAN.

7. (C) POLCOUNS INTERJECTED THAT IF THE PROBLEM IN EXTRADITING BIN

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ACTION SCT-00

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-10 ACDE-00 INLB-01 AID-00 A-00 CA-02  
CCO-00 CG-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 COME-00 CTME-00 INL-01

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Current Handling: n/a  
Document Number: 1997ISLAMA01750

Channel: n/a

OASY-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-01	EB-00
EUR-01	OIGO-01	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00
INR-00	INSE-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00
NEA-01	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OIS-01
OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	CIO-00
SARB-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00
SA-01	FMP-00	SNIS-00	NISC-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRME-01
DRL-09	G-00	/040W				

-----A0398F 041349Z /38

P 041301Z MAR 97  
 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5254  
 INFO AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY  
 AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY  
 AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY  
 AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT  
 AMEMBASSY ALMATY  
 USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL  
 USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA J5//  
 AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
 DIA WASHDC  
 AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
 AMEMBASSY BONN

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 AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001750

LONDON FOR POL/TUELLER; PARIS FOR POL/RAVELING; ROME FOR POL/DEMPSEY

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LADIN WAS MERELY LOGISTICS, THE U.S. COULD HELP. STANAKZAI REPLIED THAT THE TALIBAN WERE IN CONTACT WITH THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN KABUL. THE TALIBAN DID NOT WANT "TO SPOIL THEIR RECORD." THE TALIBAN "DON'T WANT A THIEF IN THEIR HOUSE," STANAKZAI CONCLUDED, AND DECLARED THAT "WE WILL SOLVE THIS PROBLEM."

8. (C) COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: TALIBAN OFFICIALS PRESENTED MIXED SIGNALS ON BIN LADIN TO THE LATEST GROUP OF US OFFICIALS TO RAISE THIS ISSUE IN THEIR TERRITORY. WHILE BOTH EHSAN AND STANAKZAI MADE PERFUNCTORY REMARKS AGAINST TERRORISM, EHSAN STATED DIRECTLY THAT THE SOLUTION WAS NOT THE EXPULSION OF BIN LADIN FROM

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AFGHANISTAN. HE SEEMED TO WANT TO BARGAIN ACTION ON BIN LADIN FOR ACTION FROM THE U.S. ON RECOGNITION OF THE TALIBAN GOVERNMENT. STANAKZAI, ON THE OTHER HAND, SUGGESTED THE TALIBAN WERE WORKING WITH THE SAUDIS ON A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF BIN LADIN. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF EMBASSY RIYADH COULD ASCERTAIN FROM THE SAUDIS WHAT THEY AND THE TALIBAN MAY HAVE AGREED UPON IN CONNECTION WITH BIN LADIN. END COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST.

9. (C) ON THE TALIBAN OFFER TO ALLOW U.S. OFFICIALS TO VISIT THE CAMPS IN NANGARHAR AND KHOST PROVINCES REPORTEDLY CLOSED BY THE TALIBAN, PO REMINDED FM GHAUS THAT THE U.S. SIDE WAS WAITING FOR A RESPONSE FROM KANDAHAR ON SUITABLE TIMING FOR THE TRIP, PROMISED BY DEPUTY FM ABDUL JALIL FOR "EARLY MARCH" (REF C). SIMONS

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