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B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 185645 262311Z

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INFO LOG-00 MFA-01 NP-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 FBIE-00 FBO-01 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 VCE-00 MMP-00 AC-01 NEA-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 ACE-00 P-00 IRM-00 SS-00 SA-00 ASDS-01

DSCC-00 SAS-00 /007R

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SOURCE: KODAKA.026222

DRAFTED BY: S/CT: HDIEHL/SA/PAB:JLUNSTEAD -- 09/26/00 647-9413 PAKPOL

APPROVED BY: SA:KFINDERFURTH

S/CT:EHULL P:JLAPENN CIA/CTC:TPALLAS

INR/TNC:MSTEINITZ IO/UNP: LVIGUERIE P: MFITZPATRICK

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O 262310Z SEP 00 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 185645

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/22/10 TAGS: PTER, PREL, ASEC, PK

SUBJECT: PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR TALIBAN

CLASSIFIED BY: KARL F. INDERFURTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,

SA. REASON: 1.5 (B) (C) (D)

- 1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE FOR EMBASSY ISLAMABAD.
- 2. (S) DEPARTMENT IS CONCERNED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 185645 262311Z

PAKISTAN IS STEPPING UP SUPPORT TO THE TALIBAN'S MILITARY

CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN. DEPARTMENT IS PARTICULARLY

CONCERNED BY REPORTS THAT ISLAMABAD MAY ALLOW THE TALIBAN

TO USE PAKISTANI TERRITORY TO OUTFLANK NORTHERN ALLIANCE

POSITIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. WHILE PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR THE

TALIBAN HAS BEEN LONG-STANDING, THE MAGNITUDE OF RECENT

SUPPORT IS UNPRECEDENTED.

3.	(S/	REL)	CHARGE	E SHOULD	RAIS	E ISSUE	WITH		·			•	В1
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONE DATE/CASE ID: 02 MAR 2006 200404754

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## POINTS BELOW.

- AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO REGARD THE ACTIONS OF THE TALIBAN PARTICULARLY ITS SUPPORT FOR USAMA BIN LADIN AND OTHER TERRORISTS AS INIMICAL TO OUR INTERESTS, TO THE INTERESTS OF PAKISTAN, AND TO THE STABILITY OF THIS REGION OF THE WORLD.
- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT STATED IN NEW YORK AT THE SIX PLUS TWO MEETING THAT "TO BE ACCEPTED AS A MEMBER OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, A COUNTRY MUST BEHAVE BY INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS. BY THIS MEASURE, THE TALEBAN HAVE TRULY FAILED."
- WE ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS OF GROWING PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN'S MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN.
- WE HAVE SEEN REPORTS THAT PAKISTAN IS PROVIDING THE SECRET
- PAGE 03 STATE 185645 262311Z
  TALIBAN WITH MATERIEL, FUEL, FUNDING, TECHNICAL
  ASSISTANCE, AND MILITARY ADVISORS. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND
  THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF PAKISTANI NATIONALS HAVE RECENTLY
  MOVED INTO AFGHANISTAN TO FIGHT FOR THE TALIBAN,
  APPARENTLY WITH THE TACIT ACQUIESCENCE OF THE PAKISTANI
  GOVERNMENT.
- OUR REPORTS FURTHER SUGGEST THAT DIRECT PAKISTANI INVOLVEMENT IN TALIBAN MILITARY OPERATIONS HAS INCREASED IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS.
- WE FIND ESPECIALLY TROUBLING SPECULATION THAT THE TALIBAN MIGHT MAKE USE OF PAKISTANI TERRITORY TO CONDUCT MILITARY ATTACKS AND THAT PAKISTANI MILITARY PERSONNEL MIGHT TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE FIGHTING.
- WE URGE THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN TO IMMEDIATELY CEASE SUCH MILITARY SUPPORT, WHICH IS ENCOURAGING THE TALIBAN TO PURSUE A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE AFGHAN CONFLICT. AS SECRETARY ALBRIGHT NOTED ON SEPTEMBER 15 IN HER OPENING STATEMENT AT THE SIX-PLUS-TWO MEETING, PEACE CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED BY A CEASE-FIRE AND AN END TO THE KILLING, FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE VARIOUS

AFGHAN PARTIES THAT ARE NOT CONSTRAINED BY PRECONDITIONS.

- WE BELIEVE THAT A TALIBAN MILITARY VICTORY WILL NOT SERVE

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YOUR INTERESTS.

- THE US WILL NOT ACCEPT SUCH A VICTORY. TALIBAN MILITARY SECRET
- PAGE 04 STATE 185645 262311Z

  CONQUEST WILL NOT LEAD TO THE UN SEAT OR INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. WITH TALIBAN CONTINUING THEIR CURRENT POLICIES, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NOT CHANGE ITS POSITION.
- CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS (AND RUSSIA) ALSO LIKELY TO BECOME MORE HOSTILE TO TALIBAN. THIS DOES NOT SERVE PAKISTAN'S INTEREST OF CLOSER ECONOMIC/POLITICAL TIES TO CENTRAL ASIA.
- WE UNDERSTAND PAKISTAN'S DESIRE FOR A GOVERNMENT IN KABUL WHICH IS STABLE AND FURTHER PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS. WE DO NOT THINK THE TALIBAN CAN DO EITHER OF THESE.
- THIS DOES NOT MEAN WE BELIEVE MASOOD IS THE ANSWER. HE ALSO CANNOT BRING PEACE/STABILITY.
- DON'T MISUNDERSTAND, WE ARE NOT DIVORCED FROM REALITY. WE KNOW THE TALIBAN ARE A FEATURE OF AFGHAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH, AND WILL BE PART OF ANY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
- ANSWER IS A BROADER PEACE PROCESS, IN WHICH TALIBAN, NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND OTHER PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE.
- AS YOU KNOW SECRETARY ALBRIGHT REQUESTED SYG ANNAN AT 6 PLUS 2 TO SEND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE VENDRELL BACK TO REGION TO CONTACT ALL INTERESTED GROUPS AND PARTIES. FOREIGN MINISTER SATTAR AGREED TO THIS APPROACH.
- WE ARE WILLING TO WORK WITH YOU AND OTHER RELEVANT STATES SECRET
- PAGE 05 STATE 185645 262311Z

  AND ACTORS TO TRY TO MAKE SUCH AN APPROACH WORK. PERHAPS

  VENDRELL CAN GET ALL SIDES TO SIT DOWN AND AGREE TO

  DISCUSS HOW AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE GOVERNED, NOT WHO

  SHOULD GOVERN.
- CONTINUED FIGHTING UNDERMINES THIS PROCESS AND WILL NOT LEAD TO WHAT YOU WANT. A GENUINE NEGOTIATING PROCESS MIGHT.
- REMIND YOU AGAIN HOWEVER THAT WE WILL NOT ACCEPT A

TALIBAN VICTORY AND DO NOT BELIEVE OTHERS WILL EITHER. TALIBAN VICTORY WILL NOT BRING PEACE AND STABILITY - BUT RATHER FURTHER UNREST. NOR WILL IT AVERT FURTHER MEASURES IN SECURITY COUNCIL. IT WILL NOT SERVE PAKISTAN'S INTEREST. A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO WORK TOGETHER TO SERVE BOTH OUR INTERESTS.

ALBRIGHT

SECRET

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