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BY C/S, NARA, DATE 6/7/01

TALKING PAPER FOR CONDUCT OF THE SUMMIT MEETING

In view of the need for translation, there will be relatively little time for discussion. Therefore, you may wish to set the tone for the meeting by preempting several of Chun's concerns:

--Welcome Chun's visit as an opportunity to reaffirm our friendship, restore the foundations of the alliance, and symbolize U.S. determination to meet its security responsibilities in the Pacific;

--Express appreciation for the statesmanlike manner in which the Kim Dae Jung decision was handled, thus facilitating our resumption of a normal relationship.

--Emphasize that your <sup>Administration</sup> ~~Administration~~ will refrain from public criticism of Korean internal affairs, but evidence of political moderation within Korea will help us sustain important popular support in the U.S. for the alliance.

--Reaffirm the U.S. <sup>and</sup> ~~commitment to ROK security and emphasize that you have no plans to withdraw U.S. ground combat forces from the peninsula;~~ <sup>we are committed to R.O.K. security</sup>

--Note that we should resume a full range of consultations in order to improve our cooperation; in this regard, a Security Consultative Meeting should be held this year. Details should be worked out between our Defense Departments;

--Indicate support for Chun's recent proposal for reciprocal visits with Kim Il-sung, noting that such initiatives serve to keep Pyongyang on the defensive and remind the international community where responsibility for the North-South stalemate lies.

--Note our awareness that this is a particularly crucial year for Korea's economy, and our intention to be as helpful as possible in promoting expanded economic ties.

*There will be no unilateral approach by us to N.K.*

APPRECIATE MR. PRE'S. YOUR ASSISTANCE - SECURITY SIT. - POL. DEVELOPMENTS  
& EC. PROSPECTS - S.K.

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Following these initial remarks, you should allow President Chun to respond, inviting his assessment of the security situation, political developments, and economic prospects in South Korea.

~~Chun will warmly welcome your assurances. You may also wish to take note of the \$1 million contribution which he will be making on Tuesday to the Smithsonian for the new Asian Art museum, and it would be nice if you attend that ceremony. Almost surely Chun will express appreciation for U.S. cooperation in assuring that Korea has adequate rice stocks after the recent disastrous harvest. He may also:~~

- Seek expanded FMS credits in support of ROK force improvements;
- Request agricultural credits;
- Ask for a U.S. commitment to sell the F-16 aircraft; and
- Express concern about possible U.S. weapons sales to China.

We should also utilize Chun's visit at the early phase of his leadership to brief him on our nuclear deployments and review our non-proliferation concerns. We had clear understandings with President Park in this regard. I plan to cover this in a later meeting at the State Department.

The following talking points may be useful for expanded discussion or if Chun raises the issues outlined above.

#### CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS

##### Defense Support

- We are aware of the heavy defense burden which Korea bears, and do not ask that you do more under present economic circumstances;
- We will try to expedite the transfer of appropriate weapons systems and technology;
- If you reconfirm your desire to go ahead with a specific F-16 purchase, we will proceed promptly with the necessary notifications to the Congress; and
- We will make every effort to sustain and possibly increase FMS credit levels.

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### North Korea

- We have no intention of changing our policy of refusing to discuss Korean questions with Pyongyang authorities in the absence of full and equal participation by South Korea.
- We shall not undertake any kind of official relationship with North Korea until and unless China and/or the Soviet Union are prepared to extend reciprocal treatment to you;
- (If asked about non-official travel to or from North Korea) We are committed to the principle of individual freedom of travel. We cannot prohibit American citizens from travelling to North Korea in a strictly private, unofficial capacity. North Korean citizens will not be permitted to come to the United States for political or propaganda purposes, but cannot exclude private individuals solely on the basis of North Korean citizenship.

### Economic Relations

- We will do our best with FMS and agricultural credits.
- Korea is a valued market for U.S. agricultural exports. We wish to cooperate to maintain the value of this trade for both parties.
- We will promote a better understanding in the United States of the mutuality of ROK-U.S. trade. This will help us to resist special interest pressures, but our ability will to some extent depend upon continued large, highly visible ROK purchases in the United States.
- (If Chun requests reestablishment of bilateral aid) It is not in our mutual interest to resume a formal economic aid program. Korea has gained stature by no longer appearing as a recipient of aid; to reinstitute aid at this juncture would jeopardize rather than nurture investor confidence.

### Arms Sales to China

- Constructive US-PRC relations exert a salutary influence on the security situation in Asia and contributes to a stable global equilibrium.
- Defense contacts between the U.S. and China are modest.
- We sell no lethal arms to the PRC; any change of policy in this area will be examined closely and will be a subject of consultations with our allies.

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