## **UNCLASSIFIED**

	,	CONF.T	DENTIAL	PTQ621	<sup>3</sup> RELI	EASED IN PART
PAGE 01 ORIGIN SSO-00	STATE	221643 2	01935Z		B1, 1	.4(B), 1.4(D), B6
INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 DODE-00 EB-00 INR-00 AC-01 OIC-02 SCT-00 USSS-00 PRM-02	NP-00 CG-00 DOEE-00 EUR-00 INSE-00 NEA-00 OMB-01 SP-00 SA-00 DRL-02	AF-00 CIAE-00 DOTE-00 FAAE-00 IO-00 DCP-01 PA-00 IRM-00 ASDS-01 G-00	AID-00 SMEC-00 WHA-00 FBIE-00 L-00 NRCE-00 PM-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NFAT-00	A-00 COME-00 SRPP-00 VC-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 PRS-00 TRSE-00 NISC-00 SAS-00	ACQ-00 CTME-00 DS-00 H-01 MMP-00 NSCE-00 ACE-00 T-00 PMB-00 /016R	CA-02 INL-00 EAP-00 TEDE-00 M-00 OCS-03 P-00 USIE-00 DSCC-00

221643

SOURCE: KODAKB.020032

DRAFTED BY: POL:MMINTON:RMS -- 11/17/00 647-0192

APPROVED BY: P:TRPICKERING

POL:MPATTERSON POL:HSTOFFER P:MFITZPATRICK

S/S-O:KHMERTEN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY

AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY

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ALMATY FOR DUSHANBE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/10

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

**DECLASSIFY AFTER: 17 NOV 2015** 

DATE/CASE ID: 13 AUG 2010 201001258

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

SUBJECT: U/S PICKERING DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN, DEMOCRATIZATION AND KASHMIR IN NY WITH	В1
REF: USUN 02533	
(U) CLASSIFIED BY UNDER-SECRETARY THOMAS R. PICKERING; REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).	
1. (C) SUMMARY: U/S PICKERING PRESSED  ON AFGHANISTAN, DEMOCRATIZATION IN PAKISTAN AND PAKISTAN'S UNHELPFUL ROLE IN KASHMIR DURING A MEETING IN NEW YORK NOVEMBER 14. ON AFGHANISTAN, PICKERING STATED IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT THERE WAS MOUNTING EVIDENCE OF DIRECT PAKISTANI INVOLVEMENT IN THE FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN AND THAT THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT USAMA BIN LADIN (UBL) HAD BEEN AT LEAST PERIPHERALLY INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON THE USS COLE. IF THAT WERE THE CASE, THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SOME HARD DECISIONS ABOUT PAKISTAN, CONFIDENTIAL	B1
PAGE 03 STATE 221643 201935Z WHOM THE U.S. HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED A FRIEND.	
END SUMMARY.	
PAKISTANI SUPPORT TO THE TALIBAN	
2. (C)	B1
USUN SENIOR AREA ADVISOR AND USUN POLOFF ALSO ACCOMPANIED. U/S PICKERING OPENED THE MEETING BY EXPRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT THAT PAKISTAN, WHOM HE CALLED A GOOD FRIEND OF THE U.S., WAS NOT TAKING STEPS TO HELP WITH USAMA BIN LADIN (UBL).	
WHILE PICKERING	
SAID THAT THE BOMBERS OF THE USS COLE WERE NOT YET KNOWN, THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THERE WAS A CONNECTION TO UBL - DESPITE TALIBAN ASSURANCES THAT UBL WAS COMPLETELY CUT OFF FROM THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND INCAPABLE OF CAUSING HARM. IF THE CONNECTION TO THE BOMBING OF THE USS COLE WAS MADE,	

TAGS: AF, PK, PREL, PTER, UNSC UNCLASSIFIED

THE U.S. WOULD HAVE SOME DIFFICULT DECISIONS TO SAFE THE U.S. WAS ALREADY CONSIDERING SOME TOUGH NEW MEASURES, IN PARTICULAR AN ARMS EMBARGO ON THE TALIBAN. THE U.S. WOULD CONFIDENTIAL

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ALWAYS ACT TO PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS AT A TIME AND PLACE

		CHOICE, HELP.	PICKERING	WARNED,	AND	ASKED	FOR
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4. (SBU) IN RESPONSE TO REPEATED ASSERTIONS THAT ENGAGEMENT WAS THE ONLY WAY TO CHANGE THE TALIBAN'S BEHAVIOR, PICKERING SAID THAT WE HAVE HAD NUMEROUS EFFORTS OF DIALOGUE WITH THE TALIBAN, BUT THE TALIBAN PERSISTED IN THEIR MISGUIDED BELIEF THAT THEY COULD BEHAVE AS THEY LIKED AND TELL THE WORLD WHAT THEY WISHED - THERE DID NOT HAVE TO BE ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THESE TWO COURSES. THE U.S. HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE TALIBAN RESPONDED ONLY WHEN PRESSURED AND THUS THE U.S., WITH RUSSIA, WAS PURSUING NEW SANCTIONS.

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OPIUM PRODUCTION

5. (SBU) PICKERING STATED THAT FARMERS IN AFGHANISTAN WERE ACTUALLY SWITCHING FROM PRODUCING WHEAT TO OPIUM POPPIES BECAUSE OF THE HIGH PROFITS AND TALIBAN ENCOURAGEMENT. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, THOUGHT THAT, IF IT COULD BE EXPLAINED TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE THAT THE PESTICIDES WERE NOT HARMFUL TO HUMANS OR LIVESTOCK, THERE SHOULD BE NO

B1

B6

В6

OBJECTION TO CROP SPRAYING TO ERADICATE PROPERTY OF THE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT CROP SUBSTITUTION WAS VITAL. PICKERING DID NOT RULE OUT INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN THIS REGARD, BUT ONLY WHEN THE TALIBAN HAD MADE GENUINE EFFORTS; IN THE PAST THE TALIBAN HAD TAKEN THE MONEY AND THEN EXPANDED PRODUCTION. NOW THE TALIBAN ENCOURAGED OPIUM POPPY PRODUCTION, WHILE RELYING ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO FEED THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.	В6
NEW SANCTIONS	
6. (SBU) BOTH CITED THE OCHA REPORT ON THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF SANCTIONS AS PROOF THAT THE CURRENT REGIME HAD HAD A DELETERIOUS EFFECT ON THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. FURTHER URGED PICKERING TO CONSIDER THE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE UN PEACE PROCESS WHICH HAD RECENTLY	В6
BEGUN A NEW INITIATIVE (REFTEL) AND A POSSIBLE BACKLASH IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IMPOSED NEW SANCTIONS DURING RAMADAN. PICKERING STRONGLY DISAGREED, AND SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD CONFIDENTIAL	
PAGE 06 STATE 221643 201935Z CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS AND HOPED THAT PAKISTAN WOULD BE HELPFUL IN IMPLEMENTING THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DECISION.	
7. (SBU) STATED THAT NEW SANCTIONS WOULD SEND A FLOOD OF REFUGEES INTO PAKISTAN. PICKERING COUNTERED THAT NEITHER THE CURRENT SANCTIONS NOR THE ARMS EMBARGO THAT THE U.S. PROPOSED WOULD HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN UNLIKE THE FALL OF TALOQAN, WHICH PAKISTAN HAD MASTERMINDED AND WHICH HAD SENT TENS OF THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES FLEEING TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, SO MANY THAT PAKISTAN HAD CLOSED ITS BORDERS TO THEM. MAINTAINED THAT PAKISTAN HAD ALREADY SHUT OFF THE TRANSIT TRADE IN LUXURY GOODS (ELECTRONICS, FOR THE MOST PART), MOST OF WHICH WERE IMPORTED INTO AFGHANISTAN AND THEN SMUGGLED INTO PAKISTAN TO BE SOLD, COSTING THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN USD 1 BILLION PER YEAR IN LOST REVENUE.  PICKERING INQUIRED WHETHER PAKISTAN INTENDED TO CUT OFF JET FUEL SHIPMENTS TO AFGHANISTAN, TO WHICH REPLIED THAT THE TALIBAN GET THEIR FUEL FROM CENTRAL ASIA.	В6
U.SPAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP	
	B1

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U.S. CLAIMS AND RELIED	HAD FEW FACTS TO OFFER TO COUNTER CHIEFLY ON THE "PAKISTAN AS VICTIM" S PICKERING'S CRITICISM.
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