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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

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A-763

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INFO :  
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ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : U.S. Delegation SALT, VIENNADATE: February 3, 1972

SUBJECT : SALT MemCon

REF :

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Attached SALT MemCon is to be reproduced and distributed in accordance with the memorandum to Mr. Miller, Deputy Executive Secretary, S/S, dated December 6, 1971 from Mr. Christopher, Special Assistant to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

SMITH

*att*

Attachment:

Garthoff-Grinevsky, Kishilov Memcon  
January 31, 1972

GP-3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/GDR

UAS Date: 11/18/94

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FORM 3-70 DS-323

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Drafted by:  
**SALDEL: RLGarthoff**  
Clearances:

Drafting Date:  
1/31/72

Phone No.:

Contents and Classification Approved by:  
**SALDEL: William T. Shinn**

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ANALYSIS BRANCH

SECRET/ENDISMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
U. S. SALT DELEGATION  
VIENNA, AUSTRIA

DATE: January 31, 1971

TIME: 4:30 - 5:15 p.m.

PLACE: American Embassy, Vienna

SUBJECT: SALT Communique and Other Matters

PARTICIPANTS:

US

USSR

Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff

Mr. O. A. Grinevsky  
Mr. N. S. Kishilov

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Communique

I said that we were prepared to accept resumption in Helsinki, although we continued to doubt that it was the best choice. In accepting this Soviet proposal, it was the expectation of my Delegation that the Talks would continue for the next subsequent round at Vienna in the summer. Kishilov interrupted to suggest "late summer?" I pointed out that was not what I had said: Vienna in the summer.

I then suggested that we consider slightly less pallid language than the Soviet side proposed in the draft Kishilov had given me on Saturday. I handed over the text of an American draft communique, noting that it also included a paragraph expressing gratitude to the Austrians. (The text appears as attachment 1.)

Grinevsky immediately agreed on the paragraph thanking the Austrians, and after having read the text remarked he thought this was the first time there had been public reference to a Treaty and an Interim Agreement. I confirmed that such was the case. Grinevsky then asked whether the reference to "full agreement" was intended as a reference to the follow-on negotiations. I replied that it was not, but if there was any question about the sentence I believed we could drop the word "full". Grinevsky then remarked that Moscow had already cleared the Soviet proposed text. Could not the US side accept it? I noted that we had not cleared it, and considered our proposal better. I requested that it be considered by the Soviet Delegation. Grinevsky agreed, but said that he was not sure when he could get a reaction. I then asked for an initial Soviet Delegation reaction that day, noting that having just received

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the Soviet position over the week end very little time remained, and we would plan in any event to send a text to Washington that night. Grinevsky and Kishilov said they would undertake to get a Soviet Delegation reaction that evening, although it might be necessary to reach Minister Semenov at Baden. They asked how late I would be at the office. I replied that I would be there any time.

Kishilov asked when the communique would be issued. I suggested 1:00 p.m. local time on Friday, in accordance with past procedure. Kishilov agreed.

Notification to the Austrians and the Press

I raised the question of notifying the Austrian Government, suggesting it should be done as soon as possible, and offering to do so on behalf of both Delegations. Kishilov suggested that we go together to inform the Foreign Ministry. I agreed and asked when he would suggest. Kishilov noted that the meeting the next day had been changed to 10 o'clock and suggested 9:00 or 9:15, to meet at the Austrian Foreign Ministry. I undertook to call Dr. Bauer's office and arrange the appointment. Kishilov suggested that we simply tell the Austrians that we planned to recess this phase of the Talks on February 4, and inquire about a final protocol call. I agreed, and suggested that we also tell them that we would be resuming later in Helsinki, and express our regrets at not being able to accept Minister Kirchschrager's invitation for a joint week end excursion. I suggested the protocol call on the President for Friday noon, if that was suitable to the Austrians. Kishilov agreed, but suggested there was no need to tell the Austrians when we would be resuming in Helsinki nor that we presumably would again be in Vienna next summer. I agreed, but repeated my comment that the Soviet Delegation should bear in mind that the American Delegation accepted Helsinki with the expectation that the following time would be the turn of Vienna in the summer. Kishilov and Grinevsky said that was understood, although specific arrangements concerning the follow-on Talks would be settled at the Summit. I agreed that if the initial agreements are decided or signed at the Summit, something might be said at that time with respect to the follow-on; meanwhile, our expectation is to meet in Vienna next summer for continued negotiations.

I suggested that at the time of usual press inquiries following the mini-plenary meeting the next day, our spokesman be authorized to answer any press questions by confirming that this phase of talks would be concluded on Friday, with a communique. Kishilov appeared to be a little unhappy with that suggestion, but said it would probably be all right; could we not settle it after the call on the Austrians. I agreed.

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Interpretive Statements

I said that I hoped we would be in a position this week to agree on not having any formal initiated protocols or agreed minutes to be attached to the agreements, but that agreed interpretive statements, in both languages, would be entered on the record and have full effect as explanatory interpretations. I noted that in this category were the statements on Non-Transfer, Future ABM Systems, and the US proposed statements on OLPARs, Test and Training Launchers, and essential offensive definitions. Grinevsky agreed.

Future ABM Systems

I asked if the Soviet side had anything new to suggest on this problem. Grinevsky (repeating Kishilov's suggestion of Saturday) proposed deleting the second bracketed difference by referring to "them" or "their" instead of repeating the disputed reference to systems and/or components. I commented that that would not resolve the problem. I suggested that perhaps we needed a fresh approach, first survey the problem and see if we agreed on the substance of the matter--which I believed we did--and then find appropriate language to express this agreed position. (See attachment 2 for talking points I used.) Grinevsky saw that I was speaking from prepared notes, and seemed interested. I thereupon gave him a copy noting that this was not a formal transmittal from my Delegation, but if it would help him to see precisely what I was saying, I would be happy to give him a copy of the notes. After reading the talking points, Grinevsky said that he believed there was complete agreement. I thereupon gave him a text of a new proposed formulation, based on the chain of thought expressed in the talking points (see attachment 3). At this point, Grinevsky expressed some concern at the changed formulation, noting that we were agreed on a number of parts of the text we had been working on over the past week or so. I repeated that while we had seemed to come close to agreement we had not yet achieved it. We hoped that the outline of considerations and new text based upon them might find a way out of the impasse in which we had found ourselves.

Grinevsky and Kishilov made the point in particular that there was no reference at all to ABM systems in the latest formulation. On Friday, we had still accepted reference to systems and their components in the introductory clause, while objecting to a reference to systems in the other two clauses. Now it was absent altogether. We referred to systems as well as components in Article II, and that they referred to systems as well as components in Article III. Kishilov then noted that the

American proposed language for paragraph 3 of Article V referred to systems. Grinevsky remarked that suspicions arose among some members of his Delegation by the new American aversion to including a reference to systems. I assured Grinevsky that there was no foundation for any such concern, and that we were focusing on system components since it was unlikely that a system would change all at once. Moreover, the specific limitations in the agreement pertained particularly to components. Kishilov noted that many of the articles referred to "ABM systems and their components".

Grinevsky and Kishilov agreed to report the new language to their Delegation, and to present arguments for it and the gist of the talking points.

Non-Transfer

I stated that, taking into account the expressed preference of the Soviet side for the earlier agreed language of an interpretive statement on Article IX, we would suggest only three editorial changes, principally the substitution of "or" for "and" in the last clause. Grinevsky agreed on the spot to that change, and to take the slightly revised text for a final review. We agreed that we would reach agreement on the text the next day. (See attachment 4.)

Entry into Force

I said that since the meeting of the Working Group had been delayed, I wanted to informally provide the language for entry into force for the interim agreement of which I had advised Kishilov on Saturday. (See attachment 5.) I said that the matter would be brought up in the usual manner in the Special Working Group, but I wanted to make the language available in advance in the hope it could be accepted by the Soviet side at that time. We reviewed the language, and Grinevsky said that he thought there would be no problem. I also noted that in the bracketed withdrawal passage, we had elided the two sentences of that passage into one.

Attachments:

As indicated

*R&J*  
SALDEL/EXO:RLGarthoff/res  
January 31, 1972

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U.S. Draft  
January 31, 1972

COMMUNIQUE  
On the Negotiations of the Delegations of  
the US and the USSR  
on Limiting Strategic Arms

The US-USSR negotiations on limiting strategic arms continued from November 15, 1971, to February 4, 1972, in Vienna.

The US Delegation was headed by the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Gerard Smith. Members of the Delegation Philip J. Farley, J. Graham Parsons, Paul Nitze, Harold Brown, and Royal Allison participated in the negotiations.

The USSR Delegation was headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.S. Semenov. Members of the Delegation P.S. Pleshakov, A.N. Shchukin, K.A. Trusov, and O.A. Grinevsky participated in the negotiations.

The Delegations were accompanied by advisors and experts.

In accordance with the May 20, 1971; understanding between the Governments of the US and the USSR, the Delegations engaged in further consideration of issues relating to a Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and to an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. Progress was made on a number of issues. The Delegations express their determination to continue their efforts to reach full agreement.

The two Delegations note their appreciation to the Government of Austria for again creating favorable conditions for holding the negotiations. They are grateful for the warm hospitality which was extended to them.

Agreement was reached that negotiations between the US and the USSR Delegations will be resumed on March 28, 1972, in Helsinki.

February 4, 1972  
Vienna

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**SECRET**

January 31, 1972

Statement on "Future ABM Systems"

It is understood that both sides agree that:

1. ABM systems and their components, as defined in Article II, should not be deployed except as provided for in Article III.
2. The deployment of ABM system components other than ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars to perform the functions of those components is banned.
3. Devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars could be used as adjuncts to an ABM system provided that the devices could not perform the functions of and substitute for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars. For example, a telescope could be deployed as an adjunct to an ABM system, whereas a laser for performing the function of an interceptor missile by rendering ineffective a strategic ballistic missile in flight trajectory could not be deployed.
4. Article III should be drafted so as not to permit the deployment of devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars to substitute for and perform their functions.
5. If such devices are created in the future, their deployment could be provided for by limitations subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article

XIV

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

January 31, 1972

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM system components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, it is agreed that in the event other devices capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, their deployment would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

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Attachment 4

January 31, 1972

The two sides understand Article IX of the ABM Treaty to mean that neither the U.S. nor the USSR would transfer to other countries, and would not deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty, and that this obligation includes not providing technical description or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of such ABM systems and their components.

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**SECRET**Article VIII/VII

This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon the exchange of written notices of acceptance by each party simultaneously with the entry into force of the Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems. <sup>1</sup>It shall remain in force until replaced by a treaty limiting strategic offensive arms, except that either party may withdraw after six months' notice, either \_\_\_\_ years from the entry into force of the Interim Agreement, if agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms has not been reached, or at any time if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests.<sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup>It shall remain in force while active negotiations on limiting strategic armaments are pursued, but not longer than for a period of 1.5 - 2 years.<sup>2</sup>

1  
Wording proposed by the US side.

2  
Wording proposed by the Soviet side.

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