

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
U.S. SALT DELEGATION  
HELSINKI, FINLAND

DATE: May 16, 1972

TIME: 2:45 to 6:30 p.m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy,  
Helsinki

SUBJECT: SALT

## PARTICIPANTS:

## US

Ambassador J. Graham Parsons  
Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff

## USSR

Mr. O. A. Grinevsky  
Mr. N. S. Kishilov

Work of the Editorial Working Group

Grinevsky mentioned that our colleagues on the Editorial Working Group had also been hard at work. Parsons and Garthoff said that they did not yet have a detailed report on the latest meeting, but that they understood work was proceeding satisfactorily. Garthoff noted that there was one point which he wished to take up with Grinevsky. Smolin had suggested insertion of the word "offensive" in the second preambular paragraph of the Interim Agreement, in the phrase concerning "the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic /offensive/ arms." Garthoff noted that in the parallel provision of the ABM Treaty, in the fourth preambular paragraph, the same clause did include the word "offensive." However, rather than add the word into this passage in the preamble of the Interim Agreement, the American Delegation proposed instead deletion of the word in the preamble of the ABM Draft Treaty. He noted that Ambassador Smith would like to make this change, and perhaps Grinevsky would like to bring this to the attention of Minister Semenov. Grinevsky agreed to do so. Grinevsky asked whether the American side had in mind a possibility that further negotiations could lead to an ABM ban, and Garthoff confirmed that this possibility was in mind. Grinevsky smiled and nodded affirmatively.

Standing Consultative Commission

Garthoff said there were two other points he would like to raise before the group turned to the draft texts. First, as Grinevsky and Kishilov undoubtedly knew, Ambassador Smith had suggested to Minister Semenov that perhaps one or two people on our Delegations might usefully discuss the Standing Consultative Commission in an informal manner. We had in mind

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that Dr. Weiler, who had given considerable thought to this question, might meet with Mr. Grinevsky, or with whomever the Soviet side wished to designate, for such informal discussion. In addition, there were a few points with respect to immediate decisions concerning the Standing Consultative Commission which the American Delegation wished to raise in accordance with instructions. Weiler could bring these points also to Grinevsky's attention, and following their discussion Ambassador Smith would raise these latter points with Minister Semenov. Grinevsky agreed with this procedure, and said he would see if he could arrange to meet with Weiler perhaps the next day.

Handling of Interpretive Statements

Garthoff said that the other specific point not concerning the texts which he wished to raise was the matter of agreeing on a procedure for formalizing agreed interpretive statements. Along the lines which he had discussed with Grinevsky and Kishilov on several earlier occasions, the American side wished to reach agreement on a procedure under which the agreed interpretive statements would be grouped together, without individual titles, one group representing those statements associated with the draft ABM Treaty, the other comprising those related to the Interim Agreement. At a plenary meeting, Ambassador Smith would read the statements in English and Minister Semenov in Russian, jointly agreed texts in both languages would then be initialed by the Heads of Delegation and exchanged. They would then be available to the two sides for whatever use each side considered appropriate, as positions agreed between the two parties. Grinevsky said that this procedure was in line with the thinking of his Delegation, but his side had not yet made authoritative decisions beyond agreeing to group together the statements associated with each of the two agreements under a single general reference title. He repeated that he foresaw no difficulty in proceeding along the lines Garthoff had indicated, but his Delegation wished to wait another day or two before responding definitively. Garthoff noted that Washington was interested in this procedure, but that if there was no difference, it would of course be all right to wait another day or two before finally deciding upon the arrangement. He would await further word from Grinevsky as soon as the Soviet side was prepared to take a definitive position. Grinevsky agreed.

ABM Treaty

Grinevsky suggested starting first with the ABM Draft Treaty, Article III.

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Garthoff said that the US side was now in a position to agree on the text of Article III, with the editorial changes discussed and tentatively agreed in the Group of Four the day before, with one small change in paragraph b(2), substituting the word "its" for "an" ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. He further remarked that his Delegation did consider necessary the additional insertion into that paragraph of the passage which he had informally suggested the day before. Grinevsky questioned the necessity of adding that phrase, but when Garthoff repeated that his Delegation considered it necessary, he said the Soviet side could agree. However, he questioned the wording change from "an" to "its." Garthoff noted that this small change would in no way alter the meaning, but would make more clear the fact that it was the ABM deployment area for defense of ICBMs -- and that it was desirable to make this clear since the other Soviet ABM deployment area, at Moscow, also contained ICBM silos. Grinevsky and Kishilov were amused at this point, and Grinevsky thanked Garthoff for looking out for the interests of his Delegation. Garthoff replied that clarity was in the interest of both Delegations. The Soviet participants accepted the wording change. Garthoff later suggested changing the phrase "containing ICBM silo launchers" to read "for the defense of ICBM silo launchers" for still greater precision. Grinevsky argued strongly for not making such a change, since the existing language reflected the definitional term identifying the entire paragraph. Garthoff agreed that the language could remain as earlier agreed.

An extraordinary argument of nearly two hours' duration ensued over the minor problem of reconciling the editorial differences concerning the appositional clause describing ABM radar complexes for defense of national capitals. The Soviet Delegation did not accept the simplified form which Garthoff had suggested and the Group of Four had tentatively agreed upon the day before. The gist of the issue was that the Soviet Delegation wished to describe "complexes" as the associated facilities related to a radar or a group of radars, rather than as an area within which radars could be deployed. Garthoff rejected this approach, since it could introduce an element of uncertainty into the obligation, since "complexes" in the technical sense being employed by the Soviet side could theoretically be put more than one in an area of three kilometer diameter, and in that case a side would either be limited to fewer than six such areas, or would have more than six such "complexes," either of which would not be situations intended by the two sides in agreeing upon six ABM radar areas, each with a diameter of no more than three kilometers. In the discussion, Garthoff suggested the possibility of omitting reference to complexes, and simply referring to areas of a given description. Parsons suggested a simplified version along this line. But

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Grinevsky persisted in arguing for some variation reflecting the initially expressed Soviet position. He said that the Soviet specialists who understood this question insisted on the point. Garthoff suggested discussing the matter with them, and in due course Minister Pleshakov joined the group. He and Garthoff discussed the question for a time in Russian, and agreed upon a simplified reference to "no more than six areas, each having a diameter of no more than three kilometers." Later, however, another text was brought into the room, and Grinevsky announced that the Soviet Delegation did not accept the formulation which Garthoff and Pleshakov had worked out, and insisted upon reference to complexes. He said that the Soviet side had accepted the American proposal for ABM radar complexes, and wished to maintain it. Garthoff welcomed this remark, and said that since the Soviet side accepted the American concept, there should be no problem in agreeing on any of the several variations which embodied that concept. Finally, after lengthy discussion, Grinevsky agreed on a variant which Garthoff and Kishilov had worked out, reading as follows: "within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being a circle having a diameter of no more than three kilometers." This text was then agreed, ad referendum to Delegations.

Accordingly, agreement was reached on the whole of Article III (see Attachment 1).

Garthoff then noted that, as Ambassador Smith had told Semenov that morning, agreement of the American side to Article III was dependent upon reaching agreement on the interpretive statement relating to location of ICBM defense areas, as well as on inclusion of SLBMs in the Interim Agreement. He added that, as Ambassador Smith had also indicated, the American side was prepared to state that its deployment will be centered at Grand Forks. He then gave the Soviet participants the text (in English and Russian) of a draft statement that Ambassador Smith would be prepared to make in the context of an agreed interpretive statement specifying that the US deployment would be west of the Mississippi, and the Soviet deployment east of the Urals (see Attachment 2). Grinevsky accepted the draft with appreciation and without substantive comment. He did, however, state that the Soviet position remained that there was no need to specify east of the Urals and West of the Mississippi. Garthoff remonstrated, and repeated that as had been discussed the day before, and as the US draft made quite clear, an agreed interpretation on that point was essential. Grinevsky acknowledged understanding this position, and said that he would now take the matter up further with his Delegation.

Grinevsky asked if the US side had anything further to say about OLPARS. Garthoff replied in the negative, and said that he had nothing

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more to say at this time, but would like to comment that he did not expect that the American side could agree to the Soviet proposal, and indeed believed that the latest American proposal on this subject remained the correct basis for agreement. Both Grinevsky and Kishilov again showed unhappiness over this position. Grinevsky asked whether the US Delegation had received instructions from Washington responsive to the latest Soviet proposal. Garthoff said official instructions had not yet been received, but that unofficial indications had led him to make the comment that the Soviet Delegation should be thinking in terms of a probable American rejection of the Soviet proposal. Grinevsky became quite heated in defending the latest Soviet proposal as a fair and appropriate compromise, and as the rock-bottom Soviet position on the subject. Garthoff suggested there was no point in further discussion at that time, and the Soviet participants agreed.

Article I of the Interim Agreement

Turning to the Interim Agreement, Grinevsky asked if the American participants had anything to suggest with respect to Article I. Garthoff said that they did, and presented a new draft text to the Soviet participants (see Attachment 3). He noted that it confirmed acceptance of the interpretive statement defining ICBMs, and accepted the Soviet proposal for July 1, 1972, in the basic Article. This acceptance of the July 1 date was in the context of the understanding that there would of course be no new starts of ICBM construction between the present time and July 1, and further had in mind Minister Semenov's remarks of May 6. He noted that in the second interpretive statement the date of signature was retained, because that seemed more appropriate for such a descriptive passage.

Grinevsky expressed satisfaction at agreement on the Article and the first interpretive statement. He questioned the reference to date of signature in the second statement, and said that his Delegation thought that it should also be July 1, in conformity with the agreed date in the Article itself. Garthoff said that his Delegation had considered this question, and, as he had explained earlier, believed that it was more appropriate to refer to an on-going activity such as was described in the interpretive statement by reference to date of signature; the Article represented an undertaking which could be best described in terms of a particular date. Moreover, in similar descriptive passages concerning existing activities or installations date of signature was the agreed formulation in the ABM Treaty, for example with respect to identifying certain radars in Article III, and also in one of the interpretive statements associated with Article III. After some further argument,

Grinevsky said that he could accept the American proposal. Accordingly, full agreement was reached on Article I and the first two associated interpretive statements. Both sides indicated no change in their respective positions concerning the proposed additional interpretive statement on land-mobile ICBM launchers.

Article II of the Interim Agreement

Turning to Article II, Garthoff presented a text based on the previous day's discussion (see Attachment 4). Grinevsky and Kishilov immediately showed their disappointment and dissatisfaction. They described the text as no advance, and even a step back. They repeated the strongly held position of the Soviet side against including any definition of heavy ICBMs, whether in terms of volume of the missile, mention of a particular missile as the standard, or a standard of being larger than the largest existing light missile. Grinevsky said that the obligations in Article II itself were very important. In addition, the second obligation of making no substantial increase in silo dimensions observable by national technical means was very important. Finally, both sides had a common understanding on which were heavy ICBMs and which were light ICBMs. There had been no differences on this question so far, and therefore no definition was needed. A definition might mislead.

Garthoff said that as the Soviet side knew, for more than two years the American side had said in every way it knew how that it was essential to have a clear common understanding on the subject of what a heavy ICBM was. He did not understand how the Soviet participants could describe as a "step back" reference to 70 cubic meters as the threshold defining heavy ICBMs. The day before they had said that from the standpoint of the Soviet side it made no difference whether the definition were in terms of greater than the largest light missile or a volume of 70 cubic meters. Under these circumstances, the American Delegation preferred to revert to the formulation of 70 cubic meters, since it was a more precise standard. Moreover, the Soviet participants should appreciate that a 70 cubic meter standard would in fact permit modest modernization of existing light ICBMs, all of which were below that level. Accordingly, it could hardly be described as a step back from the Soviet standpoint. He could understand that the Soviet participants might, from what they had previously said, not regard that particular formulation as a step forward; perhaps from their standpoint it was a step to the side. But from the American standpoint it represented a correct and necessary definition. Garthoff then asked if, in his comments, Grinevsky had deliberately used the word

"substantial" in preference to "significant." Grinevsky said that he had, his side preferred the word "substantial." Garthoff said that his side preferred the word "significant," but felt that it needed to be further considered, and that although the term remained without brackets in the text he had just provided, he wished to emphasize that this was still a tentative matter. He asked if Grinevsky had meant to describe the substantial increase in dimensions observable by national means as a single statement of the obligation; that is, was "observable by national technical means of verification" stated as a limiting qualification on "substantial increase" rather than merely a descriptive phrase identifying the method of verification. Also, did the Soviet side regard the inclusion of that phrase as essential. Grinevsky said that it was a qualifying element of the sentence, and the Soviet side did consider it essential. Garthoff said that, as he had said previously, the American side considered it not acceptable to use such a consideration as an element in defining the very terms of the standard being established.

Garthoff then asked what Grinevsky had meant when he said that a definition could "mislead." The American position was that a definition was necessary precisely in order to "lead," and we did not see how it could "mislead" to make clear just what obligations the sides were assuming. Grinevsky replied with a lengthy diatribe repeating familiar arguments such as the fact that throughout our long negotiations there had always been a clear understanding as to what constituted heavy ICBMs, and that a definition was not necessary. Garthoff replied that without agreeing with those considerations, he still did not see how a definition could be misleading. How could the establishment of a clear standard such as 70 cubic meters mislead a side? Grinevsky responded by saying that suppose a side wanted to build a missile of 71 cubic meters. Garthoff replied that if Grinevsky was proposing 71 cubic meters as the standard, he thought he could agree. Grinevsky replied that he did not mean that. Garthoff remarked that, in that case, it would be a violation, but that obviously what a side would do in that case would be to advise the weapons designers as to the limit they would be permitted. Grinevsky said it was necessary to allow modernization, and both sides knew what heavy missiles were. Parsons asked whether Grinevsky was saying that light missiles would remain as they are now, and heavy missiles would remain as they now are. Grinevsky said that he had only wanted to say that both sides know what they are talking about when they refer to light and heavy missiles.

Garthoff asked Grinevsky what would happen if there were a difference on understanding of what a heavy missile was at some time in the future.

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Grinevsky said that the matter could then be taken up in the Standing Consultative Commission. Garthoff asked if it would not be better to decide such a question now, before a side had taken steps which the other would regard as not consistent with the agreement. Moreover, if we were not able to agree in two years of negotiations, how would the Standing Consultative Commission be able to agree when one side had clearly thought that something was not a heavy missile and the other thought differently. Garthoff remarked that the US position on this matter had certainly been clear and consistent throughout the two years of negotiation. Grinevsky again said it was a step back to refer to 70 cubic meters. When Garthoff challenged this, Grinevsky and Kishilov both replied that 70 cubic meters was unacceptable, as the Soviet Delegation had said earlier. Therefore, to reintroduce an unacceptable proposal at this late stage of negotiations was a step back.

Kishilov suggested that perhaps the matter should be discussed by Delegations. Garthoff agreed that perhaps that would be useful.

The debate resumed in familiar terms. At one point, Garthoff said that the US will consider any missile above 70 cubic meters as a heavy ICBM. Grinevsky said that "the Soviet side will take that into account." It was not, however, clear as to whether Grinevsky meant that the Soviet side would take note of this American view, or would act in accordance with it.

#### General Atmosphere

The atmosphere was somewhat charged, and on several occasions both Grinevsky and Kishilov referred to what they regarded as a generally stiffened American position as reflected in various meetings that day. At one point, Kishilov referred to "the day of withdrawal." Garthoff emphasized that there was no connection between various positions being taken by the American side which the Soviet side might not agree with. Moreover, a number of steps forward had been registered, including agreement on Article III of the ABM Treaty and Article I of the Interim Agreement. In any case, the American side was making every effort to reach full agreement on all points at issue.

Attachments

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Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) Within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being a circle having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) Within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars of the other Party operational or under construction in its ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers on the date of signature of the Treaty, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars.

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US Statement on Location of ICBM Defenses

Mr. Minister;

The two sides have registered agreement on the following statement:

"The Parties understand that the ABM system deployment areas for defense of ICBM silo launchers described in Article III of the Treaty may be located only west of the Mississippi River for the United States and east of the Ural Mountains for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

In this connection, the US side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, shall be centered in the ICBM silo launcher deployment area at Grand Forks, North Dakota.

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Article I

The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

Interpretive Statements

The Parties understand that ICBM launchers as referred to in the Interim Agreement are understood to be land-based launchers for strategic ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental U.S. and the northwestern border of the continental USSR.

The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM launchers under active construction as of the date of signature of the Interim Agreement may be completed.

The Parties agree that they will not deploy land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of operation of the Interim Agreement.

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Article II

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBM of types deployed since that time.

Interpretive Statement

]The Parties understand that any ICBM of a volume greater than 70 cubic meters would be considered to be a "heavy" ICBM.] The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there shall be no significant increase in the dimensions ], observable by national technical means of verification,] of land-based ICBM silos.

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