President Bill Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin shake hands in a joint press conference in Washington, D.C, on October 29, 1997 (Source: Xinhua)
Negotiating “common but differentiated responsibilities” on climate change
China compared its “survival emissions” to “glutton emissions” of industrialized world
Washington, D.C., September 17, 2026 - As U.S. officials prepared for the landmark 1997 Conference of Parties (COP) climate negotiations in Kyoto, Japan, they increasingly recognized a simple reality: no meaningful solution to climate change or environmental stewardship would be possible without China, according to declassified documents published today by the National Security Archive.
On a positive note, Beijing recognized the need to address climate problems. The challenge Washington faced, as spelled out in internal communications, was how to overcome persistent resistance to international cooperation within the Chinese government.
The documentary record outlined in today’s briefing book traces a pivotal period in U.S.-China environmental diplomacy: the mid and late 1990s, when the Clinton administration came to view China as indispensable to solving climate change. While some mainstream analysis has characterized China purely as an obstructionist negotiating force during international environmental meetings,[1] the documents shared today demonstrate that the picture was more complex.
The 25 documents posted below reveal both convergence and conflict: Chinese officials repeatedly expressed support for international cooperation and acknowledged global environmental challenges, yet they insisted that developed nations like the United States bore primary responsibility for reducing their “glutton emissions” and resisted binding commitments that they feared could constrain China’s flourishing economic growth.
On the U.S. side, diplomats struggled to understand the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities” favored by China and much of the developing world. In internal assessments, U.S. officials recognized Beijing’s growing importance as an environmental actor (and its increasing environmental consciousness, spurred by domestic calls for environmental action) and sought to expand bilateral cooperation. At the same time, negotiators encountered persistent resistance from Chinese officials who argued that poverty reduction and development remained their government’s foremost priorities.
Today’s collection consists entirely of White House, State Department, and other records the National Security Archive obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and research at the William J. Clinton Presidential Library. Together they document a central question that continues to shape global climate policy today: How should responsibility for addressing climate change be divided between industrialized nations and rapidly developing countries? By the end of the decade, despite frustrations at COP-3 in Kyoto and beyond, American officials concluded that long-term progress depended on deeper engagement with Beijing.
Following a series of developmental reforms throughout the 1970s and 1980s, China attempted to regain global acceptance after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, in part by signing onto over 30 international treaties and conventions. One of these pivotal agreements was the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). China’s participation at the Rio de Janeiro conference signaled to participating nations that it was willing to engage on environmental issues on the global stage. However, China prioritized “common but differentiated responsibilities”—the principle that all countries must commit to taking climate action but that their emissions reduction targets would be based on their level of development. This aligned the PRC with other large developing countries, like India and Brazil, against industrialized nations.[2]
During the 1980s and early 1990s, China’s centralizing government treated climate change as primarily a scientific issue in need of study, with agencies such as the State Meteorological Bureau conducting the bulk of climatic analysis for issues including air pollution control, acid rain prevention, and ozone protection. Steadily, however, government officials came to understand the intrinsic ties between climate change and economic development, in large part because of the connection between economic activity and fossil fuel burning. These scientific findings were then used to support policy positions taken by China at the UNFCCC and Kyoto.[3]
On the domestic side, China’s rapid construction and development boom of the 1990s[4] led to widespread urbanization, a serious rise in energy consumption, ecological damage, and environmental pollution. Faced with mounting pressure from local governments, China’s centralizing power enacted a series of environmental pollution initiatives and legal mechanisms on ecology as a signal to its public that the PRC was committed to environmental stewardship.[5]
By the mid-1990s, U.S. policymakers began to recognize that China’s role in global environmental affairs was changing. Although Beijing remained focused primarily on economic development, diplomatic exchanges documented here between the two countries suggested that Washington saw a developing country becoming more engaged in international environmental governance.
By 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton and China’s President Jiang Zemin had established the U.S.-China Environment and Development Forum—co-chaired by Vice President Al Gore and Premier Zhu Rongji—a key partnership that would go on to produce meaningful bilateral engagements on commercial cooperation, energy policy, environmental policy, and science for sustainable development.
These early documents reveal a critical shift in U.S. thinking: Rather than treat China as an environmental problem, the Clinton administration began to view Beijing as a necessary stakeholder in the emerging global climate regime, especially as countries set the stage for COP-3 in Kyoto.
Somewhat predictably, the “common but differentiated responsibilities” stance remained a fundamental characteristic of U.S-China climate engagement in 1997. In the months leading up to the December COP-3 in Kyoto, U.S. negotiators sought Beijing’s broader participation in future emissions reductions, while Chinese officials consistently took the position that industrialized countries, whose economic growth had contributed to the majority of planet-warming emissions, should bear the primary burden of climate action.
Chinese officials thought a U.S. proposal for emissions reductions went “too far in calling for developing countries to reduce emissions.” (Document 4) Yet, at the same time, they still considered there to be “much room … for cooperation” and stressed that “China is strongly committed to environmental protection.”
Before Kyoto commenced on December 1, 1997, key officials in Washington had already reached the conclusion that China was central to a successful climate agreement and—potentially—could budge on its position. “They have an open attitude,” John “Jack” Gibbons, Science Advisor to President Clinton, reported. (Document 5) Yet, while White House official David Sandalow agreed “We are within reach of a deal at Kyoto,” he also wrote just days before negotiations began: “The biggest stumbling block is indifferent or outright opposition from China.” (Document 6)
Just as with more recent rounds of international environmental talks, the Kyoto negotiations of 1997 exposed both the possibilities and limits of bi- and multilateral cooperation on climate change. Behind closed doors, Chinese and U.S. leaders spoke in remarkably similar terms about the need to address environmental challenges, as today’s posting shows. Publicly, however, negotiators remained divided over whether, or to what degree, developing countries should assume obligations under a future climate regime.
This reflection of “shared priorities in private” was true even at the highest level, as evidenced by, among other records posted today, an exchange between Clinton and Jiang from December 1997. Jiang acknowledged the need for international cooperation on emissions reductions and expressed interest in expanding technology transfers and environmental investment. Clinton agreed there “can’t be uniform targets” for each country. “If we can transfer technology to help China and not slow its growth rate, we could have the answer to climate change.” (Document 8) The same could not be said on the public stage, as the PRC made harsh statements about Western “glutton emissions,” among other complaints.
Ultimately, in December 1997, China joined more than 100 other nations in adopting the Kyoto Protocol, which imposed emissions limits on industrialized countries. In November 1998, almost a year later, the United States also signed the Protocol, but the Senate never ratified it, and President George W. Bush later withdrew the United States from the Kyoto process.
Despite the gridlock at Kyoto, in the following two years, the U.S.-China climate diplomatic relationship made a subtle but important transformation. Although China’s formal negotiating position hadn’t changed, officials increasingly detected signs that Beijing was becoming more willing to discuss climate policy, market-based mechanisms, and long-term cooperation. In a letter to President Clinton, Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) found that it could still be possible for the U.S. to “seek win-win opportunities” with China. (Document 11) In the president’s response letter, Clinton strongly agreed: “I am hopeful these consultations will promote better understanding…and help move the world forward in meeting the challenges on climate change.”
Those challenges, for both governments, would center around finding a path forward that reconciled China’s development priorities and growing international pressure for climate action.
In 1998, the PRC underwent a significant political and bureaucratic restructuring that included its division dedicated to climate change. The National Coordination Group on Climate Change, established in 1990 and the first official Chinese institution of its kind, was rebranded as the National Coordination Group on Climate Change Strategy (NCGCCS). The addition of the last word underscored the shift in emphasis from scientific research to strategic analysis of climate change. Perhaps more importantly, the secretariat of the NCGCCS was relocated from the State Meteorological Bureau (the entity previously tasked with climate research) to the powerful State Development Planning Commission (SDPC), another signal that Beijing was continuing to link environmental issues with economic ones.[6]
At the same time, authority over climate policy became increasingly decentralized, with provincial governments exerting considerable influence over infrastructure and energy decisions. This diffusion of power complicated efforts to negotiate climate commitments at the national level. Even when senior leaders expressed support for environmental initiatives, implementation often depended on local officials whose priorities were economic growth and employment. These tensions between central and provincial authorities, as noted in some of today’s posted records, are crucial to understanding the PRC’s approach to climate change.
Other reports reveal additional fissures among groups within the country dealing with climate change. Chinese scientists generally acknowledged the risks posed by climate change, including rising sea levels, severe storms, and flooding. However, many policymakers with conflicting responsibilities viewed more immediate challenges—including water shortages, pollution, and economic development—as higher priorities. U.S. officials recognized that an additional obstacle to progress was Chinese skepticism about American intentions. Some Chinese officials had been instructed to delay major climate commitments until the United States demonstrated that it was willing and able to secure domestic support for the Kyoto Protocol. (Document 12)
In spite of the confusion caused by internal developments in the PRC, 1998 also saw unprecedented U.S.-China diplomatic engagement. In June, Presidents Clinton and Jiang agreed to establish high-level consultations on global warming. Three months later, U.S. and Chinese officials formally opened the first high-level climate dialogue between the two countries. Participants noted a significantly improved atmosphere compared to the confrontational exchanges surrounding Kyoto, as Chinese officials signaled a willingness to discuss mechanisms such as Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), areas where both governments saw potential mutual benefit.
Six months later, in his weekly Climate Change report to Clinton, presidential assistant Todd Stern stated the unconditional: “When it comes to ultimate ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, all roads lead through China.” Ultimately, the administration never submitted the Protocol for ratification, knowing it would be dead in the water in the Senate, in part because of deep suspicions about China’s behavior in various spheres. (Document 15)
The post-Kyoto timeframe provides a window into the two countries’ successes on clean energy and development cooperation. The 1997 Environment and Development Forum fostered important links between the U.S. and China, including bilateral working groups dedicated to commercial cooperation, energy policy, environmental policy, and science for sustainable development. These ties were especially important because of the intrusion of outside events, such as the accidental bombing of China’s Belgrade embassy by the United States, which prompted Vice President Gore to express “deep regret” to Premier Rongji and urge that work on the environment “must continue.” (Document 22)
Gore’s appeal was not enough to put climate cooperation immediately back on track, as Todd Stern’s reports to President Clinton show. Stern and others at the time lamented Beijing’s repetitions of “standard dogma” about being “a poor country that cannot afford to consider an issue like climate change.” But in retrospect, Beijing’s position may have reflected a more sophisticated awareness of the stakes for China both internally and abroad. Chinese officials remained firmly opposed to binding emissions targets, but they increasingly emphasized domestic efficiency improvements, cleaner energy development, and participation in international discussions. Despite some disappointment, Stern advocated for continued partnership but warned Clinton that “prospects for short-term progress [were] not good.” (Document 20)
By fall of 1999, neither side had resolved the central disagreements exposed at Kyoto. Yet the year’s diplomatic exchanges revealed a recognition on both sides that larger issues were involved. Climate cooperation would require a sustained bilateral relationship extending beyond treaty negotiations. The foundations of the modern U.S.-China climate dialogue were beginning to take shape, even as fundamental disputes over responsibility, development, and sovereignty remained unresolved.
Stay tuned for the Climate Change Transparency Project’s next U.S.-China Climate installment.
Document 1
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
In a memorandum to Secretary of State Warren Christopher following a “very positive” diplomatic visit to China, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) Eileen Claussen concludes that, “next to us, China is the most significant global environmental player.” While the memorandum looks ahead at the State Department’s environmental priorities and issues more generally, this document gives an early picture of how the U.S. government’s diplomatic and negotiating strategy with developing countries (China, Brazil, and India) started to take shape. Notably, it also demonstrates that the State Department considered China to be a big factor in negotiations even a year before COP-3 in Kyoto, Japan.
Document 2
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
This State Department cable provides a detailed account of Assistant Secretary Claussen’s visit to China for meetings with officials from the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) mentioned in Document 1. According to the initial cable summary, “the meeting…was very frank and cordial and highlighted a convergence on many environmental subjects.” A range of environmental issues were discussed, including U.S.-China discussions on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POP), air and water pollution, “green” engineering projects, and of course, climate negotiations.
On the climate front, both State Department and Chinese officials understood that cooperation between their two countries was required and could ultimately “move the world.” Although in principle both countries agreed that binding targets for both developed and developing countries were necessary, “there was no consensus yet” on the “differing responsibilities” question. From China’s vantage point—and from that of other developing countries like Brazil and India—the United States “was all talk and no action.” For the U.S., China needed to admit it would “control emissions” otherwise the “problem could not be solved.”
Interestingly, this cable details Xie Zhenua’s early role in Chinese environmental negotiations. The embassy’s concluding comment notes that Xie was “at first, and sometimes still is, dismissed as a political hack with no technical ability on the environmental field.” However, the cable goes on to say that Xie “displayed a thorough understanding of the issues and gave a clear impression that NEPA knows exactly where it needs to go.”
Document 3
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
This unclassified State Department paper provides a summary of U.S. international environmental policy approximately a year before the start of COP-3 in Kyoto. The paper marks 1997 as “the most important environmental year since Rio in 1992” and captures the increasing weight that the U.S. is putting on international environmental concerns. Although this document does not go into detail on specific U.S.-Chinese environmental relations at the time, the State Department does reveal the importance of “developing environmental partnerships with key countries,” such as China, Brazil, India, Japan, and members of the European Union.
Separately, the paper nods to the tense domestic implications of U.S. climate policy: “The Climate Change issue is highly charged and has significant domestic implications (i.e. for energy policy) and elicits deep concern from industry and certain members of Congress.”
Document 4
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
This State Department cable captures the growing tensions between the U.S. and China, specifically regarding the U.S. proposal for a climate change protocol at the upcoming Kyoto negotiations. According to the cable, Chinese officials thought the proposal for emission reductions went “too far in calling for developing countries to reduce emissions.” Yet, this same cable assessed that Chinese officials still considered there to be “much room…for cooperation” and stressed that “China is strongly committed to environmental protection. China admits that it does not, in fact, have its own official and distinct position on climate change, which, from the U.S. side, could be viewed as China shielding itself behind the emission reductions stance of other developing countries.
Document 5
Clinton Presidential Library
This brief note captures John “Jack” Gibbons’ report on China’s current stance on a potential climate treaty right before the start of COP-3. Gibbons, Clinton’s science advisor, had an extensive meeting with China’s State Councilor and Minister for State on Science and Technology, Song Jian, and came to several conclusions: 1) controlling population (presumably population growth) was a top priority for China; 2) they are open to carbon sequestration and sinks measures; 3) China is “not wed to ‘emissions per person’” like other developing countries; 4) China sees great promise in research and development for clean fuels and technologies; and 5) they are open to joint implementation efforts. Point 3 on emissions reductions is perhaps most interesting; as Gibbson writes, “this could be important in the negotiations.”
Document 6
Clinton Presidential Library
In a memorandum, David Sandalow, who was then the National Security Council senior director for environmental affairs and on the Council for Environmental Quality, paints a clear picture for White House staffers as COP-3 is about to begin: “We are within reach of a deal at Kyoto. Most of the developed world (including the EU) wants one. The biggest stumbling block is indifference or outright opposition from China, India and key OPEC members (including Saudi Arabia).” He then sketches out how a climate treaty could come together via a “differentiation” plan for specific country targets, and a “gameplan” to build a “bloc of non-EU Annex I” countries. Mainly, Sandalow’s plan continues to hold firm on the U.S. government’s opposition to the EU’s rigid targets, and “key OPEC countries.”
Sandalow does admit that one of the greatest challenges for the United States will be on the domestic front: “Critics will charge we have given up too much…for too little.” However, he concludes that it is indeed in the U.S. interest to get a deal at Kyoto.
Document 7
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
This memorandum on meetings between Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) and Chinese officials during Kyoto negotiations offers a glimpse into Beijing’s thinking about its domestic climate policy. Acting Chinese delegation head Liu Zhenhim acknowledges that Beijing could slow the growth of emissions but also argues that rising emissions are unavoidable as the country pursues economic development and higher living standards. Baucus seeks to reassure Chinese officials that the U.S. does not intend to impede China’s growth. The author, Bob Boynton, notes that, in contrast to a previous meeting with Senator Chuck Hagel’s (R-NE) COP-3 senate delegation, Baucus’ meeting with Liu “had a substantially different tone” and was noticeably more constructive. Although the discussions “produced nothing that will advance our agenda at COP-3,” Boynton suggests that these meetings “may have a long-term benefit” to U.S.-China negotiations.
Document 8
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
This State Department cable provides a memorandum of conversation between President Clinton and President of China Jiang Zemin shortly before the Kyoto Conference. Importantly, it highlights climate change as an increasingly important component of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. Clinton affirms that the United States, along with other developed countries, is committed to adopting binding targets and admits that “it would not be fair to ask developing countries, including China, to adopt such binding targets.” However, Clinton insists that they must find a way to ensure that developing countries “can participate in recognition” of this global problem and notes that the U.S. “approach suggests that [they] adopt a different set of goals and includes a system of joint implementation.” It is important to note that Clinton recognizes that developed countries cannot ask developing countries to “sacrifice economic growth” via emissions reductions, but also that the problem cannot be solved only with the efforts of developed countries.
President Jiang agrees that China and the United States should work together to reduce emissions while emphasizing the importance of investment and technology transfers to support China’s environmental goals. He also points to existing bilateral cooperation on cleaner energy technologies as evidence that the two countries share similar long-term objectives. The discussion illuminates both governments’ efforts to frame climate cooperation as a common concern rather than a non-starter.
Document 9
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
In an unofficial and uncleared State Department report from the Kyoto negotiations, Mark Hambley, part of State’s delegation to COP-3, captures the hardening of China’s public negotiating position during the conference. He notes that Chinese representatives sharply criticized proposals that they believe would restrict the “survival emissions” of developing countries while allowing industrialized nations to continue their “glutton emissions.” Beijing rejected both the proposal itself and efforts to establish further negotiations on the issue, joining other developing countries in “draw[ing] a line of their own in the proverbial sand” against additional commitments. This report illuminates the complicated efforts to reach a deal as Kyoto negotiations drew to a close.
Document 10
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
Prepared in the months following COP-3 in Kyoto, this updated State Department country profile on China begins by outlining the significant progress China has made in reducing “the potential growth” of greenhouse gas emissions via market reforms and centralizing government environmental policies. However, the document goes on to state that “the Chinese position toward issues under consideration in the UNFCCC has changed little since COP-3 at Kyoto,” largely due to its stance on continued economic growth. The profile also provides a window into China’s current “substantial” restructuring of its centralizing government. To a greater extent, the assessment sheds light on the often obscure dynamics between China’s higher political authority and local governments: “Provincial and…municipal and rural governments control much of the decision-making on infrastructure and development, which is critical to controlling China’s emissions growth.”
Portions of this document are withheld under the b(1) FOIA exemption for national security considerations. The Archive has since filed for a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) of this document.
Document 11
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
Writing to President Clinton about the president’s upcoming visit to China, Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) underscores the point that it is still possible for the U.S. to “seek win-win opportunities with China.” Byrd cosponsored Senate Resolution 98 with Senator Hagel in July 1997 (the Byrd-Hagel Resolution), which declared in a unanimous 95-0 vote that the U.S. should not sign any international climate treaty that lacked legally binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions for developing countries like China. The resolution effectively prohibited the U.S. from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. In this letter, Byrd encourages Clinton to “urge the Chinese to take a progressive leadership role among the developing countries” and commit to legally binding emissions.
In Clinton’s response to Byrd (attached), written after he returned from China, the president “strongly” agrees that there are many “win-win” opportunities for China in addressing climate change. Clinton outlines that he “addressed global warming on many occasions” with China, specifically regarding market mechanisms. He says he is “hopeful that these consultations will…move the world forward in meeting the challenges of climate change.”
Document 12
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
Prepared as a “Scenesetter” for a senior U.S. climate change delegation about to visit Beijing, this cable includes a comprehensive overview of China’s evolving climate policy landscape in 1998. Echoing the descriptions of inter- and intragovernmental dynamics and uncertainties outlined in Document 10, American diplomats describe a government undergoing major institutional restructuring with an increasingly decentralized governing authority. “At present, most ministries’ personnel situations are highly unsettled.” Additionally, the cable concludes that provincial governments are exerting considerable influence over infrastructure and energy decisions.
The authors also note that this rapid restructuring is taking place while record-breaking floods in southern China and the northernmost province of Heilongjiang are consuming the attention of authorities. Chinese scientists generally accept the risks posed by climate change, including rising sea levels, severe storms, and flooding, the cable adds. It also highlights Beijing’s reluctance to make new international commitments before the U.S. Senate acts on Kyoto, while identifying signs that climate change is gradually receiving greater attention among the senior Chinese leadership.
Portions of this document are withheld under the b(1) FOIA exemption for national security considerations. The Archive has since filed for a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) of this document.
Document 13
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
This cable summarizes diplomatic consultations ahead of COP-4 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and focuses on U.S. engagement with both China and Japan. Acting Assistant Secretary Melinda Kimble notes a more positive atmosphere in Beijing than during the previous year, observing that Chinese leaders appear increasingly willing to engage in dialogue on climate issues even if major policy differences remain. Indeed, China’s decision to send a vice foreign minister to upcoming talks is viewed as an encouraging signal of higher-level development. Separately, conversations with Japanese officials further emphasize the importance of close U.S.-Japan coordination in encouraging continued Chinese participation in international climate negotiations.
Document 14
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
This cable from the U.S. embassy in Beijing reports on the first high-level dialogue on climate change between China and the United States, an idea agreed to by presidents Clinton and Jiang at their June summit. The Chinese side gave the Americans reason for optimism by directly expressing the PRC’s commitment to addressing climate change and to finding ways to cooperate with Washington. At the same time, as other documents in this posting also show, the positive picture was offset somewhat by the recitation of previous positions about the varying responsibilities of developed versus developing nations.
Interestingly, Yin Yubiao, director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Treaty and Law Department, made a point of informing the U.S. delegation that MOFA “has responsibility” for negotiating with other countries on climate change, a comment the cable’s author theorized was a mild rebuke to the Americans for arranging meetings with other ministries.
Among numerous other points made, Liu Zhenmin, counselor in Yin’s department, discussed the broad topic of flexibility mechanisms. In the process, he signaled that Beijing favored the so-called Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as the best means for developing countries like China to meet greenhouse emissions targets. CDMs would become a stumbling block between the two countries in the post-Kyoto era.
Document 15
Clinton Presidential Library
This memorandum from presidential assistant Todd Stern to President Clinton outlines the administration’s perspective on China’s role in global climate change efforts ahead of a meeting with Premier Zhu Rongji. Stern sees China’s participation as absolutely critical, noting that “all roads lead through China” when it comes to the Kyoto Protocol. Unfortunately, Stern points out that the Chinese are “adamantly opposed to taking commitments” and were “unrelentingly obstructionist at Kyoto and Buenos Aires.”
Optimistically, Stern identifies clean energy development as a highly “fruitful area” for cooperation. The memo argues that China is a “textbook case” for persuading developing countries that the U.S. wants them to grow economically, just not with “outdated tools” like “dirty coal.” Stern notes that Zhu has already “demonstrated familiarity with climate change in private conversations,” suggesting a potential opening for agreement at the highest levels.
Document 16
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
This report details a meeting of the Commercial Cooperation Working Group (CCWG), one of four such forums created in 1997 under the inter-agency U.S.-China Forum on Environment and Development. Participants included representatives from several private firms like Enron, Ford, and Phillips Petroleum. The Chinese declared their willingness to cooperate on environmental issues and indicated that a number of plans were in place or in the works, such as a commitment to make major investments in alternative fuel vehicles. In turn, they pressed for more U.S. investment to help American companies compete with Europeans in Chinese markets, as well as a lifting of sanctions. The large U.S. delegation made several presentations outlining obstacles facing China but also proposing steps to ameliorate them. Both sides appeared to find the session useful and positive.
Document 17
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
This summary provides extended detail about a session of the Energy Policy Working Group of the U.S.-China Forum on Environment and Development. Like other working groups meeting the same day in April, this gathering presented an almost rosy picture of U.S.-China cooperation. The 15-page report describes a series of initiatives underway from an Export-Import Bank clean energy program to activities relating to petroleum activities to natural gas utilization in China to the coal industry. But the summary also reflects key friction points in the areas of financing, market access, and technology transfer. Overall, the Chinese delegation appears to dutifully project Beijing’s message of high interest in cooperating with the U.S. to modernize its energy infrastructure and address domestic pollution.
Document 18
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
The Environmental Policy Working Group also met on April 9, 1999. The session dealt with bilateral environmental issues in one section and multilateral concerns in a second part. Topics in the first ranged from air pollution control, forestry cooperation, and expanding Peace Corps operations in China. During the second, the group talked about CDMs, financing, desertification, agriculture, and biodiversity. Several Statements of Intent were signed during the day. An agenda and list of participants at the end of the report gives an idea of the scope of the undertaking.
Document 19
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
The fourth bilateral meeting held on April 9 was the Science for Sustainable Development Working Group. As positive in tone as the others, it covered discussions about using joint scientific research to manage shared vulnerabilities in climate science, natural disasters, coastal management, agriculture, and land use.
Unlike some of the other working groups, which touched on financial frictions, this session had an atmosphere of outright eagerness while sifting through some highly technical issues. The Chinese side discussed a range of serious environmental pressures, pointing out that China has to feed 22% of the global population using only 7% of its arable land. They also underscored the toll of natural disasters, which cost China 3-6% of its GNP annually, with the 1998 floods alone causing nearly $30 billion in economic losses.
Both sides catalogued some of the cooperative efforts under consideration, including using Doppler radar for weather forecasting and pairing “sister sanctuaries” for coastal management. The Chinese showed an interest in learning from historical U.S. policies, asking how the Roosevelt administration’s “New Deal” managed water conservation and hydropower. Finally, while it was reported that China had passed 395 environmental laws, officials candidly admitted that strict enforcement is their biggest upcoming hurdle.
Document 20
Clinton Presidential Library
Special envoy Todd Stern brings President Clinton up to date on the week’s news in climate change. China is a significant focus after meetings with Zhu Rongji and other developments ranging from a $100 million Exim Bank program to agreements involving both U.S. government agencies (the EPA) and private industry (Enron). But all is not rosy, as Stern reports the Chinese rebuffed other project proposals, falling back on “standard dogma.” He says the U.S. side will keep trying on climate change but rates short-term prospects as “not good.”
Document 21
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
A couple of months after a series of sessions of the U.S.-China Forum on Environment and Development on April 9, 1999, National Security Adviser Leon Fuerth sends the PRC’s science and technology minister reports on all four sessions. The overall summation attached here includes a fairly impressive list of steps taken to expand cooperation. But those accomplishments were overshadowed by political fractiousness in the U.S. over China. Pressure from the political left contributed to the decision to sponsor a U.N. resolution critical of Beijing’s human rights practices while the right decried PRC espionage targeting U.S. military and nuclear secrets. Anti-China sentiment in general led Clinton to back away temporarily from supporting PRC admission to the World Trade Organization. But it was the U.S./NATO unintended bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May that caused the greatest dent in bilateral ties and temporarily froze the environmental side of the relationship, which some news reports had already taken to labeling as “window dressing.”
Document 22
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
Vice President Gore writes to Premier Zhu Rongji attempting to get climate change cooperation back on track in the wake of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in early May. The letter follows Leon Fuerth’s communication to the Chinese science and technology minister the day before (Document 20). A few days earlier, on June 17, a high-level State Department delegation flew to Beijing to deliver the U.S. government’s formal report on the incident, which it insisted was unintentional. The PRC called the explanation “by no means acceptable” and proceeded to freeze virtually all bilateral activities on the environment. Cooperation would pick up again episodically, but it would take years to overcome the distrust created by the event.
Document 23
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
This U.S. Embassy Beijing cable summarizes a week-long visit by a U.S. technical team (including EPA and DOE officials) to the Chinese capital, spotlighting some significant bureaucratic roadblocks from China on certain climate policies but some hopefulness from other quarters. Thus, the report gives some insight into how Chinese agencies charged with carrying out climate policies could influence the direction and pace of cooperation. The main impediments reported here came from the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC), which appeared to be highly skittish about being seen as going beyond officially approved policy. This resulted in the SDPC adopting measures that would slow down work that was underway and add to costs. The size of the commission’s staff—just four people working on climate change—was another problem. On the other hand, the U.S. side was happier with progress shown by China’s State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) on cooperative efforts to reduce air pollution. The cable’s authors strongly recommend keeping future technical cooperation on an “expert-to-expert” level and as informal as possible to avoid political nervousness and bureaucratic slowdowns at working levels in the PRC.
Document 24
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
This draft, “close hold” paper from the Council of Economic Advisers evidently aims at helping U.S. negotiators convince China of the economic benefits of global climate cooperation. Over the course of 25 pages, it offers an array of data and arguments across a range of climate issues. Among other points, it highlights ways the Kyoto Protocol can help not just environmentally but financially. While unfinished, the draft gives a detailed look at how the Clinton administration hoped to approach Beijing and encourage it to take advantage of its enormous potential to benefit by abating greenhouse gas emissions without impairing economic development.
Document 25
State Department Freedom of Information Act Request
This EPA memorandum to senior State Department and Council of Economic Advisors officials follows up on the CEA paper discussed above (Document 24). The EPA’s representatives praise the CEA paper but suggest a different tactical approach involving presenting the Chinese with a much shorter document to help launch a bilateral dialogue on tackling greenhouse gas emissions. An outline of such a paper is attached. It does not on the surface seem to differ much from the CEA approach except perhaps in its attempt to emphasize for the Chinese the domestic benefits of adapting the proposed policies.
[1] Jonathan Watts, John Vidal, Robin McKie, and Toby Helm, “China blamed as anger mounts over climate deal,” The Guardian, December 19, 2009.
[2] “3: Short History of Chinese Climate Policy,” Guide to Chinese Complete Policy, Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, and Iselin Stensdal, “Chinese Climate-Change Policy 1988-2013: Moving on Up,” Asian Perspective, 2014.
[3] Ye Qi and Tong Wu, “The politics of climate change in China,” WIREs Climate Change, 2013.
[4] 1989 – 1998 being classified as the “second leap” (See Zhenhua Xie’s “China’s historical evolution of environmental protection along with the forty years’ reform and opening up,” Environmental Science and Ecotechnology, 2020).
[5] Xie, 2020.
[6] Ye Qi and Tong Wu, “The politics of climate change in China,” WIREs Climate Change, 2013.