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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

Wednesday - September 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Captured Documents in Bolivia

CIA has made a preliminary technical analysis of guerrilla documents discovered by Bolivian security forces in early August 1967 (Tab A).

With respect to the documents relating to "Che" Guevara, its findings are:

- two of the passports bearing different names carry the same photograph and fingerprints.
- the fingerprints are identical to examples of prints of Guevara furnished to CIA [redacted] in 1954 and [redacted] in 1965.
- a CIA photo comparison analyst is of the opinion that the photographs are "most probably" photographs of Guevara in disguise.
- the passports show that Guevara most likely travelled legally from Madrid to Sao Paulo, Brazil at the end of October, 1966, and from there to La Paz on November 3, although the documents do not indicate arrival in La Paz.
- certain snapshots of what looks like Guevara in the jungle give no evidence of a montage.

The foregoing leads to a strong presumption that Guevara was in Bolivia, but it is still short of conclusive proof. The CIA report avoids drawing conclusions.

The Bolivians want our analysis of the documents to use in the Regis Debray trial to demonstrate Cuban involvement in the guerrilla movement. As explained in Covey Oliver's memo to Foy Kohler (Tab B), this raises questions about the wisdom of our furnishing the only analysis of the documents.

My view is that the nature of the documents and photos are such that they can be attacked as a CIA plant, particularly if we come out as the only authenticating source. This would tend to discredit the evidence

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

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By *ch.* NARA. Date 1-27-12

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and weaken the Bolivian case against Debray. The risk is reduced by having the Bolivians announce that they have captured these documents and ask several governments of countries where "Che" is known to have resided (Argentina, Peru, Guatemala, Mexico) or who have special analysis capabilities (Brazil and U.S.) to assess the documents.

In his memo to Kohler, Oliver outlines five options for handling our response to the Bolivians. He recommends the third option which corresponds to a course of action described in the preceding paragraph. I understand that Kohler and Helms endorse the third option. I have not heard Nitze's views yet.

I recommend -- subject to Peter Jessup confirming the concurrence of the other 303 Committee members -- that you approve the third option in the Oliver memorandum.

An info memo to the President based on the assumption of 303 approval is at Tab C.

WGB
WGBowdler

cc - Peter Jessup

Attachments

Tab A - Analysis of documents.

Tab B - Oliver memo to Kohler

Tab C - Info memo to President.

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Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, National Security Files, Intelligence Files, Box 2, Folder "Guerrilla Problems in Latin America"



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2020-10-09