Saturday, Oct. 21, 1967

Mr. President:

You will find this summary of the Che Guevara diary interesting reading. It gives the highlights of the 11-month guerrilla effort.

Walter

It is interesting on how it fell apart.
1. Ernesto "Che" Guevara de la Serna arrived at Nancahuazu in the southeastern part of Bolivia on 7 November 1966 to establish a guerrilla base there. He remained in Bolivia in command of the guerrillas until he was captured and killed 11 months later.

2. Guevara was accompanied on arrival by two Cubans and a Bolivian. By 20 December 1966 their number had increased to 28. It was Guevara's aim to have a total guerrilla force of 40 men before going into action. Of these half were to be Cubans. Cubans infiltrated into Bolivia via Porto Alegre and Sao Paulo.
3. **Juan Pablo Chang Navarro**, a Peruvian of Chinese extraction known as "El Chino," sought out Guevara in November 1966 and offered him 20 Peruvians to join the guerrilla force. After some reluctance, Guevara agreed in principal to "internationalize" his guerrilla band by incorporating Peruvians after the band went into action. In fact, however, only two Peruvians joined the band, a radio operator and a doctor. "El Chino" requested arms of Guevara, which the latter provided. Guevara also set up a five-man network to pass the arms to a region near Peru on the other side of Lake Titicaca. "El Chino" decided to remain with the guerrilla band. 

**COMMENT:**

The second ranger battalion of the Bolivian army, reported that "El Chino" was killed in the clash of 8 October 1967.

4. When Guevara arrived in Bolivia, the communist parties of Bolivia had not taken a formal stand in favor of Cuban-led guerrilla activity. Bolivians like Rodolfo Saldana and Roberto "Coco" Peredo Leigue were prepared to break with the pro-Soviet communist party of Bolivia (PCB/S), if necessary, to join Guevara's force. Guevara restrained them because he felt that Mario Monje Molina, first secretary of the PCB/S, could swing the party in favor of the guerrilla movement. Accordingly he invited Monje to Nancahuazu on
31 DECEMBER 1966. IN THIS CORDIAL, BUT TENSE MEETING, MONJE LAID DOWN THREE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT:

A.) HE WOULD RENOUNCE HIS POSITION AS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE PCB/S, THUS MAINTAINING THE PARTY'S NEUTRALITY, TAKING WITH HIM PCB/S CADRE TO JOIN THE STRUGGLE,

B.) MONJE WOULD ASSUME THE POLITICAL - MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF THE STRUGGLE, GIVING THE REVOLUTION A BOLIVIAN CHARACTER,

C.) HE WOULD HANDLE RELATIONS WITH OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES, TRYING TO BRING THEM TO SUPPORT LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, CITING DOUGLAS BRAVO AS AN EXAMPLE.

GUEVARA TOLD MONJE THAT MONJE'S DECISION TO RENOUNCE HIS POSITION IN THE PARTY WAS A PERSONAL ONE ALTHOUGH HE CONSIDERED IT TO BE IN ERROR. HE FLATLY REJECTED MONJE'S BID FOR LEADERSHIP OF THE GUERRILLAS, STATING THAT ONLY HE, GUEVARA, WOULD LEAD THE MOVEMENT. ON THE THIRD POINT, GUEVARA SAID THAT WHILE IT WAS NOT INAPPROPRIATE TO ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN PARTIES, IN CERTAIN CASES, IT WOULD AMOUNT TO A REBELLION WITHIN THE LOCAL PARTIES. GUEVARA MADE MONJE'S CONDITIONS KNOWN TO BOLIVIAN MEMBERS OF THE GUERRILLA BAND AND ASKED THEM TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE
GUERRILLAS AND THE PARTY. EVERYONE AGREED TO REMAIN AND THIS APPEARED TO BE A BLOW TO MONJE. GUEVARA EMPHASIZED TO THE GUERRILLAS THAT THEIR PRIMARY MISSION WAS TO FORM AN IRON-STRONG NUCLEUS THAT WOULD SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE.

5. THE GUERRILLA SUPPORT MECHANISM IN BOLIVIA,ヘADED BY DR. WALTER PAREJA, INCLUDED LOYOLA GUZMAN LARA, WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF FINANCES (SHE WAS SENT 80,000 PESOS ($6,666), OF WHICH 20,000 ($1,666) WAS TO BE USED FOR THE PURCHASE OF A TRUCK) AND MOISES GUEVARA RODRIGUEZ, WHO WAS MADE RESPONSIBLE FOR RECRUITING BOLIVIANS. SOME BOLIVIANS RECEIVED GUERRILLA TRAINING AT A FARM NEAR CARANAVI ABOUT 70 MILES NORTHEAST OF LA PAZ.

6. THE GUERRILLAS RECEIVED REGULAR RADIO COMMUNICATIONS FROM CUBA BUT WERE UNABLE TO TRANSMIT TO CUBA BECAUSE THEIR RADIO BECAME DAMP AND RUSTED IN THE CAVE IN WHICH IT WAS STORED AND WAS INOPERATIVE. THEY MAINTAINED LOCAL COMMUNICATION AMONG SECTIONS OF THE GUERRILLA BAND WITH LOW-POWER TRANSCEIVERS. THEY APPARENTLY WERE ALSO IN RADIO CONTACT WITH LA PAZ.

LARA. HE SAID THAT DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER THE ARMY BECAME EFFECTIVE IN ITS ACTIONS. THE LOCAL PEASANTS WERE NOT HELPING HIM BUT WERE BEGINNING TO TURN INFORMERS. HE CONCLUDED "THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK NOW WILL BE TO WITHDRAW AND LOOK FOR MORE FAVORABLE AREAS."

8. DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCCLANT (ALSO SENT: 

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