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37 **INCOMING TELEGRAM** *Department of State*

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Control: 303
Rec'd: November 2, 1964
5:55 a.m.

A3U

Tel Aviv 492
11-2-64

FROM: Tel Aviv
ACTION: Secstate 492, PRIORITY
DATE: November 2, 11 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939000
By
Date

EXDIS.

FOR TALBOT FROM AMBASSADOR.

DEPTEL 357. — AE 11-2 LSR

This is obviously an unfortunate development. Not least of consequences, it seems to me, will be to increase suspicions in already susceptible quarters and set back efforts foster understanding and confidence in relations between two countries, which were given major boost by Prime Minister's visit to US. However, I am convinced Prime Minister personally most aware these considerations and consequently did not submit present request lightly. As we have indicated in numerous reports, Eshkol's political situation is extremely delicate and, despite recent successes he has achieved in party councils, will remain, or become more, so during period between now and Israeli elections next year, unless, as seems most unlikely, Ben Gurion ceases his opposition to compromise.

AE 11-2 LSR

In circumstances, I believe it to be in US interest for us to be as forthcoming in meeting Prime Minister's request as possible. Therefore, I suggest that we might recommend to the President that he not react completely negatively, but make counter proposal along line that (A) we be invited to pay a visit within the next month or two, (B) we agree to waive Prime Minister's commitment for subsequent six months visit until after his elections November 1965 and (C) we offer not to request his agreement to our communicating the results of current visit / to Nasser

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-2-492, November 2, 11 a.m. from Tel Aviv.

to Nasser also until after elections November 1965. This scenario would avoid long, almost two-(#) gap, between visits entailed in Prime Minister's present request, and assurance we would not seek communicate findings to Nasser would, I think, go far to overcome a principal apprehension of the Prime Minister that Nasser might leak fact of latest visit during political campaign, with embarrassing effects.

GP-3.

BARBOUR

MBK-18

(#) Apparent omission. Will service upon request.

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