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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (5)

FPC/HDR by SK 212194 AE(8-9)

At earliest opportunity you should inform Eshkol President

gratified at GOI agreement schedule Dimona visit.

USG naturally unhappy at Israeli postponement to January 30, but can accept this date so long as it thoroughly understood that inspection can be effectively comprehensive to meet our needs. Since Dimona now operating over 12 months inspection requirements more complex than last time. At minimum must include following:

1. Visiting ~~XXX~~ team will require whatever time necessary (minimum estimate two days) complete observations at site with full access to reactor and all other facilities in order verify nature all such facilities, their production capacity and their present utilization.

2. Team should have opportunity review operating records reactor and any facilities either at site or elsewhere in which irradiated or unirradiated reactor fuel is stored, fabricated or processed, perform physical inventory and make independent

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Authority NEW 64112
By DM/elt, NARA, Date 8/3/2008

AE 11-2 JSR

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Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - John D. Jernegan

Clearance: NE - Mr. Davies SCI - Mr. Thomas INR - Mr. Brown
AEC - Mr. Kratzer AEC - Mr. Reichard CIA - Mr. Devlin CIA Miss Cooney
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measurements as may be necessary to verify production of reactor since previous visit. This more detailed inspection necessary to account for production.

3. Team also should have opportunity verify location and use any plutonium or other fissionable material produced in reactor.

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Our inability fathom Eshkol's arguments for delay naturally heightens our security fears. Eshkol's remark that "we cannot build nuclear weapon in two months" not reassuring in light estimate US experts that if Israel decided to produce weapon following January 1964 inspection, it could produce enough plutonium for one or two nuclear devices by the end of 1965.

USG of course would not presume to suggest to Eshkol best timing of inspection politically. We hope however he will not invoke domestic political problems as pretext for further delays. Given other indications suggesting that Israel may be engaged in development weapon, further efforts delay inspection would bring into question Israel's good faith. END FYI.

GP-3

END

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Origin	ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY	
Info:	<p>EXDIS</p> <p>Embtel 660</p> <p>At earliest opportunity you should inform Eshkol President gratified at GOI agreement schedule Dimona visit, week-end January 30. Since Dimona now operating over 12 months inspection requirements more complex than last time. At minimum must include following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Visiting team will require whatever time necessary (minimum estimate two days) complete observations at site with full access to reactor and all other facilities in order verify nature all such facilities, their production capacity and their present utilization. 2. Team should have opportunity review operating records reactor and any facilities either at site or elsewhere in which irradiated or unirradiated reactor fuel is stored, fabricated or processed, perform physical inventory and make independent measurements as may be necessary to verify production of reactor since previous visit. This more detailed inspection necessary to account for production. 3. Team also should have opportunity verify location and use any plutonium or other fissionable material produced in reactor. <p>4....</p>	

Drafted by: <i>[Signature]</i>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - John D. Jernegan <i>[Signature]</i>
NEA:NE:HERussell:rvc:12/11/54 Clearances: NE - Mr. Davies <i>[Signature]</i> SCI - Mr. Thomas <i>[Signature]</i> INR - Mr. Brown <i>[Signature]</i> AEC - Mr. Kratzer <i>[Signature]</i> AEC - Mr. Reichardt <i>[Signature]</i> CIA - Mr. Devlin <i>[Signature]</i> CIA - Miss Cooney <i>[Signature]</i> S/S - White House -	REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

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