1. IT IS REASONABLY CLEAR, IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO PREVENT AN ALLENDE GOVERNMENT FROM EXERCISING POWER, THAT (A) THE POLITICAL/CONSTITUTIONAL ROUTE IN ANY FORM IS A NON-STARTER AND (B) THE ONLY PROSPECT WITH ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS WHATSOEVER IS A MILITARY GOLPE EITHER BEFORE OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER ALLENDE'S ASSUMPTION OF POWER. THIS CABLE IS ADDRESSED TO THE OPERATIONAL TASK OF ESTABLISHING THOSE DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE CHILEAN MILITARY WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO EVALUATE POSSIBILITIES AND, AT LEAST EQUALLY IMPORTANT, COULD BE USED TO STIMULATE A GOLPE IF AND WHEN A DECISION WERE MADE TO DO SO.
AT THIS JUNCTURE, THIS UNDERTAKING IS TO BE TREATED STRICTLY AS
A MATTER AND, AS SUCH, IS NOT REPEAT NOT TO BE DISCUSSED
WITH OR ANY OTHER OUTSIDE
THE STATION. IT HAS NOT BEEN COORDINATED WITH AND MAY
WELL NOT BE EVEN IN ULTIMATE DECISION STAGE.

2. WHAT IT IS DESIRED FOR STATION TO DO IS TO ESTABLISH AS
MANY DIRECT CONTACTS WITH INFLUENTIAL MILITARY FIGURES IN
NEAR FUTURE AS IT POSSIBLY CAN. WE RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEMS
INHERENT IN DOING THIS SECURELY IN FACE OF PRESENT LIMITED
ENTREE TO MILITARY FIGURES OF STATURE AND IN DOING THIS
SURREPTITIOUSLY (IN EFFECT) WITHOUT BLESSING AND COGNIZANCE
OF IF USEFUL, HQS IS PREPARED TO BRING IN
UNDER ANY GUISE OR ARRANGEMENT YOU DEEM BEST (AND WITHOUT

(Continued...)
KNOWLEDGE OF SUITABLE PERSONNEL TO MAKE SUCH CONTACTS.

3. WE WILL NOT BOTHER YOU WITH ALL THE LATERAL TRAFFIC ON THIS HQS PHASE OF THE ACTIVITY EXCEPT TO INDICATE THAT ALL TRAFFIC WILL BE IN AND, AS RESULTS THEREOF ARE WINNOWED, YOU WILL BE PROVIDED WITH LEADS AND POSSIBILITIES IMMEDIATELY. IN THIS CONNECTION, HQS WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER HAVING ANY INDIVIDUAL WITH A USEFUL AND SIGNIFICANT PAST CONTACT TO TDY TO SANTIAGO...

(Continued.....)
4. HQS is quite aware of the delicacies, risks, and other problems associated with this program. Despite these factors, we -- and this includes [-] -- place the highest priority on it as is obvious from the foregoing. With respect to [REF] program, for the record we are to proceed with our fair share of the burden in those deliberations and activities as though nothing else is on the drawing board.

5. Finally, all of us certainly recognize what a burden you have carried over the past months and what fine job you have done under, certainly, less than ideal conditions. This, we know, is asking undoubtedly the most difficult series of maneuvers yet in the final stages of this operation. If there

(Continued...)
IS ANYTHING WE CAN DO TO SUPPORT OR ASSIST YOUR ENDEAVORS, WE WILL IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO DO SO. PLEASE GIVE US ANY THOUGHTS YOU MAY HAVE IN THAT RESPECT.

6. WILL ARRIVE 11 SEPT ON TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU. WILL BE TRAVELLING ON AND HAS REQUESTED RETUR RESERVATIONS PLEASE CABLE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS FOR OUTSIDE DISCUSSIONS.

DO NOT REPEAT NOT DISCUSS THIS VISIT WITH

//END OF MESSAGE//

* Message from Assistant Secretary Meyer and requesting a "cold-blooded assessment" of the realism and feasibility of any action by the military.

William V. Broe
Chief, WH Division

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SE/ET

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