SUBJ: TFU01: PRIMAKOV VISIT

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE CLEAR SENSE IN BAGHDAD FROM CHATS WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE IRAQIS, DIPLOMATS, AND INFORMED JOURNALISTS, AS WELL AS A REVIEW OF IRAQI TELEVISION AND PRINTED PRESS COVERAGE, LEAD US TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRIMAKOV VISIT WAS A SEVERE DISAPPOINTMENT TO THE GOI. MOST LOCAL OBSERVERS BELIEVE GOI LEADERS HAD HIGH HOPES THAT PRIMAKOV WOULD ENCOURAGE PURSUIT OF SOME COMPROMISE WHICH FELL SHORT OF FULL IMPLEMENTATION.

3. THE PHOTOS AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF SADDAM AND PRIMAKOV WERE INDICATIVE OF THE HIGH
HOPES THE GOI PLACED IN ITS ERSTWHILE SOVIET FRIENDS. SADDAM, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS ENTIRE INNER CIRCLE, INCLUDING IZZAT IBRAHIM, TAHAR RAMADHAN, TARIQ AZIZ, SA'DUN HAMMADI, AND LATIF JASIM, WAS TRANSPARENTLY UNNATURAL IN HIS FORCED GARISH SMILE AND BONHOMIE. FROM THE TELEVISION COVERAGE, ONE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT IRAQ AND THE USSR WERE ABOUT TO SIGN A FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION TREATY.

4. HOWEVER, PRESS REPORTS INDICATE ONLY THAT PRIMAKOV CONVEYED A VERBAL MESSAGE FROM GORBACHEV ON "BILATERAL RELATIONS, THE SITUATION IN THE REGION, AND THE OUTCOME OF PRIMAKOV'S LATEST TOUR OF SOME CAPITALS." IN A BRIEF PHONE CONVERSATION WITH CHARGE IMMEDIATELY AFTER PRIMAKOV'S DEPARTURE, THE SOVIET DCM DESCRIBED THE TALKS AS "FRANK."

5. COMMENT AND SUGGESTIONS FOR "NEXT STEPS"

ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT YET HAD A CHANCE TO TALK TO OUR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS IN DEPTH, ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT IF THE IRAQIS HAD EXPECTED A SPLIT IN THE RANKS, THEY DID NOT GET IT.

6. IT APPEARS TO US THAT A GOOD FOLLOW-UP TO THIS VISIT WOULD BE THE SWIFT PASSAGE OF THE UNSC RESOLUTION CURRENTLY ON THE TABLE IN NEW YORK. THIS WOULD BACK SADDAM FURTHER INTO A CORNER AND DEMONSTRATE FORCEFULLY THAT HIS EFFORTS TO PRY THE SOVIETS AND THE FRENCH AWAY FROM THE CONSENSUS HAVE BEEN AN ABJECT FAILURE. ONE WAY TO DRIVE THE POINT HOME IN A VERY VISIBLE MANNER WOULD BE TO HAVE THE PERM FIVE AMBASSADORS IN BAGHDAD MAKE A JOINT DEMARCHE TO FM AZIZ RE THE RESOLUTIONS CONTENTS. ALTERNATIVELY, WE SHOULD AT LEAST FOLLOW UP THE UNSC RESOLUTION WITH PRESENTATION OF OUR "WAR CRIMES NOTE," PERHAPS IN COORDINATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS, WHICH MIGHT BE AMENABLE TO PRESENTING SIMILAR NOTES.
WE BELIEVE THAT THE RECENT EFFORTS OF THE IRAQIS TO LOBBY AGAINST THE CONTENTS OF THIS RESOLUTION SUGGEST THEIR VERY REAL CONCERN OVER SOME OF THE ISSUES ADDRESSED THEREIN, SPECIFICALLY REPARATIONS AND WAR CRIMES. AS ADDRESSEES WILL RECALL, THE ISSUE OF REPARATIONS FOR IRAN, IS STILL A STICKING POINT IN THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC 598. THE IRAQIS CAN ILL AFFORD ANOTHER MASSIVE CLAIM LEVIED AGAINST THEM.

IN THE CASE OF WAR CRIMES, IT IS NOT

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JUST THE LEADERSHIP THAT IS AFFECTED BY THE
PROSPECT OF BEING PUT IN THE DOCK, BUT MORE
IMPORTANTLY, THE OFFICERS AND OTHERS OF THE
OCCUPATION FORCE IN KUWAIT. AS REPORTED SEPTEL,
IT WAS PROBABLY GRUMBLING IN THE ARMY THAT LED
TO FIRST THE REVISION UPWARD OF THE WEEKLY
PETROL RATION FOR 8-CYLINDER CARS, AND SECOND,
THE ABANDONMENT OF THE PROGRAM. THIS DISCONTENT
CAN ONLY BE AGGRAVATED BY THE PROSPECT OF
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR ACTIVITIES IN A
CAUSE THAT IS NOT UNIVERSALLY POPULAR.
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9. IN SUM, IT APPEARS TO US THAT PRIMAKOV'S
VISIT MAY WELL BE A CATALYST TO PERMIT US TO
SEIZE THE INITIATIVE AGAIN AND FURTHER ISOLATE
SADDAM. SEVERAL IRAQIS TELL US THAT SADDAM IS
MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT THAT MUBARAK'S
ATTACKS ARE HAVING. IF THIS IS ACCURATE,
AND OUR SENSE IS THAT IT IS, GIVEN THE
VEHEMENCE OF IRAQI REJOINDERS, THEN THE
EGYPTIANS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE AND
EVEN INTENSIFY THEIR CAMPAIGN.

WILSON

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