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OA/ID Number: 91128
Folder ID Number: 91128-005

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [5]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	7

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Special Message Routing

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRT: SCOWCROFT SECTO
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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 090945Z NOV 90

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN USSR

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5118
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 24037

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FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: MY DAY IN MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 8, 1990

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I HAVE HAD LONG AND RATHER EXTRAORDINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV TODAY. I'LL GIVE YOU THE FULL BLOW-BY-BLOW WHEN I GET BACK. FOR NOW, LET ME PASS ON THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DAY AND OUR DISCUSSIONS. WE TALKED ABOUT THE GULF FOR NEARLY SIX HOURS (FOUR WITH SHEVARDNADZE, TWO WITH GORBACHEV). EACH LISTENED, EXPLAINED THEIR CONCERNS, AND NOTICEABLY MOVED DURING THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS. SHEVARDNADZE, IN PARTICULAR, CAME CLOSE TO OUR POSITION THAT A UNSC RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING FORCE SHOULD BE PASSED THIS MONTH AND BECOME OPERATIVE SIX-EIGHT WEEKS LATER. HE ACTUALLY CALLED GORBACHEV ON THE PHONE AND PUSHED HARD TO HAVE HIM GO ALONG WITH OUR APPROACH. HE WENT OUT TO GORBACHEV'S DACHA TWENTY MINUTES BEFORE ME TO LOBBY HIM FURTHER. GORBACHEV IS CLOSE BUT NOT THERE YET.
2. IN GENERAL, GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED TO BE ACTING

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

98-0099-F13
02/14/1999 JMM

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ON CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS:

A) THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST STAY TOGETHER ON THE GULF.

THEY BOTH SAID IT'S ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF TH POLICY, AND IS REFLECTIVE OF THE FACT THAT OUR MUTUAL WELL-BEING, AND FUTURES ARE LINKED. (SHEVARDNADZE WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT A FAILURE BY US IN THE GULF WOULD DAMAGE PERESTROIKA. OUR SUCCESS WOULD BE A SUCCESS FOR THEM -- AND OUR FAILURE WOULD BE A REAL BLOW TO THEM. GORBACHEV SAID MUCH THE SAME THING.)

B) SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST CLEARLY UNMISTAKEABLY FAIL. THEY

EMPHASIZED THAT HIS AGGRESSION MUST BE REVERSED. ANY HOPE FOR A NEW PEACEFUL ERA DEPENDED ON THIS, AND ON DENYING HIM ANY VICTORY -- NO MATTER HOW SMALL. TO THIS END, WE COULD NOT STAND STILL. WE HAD TO BE ACTIVE NOW IN PURSUING FURTHER STEPS TO REVERSE HIS AGGRESSION. (ACTIVITY THAT DID NOT APPEAR TO MEAN PEACE MISSIONS. SHEVARDNADZE WAS CRITICAL OF THE NAKASONE, BRANDT, AND, YES, PRIMAKOV MISSIONS. FOR HIS PART, GORBACHEV NOTED OUR DISAPPOINTMENT WITH PRIMAKOV'S MISSION AND SAID HE, TOO, HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED.)

C. GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE FELT SANCTIONS MIGHT YET WORK AND

IT'S PREMATURE TO PLAY OUR LAST DIPLOMATIC CARD -- A CARD THAT

LEAVES US NO CHOICE BUT TO USE FORCE IF IT FAILS. WHILE PREPARED TO BE ACTIVE IN PURSUING MORE STEPS IN THE UNSC TO BUILD THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM, GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE (CERTAINLY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DAY) WERE AMBIVALENT ABOUT A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT AUTHORIZES FORCE OR "ALL MEANS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT UNSC RESOLUTION 660." IT'S NOT THAT THEY REJECT THE IDEA OF SETTING A DEADLINE OR EVEN POSING AN ULTIMATUM. IT'S THAT THEY STILL FEEL IT'S TOO EARLY TO DO THAT.

3. I EXPLAINED LONG AND HARD WHY TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD NOT BE ON OUR SIDE. INDEED, I OUTLINED WHY IF WE COULDN'T PASS SUCH A RESOLUTION THIS MONTH WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO FOR

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SEVERAL MONTHS -- SOMETHING THAT COULD GET US INTO THE RAINY SEASON, RAMADAN, THE HAJJ, AND ALL THE WAY TO NEXT SUMMER BEFORE THE USE OF FORCE COULD BE CONTEMPLATED.

4. SHEVARDNADZE FOUND THIS ARGUMENT COMPELLING, BECAUSE HE SAW HOW THIS MIGHT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO SUSTAIN OUR FORCES IN THE AREA. I EMPHASIZED THIS POINT AND ALSO SAID IF WE COULDN'T SUSTAIN OUR FORCES OR HAD TO REDUCE THEM IT WOULD CONVINCE SADDAM THAT HE COULD PREVAIL.

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5. AS A RESULT, SHEVARDNADZE BEGAN TO CHANGE HIS POSITION, A POSITION THAT WAS PREMISED ON FURTHER UNSC RESOLUTIONS THAT WOULD SHOW INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY, HEIGHTEN PRESSURE ON SADDAM AND BASICALLY EXHAUST ALL DIPLOMATIC, NON-MILITARY OPTIONS OVER TIME.

6. TO A LESSER EXTENT GORBACHEV BOUGHT THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT BUT I FOUND HIM TORN MORE ABOUT HAVING TO USE FORCE AT ALL. (WHILE I THINK SHEVARDNADZE IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT USING FORCE, HE IS MORE INCLINED TO THINK IT WILL HAVE TO BE USED EVENTUALLY.) FOR HIS PART, GORBACHEV'S IMAGE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER IS SUCH THAT HE HAS A HARD TIME RECONCILING THE FACT THAT WE MIGHT NEED TO USE FORCE IN THIS INITIAL TEST. HE REFLECTED THAT SENTIMENT IN HIS LETTER TO YOU AND HE SAID AS MUCH TO ME TODAY, OBSERVING THAT WE WANT THIS ERA TO BE DIFFERENT FROM THE COLD WAR AND BASED ON DIFFERENT KINDS OF NORMS.

7. I ANSWERED HIM IN TWO WAYS: FIRST, IT'S HARD TO ESTABLISH RECOGNIZED NORMS OF CIVILIZED AND PEACEFUL BEHAVIOR IF A BRUTAL AGGRESSOR WHO QUITE SIMPLY REJECTS THESE NORMS IS ALLOWED TO SUCCEED BECAUSE THE WILL TO USE FORCE IS ABSENT. SECOND, THAT THE ONLY WAY TO PRODUCE A PEACEFUL OUTCOME -- OUR CLEAR PREFERENCE -- WAS TO CONVINCE SADDAM THAT IF HE DIDN'T WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY HE WOULD BE FORCED OUT MILITARILY. ONLY WHEN SADDAM

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BECOMES CONVINCED THAT A MASSIVE MILITARY RESPONSE WAS IMMINENT WOULD A PEACEFUL OUTCOME BECOME POSSIBLE.

8. THAT WAS THE PARADOX. THAT WAS THE REASON THAT OUR APPROACH WOULD GIVE US A CHANCE TO RESOLVE THIS PEACEFULLY -- I.E., SADDAM WOULD REALIZE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD SUPPORT THE USE OF FORCE AND HE WOULD HAVE ONLY A LIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME TO AVERT A CERTAIN DEFEAT. NOTHING ELSE WOULD SIGNAL HIM SO STARKLY AND CREDIBLY. AND YET A RESOLUTION PASSED NOW, BUT OPERATIVE ONLY AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR, WOULD ALSO SHOW THAT WE HAD GIVEN HIM EVERY CHANCE TO WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY. AND, INDEED, THAT WE HAD GIVEN SANCTIONS A FAIR AMOUNT OF TIME (FIVE AND ONE-HALF TO SIX MONTHS) TO WORK.

9. SHEVARDNADZE SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE SAW THE LOGIC OF MY ARGUMENTS, AND I FELT GORBACHEV, TOO, WAS BEING PERSUADED BY THEM. BUT HE DIDN'T WANT TO BE PUSHED INTO MAKING A DECISION TODAY, AND CLEARLY A PART OF HIM WOULD STILL LIKE TO DELAY GOING DOWN SUCH A DEFINITIVE PATH. I THINK THAT'S WHY HE SUGGESTED A KIND OF INTERIM STEP: PASS TWO RESOLUTIONS. THE FIRST WOULD WARN SADDAM THAT IF HE DIDN'T WITHDRAW BY A CERTAIN DATE, WE'D PASS A SECOND ONE THAT WOULD EFFECTIVELY AUTHORIZE THE USE OF FORCE.

10. WHILE NOTING THAT HE WAS CLEARLY TRYING TO BE RESPONSIVE, I SAID I SAW SEVERAL PROBLEMS:

-- OUR ORIGINAL UNSC RESOLUTION 660 CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. NOW WE'D BE PASSING A RESOLUTION THT GAVE HIM SOME TIME TO DO SO. THIS WOULD ACTUALLY LOOK LIKE A RETREAT FROM OUR EARLIER POSITION.

-- HAVING PASSED THE FIRST RESOLUTION, WHAT IF WE COULDN'T GET THE SECOND RESOLUTION. PROCEDURALLY, WE PROBABLY COULDN'T GET BOTH RESOLUTIONS THROUGH THIS MONTH AND WE MIGHT HAVE REAL PROBLEMS ONCE YEMEN WAS IN THE CHAIR. SUBSTANTIVELY, SADDAM MIGHT PULL BACK PARTIALLY OR FOR THE FIRST TIME OFFER A REALISTIC, IF UNACCEPTABLE, PARTIAL DEAL AS A WAY OF UNDERCUTTING CONSENSUS BEHIND THE USE OF FORCE.

-- IF WE NEVER GOT TO THE SECOND RESOLUTION, WE WOULD HAVE SHOT

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OUR WAD AND BE FINISHED TRYING TO WORK THROUGH THE UNSC. THAT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DESTROYING THE UNSC AS A CREDIBLE MECHANISM FOR PRE-EMPTING, MANAGING, OR SETTLING CONFLICTS IN THIS NEW ERA.

11. GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE WAS TO SAY, WELL IT WAS JUST A THOUGHT, AND HE NEEDED TO THINK MORE ABOUT THIS. SHEVARDNADZE LATER TRIED TO SAY THAT WE MIGHT FORMALLY LINK THE TWO RESOLUTIONS, MAKING THE SECOND ONE "PREDETERMINED" IF SADDAM HAD NOT PULLED OUT BY A CERTAIN DATE. INTERESTINGLY, TARASENKO ARGUED AGAINST HIS BOSS SAYING YOU COULDN'T GUARANTEE SUCH A LINKAGE, YOU'D LOOK FECKLESS IF YOU COULDN'T DELIVER THE SECOND RESOLUTION, AND THIS WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD ENSURE A MOVE AWAY FROM THE UNSC AND TO THE USE OF ARTICLE 51 TO LIBERATE KUWAIT.

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12. THE UPSHOT: THEY WANT TO LOOK AT OPTIONS AND GET BACK TO US BEFORE PARIS. I EMPHASIZED WE DIDN'T WANT TO PUSH THEM BUT WE NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO ACT WHILE WE HAD THE CHAIR AT THE UNSC AND IF NO DECISION WERE MADE UNTIL PARIS WE MIGHT NOT HAVE TIME AFTERWARDS.

13. MY OWN SENSE IS THAT IN THE END THEY WILL GO ALONG WITH US. GORBACHEV MADE A REAL POINT OF SAYING THEY'D STICK WITH US. AND HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTING UNDER UNSC AUTHORIZATION, NOT ARTICLE 51, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE IT WOULD ENSURE OUR CONTINUED UNITY. AS I SAID SEVERAL TIMES, WE SAW THE EXTRAORDINARY VALUE OF THEM PARTICIPATING WITH US IF FORCE WAS NEEDED, BUT UNDERSTOOD THEIR PROBLEMS (INTERNAL PREOCCUPATION, AFGHAN SYNDROME) WITH NOT DOING SO. IT WOULD BE FAR HARDER FOR US TO UNDERSTAND THEIR BLOCKING US FROM THE CLEARLY PREFERRED OPTION OF A UNSC RESOLUTION. THEY GOT THE POINT, AND I BELIEVE THEIR STAKE IN GOOD RELATIONS AND DESIRE FOR PARTNERSHIP WITH US WILL LEAD THEM IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. BUT IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME AND EFFORT TO GET THERE.

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OTHER ISSUES AND IMPRESSIONS

14. GORBACHEV AND THE NATIONAL HOLIDAY. GORBACHEV SEEMED

BUOYED BY THE LACK OF SERIOUS VIOLENCE OR COUNTER-DEMONSTRATIONS YESTERDAY. HE DIDN'T MENTION THE INCIDENT ON RED SQUARE AND SHEVARDNADZE DOWNPLAYED IT. GORBACHEV FELT THAT THE REAL "SILENT MAJORITY" (HIS WORDS) HAD SPOKEN YESTERDAY BY NOT HEEDING THE CALLS FOR COUNTER-DEMONSTRATIONS. I WONDER IF THIS IS WISHFUL THINKING OR AN ACCURATE READING, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE I HAD THE SENSE THAT THE THREAT OF CRACKDOWNS AND VIOLENCE MIGHT HAVE DIMINISHED THE CROWDS.

15. GORBACHEV'S HINTS AT THE NEED TO IMPOSE ORDER. GORBACHEV

SPOKE OF THE NEED TO CREATE TOLERANCE AND THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE KEY TO ACHIEVING A MARKET ECONOMY. HOWEVER, HE ALSO SAID THERE WAS A YEARNING FOR ORDER AND STABILITY AND SAID SOME "TOUGH STEPS MIGHT BE NEEDED. WE COULDN'T SACRIFICE THE REFORM PROCESS FOR THE SAKE OF SOMEONE'S AMBITIONS OR ACCEPT THE DISINTEGRATION OF OUR SOCIETY." HE SAID A FINE LINE HAD TO BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN MOVING FORWARD AND PRESERVING STABILITY. I NOTED THAT WAS A LINE THAT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN. WHILE HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REJECT THE CONSERVATIVE ABILITY TO EXPLOIT THE DESIRE FOR STABILITY, I WAS UNEASY ABOUT THE TONE AND DIRECTION OF THESE COMMENTS. I DON'T KNOW IF THEY PRESAGE SOME KIND OF CRACKDOWN, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO WATCH THE SITUATION CLOSELY.

16. GETTING FOOD FROM THE OUTSIDE FOR THE WINTER. GORBACHEV

NOTED A PARADOX: MOVING TOWARD THE MARKET HAD LED COLLECTIVE FARMERS TO WITHHOLD THEIR PRODUCE FROM CERTAIN AREAS AND CITIES, REQUIRING THE CENTER TO HOLD FOOD RESERVES AS A KIND OF INSURANCE POLICY. HE WOULD BE GOING TO THE GERMANS AND OTHER EUROPEANS FOR EMERGENCY FOOD SUPPLIES ON A CREDIT OR GRANT

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BASIS FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE SAID HE MIGHT BE COMING TO US ONCE HE KNEW HIS NEEDS BETTER. HE'D BE INTERESTED IN SOYBEANS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, AND WE MAY WANT TO LOOK AT WHAT WE COULD DO IF WE DECIDE TO BE RESPONSIVE.

17. ARMS CONTROL. I THINK WE'VE FINALLY CLOSED OUT THE

NETTLESOME CFE ISSUES. BUT EVERY TIME YOU THINK YOU'VE SETTLED EVERYTHING, SOMETHING ELSE CROPS UP. IN ANY CASE, I THINK -- AND HOPE -- WE'VE FINALLY DONE IT. ON START, WE CLOSED OUT THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION ISSUE, AND MAY, WITH SOME EFFORT, BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES IN OUR NEXT MINISTERIAL. THAT WOULD PUT US ON TRACK FOR A JANUARY SUMMIT. IGORBACHEV IS EAGER TO NAIL DOWN THE SUMMIT DATE, BUT JOKED THAT A MID-JANUARY SUMMIT MIGHT BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTING GIVEN WHAT WE MIGHT BE DOING IN THE GULF AT THAT TIME.)

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