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Series: Special Separate USSR Notes Files
Subseries: Gorbachev Files

OA/ID Number: 91128
Folder ID Number: 91128-005

Folder Title:
Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July - December 1990 [5]

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Row: 34
Section: 3
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The National Security Advisor requests this message also be disseminated to the individuals noted below.

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Guidance:
SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRT: SCOWCROFT SECTO
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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN USSR

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACt IMMEDIATE 5118
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SECRET - SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 24037

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FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A III)
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III
SUBJECT: MY DAY IN MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 8, 1990

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I HAVE HAD LONG AND RATHER EXTRAORDINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV TODAY. I'LL GIVE YOU THE FULL BLOW-BY-BLOW WHEN I GET BACK. FOR NOW, LET ME PASS ON THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DAY AND OUR DISCUSSIONS. WE TALKED ABOUT THE GULF FOR NEARLY SIX HOURS (FOUR WITH SHEVARDNADZE, TWO WITH GORBACHEV). EACH LISTENED, EXPLAINED THEIR CONCERNS, AND NOTICEABLY MOVED DURING THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS. SHEVARDNADZE, IN PARTICULAR, CAME CLOSE TO OUR POSITION THAT A UNSC RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING FORCE SHOULD BE PASSED THIS MONTH AND BECOME OPERATIVE SIX-EIGHT WEEKS LATER. HE ACTUALLY CALLED GORBACHEV ON THE PHONE AND PUSHED HARD TO HAVE HIM GO ALONG WITH OUR APPROACH. HE WENT OUT TO GORBACHEV'S DACHA TWENTY MINUTES BEFORE ME TO LOBBY HIM FURTHER. GORBACHEV IS CLOSE BUT NOT THERE YET.

2. IN GENERAL, GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED TO BE ACTING

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
98-0099-F/3
NAV/2/1099 JMM
ON CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS.

A) THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST STAY TOGETHER ON THE GULF.

THEY BOTH SAID IT'S ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THEIR POLICY, AND IS REFLECTIVE OF THE FACT THAT OUR MUTUAL WELL-BEING, AND FUTURES ARE LINKED. (SHEVARDNADZE WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT A FAILURE BY US IN THE GULF WOULD DAMAGE PERESTROIKA. OUR SUCCESS WOULD BE A SUCCESS FOR THEM -- AND OUR FAILURE WOULD BE A REAL BLOW TO THEM. GORBACHEV SAID MUCH THE SAME THING.)

B) SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST CLEARLY UNMISTAKEABLY FAIL. THEY

EMPHASIZED THAT HIS AGGRESSION MUST BE REVERSED. ANY HOPE FOR A NEW PEACEFUL ERA DEPENDED ON THIS, AND ON DENYING HIM ANY VICTORY -- NO MATTER HOW SMALL. TO THIS END, WE COULD NOT STAND STILL. WE HAD TO BE ACTIVE NOW IN PURSUING FURTHER STEPS TO REVERSE HIS AGGRESSION. (ACTIVITY THAT DID NOT APPEAR TO MEAN PEACE MISSIONS. SHEVARDNADZE WAS CRITICAL OF THE NAKASONE, BRANDT, AND, YES, PRIMAKOV MISSIONS. FOR HIS PART, GORBACHEV NOTED OUR DISAPPOINTMENT WITH PRIMAKOV'S MISSION AND SAID HE, TOO, HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED.)

C) GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE FELT SANCTIONS MIGHT YET WORK AND

IT'S PREMATURE TO PLAY OUR LAST DIPLOMATIC CARD -- A CARD THAT

LEAVES US NO CHOICE BUT TO USE FORCE IF IT FAILS. WHILE PREPARED TO BE ACTIVE IN PURSUING MORE STEPS IN THE UNSC TO BUILD THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM, GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE (CERTAINLY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DAY) WERE AMBITIOUS ABOUT A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT AUTHORIZES FORCE OR "ALL MEANS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT UNSC RESOLUTION 660." IT'S NOT THAT THEY REJECT THE IDEA OF SETTING A DEADLINE OR EVEN POSING AN ULTIMATUM. IT'S THAT THEY STILL FEEL IT'S TOO EARLY TO DO THAT.

3. I EXPLAINED LONG AND HARD WHY TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD NOT BE ON OUR SIDE. INDEED, I OUTLINED WHY IF WE COULDN'T PASS SUCH A RESOLUTION THIS MONTH WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO FOR
SEVERAL MONTHS -- SOMETHING THAT COULD GET US INTO THE RAINY
SEASON, RAMADAN, THE HAJJ, AND ALL THE WAY TO NEXT SUMMER
BEFORE THE USE OF FORCE COULD BE CONTEMPLATED.
4. SHEVARDNADZE FOUND THIS ARGUMENT COMPPELLING, BECAUSE HE SAW
HOW THIS MIGHT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO SUSTAIN OUR FORCES
IN THE AREA. I EMPHASIZED THIS POINT AND ALSO SAID IF WE
COULDN'T SUSTAIN OUR FORCES OR HAD TO REDUCE THEM IT WOULD
CONVINCE SADDAM THAT HE COULD PREVAIL.

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5. AS A RESULT, SHEVARDNADZE BEGAN TO CHANGE HIS POSITION, A
POSITION THAT WAS PREMISED ON FURTHER UNSC RESOLUTIONS THAT
WOULD SHOW INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY, HEIGHTEN PRESSURE ON
SADDAM AND BASICALLY EXHAUST ALL DIPLOMATIC, NON-MILITARY
OPTIONS OVER TIME.
6. TO A LESER EXTENT GORBACHEV BOUGHT THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT
BUT I FOUND HIM TORN MORE ABOUT HAVING TO USE FORCE AT ALL.
(WHILE I THINK SHEVARDNADZE IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT USING
FORCE, HE IS MORE INCLINED TO THINK IT WILL HAVE TO BE USED
EVENTUALLY.) FOR HIS PART, GORBACHEV'S IMAGE OF THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER IS SUCH THAT HE HAS A HARD TIME RECONCILING
THE FACT THAT WE MIGHT NEED TO USE FORCE IN THIS INITIAL TEST.
HE REFLECTED THAT SENTIMENT IN HIS LETTER TO YOU AND HE SAID AS
MUCH TO ME TODAY, OBSERVING THAT WE WANT THIS ERA TO BE
DIFFERENT FROM THE COLD WAR AND BASED ON DIFFERENT KINDS OF
NORMS.
7. I ANSWERED HIM IN TWO WAYS: FIRST, IT'S HARD TO ESTABLISH
RECOGNIZED NORMS OF CIVILIZED AND PEACEFUL BEHAVIOR IF A BRUTAL
AGGRESSOR WHO QUITE SIMPLY REJECTS THESE NORMS IS ALLOWED TO
SUCCEED BECAUSE THE WILL TO USE FORCE IS ABSENT. SECOND, THAT
THE ONLY WAY TO PRODUCE A PEACEFUL OUTCOME -- OUR CLEAR
PREFERENCE -- WAS TO CONVINCE SADDAM THAT IF HE DIDN'T WITHDRAW
PEACEFULLY HE WOULD BE FORCED OUT MILITARILY. ONLY WHEN SADDAM
BECOMES CONVINCED THAT A MASSIVE MILITARY RESPONSE WAS IMMINENT
WOULD A PEACEFUL OUTCOME BECOME POSSIBLE.
8. THAT WAS THE PARADOX. THAT WAS THE REASON THAT OUR
APPROACH WOULD GIVE US A CHANCE TO RESOLVE THIS PEACEFULLY --
I.E., SADDAM WOULD REALIZE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
WOULD SUPPORT THE USE OF FORCE AND HE WOULD HAVE ONLY A LIMITED
AMOUNT OF TIME TO AVERT A CERTAIN DEFEAT. NOTHING ELSE WOULD
SIGNAL HIM SO STARKLY AND CREDIBLY. AND YET A RESOLUTION
PASSED NOW, BUT OPERATIVE ONLY AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR,
WOULD ALSO SHOW THAT WE HAD GIVEN HIM EVERY CHANCE TO WITHDRAW
PEACEFULLY. AND, INDEED, THAT WE HAD GIVEN SANCTIONS A FAIR
AMOUNT OF TIME (FIVE AND ONE-HALF TO SIX MONTHS) TO WORK.

9. SHEVARDNADZE SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE SAW THE LOGIC OF MY
ARGUMENTS, AND I FELT GORBACHEV, TOO, WAS BEING PERSUADED BY
THEM. BUT HE DIDN'T WANT TO BE PUSHED INTO MAKING A DECISION
TODAY, AND CLEARLY A PART OF HIM WOULD STILL LIKE TO DELAY
GOING DOWN SUCH A DEFINITIVE PATH. I THINK THAT'S WHY HE
SUGGESTED A KIND OF INTERIM STEP: PASS TWO RESOLUTIONS. THE
FIRST WOULD WARN SADDAM THAT IF HE DIDN'T WITHDRAW BY A CERTAIN
DATE, WE'D PASS A SECOND ONE THAT WOULD EFFECTIVELY AUTHORIZE
THE USE OF FORCE.

10. WHILE NOTING THAT HE WAS CLEARLY TRYING TO BE RESPONSIVE,
I SAID I SAW SEVERAL PROBLEMS:
-- OUR ORIGINAL UNSC RESOLUTION 660 CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE
WITHDRAWAL. NOW WE'D BE PASSING A RESOLUTION THAT GAVE HIM
SOME TIME TO DO SO. THIS WOULD ACTUALLY LOOK LIKE A RETREAT
FROM OUR EARLIER POSITION.
-- HAVING PASSED THE FIRST RESOLUTION, WHAT IF WE COULDN'T GET
THE SECOND RESOLUTION. PROCEDURALLY, WE PROBABLY COULDN'T GET
BOTH RESOLUTIONS THROUGH THIS MONTH AND WE MIGHT HAVE REAL
PROBLEMS ONCE YEMEN WAS IN THE CHAIR. SUBSTANTIALLY, SADDAM
MIGHT PULL BACK PARTIALLY OR FOR THE FIRST TIME OFFER A
REALISTIC, IF UNACCEPTABLE, PARTIAL DEAL AS A WAY OF
UNDERCUTTING CONSSENSUS BEHIND THE USE OF FORCE.
-- IF WE NEVER GOT TO THE SECOND RESOLUTION, WE WOULD HAVE SHOT
OUR WAD AND BE FINISHED TRYING TO WORK THROUGH THE UNSC. THAT
WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DESTROYING THE UNSC AS A CREDIBLE
MECHANISM FOR PRE-EMPTING, MANAGING, OR SETTLING CONFLICTS IN
THIS NEW ERA.

11. GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE WAS TO SAY, WELL IT WAS JUST A
THOUGHT, AND HE NEEDED TO THINK MORE ABOUT THIS. SHEVARDNADZE
LATER TRIED TO SAY THAT WE MIGHT FORMALLY LINK THE TWO
RESOLUTIONS, MAKING THE SECOND ONE "PREDETERMINED" IF SADDAM
HAD NOT PULLED OUT BY A CERTAIN DATE. INTERESTINGLY, TARASENKO
ARGUED AGAINST HIS BOSS SAYING YOU COULDN'T GUARANTEE SUCH A
LINKAGE, YOU'D LOOK FECKLESS IF YOU COULDN'T DELIVER THE SECOND
RESOLUTION, AND THIS WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD ENSURE A MOVE AWAY
FROM THE UNSC AND TO THE USE OF ARTICLE 51 TO LIBERATE KUWAIT.

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12. THE UPSHOT: THEY WANT TO LOOK AT OPTIONS AND GET BACK TO
US BEFORE PARIS. I EMPHASIZED WE DIDN'T WANT TO PUSH THEM BUT
WE NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO ACT WHILE WE HAD THE CHAIR AT THE UNSC
AND IF NO DECISION WERE MADE UNTIL PARIS WE MIGHT NOT HAVE TIME
AFTERWARDS.

13. MY OWN SENSE IS THAT IN THE END THEY WILL GO ALONG WITH
US. GORBACHEV MADE A REAL POINT OF SAYING THEY'D STICK WITH
US. AND HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTING UNDER UNSC
AUTHORIZED, NOT ARTICLE 51, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE IT WOULD
ENSURE OUR CONTINUED UNITY. AS I SAID SEVERAL TIMES, WE SAW
THE EXTRAORDINARY VALUE OF THEM PARTICIPATING WITH US IF FORCE
WAS NEEDED, BUT UNDERSTOOD THEIR PROBLEMS (INTERNAL
PREOCCUPATION, AFGHAN SYNDROME) WITH NOT DOING SO. IT WOULD BE
FAR HARDER FOR US TO UNDERSTAND THEIR BLOCKING US FROM THE
CLEARLY PREFERRED OPTION OF A UNSC RESOLUTION. THEY GOT THE
POINT, AND I BELIEVE THEIR STAKE IN GOOD RELATIONS AND DESIRE
FOR PARTNERSHIP WITH US WILL LEAD THEM IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.
BUT IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME AND EFFORT TO GET THERE.
OTHER ISSUES AND IMPRESSIONS

14. GORBACHEV AND THE NATIONAL HOLIDAY. GORBACHEV SEEMED

BUOYED BY THE LACK OF SERIOUS VIOLENCE OR
COUNTER-DemonSTRATIONS YESTERDAY. HE DIDN'T MENTION THE
INCIDENT ON RED SQUARE AND SHEYARDNADZE DOWNPLAYED IT.
GORBACHEV FELT THAT THE REAL "SILENT MAJORITY" (HIS WORDS) HAD
spoken YESTERDAY BY NOT HEEDING THE CALLS FOR
COUNTER-DemonSTRATIONS. I WONDER IF THIS IS WISHFUL THINKING
OR AN ACCURATE READING, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE I HAD THE SENSE
THAT THE THREAT OF CRACKDOWNS AND VIOLENCE MIGHT HAVE
DIMINISHED THE CROWDS.

15. GORBACHEV'S HINTS AT THE NEED TO IMPOSE ORDER. GORBACHEV

SPOKE OF THE NEED TO CREATE TOLERANCE AND THAT THIS MIGHT BE
THE KEY TO ACHIEVING A MARKET ECONOMY. HOWEVER, HE ALSO SAID
THERE WAS A YEARNING FOR ORDER AND STABILITY AND SAID SOME
"TOUGH STEPS MIGHT BE NEEDED." WE COULDN'T SACRIFICE THE REFORM
PROCESS FOR THE Sake OF SOMEONE'S AMBITIONS OR ACCEPT THE
DISINTEGRATION OF OUR SOCIETY." HE SAID A FINE LINE HAD TO BE
MAINTAINED BETWEEN MOVING FORWARD AND PRESERVING STABILITY. I
NOTED THAT WAS A LINE THAT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN.
WHILE HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REJECT THE CONSERVATIVE
ABILITY TO EXPLOIT THE DESIRE FOR STABILITY, I WAS UNEASY ABOUT
THE TONE AND DIRECTION OF THESE COMMENTS. I DON'T KNOW IF THEY
PRESAGE SOME KIND OF CRACKDOWN, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO WATCH THE
SITUATION CLOSELY.

16. GETTING FOOD FROM THE OUTSIDE FOR THE WINTER. GORBACHEV

NOTED A PARADOX: MOVING TOWARD THE MARKET HAD LED COLLECTIVE
FARMERS TO WITHHOLD THEIR PRODUCE FROM CERTAIN AREAS AND
CITIES, REQUIRING THE CENTER TO HOLD FOOD RESERVES AS A KIND OF
INSURANCE POLICY. HE WOULD BE GOING TO THE GERMANS AND OTHER
EUROPEANS FOR EMERGENCY FOOD SUPPLIES ON A CREDIT OR GRANT
BASIS FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE SAID HE MIGHT BE COMING TO US ONCE
HE KNEW HIS NEEDS BETTER. HE'D BE INTERESTED IN SOYBEANS,
AMONG OTHER THINGS, AND WE MAY WANT TO LOOK AT WHAT WE COULD DO
IF WE DECIDE TO BE RESPONSIVE.
17. ARMS CONTROL. I THINK WE'VE FINALLY CLOSED OUT THE

UNETLESome CFE ISSUES. BUT EVERY TIME YOU THINK YOU'VE SETTLED
EVERYTHING, SOMETHING ELSE CROPS UP. IN ANY CASE, I THINK --
AND HOPE -- WE'VE FINALLY DONE IT. ON START, WE CLOSED OUT THE
NON-CIRCUMVENTION ISSUE, AND MAY, WITH SOME EFFORT, BE ABLE TO
RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES IN OUR NEXT MINISTERIAL. THAT
WOULD PUT US ON TRACK FOR A JANUARY SUMMIT. IGORBACHEV IS
EAGER TO NAIL DOWN THE SUMMIT DATE, BUT JOKED THAT A
MID-JANUARY SUMMIT MIGHT BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTING GIVEN WHAT
WE MIGHT BE DOING IN THE GULF AT THAT TIME.)

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