Note from Fred Greene

By way of illustrating the categories in the memorandum, I have taken the examples sent me last week by Dean Howells and regrouped them as follows:

1. Thematic summaries — not applicable.

2. Evaluations of INR performance — nature and extent of the VC threat; Diem's political weakness; Diem's motives and sensitivities blocking or restricting US efforts at reform and efficiency; different Diem-US assessments of the threat.

Measuring of indices regarding development or pacification, and estimating their meaning; handling of statistics.

Prospects of a coup and, more generally, the thrust of the main course of SVN politics; appraisals of particular security situations; Minh vs. Khanh.

Estimates on China; NVN reactions to US escalations.

3. INR-USIB contrasts; limitations on study of Vietnam in USIB — restricting it to stability of regime or Saigon area; limitations of various agencies, e.g., on statistics.

Giving intelligence an estimative job based on wrong assumptions, e.g., NVN not respond to US raised commitment; premises of policy rationale not placed under intelligence scrutiny, e.g., bombing decisions.

CAS need to identify alternate leadership; need to control and coordinate intelligence operations.

No call for examination of significance of loss in Vietnam until 1968; pressure to get results including intelligence evidence in given time frame.

4. Concluding observations — adequately based and proper scope for NIE's — addressing proper issues in timely manner; evaluation of methodology on China and on North Vietnamese intentions; need for periodic review of fundamental positions and existing assumptions.

Policy implications would include three in the Diem period.
(1) Need for flexibility in support of Diem and in quest for alternative individuals and policies so as to avoid extreme choices such as withdrawal or escalation; (2) need to resolve basic US-Diem differences if AID program was to have any effect; (3) problem of Diem adjusting to our pressure under duress only to reverse course when situation eases.
(Note from Fred Greene)

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The foregoing includes almost all, but not all of the examples given by Dean Howells. They cover Chapters 1-4. I will go over the full text and key the text to the points numberd in my memorandum. This therefore is simply an example of how we might pull the material together according to the outline of the memorandum. I realize that the concluding section still has to be worked out, especially in folding the policy implications into the more general conclusions in a manner that make them useful for intelligence without intruding into the policy field.