

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

611-427/11-26-62

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FSO	
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

A- 484

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State **DEC 4 PM 4 15**

Downgraded to: SECRET
110 11992

CONFIDENTIAL
Serial No. 29 Series B
OOO 16-Pages
mm 37-copies

NOISE
REPRODUCTION
PROHIBITED

FROM : Amembassy OTTAWA

DATE: Nov. 26, 1962

SUBJECT: Preliminary Negotiations with the Canadian Government on Possible Nuclear Support for Canadian Forces

REF : Embtels 695, 697, 700 and 709
S/S

For the Department's records there are attached detailed memoranda of conversations which took place in Ottawa on November 21 and 23, 1962, with representatives of the Canadian Government regarding possible agreements for the nuclear support of Canadian forces in Europe and Canada. Summary reports and comments on them are contained in the telegrams under reference.

Match
Back Slip
Destroyed
RSIR-8-31-65
wh

Ivan B. White
Ivan B. White
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosures:

1. Memo of Conversation, November 21, 1962
2. Draft Agreement
3. Memo of Conversation, November 21, 1962
4. Draft Agreement
5. Memo of Conversation, November 23, 1962

Declassified Authority: 27447
By: Laurie Madsen Date: 04-04-2013

FORM 4-62 DS-323

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

In Out

Drafted by: POL: RZSmith: pap 11/23/62

Contents and Classification Approved by: IBWhite

Clearances:

SANITIZED COPY
SENSITIVE
INFORMATION DELETED

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~Page 1 of 3
Enclosure 1
OTTAWA A-

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Ottawa, November 21, 1962

SUBJECT: Preliminary Negotiations with Canada on Nuclear Weapons for Canadian Forces in Europe

PARTICIPANTS: Canada: Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller, Chairman
Chiefs of Staff Committee
Ross Campbell, Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs

U. S. : Ivan B. White, Charge d'Affaires ad interim
William E. Lang, Department of Defense
Rufus Z. Smith, Counselor for Political Affairs

Mr. White opened the discussions by stating we were prepared to table a draft stockpile agreement (copy attached) regarding atomic weapons in Europe for Canadian Forces. He explained that it was typical of agreements which the United States has with other NATO allies.

Prior to examining the document in detail, A/C/M Miller asked whether the Canadian understanding was correct that the document being presented was a "general overall permissive agreement" with more detailed arrangements to be made at other levels. He also asked whether it was intended to cover both Europe and North America or whether, instead, we had a second agreement in mind with regard to this continent.

Mr. Lang confirmed the Canadian understanding that we had in mind a general agreement at the government level which would set forth the principles governing the nuclear support for Canadian forces, and that supplementary, detailed arrangements would be worked out at the military level within the framework of the government level agreement. He said that while we had a draft which deals only with Canadian forces in Europe and we would submit, a bit later in the discussion, a second draft to cover their air defense units in North America, it was nevertheless possible that the two documents could conceivably be incorporated into one agreement.

A/C/M Miller noted that as many as four principal commands might ultimately be involved -- SACEUR, SACLANT, NORAD, and the West Coast maritime command if we should decide to go into that area.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~Page 2 of 3
Enclosure 1
OTTAWA A-

Mr. Campbell referred to the very limited terms of reference for these discussions which had been laid down by the Canadian Cabinet. Mr. White acknowledged that he was aware of the terms of reference but noted he had been given them only orally and was not certain he had complete knowledge of their contents.

A/C/M Miller commented that he and Mr. Campbell had no more precise instructions in this regard. One of them had seen the Cabinet directive in writing, while the other had been given oral instructions; neither had a copy of the written position of the Cabinet.

At this point copies of the first US draft were distributed and Mr. Lang briefly reviewed it.

With regard to paragraph (1) of the draft, Mr. Campbell asked to what extent negotiations with other governments would be necessary. In response Mr. Lang explained that there was an agreement with the FRG covering the storage of nuclear weapons in support of NATO forces there and that, as a procedural matter, we would merely need to notify the German Government of the arrangement with Canada.

Mr. White commented that paragraph (2) is not so formidable as it might appear at first glance to Canadian budget authorities, and Mr. Campbell, nodding agreement, commented that these facilities would be "100% infrastructure".

Mr. Lang, at the Canadians' request, briefly elaborated on the meaning the US attaches to "surveillance" in paragraph (5).

Mr. Lang drew attention to paragraph (8) and remarked that the obligations which the Government of Canada would assume under its provisions would be minimal since the United States is already working on its own tropospheric scatter system which would take care of the problem to a large extent.

Both A/C/M Miller and Mr. Campbell appeared to be agreeably surprised at the relative simplicity of the draft, Miller remarking at one point that "there must be a mass" of additional agreements to be worked out. Mr. Lang responded that all that would be needed were technical level arrangements, fleshing out certain details on matters covered in principle by the government level agreement. He noted that there is already in existence an agreement with Canada that permits us to give Canadian forces the atomic information they would need to achieve an atomic capability with their weapons systems.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~Page 3 of 3
Enclosure 1
OTTAWA A-

Mr. Campbell asked whether the US had differing agreements with other governments, and whether a different agreement would be needed for nuclear-capable delivery systems other than the Honest Johns and the CF-104's. Mr. Lang replied that our draft was intended as an umbrella agreement to cover varying types of delivery systems and was identical in substance (if, indeed, not wording) with our agreements with other NATO allies. The only exceptions were the bilateral agreements covering the IRBMs which were provided under the Military Assistance Program.

In response to Mr. Campbell's questioning, Mr. Lang described the actual custodial arrangements, including those for aircraft on Quick Reaction Alert. Mr. Campbell appeared surprised (but reassured) to learn that US control even remains in this status of high alert.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Page 1 of 3
Enclosure 2
OTTAWA A-DRAFT

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to Articles 20 and 21 of the Communiqué issued by the North Atlantic Council on December 19, 1957 and to conversations which have taken place between the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Governments of Canada and of the United States regarding the stockpiling of atomic weapons in Europe for Canadian forces.

It is the understanding of my Government that in the course of these conversations agreement in principle was reached to the establishment of elements of a stockpile of atomic weapons to be provided by the United States in support of Canadian forces in Europe. In order to implement this agreement in principle my Government suggests the following arrangements:

EO25X6 STATE


~~SECRET~~SANITIZED COPY
SENSITIVE
INFORMATION DELETED

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 949598

~~SECRET~~

Page 2 of 3
Enclosure 2
OTTAWA A-



EO25X6 STATE

~~SECRET~~

**SANITIZED COPY
SENSITIVE
INFORMATION DELETED**

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MND 9495 98

~~SECRET~~

Page 3 of 3
Enclosure 2
OTTAWA A-

EO25X6 STATE

I propose that if the foregoing is acceptable to your Government, this note and your reply indicating such acceptance will constitute an agreement between the two Governments on this subject, the agreement to enter into force on the date of your note in reply.

SANITIZED COPY
SENSITIVE
INFORMATION DELETED

~~SECRET~~

NW#: 27447

DocId: 617793

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 1 of 3
Enclosure 3
OTTAWA A-


MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Ottawa, November 21, 1962

SUBJECT: Preliminary Negotiations Regarding Atomic Weapons
for Canadian NORAD Forces

PARTICIPANTS: Canada: Air Chief Marshall Frank Miller, Chairman
Chiefs of Staff Committee
Ross Campbell, Assistant Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs

U. S. : Ivan B. White, Charge d'Affaires ad interim
William E. Lang, Department of Defense
Rufus Z. Smith, Counselor for Political Affairs



EO25X6 STATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED COPY
SENSITIVE
INFORMATION DELETED

[5 pages exempted]

~~TOP SECRET~~Page 1 of 3
Enclosure 5
OTTAWA A-

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Canada on Possible Nuclear Support for Canadian Forces (Second meeting with officials)

PARTICIPANTS: Canada: Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee
Ross Campbell, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

U.S. : Ivan B. White, Charge d'Affaires
William E. Lang, Department of Defense
Brig. Gen. Frank B. James, CCS-Ottawa
Rufus Z. Smith, Counselor of Embassy

DATE: November 23, 1962

A/C/M Miller opened the meeting by saying that he and Mr. Campbell had met with the Canadian Cabinet Committee (Green, Harkness and Churchill) the night before and had been instructed to present certain views to us. He said he and Campbell had reported to the Ministers on our meeting of the day before and had found that there were no particular difficulties with regard to the proposed agreement for nuclear support for Canadian forces in Europe, although there are certain problems with regard to Canadian forces on this continent. He said that for a variety of reasons the Canadian Government does not wish to deal with nuclear weapons in a piece-meal fashion and therefore thought that the problem of the forces in Europe and the problem of forces at home should "move to finality together."

With regard to the defense of North America, A/C/M Miller said, the Ministers had been intrigued by the possibility of some device which would both meet the hard requirements of adequate defense and would take account of the political problem faced by the Canadian Government.

EO25X6 STATE

Mr. Campbell commented that one of the Ministers had suggested we explore the possibility of having the Canadian 101Bs move to a United States base during a state of Defcon 3 or Defcon 4 alert, where they would stand by for possible emergency action. He and A/C/M Miller had pointed out the principal drawbacks to such arrangement--the aircraft

~~TOP SECRET~~SANITIZED COPY
SENSITIVE
INFORMATION DELETED

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO25X6 STATE

Page 2 of 3
Enclosure 5
OTTAWA A-

would be too far south, additional fuel problems were raised, the problem of possible re-loading was not taken care of, and, of course, the arrangement would not be applicable to the [redacted] missiles. He went on to emphasize, however, that the Ministers were groping for a device which would meet genuine defense needs but which would, nevertheless, salvage something of their basic policy of resistance to the acquisition of nuclear warheads.

Mr. White asked if it would be fair to say that they were seeking to arrive at a "modification" rather than a change of policy.

[redacted]

The desire, he said, is to preserve whatever validity there may be to Canada's policy of remaining "formally non-nuclearized", in view of the possible significance such a posture may have in the field of disarmament or in other international problems.

When A/C/M Miller stressed that he thought this was a definite step forward for the Canadian Ministers to have taken, Mr. White asked whether it would be correct to say that the Canadian Government was seeking to find a solution within the frame-work of (1) an adjustment of the Defcon level, [redacted] (3) the temporary movement of Canadian military aircraft southward across the border for stand-by.

A/C/M Miller responded that this was indeed the situation. The Canadian Government's position was not hard and fixed; rather, the Ministers were groping for some device by which they could reconcile both major considerations.

Mr. Campbell remarked that when question had been raised as to the inevitability of public knowledge of the movement southward of Canadian aircraft for the purpose of being armed, the Ministers had noted that frequent training missions of this kind might well be used to condition the public to regard them as routine.

In response to a question, Mr. Campbell noted that the Canadian Ministers did not appear to have a uniform notion of how large the essential missing portion of each [redacted] would be.

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED COPY
SENSITIVE
INFORMATION DELETED

~~TOP SECRET~~Page 3 of 3
Enclosure 5
OTTAWA A-

Mr. White reiterated the comment of the earlier meeting that we, of course, were not technically qualified to assess the feasibility of such a device but would recommend that Washington look into the matter most carefully and urgently. He hoped that we could have another meeting of the same group prior to the departure of Ministers Green and Harkness for the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December. (Discussion of possible dates revealed that A/C/M Miller would probably have to leave Ottawa on the evening of December 7.) A/C/M Miller remarked that in any event he presumed that the Canadian Ministers would wish to discuss this problem with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara when they saw them in Paris. Mr. White responded that he was sure the United States representatives were looking forward to the possibility of such a discussion, and he hoped the four Ministers would be able to sit down together. Mr. Campbell pointed out in this connection that Ministers Fleming and O'Hurley might also be in Paris at same date.

At the close of the meeting the Canadian representatives stressed once again that the fact that discussions were going on was still regarded by the Canadian Government as exceedingly sensitive.

Mr. Campbell suggested it would be useful if the U.S. could present a written version of the presentation given by Gen. Agee to the Ministerial Committee on November 21, together with as many details as practicable and with reference to the more general considerations with which Mr. White had introduced the meeting with the Ministers.

~~TOP SECRET~~



This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu

[Read related article:](#)

**The U.S. Nuclear Presence in Western Europe,
1954-1962, Part II**

2020-09-17