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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SENSITIVE

CM-966-62
20 September 1962

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.5
By NND 94107 Date 02/28/97
By H2161

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT *Cy 1 w/enc*

SUBJECT: Joint Chiefs of Staff Briefing NATO Nuclear Capabilities and Problem Areas

1. In accordance with your request to General Unger, enclosed for your review are the scripts for the briefings you received on 8 September by the Joint Staff.
2. In view of the extremely highly classified information, particularly on nuclear matters, contained in the scripts, I am sending this document to you by special officer courier who will be available on call to return it to Joint Staff custody when you have completed your study of it.

(S) L. L. LEMNITZER

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

cc: SJCS *cy 2 w/enc & orig DJSN*
DJS - *cy 3 w/enc*
D/J-3 - *cy 4 w/enc*
CM-FILE, *cy 5 w/enc (cys 7-8 Xtra)*
FILED *cy 6*

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 2.2

NND 941107By MLH Date 4/28/97

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ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

1. SACEUR Organization

The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) is General Lauris Norstad with headquarters in Paris.

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is manned by a combined staff representing the various NATO nations. The major subordinate elements of General Norstad's command are as follows:

. SACEUR
Supreme Allied Commander Europe

CINCNORTH	CINCENT	CINC SOUTH	CINCAF MED
Allied Forces Northern Europe Kolsaas, Norway	Allied Forces Central Europe Fontainbleau, France	Allied Forces Southern Europe Naples, Italy	Allied Forces Mediterranean Malta

CINC NORTH is commanded by a UK General - Lt. General Sir Harold Pyman.

CINCENT is headed by a French Army General - General P. E. Jacquot.

CINC SOUTH by Admiral James S. Russel, USN

CINCAF MED by Admiral Sir Deric Holland-Martin who is a UK Naval Officer.

2. CINCEUR Organization

US European Command Organization - CINCEUR - with headquarters at Camp de Loge-outside of Paris. General Norstad is in command here also, with a US Deputy Commander-now General Wheeler, USA, to be replaced on 17 September by General McConnell, USAF.

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USCINCEUR
St. Germain-En-Laye France

CINCUSAREUR
Heidelberg, Germany

CINCUSNAVEUR
London, England

CINCUSAFE
Weisbaden, Germany

COMCIAEUR

Chiefs MAGS

COMSOTFE

The subordinate commanders are as follows:

US Army Europe - General Paul Freeman, with Headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany.

US Navy Europe - Admiral H. P. Smith, located in London. Admiral Smith is a component commander of CINCEUR and is also in command of a US Specified Command - NELM - North Atlantic and Eastern Mediterranean, which is charged with planning for Middle East operations but which has no assigned combat forces.

US Air Force Europe - General Truman H. Landon - located at Weisbaden, Germany.

Commander Special Operations Task Force Europe - is headed by Colonel C. B. Boswell

and
the Central Intelligence Agency, which comes under the Theater Commander in time of emergency and is headed by Mr. Gordon Stewart.

3. SACEUR's Mission

General War

Defend far forward as possible.
Support other NATO commands.
Maintain Sea Communications.

Aggression Less Than General War

Defend with Forces Required.
Maintain General War Capability.

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4. SACEUR's Concept of Operations

SACEUR's Concept of Operations provides for the defense of Allied Command Europe against any level of aggression, using whatever force is required within the limits of that which is available but not more force than necessary. To accomplish the above, SACEUR's concept has been developed as follows:

General War

Defend the populations territories, vital sea areas, and offensive striking power of ACE and to destroy the ability and the will of the enemy to pursue General War by undertaking operations to accomplish the following major tasks:

A Nuclear Offensive.

Active Air Defense

Contain the enemy land advance as far forward as possible and prevent the enemy from turning the flanks of ACE.

Destroy enemy naval forces attempting to operate in ACE Waters.

Regain the initiative.

Reorganize and rehabilitate available forces.

For Aggression Less than General War

SACEUR's operational concept has been developed to engage, as appropriate, in land, sea, and air operations to compel the enemy to halt his aggression and withdraw his forces in order to restore and maintain the security and integrity of the NATO nations and Allied Command Europe. In undertaking such operations SACEUR has enjoined his major subordinate commanders to plan to act in accordance with the principles set forth below. In respect to the use of nuclear weapons in either General or Limited War--it is emphasized that no such US weapons can be used until the President of the United States has authorized such use. Carefully planned administrative and physical safeguards assure this control.

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~Aggressions Less Than General War

Restore and maintain the security and integrity of the NATO Nations of ACE by acting in accordance with the following principles:

- Maintain overall General War Capability.
- Use assigned and ACE Mobile Forces.
- Demonstrate NATO solidarity; act positively and effectively and insofar as possible minimize risk of General War.
- Respond to conventional weapons attacks with conventional weapons if they are adequate to the task.
- Use Nuclear Weapons, when authorized by SACEUR, necessary to defend ACE. (Assuming US Presidential release).

SACEUR retains overall control of nuclear weapons for any type of conflict.

5. CINCEUR's Mission

- Support NATO and US Commanders.
- Conduct Military Operations in Support of US Policy in Event NATO Concept Fails.
- Conduct Contingency Operations as Directed.
- In discussing the mission assigned to the purely US Command in Europe - CINCEUR - it is important to remember that any general war operations, nuclear and/or non-nuclear, will be carried out in accordance with NATO plans whether under NATO or national auspices. On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff place requirements on CINCEUR for contingency planning of a unilateral US character.

Here again, when one considers that our forces are located and must operate within, and/or through Allied territory, it is difficult to envisage any significant combat action being pursued without the active or passive participation of certain of our NATO Allies.

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6. CINCEUR Forces

USAREUR

USCINCEUR

USNAVEUR

USAFE

* Intermittently Deployed

The above data summarizes the major US combat forces assigned to CINCEUR. These forces have the greatest combat capability of any forces in the Allied Command Europe and may possibly be the only ones fully combat ready.

a. USAFE

The number of nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles possessed and on alert are as follows:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Sqdns</u>	<u>Poss</u>	<u>Alert</u>
B-66	0		0
F-100	15		35
F-101	4		10
F-105	8		0
Totals	27		45

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Non-Nuclear

<u>Type</u>	<u>Sqdn</u>	<u>Poss</u>
Tac Fighter F-100, F-86, F-84, F-104	6	104
Fighter Interceptor F-102	8	144
Tac Recon RF-101 RF-84 RF-66 B-66	6	134
Troop Carrier C-130 C-124	5	73
Air Refueling, Tactical KB-50	1	18

Missile

<u>Type</u>	<u>Sqdns</u>	<u>Inchrs</u>	<u>Poss</u>	<u>Alert</u>
TM-61	0	0	0	0
TM-76	2	48	72	48
Total	2	48	72	48

These squadrons are located in Western Germany, England, Italy, and Turkey.

b. USAREUR

Army forces under CINCEUR are as follows. The asterisks indicate nuclear capable forces:

Army Hq	1
Corps Hq	2
* Armd Div	2
* Inf Div	3
Armored Group	1
Armd Cav Regt	4
Msl Command Medium	1
Inf Battle Gp	4

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* FA Msl Gp (RS)	2
* FA Msl Bn (Cpl)	8
* FA Msl Bn (HJ)	5
* FA Msl Bn (Lax)	3
* FA 280 MM Gun Bn	3
* FA 8 Inch How Bn	11
* SFG	1
* Air Def Bn (Herc)**	6
Hawk Bn**	7
* Engr Bn (ADM)	10

* Nuclear Capable

** AF Opnl Control


c. USNAVEUR

USCINCEUR Naval Forces under USNAVEUR are shown below. These forces are located, in the Mediterranean under CINCSOUTH. The number of nuclear-capable forces shown will vary from time to time, dependent upon the type of carriers in the 6th Fleet at the time.

Surface Forces

CVA	2
CVS	0
CA/CL	2
DD/DLG	19
SS	4
Mine	4

Aircraft (Nuclear)

	<u>Poss</u>	<u>Alert</u>
* A3D		1
* A4D		5
* AD		4
* A3J		1
P2V, P5M		0
S2F (VS)		0
HSS		0
Total		11

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* Attack Carrier based aircraft

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~Aircraft Non-Nuclear

	Poss	O/R (Operational Ready)
* F8U	24	19
* F3H	0	0
* F4D	48	38
Total	72	57

* Attack Carrier based aircraft

Landing Forces
(About 2,200 Men)

1 BLT
(With Service & Support Units)
2 - 8" HOW

Missiles

	Poss	Alert
HJ	0	0
8" How	8	0
ASROC	16	0
Total	24	0

d. Non-US NATO Forces

The following figures are a general summary of the major combat non-US NATO forces committed to SACEUR. Although a sizeable force is indicated the data must be used with the greatest caution, since the statistics in no way reflect combat capability. For example, in a recent study of the capability of NATO to conduct conventional war in the Central European Region it was determined that of

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approximately 23 M-Day divisions equivalent assigned, only 7 could be categorized as good or excellent. The remainder fell into the fair or poor categories. Serious deficiencies exist in training, manning, equipping and deployments. Although the study referred to was limited to the Central Region, the same type of deficiencies exist in the Northern and Southern Region forces and their combat capability is therefore similarly degraded, possibly to a greater degree.

(1) Land Forces

	<u>In Europe</u>		<u>Elsewhere</u>	
	<u>Div</u>	<u>RCT</u>	<u>Div</u>	<u>RCT</u>
M-Day	42 4/2	16		2
1st Echelon	12 1/2	8	6	5
2nd Echelon	8	17	2	9
Cumulative Totals	62 5/2	41	8	16

Surface to Surface Missile Units

	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Btr</u>
280 mm (Nuclear Capable)	0	0
8" HOW (Nuclear Capable)		34
Honest John	23	28
Sergeant	5	
Totals	28	62

(2) Air Forces

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Squadrons</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
LB/FB Strike	17	311
LB/FB Attack	49	1031
RECCE	31	489
Totals	97	1831

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AWX	39	621
1 DF	29	610
Totals	68	1231

Troop Carrier
SAM Units

H1-Alt	29
Lo-Alt	0

(3) Naval Forces

<u>Type</u>	<u>M-Day</u>	<u>1st Echelon</u>	<u>2nd Echelon</u>
Submarines	19	2	5
Destroyers	35	10	6
Patrol Craft	9	2	2
Mine Sweeper Ocean	33	9	7
Mine Sweepers Coastal and Inland	33	9	1
Maritime Patrol Aircraft	72		
Torpedo Boats	60	6	11
Maritime Recce/Strike A/C	54		

(4) Non-US NATO Nuclear Forces Ground UnitsGermanySANITIZED COPY
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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~Non-US NATO Nuclear Forces Ground Units (cont'd)United Kingdom

Honest John Battalions

4 Launcher Units 3

6 Launcher Units 0

Corporal 2

8" Howitzer Bns 0

(5) Non-US NATO Nuclear Forces Air UnitsGermany

Strike Squadrons (F84F) 1

United Kingdom

Strike Squadrons

e. Nuclear Launch Bases

The primary nuclear launch bases for SACEUR forces are located as follows:

Country/AreaNumber BasesGermany

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7. Weapons

Nuclear weapons available to CINCEUR and their locations are as follows:

England

Germany

CONUS

Total Inventory
FY 63 Allocation
FY 61 Dispersal Authorization

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The total inventory shown above is somewhat less than the current dispersal authorization and significantly less than his allocation of weapons. Those weapons shown in the CONUS are dispersed to CINCEUR but are stored in the ZI at National Stockpile Sites in accordance with CINCEUR wishes. CINCEUR may call for the delivery of these weapons at any time as they are considered to be in his custody for accounting purposes.

8. Nuclear Objectives

SACEUR's stated objectives of nuclear operations in the event of General War are as follows:

General War

Destroy or Reduce the enemy's nuclear capability.
Disrupt and impair enemy's capability to execute command and control over military operations.
Destroy enemy's land, naval and air forces.
Support Allied forces in defense of ACE.

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
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
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9. Threat List



SACEUR/CINCEUR Threat List



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
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10. US SIOP and SACEUR



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14. SACEUR/CINCEUR Nuclear Problem Areas

a. Permissive Devices

On 5 June 1962, by National Security Action Memorandum #160, the President directed:

(1) The procurement of appropriate permissive devices for all nuclear weapons now dispersed or to be dispersed to NATO commands for both US and non-US Weapon Systems.

(2) Secondly, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to submit, at the earliest feasible time for his approval, a schedule for installation of these devices in NATO weapons.

(3) Thirdly, the President directed the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to carry on a research program on an urgent basis, directed toward an examination of the feasibility and desirability of more advanced permissive link devices with a wider range of capabilities.

In compliance with the first part of the directive, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission is producing, under a crash program, on a hand-made basis,



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The Atomic Energy Commission is forecasting a production rate

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In compliance with the second part of the Presidential Directive, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in compliance with the Secretary of Defense instructions, submitted on 11 August 1962, a schedule for the possible installation of permissive devices in the European Theater of Operation Weapon Systems. This schedule of installation would commence in October 1962 with

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If the schedule is approved by the President, the program could be completed in the Summer of 1964 after an estimated initial cost of approximately 70 million dollars.

As far as the third part of the Directive is concerned, the Sandia Corporation is making rapid progress in the development of permissive devices that meet more of the military application requirements. For example, as a result of two Sandia Corporation technicians serving on a Joint AdHoc Group Survey of NATO Weapon Systems; a permissive device was developed in a 6-week period and demonstrated in this headquarters 3 weeks ago that would provide for the

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We are continuing to study the problem associated with the use of permissive devices and to provide to the Secretary of Defense military characteristics requirements desired in advanced permissive devices.

Further, in compliance with the President's desires, the Secretary of Defense has directed an extensive study of the communications capabilities in the European Theater of Operations. This study will be in sufficient detail to permit the review of the communications network from each nuclear

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weapon operational site location, back through the specific command channels to the CINCEUR Headquarters. Additionally, CINCEUR has been directed to institute random unannounced simulated R-Hour released type messages from CINCEUR Headquarters by way of normal command channels to the weapon sites and to report the results of these checks with indicated corrective action requirements to this headquarters. These studies are presently being conducted and it is anticipated that the results of these studies will be available by 1 October 1962.

The schedule of possible installation of permissive devices submitted by the Joint Chiefs on 11 August 1962 to Secretary of Defense is in advanced stages of Secretary of Defense consideration and it is anticipated that the Secretary of Defense's recommendations will be submitted to the President in the near future.

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c. NATO Defense Data Program

The JCS have been directed to implement a program in furtherance of national policy as expressed by National Security Action Memorandum #147. The program is presently under preparation and provides for a series of presentations by a special team of US senior officers to the North Atlantic Council and selected government officials in the major NATO capitals. The presentations will be reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that the information to accomplish the objectives of the program is included and, at the same time, insure that highly sensitive operational information that would endanger the US security is not divulged.

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The program will cover the following:

- Capabilities and limitations of US Nuclear Weapons
- Nuclear Weapons orientation course.
- Nuclear Weapons families and forces.
- NATO Stockpile Support Program
- Nuclear Weapons Safety and Peacetime Operations

- Command and Control aspects of Nuclear Operations.
- Political-Military-Technical Considerations
- Operational Considerations
- Coordination

- Sino-Soviet Threat vs w/Alliance Capabilities.
- Current Intelligence Estimate of Soviet Forces.
- Capabilities of Alliance and US Forces and
- Comparison with Soviets.
- Spectrums of Strategies available
- Strategic Issues.

d. Limitation on two-stage nuclear weapons.

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**The U.S. Nuclear Presence in Western Europe,
1954-1962, Part II**

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