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Info

FROM: PARIS

EO 11652: XGDS (1) 2 (3) 4

Authorized By: H. D. Brewster

August 4, 1975 *11/03*

(S)

SS

TO: Secretary of State

SR

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NO: POLTO 1180, MARCH 9, 9 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

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NAC MEETING, MARCH 8: NATO DEFENSE PLANNING

INR

RRR

SUMMARY. STIKKER WOUND UP LENGTHY MEETING BY STATING HIS FEELING NAC HAD EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH US STATEMENT POLTO 1163 AMENDED TOPOL 1323. NAC ALSO AGREED TO SET UP WORKING GROUP UNDER COLERIDGE TO DEVELOP SECURITY PROCEDURES FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, WITH PARTICIPATION NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES. NAC ALSO AGREED TO MEET TO ATTEMPT TO FURTHER REFINE GUIDELINES ON BASIS REVISED STIKKER PROPOSALS (CABLED SEPARATELY), FIRST MEETING MARCH 13. RE GUIDELINES, GERMANY EXPRESSED STRONG RESERVATION THAT GUIDELINE TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EVENT NON-NUCLEAR ATTACK WITH WHICH ALLIANCE FORCES COULD NOT CONVENTIONALLY COPE WOULD CALL FOR DECISION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AFTER INTEGRITY OF TERRITORY ALREADY SACRIFICED. CONSENSUS SEEMED TO BE ATHENS MEETING COULD USEFULLY REFLECT NOTATION OF US ASSURANCES, ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERIM GUIDELINES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME INFORMATION MACHINERY, BUT PROBABLY NOT GO BEYOND THAT, END SUMMARY.

STIKKER OPENED WITH FORTY MINUTE INTERVENTION, TEXT OF WHICH HE WILL CIRCULATE NEXT WEEK, AFTER FURTHER CHECKING STATEMENTS THEREIN ATTRIBUTED TO VARIOUS DELEGATIONS HE SAID IT WAS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED A DOCUMENT FOR AGREEMENT BUT AS THE BASIS FOR SECGEN BASIC PAPER FOR THE ATHENS MEETING WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE CIRCULATED BY APRIL 17. IT CONTAINS SOME INTERPRETATION BY HIM. HE SAID TASK WAS DIFFICULT IN LIGHT OF TRYING TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF STATEMENTS MADE AND CONTEXT OF PRESENT NATO DOCTRINE.

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-2- POLTO 1180, MARCH 9, 9 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF THREE) FROM PARIS

STIKKER'S STATEMENT COMPOSED OF THREE BASIC ELEMENTS:
(1) US STATEMENTS AND ASSURANCES, (2) NUCLEAR INFORMATION MATTERS, (3) GUIDELINES. INTERVENTIONS DEALT WITH THESE SUBJECTS IN RATHER MIXED UP WAY, AND FOR PURPOSES OF CLARITY THIS REPORT BROKEN DOWN INTO THESE THREE PARTS.

I. US STATEMENTS AND ASSURANCES

STIKKER REFERRED TO US STATEMENTS THAT US WILL CONTINUE TO PLACE AT DISPOSAL OF ALLIANCE ADEQUATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO MEET NEEDS OF NATO DEFENSE. WORD "ADEQUATE" NEEDS INTERPRETATION, BUT WE MIGHT WANT TO LEAVE INTERPRETATION TO MILITARY AUTHORITIES WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE. QUESTIONS OF NUMBER AND TYPES ARE MILITARY QUESTIONS AS ARE CHANGES IN TYPES OF WARHEADS WHICH ARE DETERMINED BY CURRENT OPERATIONAL NEEDS OF MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS BASED ON APPROVED NATO PLANS. US HAS ALSO INDICATED INTENT FOR FULLEST COORDINATION EXTERNAL FORCES AND THOSE AT DISPOSAL OF NATO TO INSURE MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF ALL WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO DEFEAT SOVIET AGGRESSION. US INTENDS TO HAVE ITS POWER GROW FASTER THAN SOVIET STRIKING POWER AND INCONJUNCTION NATO FORCES COVER ALL KEY ELEMENTS OF RUSSIAN POWER INCLUDING MRBM SITES, WITH EQUAL PRIORITY FOR SITES THREATENING NATO EUROPE AND US. US ALSO WILLING TO FURNISH FULLEST AMOUNT OF INFORMATION COMPATIBLE WITH SECURITY. PROBLEM IS WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION INVOLVED. THIS IS FOR LATER DISCUSSION: SHOULD IT COVER TYPES, NUMBERS, STRIKING POWER, DEPLOYMENTS, TARGETING, LOCATIONS, DESTRUCTIVE POWER? US ALSO WILLING MAKE APPROPRIATE INFORMATION AVAILABLE RE OVER-ALL PLANS STRATEGIC FORCES. US WILLING IMPROVE INFORMATION SYSTEM TO LET NAC PURSUE PROBLEMS OF NATO DEFENSE POLICY. THESE STATEMENTS ALL OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE, VERY SATISFACTORY, AND SEEM TO CORRESPOND FULLY TO 7A AND 7B OF MDP 62/2. THESE POINTS SHOULD BE CLEARED UP IN PAPER FOR ATHENS MEETING.

STIKKER UNDERSTOOD US ALSO WILLING MAKE ALL THIS TYPE INFORMATION AVAILABLE RE EXTERNAL FORCES AS BACK-UP FOR NATO FORCES. STIKKER CALLS THIS DESIRE OF US TO "ASSOCIATE" ALLIES WITH NUCLEAR DEFENSE POLICIES OF US AND MEANS ALLIES WOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND PLANS TO USE FORCES EXISTING IN US. ONLY ON THIS BASIS CAN EUROPEAN ALLIES DISCUSS PROBLEMS ON ADEQUATE LEVEL.

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-3- POLTO 1180, MARCH 9 9 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF THREE) FROM PARIS

FOLLOWING INTERVENTIONS OF PERM NEPS DID NOT DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH THIS PART OF STIKKER SUMMARY, OTHER THAN TO REFLECT GENERAL APPRECIATION OF US STATEMENTS AND ATTITUDES.

II. NUCLEAR INFORMATION

STIKKER THEN TURNED TO INFORMATION IDEAS. SAID THERE WERE THREE LEVELS: (A) INSURE ALL GOVERNMENTS HAVE GENERAL INFORMATION ON PLANS FOR DEPLOYMENT AND USE OF NUCLEARS SO AS TO APPRECIATE PROBLEMS RE CONTROL AND FULFILL RESPONSIBILITY RE IMPLEMENTATION OF DEFENSE PLANS; (B) INFORMATION OF A REGIONAL NATURE; (C) SPECIAL INFORMATION TO HOSTCOUNTRIES SUCH AS NUMBERS, TYPES, AND PHYSICAL CONTROL AND POSSIBILITIES OF USE. (A) COULD BE HANDLED BY COMMITTEE OF A WHOLE, (B) BY REGIONAL COMMITTEES, (C) BY BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST COUNTRIES. SECGEN WOULD CHAIR COMMITTEE FOR (A) AND (B), BUT IS NEED NOT KNOW INFORMATION PASSED BILATERALLY BY US OR COMMANDERS. STIKKER THEN ASKED FOR COMMENT ON IDEA OF COMMITTEE OF WHOLE HAVING ADDITIONAL CONSULTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS AS PROPOSED BY UK. HE STRONGLY URGED SET UP SPECIAL COMMITTEE UNDER COLERIDGE TO STUDY SECURITY ASPECTS TO KEEP DISSEMINATION DOWN TO ABSOLUTE MINIMUM AND DEAL WITH OTHER SECURITY ASPECTS.

DML

FINLETTER

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Control: 6735

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FROM: Paris

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: POLTO 1180, March 9, 9 p.m. (Section Two of Three)

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ITALY CRITICIZED PARA 2 UK INFORMATION PAPER IN THAT IT DID NOT RECOGNIZE SPECIAL NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDERTAKEN BY CERTAIN MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE, PARTICULARLY PARA 2(3), AND SAID COULD NOT GO ALONG WITH ANY PROCEDURE THAT DID NOT RECOGNIZE THIS ASPECT. TURKEY SUPPORTED ITALY, AND RAISED ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS. IS PURPOSE OF PROJECTED EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION OR MACHINERY FOR DECISION ON USE? IF ONLY INFORMATION, WHY IS SPECIAL ORGAN NECESSARY? IF ISSUE IS CONSULTATION, THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN BEFORE COUNCIL ESTABLISHES SPECIAL GROUP. BIRGI ALONE OF PERM REPS HAD DOUBT ABOUT NEED FOR SPECIAL SECURITY PROCEDURES, BUT DID NOT INSIST ON HIS POSITION WHEN STIKKER STRONGLY INSISTED ON NEED.

GFR AGREED THREE CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION STIKKER SUGGESTED. SUPPORTED ITALY ON MOST COUNTRIES BEING MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE AND REJECTED TRIPARTITE MEMBERSHIP. ASKED UK WHAT WAS MEANT BY PARA 3(2)A ON SHARING PEACETIME ADMINISTRATION WARHEADS. DENMARK NOTED HAD NOT ACCEPTED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH ONLY SUCH INFORMATION AS MADE AVAILABLE TO COUNTRIES IN SAME POSITION. THIS DID NOT REQUIRE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE. STATED ASSUMPTION PARA 3 UK PAPER NOT INTENDED DEAL WITH DESIGN INFORMATION, WHICH UK CONFIRMED.

BELGIUM SHARPLY REJECTED UK SUGGESTION TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE. THOUGH SUBGROUPS MIGHT CONTAIN REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES, E.G. ONE FROM BENELUX, ONE FROM SCANDINAVIA. DUTCH, TOO, FLATLY REJECTED "RENAISSANCE OF TRIPLE ENTENTE". CANADA ASKED WHAT RELATION COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE TO NAC AND REJECTED IDEA OF RESTRICTED MEMBERSHIP. RE PARA 3(2)

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-2- POLTO 1180, March 9, 9 p.m. (Section Two of Three) from Paris

UK PAPER, INQUIRED BY WHOM COMMITTEE WOULD BE CONSULTED;
E.G. NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES?

Secret

CONSENSUS STRONGLY SUPPORTED STIKKER PROPOSAL HAVE WORKING GROUP TO MEET ON SECURITY ASPECTS. UK THEN ATTEMPTED RESPOND TO QUESTIONS AND CRITICISMS. PAPER HAD BEEN MERELY FLOATING AN IDEA AND SO HAD NOT BEEN EXPLICIT. IDEA HAD DEVELOPED APART FROM US STATEMENTS. IDEA WAS NAC MIGHT HAVE GREATER KNOWLEDGE OF AND GREATER SENSE OF CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS ASSIGNED TO NATO. IT BASICALLY DEALS WITH PRESENT NATO-ASSIGNED FORCES AND GOES BEYOND INFORMATION INTO AREA OF PEACETIME ADMINISTRATION AND CONSULTATION. ON COMPOSITION, UK UNDERSTOOD RELUCTANCE TO ESTABLISH SMALL STEERING GROUP, YET ARGUED FOR CONCEPT ON BASIS OF EFFICIENCY. ON INFORMATION ASPECT, PURPOSE IS TO REGULARIZE FLOW OF INFORMATION. AT PRESENT, SACEUR BRIEFS ON ADHOC BASIS IN RESPONSE TO COUNCIL REQUEST. IF NAC KNOWS ON CONTINUING BASIS WHAT IS IN ITS ARMORY, THERE WILL BE MORE CONFIDENCE. NOTED THAT SUB-PARAGRAPH (D) COVERS NON-NATO ASPECTS AND SUB-PARAGRAPHS (E) AND (F) COVER GENERAL BRIEFINGS ON STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE, OF SAME NATURE AS MCNAMARA AND FINLETTER BRIEFINGS.

Info

AS TO CONSULTATION IDEA, UK SAID IDEA OF ADMINISTRATION DID NOT MEAN TECHNICAL INFORMATION SUCH AS MATING. IT DOES MEAN MORE SAY WOULD BE GIVEN AS TO COMPOSITION OF NUCLEAR ARMORY. THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE CERTAIN TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN OR INTRODUCED WITHOUT NAC KNOWING OF IT AND WITHOUT EXPRESSION OF GOVERNMENT OPINIONS. UK NOT SUGGESTING VETO OVER MILITARY AUTHORITIES, BUT NAC SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THIS. CERTAIN WEAPONS ARE DESIGNED TO COVER CERTAIN TARGETS OR YIELDS AND MAY BE MORE OR LESS THAN NEEDED. SOME CHECK OVER WITHDRAWAL OR ADDITION WOULD BE DESIRABLE. PROPOSAL AS TO GIVING ADVICE STEMS FROM FACT THAT DIFFERING OPINIONS OF SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS AND GOVERNMENTS MAY OCCUR WITH REGARD TO RELEASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM OR ON TERRITORIES OF GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, AND COMPARING NOTES WOULD EASE THIS PROBLEM. FOR SECURITY REASONS, FAVOR SMALLEST INFORMATION COMMITTEE POSSIBLE. FRANCE ALONE EXPRESSED GENERAL SUPPORT FOR UK DOCUMENT.

III. GUIDELINES

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-3- POLTO 1180, March 9, 9 p.m. (Section Two of Three) from Paris

Guidelines

STIKKER REFERRED TO US MARCH 2 AD REFERENDUM STATEMENT. HE MADE CLEAR GUIDELINES WERE NOT A DELEGATION OF RESPONSIBILITY BUT WHAT ACTION NECESSARY BY MEMBERS INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY IN VARYING CIRCUMSTANCES. STIKKER HAS REDRAFTED PARA 13 IN LIGHT DISCUSSIONS AND AS BASIS FURTHER TALK. REDRAFT ADHERES TO STIKKER'S THREE BASIC CATEGORIES. TEXT SENT SEPARATELY.

STIKKER CONCLUDED BY REFERRING TO US STATEMENT MARCH 2 AND ASKED IF ALLIANCE COULD CONCUR IN PROPOSAL FOR INTERIM GUIDELINES PENDING FURTHER STUDY GUIDELINE QUESTION IN WORKING GROUP.

US SAID PREPARED TO JOIN IN CONTINUING REFINEMENT OF EXISTING GUIDELINES PRESENTLY IN FORCE AND TO ENTERTAIN ANY NEW PROPOSALS. SAID HE WAS NOW IN POSITION TO CONFIRM MARCH 2 STATEMENT THAT PENDING FURTHER STUDY GUIDELINES MIGHT BE USEFUL TO CONFIRM EXISTING ONES ON BASIS APRIL 26 STATEMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL ASSURANCES, WHICH HE QUOTED.

IN THIS RESPECT, US RECALLED THAT HE HAD SAID THAT WORD "COPE" HAD REQUIRED EXPLANATION WHICH HE HAD GIVEN IN LIGHT SECSTATE AND SECDEF DECEMBER MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS DESIGNED TO REASSURE THOSE COUNTRIES CONTIGUOUS TO BLOC. US HAD TO RECONCILE GREAT SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT SO THAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE COMMITMENT TO DEFEND VITAL INTERESTS WOULD NOT REQUIRE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF UNDER ANY POSSIBILITY THEIR USE WOULD BE UNNECESSARY. USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS DREADFUL MATTER AND WE WOULD WANT TO USE THEM ONLY IF NEED WERE VERY CLEAR. ON OTHER HAND, US FULLY CONSCIOUS EUROPEAN NATIONS MORE EXPOSED TO MORE IMMEDIATE LOSSES OF THEIR TERRITORY THAN OTHER MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE, ALTHOUGH MUST RECALL ALL MEMBERS NOW LIVE UNDER THREAT

OF NUCLEAR ATTACK. US AGAIN QUOTED RUSK STATEMENT FROM DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING, AND SAID IF ALLIANCE AGREES, CAN CONFIRM US WILLING TO CONSULT RE USE NUCLEARS ANYWHERE. US THEN READ STATEMENT PER POLTO 1163 AMENDED TOPOL 1323 AND SAID IF SATISFACTORY WOULD MAKE STATEMENT OFFICIAL ON BEHALF OF GOVERNMENT.

FINLETTER

NOTE: RELAYED CINCLANT POLAD 3/9/62.

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FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: POLTO 1180, MARCH 9, 9 PM (SECTION 3 OF 3)

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NAC MEETING, MARCH 8: NATO DEFENSE PLANNING.

ITALY SAID U.S. STATEMENT VERY INSPIRED AND WOULD COMMENT LATER. FRANCE THANKED U.S. SAID THAT PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH INTERIM GUIDELINES ON BASIS APRIL 26 STATEMENT AND NEW U.S. STATEMENTS PENDING FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES WAS WISE INTERIM SOLUTION. GREECE SAID GOVERNMENT APPRECIATED AND ACCEPTED U.S. PROPOSAL AND INTERIM ARRANGEMENT.

✓ GERMANY THEN THANKED U.S. FOR PROPOSAL FOR INTERIM GUIDELINES, BUT RAISED FOLLOWING QUESTION. REFERRING TO US QUOTATION RUSK STATEMENT, "WE SHOULD, BEFORE USING"NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EXPLOIT TO THE FULL OUR OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESS IN PRESERVING OUR VITAL INTERESTS, INCLUDING INTEGRITY OF OUR FORCES AND TERRITORIES WITHOUT RESORT TO USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS" AND TO APRIL 26 ASSURANCE BY PRESIDENT ON USE NUCLEARS IN EVENT FACED WITH CONVENTIONAL ATTACK WITH WHICH FORCE CANNOT COPE, SAID BOTH THESE STATEMENTS INDUCED GERMANS TO THINK THAT MOMENT WHEN IT IS KNOWN NATO CANNOT COPE WITH CONVENTIONAL ATTACK AND/OR MOMENT WHEN WE HAVE EXPLOITED TO FULL CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY TO RESIST WOULD ALREADY BE TOO LATE. IF WE WAIT FOR SUCH CLEAR PROOF, NATO FORCES WOULD ALREADY BE DEFEATED. ASKED U.S. TO COMMENT ON HOW ARRIVAL AT THESE CRITERIA WOULD

BE PROVEN.

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-2- POLTO 1180, MARCH 9, 9 PM, FROM PARIS (SECTION 3 OF 3)

BE PROVEN. FOR COUNTRIES CONCERNED, TIME MIGHT BE TOO LATE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY SECRETARY HAD REFERRED TO WOULD ALREADY BE GREATLY DAMAGED. FOR EXAMPLE, MUNICH OR HAMBURG, SITUATED CLOSE TO IRON CURTAIN, WOULD ALREADY BE GONE. SHOULD NOT CRITERIA BE AMENDED BY ADDING WORD "THREAT" TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR INTEGRITY OF FORCES?

U.S. SAID THESE QUESTIONS REQUIRE CONTINUED STUDY IN WORKING GROUP. U.S. SAID HAD DONE HIS BEST IN BROAD GENERAL TERMS TO MAKE CLEAR U.S. INTENDED NOT TO TAKE ACTION WHEN IT WAS TOO LATE AND SAID U.S. WAS DOING ITS BEST TO ANSWER VERY DIFFICULT QUESTION WITH DUE RECOGNITION OF PROBLEM. FORMULA OF "CANNOT COPE" IS NOT PRECISE AND PERHAPS IN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF SECGEN'S NEW DRAFT MATTER MAY BE CLARIFIED. GERMANY RESPONDED FURTHER STUDY NEEDED, BUT HAD TO RAISE QUESTION POINTEDLY WHICH IS VITAL FOR GERMANY. PROTESTED THAT GERMANY IN NO WAY DOUBTS GOODWILL OF FORMULA, BUT POINT WAS VITAL AND MUST BE EXPLORED. MATTER OF GRAVE IMPORTANCE TO COUNTRIES BORDERING USSR SUCH AS GFR AND TURKEY.

BELGIUM WARMLY WELCOMED INTERIM GUIDELINES AND SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDY IN WORKING GROUP.

NETHERLANDS SAID BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS INVOLVED IN DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND STIKKER REDRAFT OF PARA 13 SHOULD BE MORE CLOSELY RELATED TO MILITARY URGENCY REFLECTED IN MC 95. IF POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE DIFFERENT THAN MILITARY, WE SHOULD BE DEFINITE ON THIS POINT. SUGGESTED INFORMAL VIEWS OF NORSTAD ON THESE FORMULAE BE OBTAINED. (DUTCH DELEGATION TELLS US NETHERLANDS FEARFUL THAT GUIDELINES THAT WOULD NOT DEAL WITH SURPRISE ALL-OUT CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, OR IN EFFECT WOULD FAIL TO MEET GERMAN POINT, WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE AS WEAKENING OF DETERRENT, EVIDENCE OF US UNDUE RELUCTANCE USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND

AS AMENDMENT

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-3- POLTO 1180, MARCH 9, 9 PM, FROM PARIS (SECTION 3 OF 3)

AS AMENDMENT POLITICAL DIRECTIVE.) CANADA WELCOMED PROGRESS BUT SAID OFFER TO CONSULT ON USE NUCLEARS ANYWHERE REQUIRES MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

IV. ATHENS MEETING.

summary ✓
RE STIKKER'S OPENING REMARKS ON PREPARING PAPER FOR ATHENS MEETING, NORWAY STRESSED NEED TO PREPARE FOR DEALING WITH PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION AVOID STORIES OF SPLITS. GOOD STORIES COULD BE BASED ON U.S. ASSURANCES RE MAINTENANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CAPABILITIES OF FORCES. OTHER ASPECTS MIGHT HAVE DIFFICULT PRESS ASPECTS. GUIDELINES NOT APT FOR DISCUSSION AT ATHENS AND PRESS SHOULD BE TOLD SUCH MATTERS ARE FOR PERMANENT COUNCIL. BELGIUM AGREED, SAYING ACTION AT ATHENS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO NOTING MATTERS DEALING WITH PRESENT FORCES, AND PERHAPS INFORMATION ARRANGEMENTS AND ASSURANCES ON CONSULTATION. MATTER OF MULTILATERAL FORCE SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED AT ATHENS. CANADA SAID MINISTERS SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN ANY ISSUES WHICH WERE NOT WELL PREPARED. STIKKER SAID HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE MUCH PROGRESS ON ISSUES OTHER THAN THOSE COVERED IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT BEFORE ATHENS.

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COMMENT: ON WHOLE, THINK SITUATION CONCERNING PARA 13 SATISFACTORY. COUNCIL BASICALLY BELIEVES ANY GENERAL REFINEMENT APRIL 26 GUIDELINES RELEASE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MOST UNLIKELY. ALLIANCE BASICALLY SATISFIED APRIL 26 GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING NUCLEARS. ALLIANCE ALSO MUCH IMPRESSED BY UAMS. LEADERSHIP IN OFFERING CONSULT ABOUT USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANYWHERE. AM ESPECIALLY PLEASED FRENCH SUPPORT OUR PROPOSAL FOR INTERIM GUIDELINES AS BEST WAY OUT OF PARA 13 PROBLEM. HAD SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH DE LEUSSE ABOUT THIS BEFORE MEETING AND HE REFERRED QUESTION TO "HIS GOVERNMENT".

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-4- PDLTO 1180, MARCH 9, 9 PM, FROM PARIS (SECTION 3 OF 3)

I WAS FEARFUL NEGATIVE ATTITUDE ON PART "HIS GOVERNMENT",
BUT HE APPROVED TEXT OF POLTO 1163 AS AMENDED TOPOL 1323
TEXTUALLY AND WAS GENERALLY MOST HELPFUL.

FINLETTER

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1954-1962, Part II**

2020-09-17