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The U.S. Intelligence Community, 7th edition (Westview, 2015) The Pentagon’s Spies The Record on Curveball Underground Facilities: Intelligence and Targeting Issues
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Washington, D.C., November 20, 2015 – The Defense Intelligence Agency, established in 1961, is one of the United States government’s largest intelligence organizations – employing 17,000 individuals, including thousands stationed overseas. Its 2013 fiscal year budget request was for $3.15 billion. Yet, the DIA is also one of the more secretive agencies in the U.S. intelligence community, regularly denying access to basic information about its structure, functions and activities. Today the National Security Archive posts a new sourcebook of over 50 documents, many appearing for the first time, that help to illuminate the DIA’s five-decades-long history. Highlights of the posting include an internal memo about the infamous Iraqi defector known as CURVEBALL and the false intelligence he provided about Iraq’s supposed WMD programs; a 180-page review of the case of DIA analyst Ana Belen Montes, convicted of supplying secrets to the Cubans several analyses of Iraqi and Chinese weapons of mass destruction programs; and descriptions of DIA’s interest in “psychoenergetics” activities such as extrasensory perception, telepathy, and remote viewing. Today’s posting also features dozens of issues of the DIA’s in-house publication, Communiqué (see sidebar), containing significant information about the agency that is routinely withheld from the public under the Freedom of Information Act. The documents posted today concern:
DIA DECLASSIFIED by Jeffrey T. Richelson Along with the national intelligence agencies (the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is one of the largest United States government intelligence organizations. It employs approximately 17,000 individuals, with thousands deployed overseas. Its fiscal year 2013 budget request was for $3.15 billion dollars.[1] Some of the intellectual work that led to its creation took place during the later years of the Dwight Eisenhower administration (although it appears Eisenhower was interested in moving toward creation of such an agency as early as 1953). In 1959, the United States Intelligence Board created a Joint Study Group (JSG), chaired by the CIA’s Lyman Kirkpatrick, to study the intelligence-producing agencies. The group concluded that there was considerable overlap and duplication in defense intelligence activities, resulting in an inefficient distribution of resources. It observed that “... the fragmentation of efforts creates ‘barriers’ to the free and complete interchange of intelligence information among the several components of the Department of Defense” and recommended that the Secretary of Defense “bring the military intelligence organization within the Department of Defense into full consonance with the concept of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.”[2] However, as the end of Eisenhower’s tenure as president approached there was no concrete plan to establish a DoD-level intelligence agency. As a result, in an early January 1961 meeting of the National Security Council, Eisenhower was reported to have observed (Document 1, p. 4) that “each Military Service developed its own intelligence organization,” [that] “this situation made little sense in managerial terms” and that “he had suffered an eight year defeat on this question.” As a result, he “would leave a legacy of ashes for his successor.” Creation
In an oral history interview, Kennedy’s first Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, recalled that one event that helped convince him of the need for a defense intelligence agency was a visit, not long after taking office, to Air Force intelligence headquarters in the Pentagon. The Air Force’s intelligence chief “got out all of his photographs. We went over them, and it didn’t prove to me that there was a missile gap. But he was not lying. He was looking at the photographs through Air Force-colored glasses.” Among McNamara’s conclusions was that “we ought to have one defense intelligence agency, and not several, each representing a particular service with operational interests involved it.”[3] That experience may have further advanced the cause of establishing a DIA. In a February 8, 1961 memo to the Joint Chiefs, McNamara raised the issue of establishing a Defense Intelligence Agency – that would possibly not only include the new agency absorbing the military service intelligence analysis agencies but also the National Security Agency.[4] A flurry of memos produced by staff members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff followed. Included was an April 21, 1961 memorandum (Document 2) on considerations with regard to establishing a Defense Intelligence Agency, one of which was whether the agency would report directly to the Secretary of Defense or to the Secretary via the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ultimately, on July 5, McNamara reached the decision to establish the DIA, which he reported to President John F. Kennedy (Document 3) the following day in a memo that also reviewed his reasoning, the expected benefits from creation of the new agency, and the work that already been done. Less than a month later, on August 1, with the issuance of DoD Directive 5105.21 (Document 4), DIA was formally established, reporting to McNamara through the JCS – as the DoD announced (Document 5) the following day. The directive made DIA responsible for: (1) organization, direction, management, and control over all DoD resources assigned to or included within the DIA; (2) review and coordination of those DoD intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the military departments; (3) supervision over the execution of all approved plans, programs, policies, and procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to the DIA; (4) the exercise of maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of DoD intelligence resources; (5) responses to priority requests by the United States Intelligence Board; and (6) fulfillment of the intelligence requirements of major DoD components. As a consequence of DIA’s creation, the Joint Staff Director of Intelligence (J2) was abolished (although subsequently re-established), as was the Office of Special Operations, the small intelligence arm of the Secretary of Defense.[5] CIA-DIA Relations The DIA’s creation inevitably was of concern to the CIA, since it established a new major intelligence agency, which had an impact on the Intelligence Community’s analytical work as well as, at the very least, tasking of its collection activities – whether human or technical. Thus, in the early 1960s, the CIA monitored and reported on DIAs’ growing pains. In April 1963, CIA Executive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick reported (Document 8) on his conversation with DIA Director Joseph Carroll with regard to clandestine collection, current intelligence production, and DIA participation in the National Photographic Interpretation Center. In late 1964, both Albert Wheelon, the CIA’s deputy director for science and technology, and Kirpatrick produced memoranda (Document 9, Document 10) – for Kirkpatrick and DCI John McCone, respectively – evaluating DIA and reviewing CIA-DIA relations. Three years later, the chief of the CIA’s Board of National Estimates, Sherman Kent, prepared a memorandum (Document 11) for McCone on McNamara’s possible difficulties with DIA – which he attributed to DIA being a headquarters military intelligence organization “with all the classic maladies of such,” and to the fact that it reported to the Secretary through the JCS. Organizational Structure The DIA, in its 54-year existence, has undergone a large number of major organizational changes – particularly in its early years. Those changes have reflected both alternative structures for accomplishing its analytical mission and the growth of its responsibilities in the areas of human and technical collection. The first document authoritatively concerning DIA’s organizational structure was the September 29, 1961 Plan for Activation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Document 6), which specified (pp. 4-5, 10) that DIA would have at least two key directorates – the Directorate for Acquisition (whose responsibilities would include requirements and collection management) and the Directorate for Processing (which would operate an indications center, a production center, and an estimates office). The plan also made provision for organizational components to perform “other functions and activities” to be added in the future. By 1964 (Document 46), the number of key directorates had doubled, with the addition of directorates for mapping, charting, and geodesy as well as scientific and technical intelligence.[6] Several decades later, in 1986, DIA’s structure had evolved (Document 19) to include a General Defense Intelligence Program Staff, a group of Defense Intelligence Officers (the DIA’s counterpart to the Director of Central Intelligence’s National Intelligence Officers), and six directorates – Security and Counterintelligence; Operations, Plans, Training; Foreign Intelligence; JCS Support; External Relations; and Resources and Systems. DIA’s role in human intelligence collection – via attachés and other sources – was managed by the Directorate for Operations and Attachés within the Operations, Plans, and Training Directorate. The Foreign Intelligence Directorate had absorbed the scientific and technical intelligence production mission in addition to containing a component for imagery exploitation. A major reorganization of DIA occurred during James Clapper’s tenure (1992-1995) as DIA director. Clapper established three key centers which would be responsible for collection, analysis, and infrastructure – the National Military Intelligence Collection Center, the National Military Intelligence Production Center, and the National Military Intelligence Systems Center. The centers were renamed after Clapper retired as DIA director.[7] In February 2003, DIA Director Lowell Jacoby approved another significant reorganization (Document 34), which established a Director’s Staff and seven primary operating elements – directorates for HUMINT, MASINT and technical collection, analysis, information management, external relations, intelligence support for the Joint Staff, and administration. Subsequent organizational changes included creation of a human intelligence and counterintelligence center and Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center – both now disestablished – although’s Jacoby’s reorganization remained largely intact for years afterward. Then, in July 2012, DIA Director Michael Flynn ordered a reorganization in some ways similar to the one subsequently undertaken at CIA. While the directorates for operations, analysis, and science and technology were retained, four regional centers were added to the existing Defense Combating Terrorism Center (formerly the Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism – see Document 30). That resulted in a new DIA organizational structure (Document 51) that remains in place today – in which individuals from different directorates are assigned to the Americas, Asia/Pacific, Europe/Eurasia, or Middle East/Africa center and are responsible for the collection and production of the intelligence required to produce finished intelligence support of DoD and its components. Evolution Some of DIA’s organizational change was the result of its shift in responsibilities – one of a number of ways in which DIA has evolved over the last 54 years. Its original charter has been updated a number of times. An updated version of DoD Directive 5105.21 was issued on December 16, 1976, and limited the JCS’s operational control over the agency to obtaining intelligence support required to perform the Joint Chiefs’ statutory functions and responsibilities as well as ensuring adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence for the unified and specified Commands (e.g. European Command, Strategic Air Command). Further updates of 5105.21 were issued in May 1977, February 1997, and most recently March 2008.[8] The March 2008 directive (Document 38) specified twelve categories of responsibilities and functions, with over 70 specific responsibilities and functions for the DIA director. DIA began as an analytical agency and that has remained its primary focus, but over the years its responsibilities with regard to collection have also expanded. Its role in human intelligence collection has included assuming responsibility for the Defense Attaché Service in 1965, whose representatives in United States embassies throughout the world have performed assorted intelligence collection functions. In 1993, DCI James Woolsey and Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry agreed to establish, under DIA, a Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), which would absorb the responsibilities of the clandestine and strategic HUMINT activities of the military services, particularly the Army. The DHS reached initial operational capability in 1995 but would eventually be disestablished in 2006 upon the creation of the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. Then in 2013, a Defense Clandestine Service was established within DIA to conduct HUMINT operations.[9] DIA’s responsibility for managing collection also expanded as the result of the grouping of a diverse number of technical collection activities (including seismic, non-imaging infrared, acoustic, radar) under the title ‘measurement and signature intelligence’ (MASINT). DIA’s responsibilities in the MASINT area were consolidated in 1999 (Document 28) under a Central MASINT Office (CMO). Subsequently, the office’s functions were assigned to the agency’s Directorate of MASINT & Technical Collection (Document 34), and more recently to its Directorate for Science and Technology. In addition, DIA, partially as a result of reorganization efforts in the Defense intelligence area in the early 1990s, assumed responsibility (Document 23) for two geographically dispersed, Army-managed intelligence organizations. Specifically, it assumed control of the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) and Army Missile and Space Intelligence Center (AMSIC) in 1991. AFMIC retained its name and the Army center became the Missile and Space Intelligence Center. Both remained at their locations – AFMIC at Ft. Detrick, Maryland, and MSIC in Huntsville, Alabama. In 2008, AFMIC was retitled (Document 39a, Document 39b, Document 40, Document 42) the National Center for Medical Intelligence to better reflect its role in support of organizations outside the DoD. A third geographically dispersed center, managed by DIA for the Intelligence Community, was established in 1997 – the Underground Facility Analysis Center (UFAC) at Herndon, Virginia.[10] In addition to the production responsibilities of its directorates and centers, as part of the DoD’s extensive intelligence production efforts (Document 27) DIA has also supervised and tasked production by a number of organizations operated by the military services – including the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, the National Ground Intelligence Center, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.
“Psychoenergetics” During the 1970s, and sometimes beyond, DIA and a number of other intelligence agencies (including the CIA, the Army Intelligence and Security Command , and the Air Force Technical Applications Center) attempted to employ individuals purported to possess psychoenergetic abilities – alleged to include psychokinesis, telepathy, remote viewing, and extrasensory perception – as a means for gathering intelligence. In 1985, the director of DIA informed the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Document 18) that his agency had assumed responsibility for the Intelligence and Security Command’s program, codenamed CENTER LANE. The DIA’s continued activity in that area was illustrated by a circa 1990 briefing (Document 21) on its Project SUN STREAK, which reviewed past activities by military service and DoD organizations as well as then-current SUN STREAK activities. The briefing asserted that in the 1970s such methods were employed “to gain detailed information about [a] Soviet R&D facility at Semipalatinsk.”[11] Analytical Product One early “trial by fire” for the agency was the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. A DIA historical study (Document 44) noted (p. 27) that the missile crisis “presented the hobbling young Agency with an opportunity to overcome much of this criticism.” The study, also noted that “in the early summer and early fall of 1962, astute analysis and assertive management by individual DIA personnel led to important breakthroughs in Cuba” but “it was also clear that the Agency still had maturing to do.” The 1960s and early l970s also required DIA to devote considerable attention to the Vietnam War and other events in Southeast Asia. Another DIA historical study (Document 46) examined the DIA’s performance with respect to the air and ground war in Vietnam as well as a number of other Asian crises during the 1960s and 1970s – including the seizure of the USS Pueblo, the Son Tay prison rescue mission, and the seizure of the USS Mayaguez. It concluded with the observation (p.40) that despite “incremental improvements” in DIA performance in the early 1970s “neither military leadership nor policymakers were yet convinced of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s necessity.” Events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and those in Southeast Asia did not prevent DIA from devoting significant resources to analyzing Soviet and Chinese nuclear weapons and missile programs. A 1972 study (Document 13) focused on Soviet and Chinese nuclear weapons employment policy and strategy – covering topics such as force development and deployment, training, command and control, nuclear weapons development, as well as R&D and production facilities. A dozen years later a shorter product (Document 17), a Defense Estimative Brief, also focused on nuclear weapons systems in China – discussing the number, rates, and types of nuclear tests, possible future qualitative impacts on the Chinese arsenal, production of nuclear delivery systems, and possible Chinese interest in Enhanced Radiation Weapons. It also provided estimates of the number of warheads associated with different delivery systems in 1984, 1989, and 1994.
DIA also, along with the CIA, focused on the political situation in Iran in 1978 but – as was the case with the CIA – did not foresee the abrupt end of the monarchy early the following year. An August 1978 appraisal (Document 14) observed that while the months ahead were “likely to be turbulent” there was “no threat to the stability of the Shah’s rule.” In subsequent years, DIA analysts produced a number of papers on Iran’s neighbor, Iraq. In the aftermath of the first Gulf War the agency produced an assessment (Document 24) of U.S. efforts to locate and destroy Iraqi short-range mobile missiles. In 2001, an article in the DIA’s Military Intelligence Digest (Document 31) addressed Iraq’s acquisition of aluminum tubes, reaching the same conclusion as CIA and National Ground Intelligence Center assessments that the tubes were unlikely to have been procured for conventional military use. In 2002, it produced Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Weapons Program (Document 33), most of which was redacted before release to the public. Another area of DIA analysis has concerned foreign intelligence services – and that analysis has ranged from examinations of the intelligence threat posed by a specific nation’s intelligence services to studies such as the one completed in November 1978 (Document 15) assessing the reorganization of the Italian intelligence community. In addition to producing estimates and studies, DIA’s production responsibilities have included biographic sketches (more recently known as military leadership profiles) focusing on foreign military leaders. In addition to a large number of profiles of Chinese military leaders, DIA analysts have also produced profiles on the likes of Pakistani Army Chief of Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg (Document 22) and General-Lieutenant Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed (Document 26), subsequently a political rival of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. CURVEBALL In May 2003, in the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the CIA and DIA issued a joint paper (Document 35), prepared for public release, presenting the agencies’ case for the existence of Iraqi mobile biological warfare production facilities, a case which fell apart in subsequent months. The key source behind the CIA and DIA claims was an Iraqi defector living in Germany, codenamed CURVEBALL, who had been debriefed by Germany’s Bundesnachrictendienst [BND] – Federal Intelligence Service – which passed his claims on to the United States but did not grant U.S. intelligence agencies direct access to him, claiming that the defector did not speak English and hated Americans, neither of which was true.[12]
About two years later, DIA Director Lowell Jacoby produced an information memorandum (Document 36) summarizing key aspects of the case. Included among the 12 main points of the memo were the statements that “Curveball (CB) was the main Intelligence Community source reporting Iraq had transportable biological warfare agent production systems,” “[BND] did not allow direct DIA contact with CB,” “CB provided detailed information on production processes, equipment, concealment methods, personnel, organizations, and locations of the transportable systems,” and “DIA and CIA determined that CB was a fabricator.” The Montes Case The CIA, FBI, and NSA have over their lifetimes each discovered several individuals who, for monetary or ideological reasons, committed espionage on behalf of foreign nations. Those individuals have included Aldrich Ames, James Nicholson, Edward Lee Howard, Jack Edward Dunlap, William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell, and Ronald Pelton. DIA’s experience with such situations has been more limited. Before 2001, the only apparent instance involved Waldo Dubberstein, who, according to one account, passed information to former intelligence officer Edwin P. Wilson “and thence to the Libyans – beginning in 1977.”[13] Then, on September 21, 2001, the FBI arrested the DIA’s senior Cuban analyst, Ana Belen Montes, and charged her with having served as a Cuban agent since 1984, while she had been employed by the Department of Justice. Among the classified reports produced in the wake of her arrest was a damage assessment by the National Counterintelligence Executive and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG). The DoDIG report (Document 37), over 150 pages long, examined “the enigmatic life of Ana Montes,” her government service and commitment to espionage, her maturation as an analyst and spy, and how her life unraveled. It concluded with findings, recommendations, and observations.[14] DIA & Organizational Transparency
DIA is one of several agencies that has been given discretionary authority by Congress to refuse to provide even unclassified information about its organizational structure and personnel in response to Freedom of Information Act requests – an authority it has used more extensively in recent years and which it uses more drastically than the CIA, National Reconnaissance Office, or NSA. (The other national intelligence agency – the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency – currently provides no organizational details at all). Thus, while it released its entire organization and functions manual in earlier years (Document 19) it currently refuses to release more detail than that posted on its website – which consists of a listing of directorates and centers (excluding the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, the National Center for Medical Intelligence, and the Underground Facility Analysis Center) without any statement of their specific functions. Since 2012, it has denied, in their entirety, requests for the organizational charts of the MASINT & Technical Collection, Human Intelligence, and Analysis Directorates as well as of MSIC, NCMI, and UFAC. The agency also refused to release a single word from 15 pages of material concerning the creation and mission of the short-lived Directorate for Collection Management. In addition, it denied a request for any memos or documents that listed current Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO) titles – although those titles and more information about the DIO system appeared in the spring 2012 issue of the DIA journal Communiqué, which had been publicly released.[15] DIA is also no longer willing to release unclassified brochures similar to the one it released only a few years ago on the Directorate for Analysis (Document 43). A response to a February 2014 FOIA request for any brochures providing an overview of the Directorates of Analysis, Operations, or Science & Technology noted that the one responsive document had been located but it was being denied in its entirety.[16] A major alternative means of obtaining information about the workings of DIA was eliminated when then-director Michael Flynn ordered – without production of any memos or other documentation – that Communiqué halt publication because he “felt it prudent, with declining resources, to halt the electronic and hardcopy production of this publication,” according to a letter from the DIA’s FOIA chief.[17] The journal, many of whose issues are posted with this briefing book, offered a detailed look into many aspects of DIA organization and operations. And because it was an unclassified magazine that was available to family members of DIA personnel, no FOIA exemptions could be employed to deny any portion of it to a requester – in the same way that NSA was unable to deny author James Bamford issues of its newsletter when he requested copies during his research for The Puzzle Palace. It is not clear that DIA’s increasing lack of transparency is based on any systematic analysis. In response to a 2012 FOIA request for any 2005-2011 studies of the consequences of public disclosure of DIA organizational structure, the agency reported that “despite a thorough search, no documents responsive to your request were found.”[18] Notes to Essay
DocumentsDocument 1: Marion W. Boggs, Memorandum, Subject: Discussion at the 473rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 5, 1961, Top Secret. Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. This memo, concerning one of President Dwight Eisenhower’s last National Security Council meetings, covered a number of topics – including Eisenhower’s views on the maintenance of separate intelligence services by the Army, Navy, and Air Force in contrast to the creation of a single Defense Intelligence Agency. Eisenhower remarked, according to Boggs (p.4), that “he had suffered an eight-year defeat on this question but would leave a legacy of ashes for his successor.” Document 2: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Considerations in the Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency, April 21, 1961 w/atts. Top Secret. Source: CIA Records Search Tool (CREST). This memorandum was one of many produced in the spring and summer of 1961 concerning plans to establish a Defense or Military Intelligence Agency. It covers a variety of issues – including national vs. military intelligence, and the organization and location of DIA. It concludes with the recommendation to place the DIA under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Attached are a draft memo concerning creation of the agency and a draft DoD directive that would establish the agency. Document 3: Robert S. McNamara, Memorandum for the President, Subject: Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), July 6, 1961. Top Secret. Source: National Archives and Records Administration. This memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President John F. Kennedy notes the origins in the Eisenhower administration of the effort to establish a Defense Intelligence Agency, the reason for implementing such a plan, the expected benefits, and the work done in the new administration to produce a plan. Document 4: Department of Defense Directive 5105.21, “Defense Intelligence Agency,” August 1, 1961. Confidential. Source: Editor’s Collection. This directive is the first of several between 1961 and 2008 (see Document 38) that have served as the charter of DIA. It contains sections on organization and command, responsibilities, functions, relationships, authority, and administration. Document 5: Office of Public Affairs, Department of Defense, Release No. 777-61, “Department of Defense Announces New Defense Intelligence Agency,” August 2, 1961. Unclassified. Source: Department of Defense. This one-page DoD press release announced the creation of the DIA and asserted that the agency would “combine a number of intelligence functions heretofore carried independently by the separate military departments” and, it was expected, would lead to “the elimination of duplicating facilities, organizations and tasks.” Document 6: Department of Defense, Plan for Activation of the Defense Intelligence Agency, September 29, 1961. Secret. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. This plan for the activation of DIA specifies organizational structure, the headquarters establishment, management responsibilities, and a draft directive to establish a Military Intelligence Board to advise the DIA director. For each directorate to be established it specifies the missions and functions of the directorate as well as its organizational structure. Document 7: Defense Intelligence Agency Instruction No. 57-1, Substantive Intelligence Support, March 23, 1962. Confidential. Source: Editor’s Collection. This DIA instruction specified the type of substantive intelligence to be supplied to the Unified and Specified Commands (unified commands such as the European Command and Pacific Command and specified commands such as the Strategic Air Command). That support included estimates, current intelligence (including eleven different types of products), and basic intelligence production. The instruction also specified support to be provided by the Unified and Specified Commands to DIA – for example, creation of Unified and Specified Command indications centers in support of the DIA Indications Center. Document 8: Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Review of CIA-DIA Relations with Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll, 1245-1545, 2 April 1963, April 3, 1963. Top Secret. Source: CREST. This memorandum, written by CIA Executive Director Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, summarizes his discussion with Lt. Joseph Carroll, the DIA’s director, on relations between the two agencies. Specific topics covered are clandestine collection, current intelligence, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center. Document 9: Albert D. Wheelon, Deputy Director, Science and Technology, CIA, Memorandum for: Executive Director – Comptroller, Subject: Evaluation of DIA, December 6, 1964. Secret. Source: CREST. CIA Executive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick was the recipient of this memo, written by Deputy Director for Science and Technology Albert Wheelon, based on his review of CIA-DIA relations. Topics covered include research and development, collection and analysis, production and estimation, and support for seven different interagency committees. Document 10: Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director, CIA, Memorandum for the Director, Subject: CIA/DIA Relations, December 21, 1964. Secret. Source: CREST. This memo from Executive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick to Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John McCone was based on responses from United States Intelligence Board (USIB) committees and CIA directorates concerning relations with DIA. Topics discussed by Kirkpatrick include clandestine collection, substantive intelligence, research and development, estimation, and support to USIB committees. Document 11: Sherman Kent, “A Comment on Mr. McNamara’s Possible Difficulties with the DIA,” June 5, 1967. Secret. Source: CIA Historical Review Program. This memo from the CIA’s director of National Estimates, Sherman Kent, to John McCone focuses on his understanding of the apparent problems that Defense Secretary McNamara was having with DIA’s performance. Kent attributed McNamara’s problems to the fact of DIA being a Headquarters military intelligence organization “with all the classic maladies of such” and that it reported to the secretary through the JCS. Document 12: Defense Intelligence Agency, “Minutes of DIA Scientific Advisory Committee Meeting,” 21-22 May 1970, n.d.. Secret. Source: www.governmentattic.org. These minutes of a May 1970 meeting of the DIA Scientific Advisory Committee summarize the subjects discussed. Attached is a report of a review panel on determining the yields of foreign nuclear tests. Document 13: Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet and Peoples Republic of China Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy and Strategy, March 1972. (Extract) Top Secret/Codeword. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. The released portion (91 pages) of this document contains an extensive discussion of Chinese nuclear weapons employment policy and strategy as well as five annexes examining force development and deployment, training, command and control, nuclear weapons development, as well as R&D and production facilities. The document was written at the codeword level; numerous references to overhead imagery and communications intelligence have not been redacted from the version released. Document 14: Maj. Don Adamick, Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Appraisal, Iran: Renewal of Civil Disturbances, August 16, 1978. Confidential. Source: Editor’s Collection. This assessment of civil disturbances in Iran was completed only months before the Shah was forced to leave the country. Similar to ones produced by the CIA in the same time period, it stated that while the months ahead were “likely to be turbulent” there was “no threat to the stability of the Shah’s rule.” Document 15: Defense Intelligence Agency, Italy: Reorganization of Intelligence and Security Services, November 15, 1978. Secret. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. This appraisal, one of many DIA products on foreign intelligence services or activities, was produced in response to a major reorganization of the Italian intelligence services in May 1978, which resulted in the Defense Intelligence Service and Security Service being replaced by SISMI (Service for Information and Military Security) and SISDE (Service for Information and Democratic Security). Document 16: United States Government Memorandum, Subject: DIA Terrorism/Counterterrorism (T/CT) Program, July 30, 1982. Secret. Source: www.governmentattic.org. This memo summarizes DIA’s program for the production of intelligence related to terrorism and counterterrorism. It noted that “a computerized terrorist data base is needed urgently.” It also notes that a DIA component, whose named was deleted, would continue to provide intelligence support to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). The final pages list the terrorism/counterterrorism responsibilities of DIA components. Document 17: Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Estimative Brief, “Nuclear Weapons Systems in China,” April 24, 1984. Secret. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. This brief assessment of nuclear weapon systems in China first notes China’s targeting of Western technology to support its nuclear test program. It then discusses the number, rate, and types of nuclear tests, possible future qualitative impacts on the Chinese nuclear arsenal, production of nuclear delivery systems, possible Chinese interest in an Enhanced Radiation Weapon. It goes on to estimate the number of warheads associated with different delivery systems in 1984, 1989, and 1994. Document 18: James Williams, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Subject: DIA Psychoenergetics Activity – ACTION MEMORANDUM, March 7, 1985. Secret. Source: CREST. This memo from the DIA director to the deputy secretary of defense notes that as a result of an agreement between the Army’s Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and DIA, the latter assumed responsibility for INSCOM’s psychoenergetics (psychokinesis, extrasensory perception, telepathy and remote viewing) program – codenamed CENTER LANE. It also provides historical details on DIA and INSCOM’s remote viewing efforts. Document 19: Defense Intelligence Agency, Organization, Mission and Key Personnel, September 1986. Unclassified. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. This manual describes, as of September 1986, DIA’s organization, mission, and key personnel. Not only does it provide organization details for the DIA as a whole, it contains detailed organizational information on its directorates and their divisions. It also provides a description of the mission as well as the products provided by each directorate. Document 20: Office of the Secretary of Defense Study Team, Report by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Study Team, Reassessment of Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities, Appendix D, October 1987. Unclassified. Source: Editor’s Collection. This portion of a report by a secretary of defense study team contains a series of recommendations concerning DIA – with respect to mission and oversight, readiness and responsiveness, organization and functions, employment of DIA civilian personnel in support of Unified and Command activities, and manpower and budget. In each case it provides background, discussion, conclusions, and recommendations. Document 21: Defense Intelligence Agency, Project SUN STREAK, circa 1990. Classification Not Available. Source: CREST. In the 1970s and, in some cases beyond, the DIA, as well as several other intelligence agencies (including the CIA, the Army’s Intelligence and Security Command, and the Air Force Technical Applications Center), employed individuals alleged to have paranormal capabilities as means of acquiring intelligence about distant events. This overview, produced by the DIA’s science and technology component, focused on Project SUN STREAK, the attempted use of purported psychoenergetics capabilities for intelligence collection. Document 22: Defense Intelligence Agency, Military Leadership Profile, “General Mirza Aslam BEG,” March 1991. Confidential/Noforn. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. One aspect of the DIA’s analytical efforts is the production of biographic sketches or military leadership profiles on foreign military officers. This 1991 profile focuses on Pakistani General Mirza Aslam Beg, at the time the Army chief of staff. Document 23: Defense Intelligence Agency, Plan for the Transfer of the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center and Missile and Space Intelligence Center to the Defense Intelligence Agency, 1991. Unclassified. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. As part of extensive reorganization efforts in defense and military service intelligence in the early 1990s it was decided to transfer responsibility of two Army-managed intelligence efforts – the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) and the Army Missile and Space Intelligence Center (AMSIC) – to DIA. Both remained geographically dispersed units, with no change in name for AFMIC and with AMSIC becoming MSIC. The plan provided a brief treatment of required actions and conclusions as well as extensive appendices that covered issues related to the transfer – including finances, security, production, and change of command. Document 24: Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Assessment, OGA-1040-23-91, Mobile Short-Range Ballistic Missile Targeting in Operation DESERT STORM, circa November 1991. Secret. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. This document, produced months after the end of the 1991 Gulf War, assesses the efforts to locate and destroy Iraqi short-range mobile missiles (SRBM) during the war. Among the topics discussed are pre-war intelligence assumptions, Iraqi SRBM force dispersal, an assessment of extended-range SCUD capabilities, wartime location intelligence, and concealment methods. Document 25: Defense Intelligence Agency, Transition Book, 1992. Classification Not Available. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. This transition book, prepared for the incoming Clinton administration, covers organization and management, budget issues, personnel, and policy issues. Document 26: Defense Intelligence Agency, Biographic Sketch, “General-Lieutenant Aleksander Ivanovich LEBED,” August 1994. Confidential. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. This biographic sketch of Aleksandr Lebed, subsequently a political rival of President Boris Yeltsin, was produced when he was commander of the 14th Army, Moldava. In contrast to most other released biographic sketches it is was released with no redactions (other than the name of the preparer). It covers Lebed’s significance, personal data, and career. Document 27: Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Management Document, Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program: Production Responsibilities, March 1995. Secret. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. This document provides an exceptionally detailed description of defense intelligence analytical efforts,which involve the activities of DIA and several military service intelligence components that respond to DIA tasking. Document 28: Central MASINT Office, CMO: DIA’s Newest Component, March 12, 1999. Unclassified. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. These briefing slides focus on the newly established Central MASINT Office, which would serve as DIA’s (and the Intelligence Community’s) key organization for the management of measurement and signature intelligence activities. Document 29: Defense Intelligence Agency, “Overview of the Origins of the DIA,” February 2000. Source: Editor’s Collection. This overview of DIA, which appeared on the DIA’s internal website, focuses on the evolution of U.S. military intelligence from World War II through developments in the Eisenhower administration that advanced the idea of establishing a Defense Intelligence Agency, and through the early part of the Kennedy administration. Document 30: Donald Rumsfeld to George Tenet, Subject: JITF – CT, September 26, 2001 w/att: Briefing slides: JITF – CT: Supporting a Unified National Campaign. Classification Not Available. Source: www.rumsfeld.com. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, reporting that he had heard that the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center was “too small to do a 24/7 job.” Attached to his memo were briefing slides for a proposed component that was eventually established – the Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism. Document 31: Defense Intelligence Agency, “Iraq: Procuring Possible Nuclear-Related Gas Centrifuge Equipment,” Military Intelligence Digest Supplement, November 30, 2001. Top Secret Codeword. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. This article for DIA’s primary current intelligence publication includes the agency’s assessment of Iraq’s motivations for its on-going purchases of aluminum tubes – which agreed with the CIA and National Ground Intelligence Center assessments. The article asserts that conventional military use is an unlikely reason and explains why DIA reached that conclusion. Document 32: Deane J. Allen and Brian G. Shellum (eds.), DIA History Office, At the Creation 1961-1965, 2002. Unclassified. Source: Defense Intelligence Agency. This document collection contains material concerning the origins of DIA, and the creation and early transformation of DIA directorates and main units. Appendices include interviews, biographies, a chronology, and a glossary. Document 33: Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Assessment, DI-1610-93-02-SCI, Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Weapons Program, September 2002. Top Secret Codeword. Source; DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. One of the many analyses concerning Iraq’s nuclear weapons program in the years just prior to the 2003 invasion was this study, heavily-redacted prior to release. Among the topics addressed are the impact of the lack of international inspections, activities at various facilities, uranium acquisition and processing, gas-centrifuges, nuclear weapons design and fabrication, and foreign assistance. Its conclusions have been redacted in their entirety. Document 34: VAMB Lowell E. Jacoby, Subject: Agency Restructuring, February 11, 2003. Unclassified. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. This unclassified memo, sent to agency personnel, describes DIA Director Lowell Jacoby’s plan for significantly reorganizing DIA. It names the directorates that will constitute DIA’s major components, specifies their mission, and identifies current components to be managed by the new directorates. Document 35: Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Production Plants, May 28, 2003. Unclassified. Source: www.cia.gov. This joint CIA-DIA paper, prepared for public release and based significantly on the claims of an Iraqi defector codenamed CURVEBALL (Document 36), presents the two agencies’ case for the existence of Iraqi mobile biological warfare production facilities – a case that eventually fell apart in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. Document 36: Vice Admiral L.E. Jacoby, Director, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Info Memo, Subject: CURVEBALL Background, January 14, 2005. Secret Codeword. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. CURVEBALL is the subject of this information memo, authored by DIA Director Lowell Jacoby. The source description section notes his role in the claim that Iraq had transportable biological warfare agent production facilities, his claimed background, and provides an assessment of his knowledge of the Iraqi biological warfare program. It also summarizes DIA’s involvement and the intelligence provided, and concludes with an assessment of his credibility (or lack thereof). The redactions in the section on DIA involvement are clearly Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), BND, and BND (respectively), all aimed at removing references to the German Federal Intelligence Service’s connection to CURVEBALL. Document 37: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report No. 05-INTEL-18, Review of the Actions Taken to Deter, Detect, and Investigate the Espionage Activities of Ana Belen Montes, June 16, 2005. Top Secret/Codeword/Noforn. Source: DoD Freedom of Information Act Appeal Release. This report was produced following the arrest of Ana Belen Montes, the DIA’s senior Cuban specialist, who was charged with supplying classified information to the Cuban intelligence service between 1985 and the date of her arrest. It consists of eight parts – an introduction, the “enigmatic life” of Montes, government service and her commitment to espionage, her maturation as analyst and spy, “a prominent life unraveled,” findings, recommendations and observations, a set of appendices, and management comments. Document 38:DoD Directive 5105.21, Subject: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), March 18, 2008. Unclassified. Source: www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. This directive is the most recent charter for DIA, and describes, inter alia, the agency’s mission, organization and management, and responsibilities and functions. Included in the section on responsibilities and functions are subsections concerning all-source intelligence analysis, human intelligence, joint staff intelligence, technical collection, and counterintelligence and security. Another section describes the authorities of the DIA director. Document 39a: Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to: Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Subject: Establishment of the National Center for Medical Intelligence, January 9, 2008. Unclassified/For Official Use Only. Document 39b:Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to: Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Subject: Establishment of the National Center for Medical Intelligence, January 9, 2008. Unclassified/For Official Use Only. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. These two documents represent the initial release (Document 39a) and the release subsequent to appeal (Document 39b) of a memo from the DIA director advocating the renaming of the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, and replacing that title with “National Center for Medical Intelligence” to reflect the center’s role in providing medical intelligence to organizations outside the Department of Defense. Document 40: Defense Intelligence Agency, “U.S. Dedicates National Center for Medical Intelligence; Pentagon Facility Expands Into National Mission,” July 2, 2008. Unclassified. Source: Defense Intelligence Agency. This press release announces the transformation of the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (Document 23) into the National Center for Medical Intelligence, as had been requested by DIA Director Michael Maples. The release provides some history concerning the DoD medical intelligence effort and describes some of the reasons for the renaming. The change did not affect the center’s status as a component of DIA. Document 41: Defense Intelligence Agency, “Organization of the Defense Intelligence Agency,” November 25, 2008. Unclassified. Source: www.dia.gov. This chart shows the basic DIA organizational structure in late November 2008. It indicates that the structure established by the Jacoby reorganization (Document 34) remained largely intact. Document 42: DoD Instruction 6420.01, Subject: National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI), March 20, 2009. Unclassified. Source: www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. This DoD directive serves as the charter for the National Center for Medical Intelligence. Document 43: Defense Intelligence Agency, Overview: Directorate for Analysis, 2011. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. This brochure, circa 2011, describes the customers, organizational structure, workforce, and product of the Directorate for Analysis. Document 44: Michael B. Petersen, DIA Historical Research Support Branch, Legacy of Ashes, Trial by Fire: The Origins of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Cuban Missile Crisis Crucible, 2011. Unclassified. Source: www.dia.mil. This monograph, produced by the DIA’s history office, begins by examining the state of U.S. military intelligence after World War II, then discusses defense and intelligence reform, the path to the creation of the DIA, and the agency’s role in the Cuban missile crisis. Document 45: Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Digest: Special Historical Edition, DIA 50th Anniversary, September 29, 2011. Unclassified. Source: www.dia.mil. This DIA history office product, reproduces articles in DIA publications on six topics – Cuba, Afghanistan, Russia/Soviet Union, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Indonesia. Along with the articles are discussions of background, the DIA effort, and historical significance. Document 46: Michael B. Petersen, DIA Historical Research Support Branch, The Vietnam Cauldron: Defense Intelligence in the War for Southeast Asia, 2012. Unclassified. Source: www.dia.mil. This monograph covers a number of topics concerning DIA and developments in Southeast Asia from the 1960s to mid-1970s – including the expansion of DIA, developments in the Vietnam war, intelligence estimates and the ground war, the USS Pueblo Incident, the Son Tay prison rescue attempt, the fall of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident. Document 47: Department of Defense Inspector General, DODIG-2013-112, Assessment of Department of Defense Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities, August 5, 2013. Secret/Noforn. Source: Department of Defense Inspector General Freedom of Information Act Release. This report by the Defense Department’s inspector general focuses on the long-term intelligence analysis capabilities of the “Defense Intelligence Enterprise” – which includes DIA and the analytical components of the military services and combatant commands. Topics covered include the subject matter expertise of analysts, the failure to satisfy command requirements, and efforts to improve DIA databases. Document 48: Department of Defense (DoD) Information Review Task Force 2 (IRTF-2), Initial Assessment of Impacts Resulting from the Compromise of Classified Material by a Former National Security Agency Contractor, December 18, 2013. Source: http://s3.documentcloud.org. This heavily-redacted report was produced in response to the disclosure of documents provided to journalists by Edward Snowden concerning the activities of the National Security Agency and several allied SIGINT agencies. The released portion provides some background on the creation of a task force and the assessment that “The scope of the compromised knowledge related to U.S. intelligence capabilities is staggering.” Document 49a: Lt. Gen. Michael F. Flynn, Subject: FLYNN Sends: DR/DD Transition Announcement, April 30, 2014. Unclassified. Document 49b: Michael T. Flynn and David R. Shedd to DIA Workforce, Memorandum, Subject: Transition, April 30, 2014, Unclassified. Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. These two documents concern the departure of DIA Director Michael Flynn and his deputy, David Shedd. Flynn was widely reported to have been forced out due to conflicts with both superiors and subordinates. Among the accomplishments noted by Flynn in the memo to the workforce is the DIA reorganization, which established unified regional centers (Document 51), incorporating personnel from several directorates, to address intelligence issues. Document 50: Lt. Gen. Vincent R. Stewart, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment, February 3, 2015, Unclassified. Source: https://armedservices.house.gov. As of this publication, the most recent assessment of worldwide threats, produced by the DIA, was presented in February 2015 by Michael Flynn’s successor as director. It covered Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism, regional threats from Russia and the Middle East to Latin America, and six categories of global threats (to U.S. space systems, cyber security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, proliferation of advanced conventional weapons, infectious diseases, and foreign intelligence and insider threats. Document 51: Defense Intelligence Agency, “Organization,” November 2015. Unclassified. Source: www.dia.mil. Prior to his departure (Document 49a, Document 49b) DIA Director Michael Flynn initiated the most significant reorganization of DIA since 2003 (Document 34) in which he established centers to be the focus of DIA’s efforts with respect to different regions of the world and terrorism, drawing on personnel from DIA’s directorates. This development was similar to the subsequent reorganization of the CIA. This page from the DIA’s website provides a list of those centers and other agency components, although there is no reference to the three major DIA centers subordinate to the Directorate of Analysis that existed before the reorganization and are located outside of Washington – the National Center for Medical Intelligence (Document 23, Document 42), the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (Document 23), and the Underground Facility Analysis Center. The listing (and the links to the inspector general, senior enlisted advisor, and National Intelligence University) is the entirety of DIA organizational information currently released – either on the agency’s website or via the Freedom of Information Act – and contrasts sharply with the organizational details released in earlier years (Document 19). |
Communiqué: DIA's In-House PublicationCommuniqué was the DIA's unclassified, in-house magazine that was available not only to DIA employees but their families, and contained significant information about DIA that the agency often redacted from other documents released in response to Freedom of Information Act requests. Publication was halted in 2013 following a directive from the agency's director, Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn. (Click on each year to view issues) |
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