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DRAFT E.A. Gullion December 5, 1956


Position Paper on Future Production of Fissionable Materials

(Re Paragraph A, Part III, Memorandum of June 29, 1956 as approved November 21 in DPC Note No. 96)

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December 5, 1956

DISARMAMENT STAFF Executive Secretariat The White House



POSITION PAPER ON PARAGRAPH A OF MR. STASSEN'S JUNE 29. 1956 MEMORANDUM AS APPROVED IN THE NOVEMBER 21 CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT

I. PROBLEM

To outline a US position upon the following paragraph for use in forthcoming negotiations.

"Paragraph A. The U.S. should propose that subsequent to December 31, 1957 — or as soon as possible thereafter and within one month after the establishment of a satisfactory functioning inspection system to verify the commitment is accomplished—all future production of fissionable materials:

- (a) shall be subject to effective international inspection, and
- (b) shall be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international supervision.

The inspection system, including appropriate ground, aerial, and scientific components, should be promptly and reciprocally installed and its effective operation in states having significant military potential should be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the US (and other key states), prior to the taking effect of commitment (b). The continuing effectiveness of the inspection system and the continuing adherence of essential states having a significant military potential, shall be a condition for the continuation of the commitment."

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That UK, French and Canadian approval of the above position be obtained in the course of forthcoming negotiations.

June 29 proposals, as amended.

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- b. That our allies be advised that the execution of the proposed program would take account of their respective positions. The United States would not now offer to assist the UK in the nuclear fields, but any inquiries or propositions the UK makes should be sympathetically received with indications of possible constructive U.S. action. (See paragraph D of June 29 proposals, as amended).
- c. That the UK, France and Canada be advised that the US plans at an early date (i.e., after Task Force considerations) to exchange views with them with respect to what constitutes "effective international inspection" for the purposes of this proposal.
- d. That we point out that this proposal permits refabrication of stockpiled material; also, that it does hamper the use of nuclear fuel for propulsion purposes or various mixed military-civil application.
- e. That the UK, France and Canada be informed that the execution of this proposal is not contingent upon the other paragraphs of the US outline plan, nor upon any measure for regulation and limitation of conventional forces.
- f. That in the event of inquiries upon any of the following topics, 2 we advise our conferees that these are under study (see Discussion infra), and that we be prepared, if possible, to exchange tentative views on:
 - 1. the manner and timing of presenting these proposals to the Soviet Union.
 - 2. the identity of the "states with significant military potential" for the purposes of this paragraph. (See also, paragraph L of June 29 proposals).
 - 3. measures to be taken with respect to control or accounting for "past production" as opposed to future production after December 31, 1957.
 - 4. the time table envisaged by the US in more specific terms.
 - 5. a definition of "non-weapons purposes" in the context of this program.

III. DISCUSSION2

A. The proposal is conceived to enhance the security of the United States and its allies by:

^{&#}x27;According to information, (EAG).

2See also "Study Paper" (EAG), October 15, 1956.

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- 1. Curbing nuclear weapons development in the Soviet bloc before it reaches its more dangerous peak;
- 2. By preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in umpredicable circumstances among a number of nations which do not now possess them.
- B. The UK is unlikely to accept a cut-off of nuclear weapons production unless she is compensated in some way; for example, by US donation of weapon stocks and know-how. France and Canada are likely to be less concerned.
- 1. The negotiability of these proposals will soon be seen to depend upon what is meant by "effective international inspection." US, UK and French views, as expressed at London in May, 1956, appear to differ; e.g., on the extent to which inspection would apply to nuclear weapons, facilities and installations; and to undisclosed or cancelled "objects of control." The US has not yet given the Soviet Union an explicit answer to its inquiries as to whether the Eisenhower proposal relates to nuclear facilities.
 - 2. The U.S. appears to be thinking of an "executive agent" concept of the inspection activity which would result in a less autonomous international authority than our allies seem to have in mind.
- D. It is believed that the US would be prepared to execute most provisions of the new policy independently, one or the other. Our allies may inquire about a degree of separability.
- E. A number of questions may be raised upon which US policy is still in formation. For example;
 - 1. We might discuss the program for negotiating with the Soviet Union.

Prior to the recent Hungarian crisis, bilateral negotiations, with the concurrence of the allies, had been contemplated. Such bilaterals may no longer be so palatable to the Allies.

- 2. It is not clear which states like China, Japan and Poland are deemed to have significant political potential.
- 3. Paragraph A would apparently not require disclosure or verification of past stockpiles. Yet, paragraph E, of the June 29 proposals speaks of "proportionate" transfers of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. The latter may mean that the increments so transferred would be in a verifiable ratio to a declared stockpile; or it may mean, merely, that they would be in a theoretical proportion, much as USA and USSR contributions to "atoms-for-peace" are now reckened. Our allies may consider that the exemption of all past production from controls would be advantageous to the Soviet Union.

- 4. A line has not yet been clearly drawn in US policy, as to weapons and non-weapons usage. Presumably propulsive machinery for ships and aircraft is not supposed to be designated for "weapons use."
- 5. Our allies may also wish to know our thinking on the lapse of time which would ensue between promulgation of the proposals and the entering of the program into effect. We may wish to talk in terms of 18 months to two years.