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This document consists of 8 pages
Copy No. 1 of 8, Series A

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 16 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Further Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons in Support of Non-U.S. NATO Forces

By my letter of April 11, 1961, you were informed that the matter of U.S. nuclear weapons support of NATO was under intensive study which would result in a decision as to the future course of action concerning allocation of nuclear weapons to support non-U.S. NATO forces. It was proposed that, until such a decision was reached, no further nuclear weapons should be allocated for support of non-U.S. forces. By your memorandum of May 20, 1961, you agreed to this proposal and stated that the results of the studies and recommendations based upon them should be communicated to you before further dispersal of nuclear weapons for support of non-U.S. forces would be authorized.

As a result of the National Security Council Action of April 24, 1961, subject: "NATO and the Atlantic Nations," several studies were initiated to determine the extent to which its objectives could be accomplished and the means of accomplishing them. The status of those studies and the actions taken to date in pursuance of the NSC NATO action are summarized in the Annex A to this memorandum. Further studies are now in train, and we will be in a better position to make recommendations to you about long-range programs and policies upon completion. In the meantime, certain interim actions appear required in regard to dispersal of nuclear weapons.

From the studies we have undertaken, it appears that the following questions are the most relevant to our policy decision concerning such interim dispersal of nuclear weapons to meet immediate operational needs.

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1. Will the weapons be under adequate U.S. control both with respect to [redacted]

2. Is additional dispersal politically necessary to maintain the cohesion of the Alliance and, if so, in what numbers?

3. Will a policy that permits additional dispersal be consistent with our objectives of restricting the nuclear build-up in Europe?

As indicated in Annex A, problems associated with the first question have been studied in detail. Certain deficiencies in our [redacted] arrangements and in our [redacted] procedures were found and corrective action has now been taken to overcome them. In my opinion, [redacted] over these weapons is now adequate to permit dispersal to meet immediate needs. Further measures are in train; we are developing the [redacted] on an urgent basis, and it will be applied to all future designed and manufactured nuclear delivery systems dispersed to [redacted] Whether such devices can be successfully developed and installed in existing weapons must be decided on a system by system basis after review of [redacted] proposals. Our intent is to apply the maximum safeguards that are technically and operationally feasible; we will report further to you on the progress of these studies as they develop.

The second question is more complex and involves not only U.S. commitments made in the past but also the whole question of NATO strategy and the role to be assigned to nuclear weapons. We have encouraged and helped, or promised to help, our NATO Allies to acquire certain nuclear delivery systems; we have set out to train their personnel to use these systems and to install necessary nuclear storage facilities. In their view, these nuclear delivery systems will play a major role in

the defense of Europe. It would therefore be extremely disruptive to Alliance cohesion if we were now to withhold the nuclear weapons necessary to make fully effective those specific weapons systems which we are committed to provide our Allies, except as continuing discussion of NATO strategy may lead NATO freely to decide to change the programs in question. We are now taking the lead in such a full and frank discussion of NATO strategy with our allies in the NAC. We do not want to prejudice the results of this discussion either by dispersing more nuclear weapons than are immediately required to fulfill U.S. commitments or by unilaterally revoking those commitments, thus giving rise to allied charges of bad faith. Until this discussion leads to changes in programs, therefore, in my opinion we should continue to disperse nuclear weapons for use by our Allies in numbers sufficient to make fully effective the delivery systems that we are committed to provide, as these become operational. The number and nature of delivery systems to which we are thus committed are set forth in a list which was compiled by the State and Defense Departments last Spring. Even in these cases, the United States does not take the lead; its posture is one of willingness to consider requests from other governments for these delivery systems. As such requests are received, they are jointly reviewed by State and Defense to ensure that they are fully consistent with existing policy.

On the other hand, it is not now necessary that we endorse requirements for nuclear delivery systems over and above those we are already committed to provide, notably MC 26/4 requirements for end 1966, in view of possible changes in our NATO strategy and the fact that we are not yet committed to providing the enlarged nuclear support indicated by such force requirements. We will instruct US personnel concerned, including US MAAG personnel in NATO countries, that we have not yet decided to provide, and that these countries should not therefore now be led to expect, these additional nuclear delivery systems in programming future defense efforts.

Nuclear weapons systems which are already operational, or will become so by July 1, 1962, include:

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[redacted]

Based on USCINCEUR estimates, providing nuclear weapons for these forces will involve an increase of weapons dispersed [redacted] at Annex B shows breakdowns of the delivery systems and types of nuclear weapons programmed for dispersal in FY 1962 for use by non-U.S. forces.

Beyond July 1, 1962, additional F-84, F-100, F-104G and G-91 squadrons are programmed. Our requests for approval of warhead dispersal for such additional systems will wait on progress in current studies of NATO strategy. [redacted] programs for certain of our Allies are also in various stages of negotiation and if carried out will involve a concomitant requirement for nuclear warheads. Our commitment to provide [redacted] is specifically subject to review, as I stated to [redacted] on April 26, in the light of studies of NATO strategy. Annex C contains a discussion of warhead requirements for various programmed delivery systems.

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An associated problem involves the transmission of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data to Allied nations during the early stages of procurement in order that delivery systems will be compatible with U.S. nuclear weapons and for training and planning purposes. This is particularly a factor now with respect to those countries programming the F-104G, and there will be a further need in the near future to make Restricted Data available to those countries programming the G-91 aircraft and the Pershing and Sergeant missiles.

[redacted] We have determined that communication of such information on these weapons and on the [redacted] will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security as required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. In order to meet urgent requirements for a compatibility program which was scheduled, the Atomic Energy Commission joined in a determination only for [redacted] The Commission stated its concern for the possibilities of compromising Restricted Data in the weapons and in making the limited determination stated that it was done with the understanding that the Commission would be afforded an opportunity to review the proposed physical security arrangements to safeguard the Restricted Data contained in [redacted] in connection with the determination prior to their actual dispersal.

The Atomic Energy Commission has not agreed to our proposals concerning transmission of information and dispersal of two-stage weapons contained in this memorandum. The Commission believes that distribution of two-stage weapons and the necessary information concerning them to make [redacted] together with the information that might be gained covertly by the user nations, could contribute significantly to the capabilities of technically advanced countries such as [redacted]

[redacted] The majority of the Commission doubts that even the most vigorous, feasible security measures could reduce the risk to justify determinations as required by the Atomic Energy Act for passing such Restricted Data to allied nations as we are proposing.

As indicated above, we believe that our arrangements for security of atomic weapons are adequate. Actions which have been taken in this regard are indicated in Annex A. Further, in view of the importance to the Alliance of not withholding from our Allies weapons comparable to those which our own forces are provided for similar missions, we consider it necessary to proceed with communication of Restricted Data and dispersal of [redacted] weapons in support of these forces programmed for compatible delivery systems which we are committed to provide our Allies. [redacted] We will disperse the minimum number and yield of warheads needed to meet immediate requirements. We are developing procedures with the Department of State which will ensure that political as well as military considerations are fully reflected in this determination.

In view of the above, we are attaching at Annex D a determination for transmitting information [redacted] for your consideration. A list of additional determinations of a similar nature which will be called for as we proceed with programs to which we are already committed is at Annex E.

With respect to the third question, additional dispersal will, of course, result in some nuclear build-up in Europe. However, in my opinion, control over the nuclear build-up should be exercised through the programming of the delivery systems and through our formulation of NATO strategy rather than by withholding the nuclear weapons needed to make these systems effective. This is now being done by our review of NATO force requirements, including MRBMs and the related question of strike aircraft and our continuing discussions of NATO strategy both within the NAC and bilaterally with certain of our Allies.

As indicated above, we wish to conduct our dispersal program in such a way as not to prejudice the results of this review and these discussions. To this end, we are proposing to disperse only nuclear weapons to meet the immediate operational requirements which we are committed to fulfill.

[redacted]

Recommendations:

1. That we be authorized to disperse, under U.S. custody, weapons for use by non-U.S. forces as indicated in Annex B. Authority for any additional dispersals will be sought, as necessary, on a case-by-case basis as the forces become operational, and in the light of continuing studies of NATO strategy.

[redacted] State and Defense will cooperate urgently in a thorough study of the strike aircraft program, in the light of such factors as existing commitments, NATO strategy, and the MRBM program now under consideration. We will make clear that weapons being dispersed for strike aircraft in the meantime are [redacted] subject to review in the light of continuing studies of NATO strategy.

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2. That we be authorized to provide to allied nations information in the respects indicated below, except that no information will be provided which the receiving country would probably consider committed the U.S. to dispersal of weapons [redacted]

a. Restricted Data, in connection with delivery systems referred to in Annex E to which we are committed, with the [redacted] follow-on provision of weapons in support of the forces concerned is subject to review in the light of continuing studies of NATO strategy. Approval, in principle, of provision of this information is requested with exception of certain information [redacted] as indicated below. Determinations as required by the Atomic Energy Act will be processed in accordance with Executive Order 10841 as amended covering specific information proposed for communication to the Allies.

b. [redacted]

Roswell Gilpatric

Inclosures:
Annexes A thru E

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cc to Gen. Taylor 4/2/62

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ANNEX A

NSC ACTION "NATO AND THE ATLANTIC NATIONS"

In reaching our recommendations on objectives and procedures the principal objective of the NSC policy directive has been interpreted to be consideration of allied positions looking toward cohesion of the Alliance.

Concerning nuclear forces, the NSC NATO Action provided that:

"a. The President should state that an effective nuclear capability will be maintained in the European area and that nuclear weapons will not be withdrawn without adequate replacement. Nuclear weapons in NATO Europe may be regrouped as further studies may indicate."

This policy was conveyed to the North Atlantic Council by Ambassador Finletter on April 26, 1961. The NAC has been briefed by General Norstad concerning the substantial nuclear capability that exists within NATO.

[redacted]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that all reasonable command and control measures must be developed and employed consistent with operational requirements.

[redacted]

Incl. to 1523

[redacted]

To improve command and control, certain measures were indicated and actions have been taken. Steps have been taken to improve communications to the U. S. custodial units which control U. S. weapons for NATO. [redacted] After development of these devices, each weapon system used by NATO will be considered and, consistent with operational requirements, a decision will be made whether the device will be installed and at what level control of the link will be exercised. Such devices can also be incorporated in weapons as a mechanism for assuring custody.

In the meantime, General Partridge has suggested measures which should be taken immediately to improve security of weapons in NATO, including clarification of the responsibility of U. S. Commands to destroy quickly weapons in their custody if they are subject to overrun or capture.

"b. Additional resources should be used to strengthen the nuclear capability now in Europe only where (i) going programs are so far underway that they could not be changed without serious adverse political effects, or (ii) the increase will not divert needed resources from non-nuclear tasks and is clearly required to cover needs either for replacement of expansion that cannot be met from outside the theater. The 1963 MC-70 goals, as well as the proposed 1966 goals, should be reviewed by the State and Defense Departments from this standpoint."

Such a review of U. S. and Allied commitments reveals a number of nuclear weapon system programs which are beyond recall without serious adverse political effects. These programs are not inconsistent with SACEUR's 1966 force requirements since in each case the commitments are less than indicated as required in 1966. Systems committed which are of particular concern are the Pershing [redacted] and F-104G aircraft.

"c. The Secretary of Defense should undertake a study of the extent to which nuclear weaponsin NATO Europe could be made more secure [redacted] Some possible safeguards to be considered in such a study are discussed in the body of this report. These include making SACEUR headquarters and communications more secure against wartime disruption."

These problems have been studied in detail by General Partridge's Committee and othersas indicated previously. In addition, Dr. Johnson, The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) and General Leon Johnson have made a thorough review of this matter. Both have supported the conclusions of General Partridge's study and the resulting action taken concerning the need for increased security of communications and the improvement of procedures for the destruction of weapons in event of imminent capture. This is a matter of continuing interest, however, and additional actions may be necessary in time.

"d. SACEUR procedures for ordering use of nuclear weapons, once he has been given political direction, should be clarified and made more explicit."

Immediate actions have been taken in this regard as a result of the reviews conducted by General Partridge and Dr. Johnson. The dual channel for release of weapons and nuclear forces in use by SACEUR/USCINCEUR have been reviewed and actions have been taken to correct deficiencies and strengthen this system. [redacted] The NAC has been invited to consider this problem and there are studies in progress by military organizations of NATO.

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ANNEX B

RECOMMENDED DISPERSAL FY 62
NON-U. S. FORCES

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Country of Unit	Country of Storage	Weapon System/ Weapon	No of Wpns as of 30 Jun 62	In Place as of 6 Mar 62	Additional Dispersals

[redacted]

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2d

Country of Unit	Country of Storage	Weapon System/ Weapon	No of Wpns as of 30 Jun 62	In Place as of 6 Mar 62	Additional Dispersals
[redacted]					

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Country of Unit	Country of Storage	Weapon System/ Weapon	No of Wpns as of 30 Jun 62	In Place as of 6 Mar 62	Additional Dispersals
[redacted]					

C

(Changed to read ... 97-57.
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ANNEX C

NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRESENTLY PROGRAMMED FOR USE BY ALLIED NATIONS

The nuclear weapons delivery systems presently programmed for Allied use in the NATO 1966 forces consist of fighter-bomber aircraft including the F100 and F-104G; missiles, including the Sergeant and Pershing for ground support and Jupiter IRBMs.

a. Aircraft

(1) F100 aircraft are presently available to Turkey, France and Denmark. [redacted]

(2) F-104G aircraft are being purchased by NATO nations under a consortium arrangement. Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Greece, Turkey and Canada are expected to have this type of aircraft in view of present commitments and the NATO 1966 force requirements. [redacted]

(3) [redacted]

(4) [redacted]

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(5) [redacted] The first War Reserve weapon is presently scheduled to enter the stockpile in August of 1962.

b. Pershing

The Pershing is a surface-to-surface, inertially guided, solid propellant ballistic missile. Minimum range is 100 nautical miles with guidance optimized for ranges between 200 and 300 nautical miles. Pershing is intended as a replacement for Redstone. [redacted] However, it could not be provided in time to meet our present commitments and would be more susceptible to countermeasures.

The Pershing is expected to become operational in January 1963. The missile production schedule has been established to satisfy established requirements for both U. S. and non-U. S. use. [redacted]

c. [redacted]

The [redacted] The missile production schedule has been established to satisfy requirements for both U. S. and non-U. S. use.

[redacted]

d. Thor and Jupiter IRBMs

[redacted]

At the present time, restrictions have been imposed on preparations and plans [redacted]

When we placed a hold on [redacted]

Of particular concern was the possibility of France obtaining such information. In examining the various ways in which such [redacted] one which appeared possible was through the [redacted] A thorough study was made of this and procedures have been established which provide for adequate security against this possibility.

If France continues her effort at the present level, she will probably test her first thermonuclear bomb by 1965-1966, and can have such weapons in production by 1966-1968, based on National Intelligence Estimates. However, it is possible and the

pressures are great to achieve such a system parallel to the availability of the MIRAGE IV bomber. In this case the bombs would be needed by 1965 or in about three years. To produce a highly sophisticated design like the Mark 28 bomb or the warhead for Pershing, would probably require additional time and tests. Therefore, compromise of essential elements of the design of these weapons could advance French capability substantially, but denying the information to France is most unlikely to prohibit her from obtaining thermonuclear weapons of her own.

Countries other than France cannot capitalize on design information until they at least have production capability for nuclear materials or are able to procure the materials from producing countries.

In view of the importance to the Alliance of not withholding from our Allies weapons comparable to those with which our own forces are provided for similar missions, we consider it necessary to proceed with [redacted] in support of all non-U. S. forces in Europe programmed for compatible delivery systems. We will continue, however, to emphasize adequate measures to protect design information as well as the weapons themselves.

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ANNEX D

ATOMIC INFORMATION PROPOSED FOR COMMUNICATION TO GERMANY

1. The information outlined in paragraphs 2 through 4 below applies to the following nuclear weapons (except as indicated):

2. YIELDS.

3. TECHNOLOGY AND SAFETY:

a. Characteristics and purposes of fuzes and external features of weapons as required for loading and delivery operations.

b. Sequence of operation of fuzing systems to include circuitry, types of components, arming operations, fuze settings, and fuzing options.

c. Type and operational description of those safety features of weapons and ancillary equipment as required for loading or delivery operations.

d. The probability against accidental or premature nuclear explosion.

e. Safety criteria which reveal the approximate amount of high explosive in specific weapons when information is revealed by reference to quantities of explosive such as:

(1) Incremental amounts as given in tables of Quantity-Distance Standards for Explosives as approved by

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the Armed Services Safety Board, on 1 December 1955. (In lieu of an increment, [redacted] the mid-point, [redacted] may be used.)

(2) Equivalent weight of a standard general purpose bomb.

f. These are implosion weapons and are one-point safe.

g. [redacted]

4. STORAGE INFORMATION:

Location of planned or actual nuclear weapon stockpile storage sites in support of [redacted]

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ANNEX E

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FORESEEABLE REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMUNICATION TO ALLIES ON THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS

For Planning, Compatibility and Training:

(Approximate Date)

[redacted]

For Planning Only:

[redacted]

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Read related article:

The U.S. Nuclear Presence in Western Europe, 1954-1962, Part II

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