

hwb chon

hwb  
signs  
1930 hrs  
4/24/79

SECRET

OES/NEP:MGUHN:NEA/PAB:MHORNBLow:JW  
7/23/79, EXT. 27036  
P:DDNEWSOM

T:LBENSON  
PM/NPP:MHUMPHREYS  
L:MICHEL  
NSC:THORNTON

NEA:CONSTABLE:PECK  
ACDA/NP:CVAM'DOREN  
D:DEITZ  
NSC:OPLINGER

IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

NODIS

E.O. 11652: RDS 7/23/79 {GUHN, MICHAEL} OES/NEP

TAGS: TECH, ENRG, PARM, PK

SUBJECT: ZIA'S WRITTEN ASSURANCE OFFER

REFS: {A} ISLAMABAD 8216, {B} PARIS 22907, {C} STATE 185580

1. {S} ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FYI. WE UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT FOLLOW-UP ON ZIA'S OFFER AND AGREE THAT SEEKING ASSURANCES WHICH ARE NOT ADEQUATE FOR WAIVER OF SYMINGTON AMENDMENT (AS DISCUSSED PARA BELOW) IS NOT VERY ATTRACTIVE CHOICE AND, AS YOU NOTE, HAS SOME VALID POINTS AGAINST IT. BUT ON BALANCE, FOR REASONS OUTLINED BELOW, WE STILL WANT TO GO AHEAD.

3. WE RECOGNIZE THAT GOP STRATEGY MAY BE TO STRING ANY DIALOGUE ALONG WITH DIALOGUE ALONG WHILE IT STUBBORNLY PURSUES A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY (REFS A, B AND SRF RECENT REPORTING). SUCH A MACHIAVELLIAN LINE MAY, HOWEVER, BE TURNED AGAINST ITS NUCLEAR-PLANNERS AT SOME NUCLEAR PLANNERS AT SOME STAGE. FOR EXAMPLE, ASSURANCES ON "NO EXPLOSIVES" MAY STRENGTHEN HAND OF SOME WHO MAY OPPOSE DEVELOPMENTS NOW OR IN THE FUTURE (PARTICULARLY

DDN  
MG/M  
LB  
C/P  
HM  
CV  
L M  
D D  
NSC T  
NSC O  
S/P K  
S/ASR  
P S  
INR S  
OES TR  
S/S SS

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 46819

SECRET

12

IF THE FORMAL PLEDGE LATER BECOMES PUBLIC} AND SUCH COMMITMENTS MAY AT LEAST INCREASE "PARIAH-LIKE NATURE" OF ANY GOP ACTIONS CONTRAVENING THEM.

4. WE WOULD ATTEMPT TO BUILD ON SUCH ASSURANCES IN ISLAMABAD BY ENGAGING GOP IN FURTHER DIALOGUE REGARDING ACTIONS IT IS TAKING WHICH APPEAR TO BE IN CONFLICT WITH DECLARED PEACEFUL INTENT OF NUCLEAR PROGRAM. MOREOVER, REMOVAL OF THE AMBIGUITY ABOUT PNEs IS A VALUABLE GAIN IN ITSELF.

5. WE RECOGNIZE YOUR POINTS THAT THE ABOVE ARE SLENDER THREADS AND THAT OBTAINING ZIA'S ASSURANCES ~~ACTIONS~~ CURTAILING HIS PROGRAM (WHICH COULD FORM A BASIS IS A LONG SHOT AT BEST. ON OTHER HAND, WE SEE LITTLE REASON NOT TO TAKE UP THIS ADMITTEDLY SMALL OPENING IN THE DIALOGUE WHICH, IF IT LED TO AN ASSURANCE, MAY BE USED FOR SOME LEVERAGE IN OUR FURTHER EFFORTS:

{A} IF SUCH AN ASSURANCE WERE OBTAINED, WE DOUBT THAT THIS WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE EITHER IAEA OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS AS PAKISTANI PROGRAMS INCONSISTENT WITH THE DECLARED PEACEFUL INTENT CONTINUED.

{B} AS FOR THE PUBLIC CONFRONTATION POSSIBILITY YOU NOTE, WE AGREE THERE ARE RISKS HERE, BUT ALSO BELIEVE THERE ARE RISKS IN A PUBLIC MODE OF NEVER HAVING TAKEN HIM UP OR FOLLOWED THROUGH ON HIS OFFER. WE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN EXPLAINING AT SOME FUTURE TIME WHY WE FAILED TO EXPLORE EVERY OPENING WE WERE GIVEN TO OBTAIN WRITTEN "COMMITMENTS" FROM PAKISTANIS. THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN NO-TEST ASSURANCES AND THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT; IN PUBLIC WE COULD WELCOME ZIA'S ASSURANCES WHILE POINTING OUT THAT WE ARE CONTINUING TO PURSUE THE QUESTION OF ACQUISITION OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES WHICH IS THE TARGET OF SYMINGTON.

{C} IF WE ASSUME ZIA BACKS DOWN ON HIS OFFER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW WE ARE ANY WORSE OFF THAN TODAY AND IF

~~{D}~~ IF WE WERE NOT TO FOLLOW UP ON ZIA'S OFFER, WE WOULD BE ~~MINUS~~ WHATEVER SLIGHT OPENING MAY ACCRUE IF ZIA PROVIDED HE REFUSES, WE MAY LATER BE ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE {PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY} OF YET ANOTHER INSTANCE OF HIS REJECTING FOLLOW THROUGH ON AN OFFER.

{D} AS FLIMSY AS ZIA OFFER MIGHT BE IT COULD HAVE SOME UTILITY IN BINDING SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT OR GIVING A SUCCESSOR AN EXCUSE IF IT WAS INCLINED TO WORK WITH US.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 66819

SECRET

SECRET

| 3

6. FINALLY, WHEN WE GET TO THE BOTTOM OF THE MATTER, ZIA'S OFFER IS A MATTER OF RECORD AND HAS, IN EFFECT, PUT US ON THE SPOT. IGNORING IT MAY BE MISINTERPRETED NOT ONLY BY GOP BUT BY OTHERS AS WELL. WE THEREFORE CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT TO TAKE UP HIS OFFERING IN AN ATTEMPT TO FURTHER OUR DIALOGUE, WHILE RECOGNIZING ITS LIMITATIONS AS A FIRST STEP.

7. CONCERNING QUESTION RAISED PARA 2(A) OF REF A, AS YOU KNOW THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT MAY BE WAIVED IF THE PRESIDENT DETERMINES THAT TERMINATION OF ASSISTANCE WOULD HAVE A "SERIOUS ADVERSE EFFECT ON VITAL U.S. INTERESTS" AND THAT HE HAS RECEIVED RELIABLE ASSURANCES THAT PAKISTAN WILL NOT "ACQUIRE" OR "DEVELOP" NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ASSIST OTHER NATIONS IN DOING SO. HE MUST CERTIFY THESE IN WRITING TO THE CONGRESS, SETTING FORTH THE REASONS SUPPORTING SUCH DETERMINATIONS IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE. A KEY FACTOR WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF RELIABILITY IS WHETHER THE SUBSTANCE OF AN ASSURANCE IS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER AVAILABLE INFORMATION CONCERNING A COUNTRY'S INTENTIONS. CLEARLY, AS YOU NOTE, PAKISTAN'S PRESENT SENSITIVE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH A "PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAM". APART FROM THE ISSUE OF CREDIBILITY, THE LANGUAGE OF ZIA'S ASSURANCE DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN U.S. LAW. (FOR EXAMPLE, ZIA'S LANGUAGE DOES NOT OFFER THE REQUISITE ELEMENT OF ASSURANCE OF NOT ASSISTING OTHER NATIONS IN ACQUIRING OR DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ALSO, IT IS NOT EXPLICIT ON THE MATTER OF NOT "ACQUIRING" OR "DEVELOPING" BUT RATHER REFERS TO "CONDUCTING AN EXPLOSION".) HOWEVER, IT COULD BE DETERMINED THAT SUCH AN ASSURANCE FORMED PART OF THE REQUIRED "RELIABLE ASSURANCES" IF THEY WERE FOLLOWED BY CHANGES IN PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM WE ARE SEEKING. END FYI.

8. IF NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN TO ZIA WHY THE WRITTEN ASSURANCES ALONE WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR WAIVER OF THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT, YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT, AMONG OTHER FACTORS, THE MOST IMPORTANT WILL BE CHANGES IN PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM CONSISTENT WITH THE DETERMINATIONS REQUIRED BY THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT, COUPLED WITH ASSURANCES THAT PAKISTAN IS NOT ACQUIRING OR DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ASSISTING OTHER NATIONS IN DOING SO. THESE ASSURANCES WOULD BE EVALUATED BY THE U.S. AND IN MAKING THIS EVALUATION WE WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT INDEPENDENT INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US. IF ASKED WHY WE ARE SEEKING "INADEQUATE ASSURANCES", YOU MAY WISH TO INDICATE THAT WE ARE SIMPLY FOLLOWING UP ON HIS OFFER TO CONSTABLE AND THAT THEY WOULD REPRESENT

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 46819

SECRET

4

A FIRST STEP IN A DIRECTION WE CONSIDER ESSENTIAL FOR MUTUAL INTERESTS AND SECURITY IN THE REGION.

9. AFTER FURTHER CONSIDERATION PROMPTED BY YOUR CABLE, WE HAVE REDRAFTED THE TALKING POINTS SUGGESTED IN PARA 5 OF OUR ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS (STATE 185580). IN YOUR MEETING WITH ZIA, PLEASE DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS WHICH SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT BE LEFT WITH HIM IN WRITTEN FORM:

-- WE HAVE NOTED WITH INTEREST AND APPRECIATION THE STATEMENT YOU MADE TO CONSTABLE ON JUNE 9. AS HE REPORTED IT, YOU SAID PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES; THAT PAKISTAN DOES NOT INTEND TO CONDUCT A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION; THAT PAKISTAN DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION; AND THAT PAKISTAN'S DEFINITION OF PEACEFUL PURPOSES EXCLUDES A SO-CALLED PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION.

-- THE USG UNDERSTANDS THIS TO BE AN AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT OF THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN. WE SEE THIS AS A USEFUL FIRST STEP FORWARD IN OUR NUCLEAR DISCUSSIONS AND, INDEED, IN THE CAUSE OF NON-PROLIFERATION.

-- CONSTABLE DID REPORT YOUR OFFER OF WRITTEN ASSURANCES. WE DID NOT FOLLOW UP ON IT IMMEDIATELY SINCE I WAS IN WASHINGTON. WE WOULD OF COURSE WELCOME YOUR OFFER OF WRITTEN ASSURANCES.

-- WE WOULD ALSO WELCOME ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS WHICH YOU MAY HAVE ON FURTHER SUCH STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN TO MOVE TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM.

YY

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 66819