

DD/P 2-13032

7/23/62

Executive Registry
62-5265

25 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

1. On 20 July 1962, the Director and the Deputy Director (Plans) met with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, William Langer, and J. Patrick Coyne to discuss certain aspects of the Agency's Political Action Programs. The Director sat with the Panel from 10:30 'til noon, the Deputy Director (Plans) was present from 10:30 to 12:30 and from 2:00 to 3:30.

2. The Director opened the discussion with a historical description of the Agency's covert financial support to political parties in the fight against Communism. He described in detail the procedures now in effect whereby Political Action Projects are originated, staffed out, and cleared with appropriate elements of Government. He pointed out that each project must have his approval prior to its circulation to the members of the Special Group. At this point, he digressed to inform the Panel that reconnaissance overflights are now approved by the Special Group and subsequently by the President. He said that this same procedure applies to peripheral flights although to a lesser degree. He terminated this part of the discussion by stating that in his opinion "all covert action programs are now handled in an orderly, correct manner".

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

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3. The Director then described in some detail Agency covert financial support in the recent [Peru]¹¹ elections, the last [Greek]⁸ elections, and the [Finnish]⁸ election. He also described our activities in connection with the Italian political parties. Following this, he covered our plans for the upcoming [Brazilian]⁸ elections. He touched on our thoughts with regard to the political situation in [British Guiana]¹¹.

4. At this juncture, the Director discussed Agency labor operations. He read to the group a short paper which outlined our support to anti-Communist labor unions in [France]¹¹ and [Italy]¹¹, our work through the [ICFTU]²⁹, and our relationships with [American]⁸ labor and the assistance [United States unions]²⁴ have given us.

5. Agency support to cultural organizations was raised by Dr. Langer, and the Director covered in some detail the current status of our support plus that of the Ford Foundation to the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the International Commission of Jurists. He touched on the Asia Foundation, and our desire to try to obtain the services of Mr. Livingston Merchant to head it.

6. In the time remaining to him, the Director went over with the Panel country by country an extended list of political parties and leaders supported by the Agency throughout the world. What he did not have an opportunity to cover in this list the Deputy Director (Plans) finished during the remainder of the morning and during the afternoon session.

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7. Also in the afternoon, the Deputy Director (Plans) read to the Panel a paper on Operation Mongoose which the Director had used earlier in the day for briefing the President. This paper was used on the instruction of the Director. The Panel asked questions about Agency activity involving Cuba, all of which were answered with the exception of one having to do with the role of the Attorney General. This query was raised by Mr. Gray who recognized and gracefully accepted the fact that he was not answered directly.

8. Before the afternoon session adjourned, the Panel raised the question of the total dollar amount of funds expended annually for covert action. The Deputy Director (Plans) showed them a chart compiled by DDP-FG, dated 4 April 1962. This chart gives the precise dollar amounts expended annually. These figures vary from the Congressional ones since the support slice is not included.

wt
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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1 cc - Exec. Director
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2-5767

11/9/62

Executive Registry
62-8090

2 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

1. On 1 November, the Deputy Director (Plans) met with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to present a follow-up briefing on the Agency's political action programs since the one held on 20 July 1962. The meeting lasted from 2:30 to 4:45.

2. There was little discussion on Cuba. In response to Mr. Murphy's inquiry, I told him that a good intelligence job had been done but that I thought it desirable to have this studied by the Board on the basis of a paper which the Director was having prepared and which Mr. Kirkpatrick had assured Mr. Coyne would be submitted to the Board after the Director had had an opportunity to review it.

3. The ⁸[Brazilian] election program was covered in considerable detail. Points covered were: (a) the reason for the program, (b) the manner in which candidates were chosen, (c) the amount of money involved, (d) the methods of funding, and (e) the coordination of State and the Agency on the entire scenario. Following the presentation of the factual elements, there was considerable discussion of the political situation in ¹¹[Brazil] and the direction in which that Government seemed to be tending.

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- 2 -

4. CIA-sponsored activities at the Helsinki Youth Festival was the next item presented. A full report was given which followed carefully the post-mortem written by the CA Staff.

5. As for CA activities in the remainder of Latin America, the following countries were covered: Dominican Republic, Chile, [Peru], and [Venezuela]. [Haiti] and [British Guiana] were then touched on, with particular reference to the sensitivity of the [US-UK]²⁴ cooperation on the latter.

6. In Southeast Asia, an up-to-date report was presented on operations in Laos, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam. Problems in connection with North Vietnamese operations were specifically identified.

7. On the [Sino-Indian]²⁴ conflict, the Panel was made aware of pending and current requests from the [Indian CIB]²⁹ for assistance in the training of guerrilla forces. The role of the Tibetans was also identified. In response to a query from Mr. Murphy, I said that I did not see any requirement at this time for an increase of our permanent establishment in [India], expressing the opinion that any trainers and paramilitary experts which we might send could be covered for us by the [Indians]⁸

8. In Europe, CA programs in the following areas were updated: Berlin, France and Italy, [Spain], [Finland], and [Cyprus].

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- 3 -

Mr. Murphy seemed particularly interested in the level of activity in Italy and our efforts to cut it back.

9. At one point in the briefing, I spoke of the change in status of the African-American Institute and told of our negotiations with the Ford Foundation on the Congress for Cultural Freedom. I mentioned the Department of State veto on passing funds to [Holden⁶ Roberto]. There was some discussion of the Yemen and associated problems. Here, I simply gave an intelligence briefing on the Yemen and the effects of the revolution there on Saudi Arabia and the British position in the Aden Protectorate.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

2 NOV 11/5/62

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LBJ

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11/9/62

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EX. DIR. for files

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DD/P 3-1911

17 April 1963

Executive Registry
63-249

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

1. On 15 April, at DDP's request, I met with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to brief them on major covert action developments since their previous briefing on 2 November 1962. The meeting lasted from 10:00 to 12:15.

2. At Mr. Murphy's request, I began with a description of our electoral operations as approved by the Special Group in Chile, the Dominican Republic, [Brazil], and Guatemala. Mr. Murphy was particularly concerned with the situation in [Brazil] and both he and Mr. Gray found it difficult to understand why the State Department continued to provide large-scale economic assistance when [Goulart] had to date refused to clean house of the Communists and fellow travelers both within the government and the labor movement. They were interested in knowing that we were in touch with some of the military leaders who are opposed to [Goulart] and they seemed to feel that a military coup at some point might be preferable to allowing a country [as large and powerful as Brazil] to drift into the hands of the opposition. Both gentlemen wished to know the amounts that we had expended in these electoral operations and our own estimate of the results. They did not question either the need for intervention or the size of our effort; although in the [Chilean] case Mr. Murphy wanted to be sure that we had evidence that the funds passed through [Italian] hands actually reached the [Chilean] Christian Democrats.

3. Mr. Murphy then raised the [Argentine] problem and said that he had been informed in New York that the State Department was putting considerable pressure on the [Argentine] regime to persuade it to hold the elections scheduled for [June] 1963. He questioned the wisdom of this pressure, pointing out that there was a real danger of the [Peronistas] returning to power if the elections were held. He asked our opinion and I said that, despite the pressure, there was still considerable doubt whether the elections would actually take place.

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I added that the more responsible military were trying to work out with the [Guido] government and the non-[Peronist] political parties a formula which would prevent the [Peronistas] from making large gains on the national level.

4. On the subject of [Haiti], Mr. Murphy felt that in so small a country action should be possible to remove [Duvalier] and wondered why it had not been done. I pointed out that we had as yet no policy approval for such action but that we were active in identifying and making contact with opposition elements both within [Haiti] and in exile. I described some of the difficulties, such as [Duvalier's] control of the arms in the palace and his widespread penetration of opposition plotting that had just resulted in the rolling up of a coup attempt by [Haitian] army officers.

5. Mr. Gray noted that he had seen in the newspapers a report of our recent decision to allow Radio Liberty to broadcast in Russian to the Soviet troops in Cuba. He was heartily in favor of such action but wondered how we were able to obtain approval of it when the Administration seems so anxious to avoid actions that might appear to be provocative to the Soviets. I informed him that there had, in fact, been some delay in obtaining the approval.

6. Both the gentlemen asked for detailed information on the structure and workings of the Latin American Policy Committee (LAPC) and asked whether we felt this committee in any way hampered or interfered with the approval process in the Special Group. I said that both Chief, WH and myself were well pleased with the way the LAPC operates and believed it to be highly useful.

7. I then briefed them on actions which were taken in Southeast Asia, particularly the measure to strengthen the border police in the [north of India]. I told them that [Nehru] was aware of these actions and they wanted to be certain Mr. [Bowles] was clearly instructed prior to his departure [as ambassador].

8. Both men objected to press reports that certain Administration officials believed the Soviets to be exerting a helpful and restraining influence in Laos. I had to agree with them that it was hard to maintain such a view in the face of the increasing aggressiveness of the Pathet Lao, and I described the existing policy limits on our relations with [Phoumi] and [Kong Le]. I then described the present state of the Soviet-Chinese

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split and some of our efforts to exploit and exacerbate these tensions. Mr. Murphy asked for specific information on the extent of trade, if any, between China and the Soviet Union and the amount of the outstanding Chinese debt to the Soviets. I agreed to provide this via Mr. Coyne. Mr. Gray asked about the depth and extent of our intelligence from Peking and the China mainland, and was critical of the information supplied to us by the Chinese Nationalists. I said that intelligence operations in China were not my field but that I would make sure that a report on this did get to them.

9. I went on to describe the cultural ferment within Russia and recent action Khrushchev had taken to discipline the dissident writers and artists. They were very much interested in the actions we had taken to exploit this situation and particularly interested in the current issue of Encounter and in the account therein of the Khrushchev tirade at the recent art exhibition.

10. On Cuba I explained that I was not in a position to brief them in depth and any questions in this field would be handled by the Director or DDP. I did, however, brief them on the Krulak Committee and the recent meetings in Managua regarding measures that could be taken to limit the export of subversion from Cuba. (I have sent to them via Pat Coyne the CIA Memorandum on the present scope of the Cuban subversive training effort.)

11. I described the covert support to the ⁸[Italian] political parties for the forthcoming parliamentary election as approved by the Special Group. Mr. Murphy had not previously known of the decision to lend some selective support to the ⁸[Nenni autonomists] and described this decision with some surprise "as quite a switch." ⁸

12. Finally, ⁸when informed of the policy limitations on our relations with the ⁸[Angolan Nationalists] and ⁶[Holden Roberts], Mr. Murphy expressed himself as being in agreement with those limitations and ⁸seemed to feel that the best course to follow was to assist the ⁸[Portuguese] Government in its attempts to control the situation. He said that he had met recently for the first time with ⁶[Roberto Holden] in New York last week and was not impressed by the man. ⁶

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13. The meeting was throughout a cordial one and I detected no evidence of a critical attitude towards the Agency's covert action program.

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CORD MEYER, JR.
Chief
Covert Action Staff

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- 1 - Exec. Director
- 1 - DDP
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1. Exec. Director

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23 April 1963

DCI

(CLASSIFICATION)

copy 1
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Handle Via Indicated Controls

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[BYEMAN]

Gave copy 2
of this
document to
Chas. Enright
on 7 Aug 1964

3/19/98

*Assassination
Record*

Michelle

WARNING

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This document contains information referring to Projects:

..... CORONA ⁹⁹ [TACKLE]

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24 April 1963


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
1015, Tuesday, 23 April 1963**

**Present: Dr. Killian, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Clifford, Mr. Pace,
Gen. Doolittle, Mr. Gray, Dr. Langer, Dr. Land;
Staff members Messrs. Coyne and Ash;
From CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. FitzGerald,
Mr. Bruce Clarke, Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick**

1. When Mr. McCone entered the room the group had been discussing the release of the American prisoners in Cuba, and it had been explained to the Board that the three CIA men who had been imprisoned had been released. Mr. Murphy had asked what their cover story had been and had been told that they represented themselves as conducting audio surveillance for commercial interests, and that their fictitious names had apparently held up during interrogation.

Mr. Murphy asked Mr. McCone the conditions of the release of the 22 and the DCI explained that at Castro's request we were trying to obscure the fact that there had been a quid pro quo in releasing the four Cubans in exchange for the 22 Americans. The Attorney General had arranged the release of the three Cubans who had been accused of, but not convicted of sabotage, and Mr. McCone had personally arranged the release of Molina with Governor Rockefeller, who had granted him executive clemency with deportation. Mr. McCone noted that the release of the three CIA persons was very important to the Agency, and that nothing in the agreement for the release involved any other commitments.

Mr. Murphy asked what the DCI thought was behind Castro's making these releases. Mr. McCone replied that it was probably domestic foibles, and that Donovan was the only thread open to the United States. Mr. Clifford asked if we had everyone out that we wanted. The DCI replied that he knew of no one else there that we wanted. He reported that Donovan had to make a statement that he would not return to Cuba, advised that he had no intention of returning at this time, and he would have to use another cover if he did return. Dr. Land asked why Castro did all this, and the DCI said we didn't really know, but one possibility offered by Donovan was that Castro apparently is interested in trying to reach some rapprochement with

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the United States, that Donovan says he is not a Communist, and that Fidel didn't know how to go about making any accommodation with the U. S. because he was so closely surrounded by advisers who were watching everything he did. Mr. McCone said that Castro had specifically requested that the President, the ~~Attorney General~~ and the DCI be advised of his attitude. Mr. Clifford asked why Castro wanted the DCI to know, and Mr. McCone said he had no idea, because at no time during the Donovan negotiations was any indication given that CIA was being consulted or advised. Dr. Killian then suggested that the Board turn to the briefing on Cuba. Mr. McCone said there were several things he wished to discuss before going on to that briefing.

2. Mr. McCone reported that on coordination the NRO agreement was in effect and working pretty well. An agreement had been reached on the complete and comprehensive use of the NPIC facilities by DIA, and NPIC was developing well. The Special Group has expanded its review of counter-insurgency activities to include those of the DOD, and they are now cognizant of DOD activities in this field. In the field of current intelligence reporting, we are now attempting to correct the DIA and CIA bulletins and to establish one bulletin with increased DIA input and with DIA issuing addendum. Mr. McCone said this was supported at the DOD stage by the Secretaries. He noted that he was attempting to get all issues with the DOD settled by the 15th of May so that they can be fully implemented before Mr. Gilpatric leaves in June. He said that in the clandestine collection field the work of Defense was being fully and carefully coordinated on a regular basis. Mr. McCone said that reasonable progress was being made on the five areas of coordination. He said that he and Mr. McNamara had postponed the reorganization of USIB. It was going along all right as it was and they didn't see any point of creating problems on the Hill by a reorganization at this time.

3. Mr. McCone reported that recent CORONA ¹⁶ and TACKLE flights over China produced the best photography we have ever had, and that he had not set up a formal briefing for the Board because of their busy schedule. He advised that there was one point concerning ICBM complexes in the Soviet Union which he wished to call to the attention of the Board. The last CORONA flight had revealed one new ICBM complex and this now located these installations in 18 separate places. He noted that these complexes ranged from four pads to possibly as many as 18. This might well indicate that 18 launching pads were standard, and if the support facilities are proportioned similar to the one with 18 pads, there might well be as many as 18 times 18 launching pads, or a total of about 450. Mr. McCone advised that at this time we were analyzing each one to determine the level of support facilities.

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The photograph was being reviewed for clearer guide lines as to construction time. He said he saw no reason to change the mid-'63 estimate of 125 to 150 launching sites, but there might be reason to change the future estimate. Dr. Langer asked how many sites there were with 18 pads and Mr. McCone replied, "Only one."

4. Dr. Land stated that CORONA was getting better and better, and he hoped that all of those in the pursuit of a better vehicle would not forget that CORONA is doing the job. Mr. McCone replied that this was true, and said that he had the schedule for satellite launchings which he would leave with the Board. This called for CORONA-M once a month to July, with an extra one in May, and CORONA-J once a month from May 1963 to July 1964, with two in September. If trouble develops with the "J" configuration, "M" can be continued once a month until March. The next [LANYARD] shot is scheduled for early next month and will be followed by three more. The first 99 [GAMBIT] shot is scheduled in June, and will then be launched once a month through all of 1964. Mr. McCone noted that if there were future failures, there should be no hiatus and a maximum of only seven days' delay between shots.

5. Mr. McCone reported that the OXCART vehicle would have one more flight at Mach [2.5]²⁴ and then would be pushed up to its full speed and altitude. General Doolittle noted that the next [6]²⁴ increase presented very serious engineering problems. Mr. McCone said that this was thoroughly understood but he wanted the Board to be apprised of the status.

6. Mr. McCone reported that he was establishing a panel to make a judgment as to what additional steps should be taken to bring satisfactory photography in the area of resolution. He noted that he felt we were dealing too much in optimistic hope at the present time, and that he wanted the best possible judgment as to the resolution that could be achieved from satellite photography in order to be weighed with the political decision of overflying the Soviet Union. [He stated that he had gone to Cambridge to see Dr. Edward Purcell in an effort to persuade him to chair a panel which would be composed of the best brains from both inside and outside the Government. He reported that he felt he must be able to tell the President when satellite photography would reach the desired resolution. Mr. McCone advised that he had a memorandum establishing the terms of reference of this committee which he would submit to the President's Board. He noted that there were many studies oriented toward the most exotic types of reconnaissance, including the best read-out, but that he wanted this committee to be completely impartial and objective and therefore was establishing it under his personal direction. He noted that he had the enthusiastic support

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of DOD in doing this. He said he would like the support of the President's Board and their thoughts on the terms of reference and the membership, including whether they thought some members of the Board might sit on the committee or whether this would present a conflict of interest, as the Board had apparently felt in a previous matter.]

Dr. Killian asked if this panel was supposed to look at the future potentiality of satellite photography, and Mr. McCone then read to the Board the terms of reference in his memorandum. He noted that he thought this panel should be constituted at this time because there were serious doubts in the U. S. Government about flying an aircraft over the USSR. Mr. Clifford asked if the panel would deal with politics, and Mr. McCone replied, "No." Dr. Land asked what the relations of the panel would be with NRO and Mr. McCone replied that NRO would support the panel. Gen. Doolittle noted that the Air Force had a committee on satellite survivability, and Mr. McCone said that he knew this, but felt that that committee was not full out and not devoting the effort that the seriousness of the problem warranted. Gen. Doolittle replied that he was a member of that committee and he thought they were giving the problem very serious consideration. Mr. McCone said he thought the problem involved a vast amount of work and he was concerned because all of the views were not being pulled together. He noted that what was necessary was to get an authoritative expression as to what resolution was required down to the nearest inch in order to determine the engineering of missiles.

Mr. Land asked what Dr. Purcell had said, and commented that he thought such a panel would be all right if it was composed of four or five who knew what they were talking about. Mr. McCone replied that he was not sure he had been able to get Purcell, and that he might have to ask Dr. Land to persuade Purcell; Dr. Land replied that he might be able to do it.

7. [Mr. Pace asked whether there had been one or two U-2 flights over China. Mr. McCone replied that there had been two, and that they had produced some interesting results. These included progress on a possible gaseous diffusion plant. He noted that the preparations are just half those of the Soviet plant, of which it may be a duplicate. He said that this was not understood, and noted that, as presently constituted, the plant could not produce cascades to develop the quality of the top product. He noted that it could possibly be another process, metallurgical or textile, but on another area there were a large number of cooling towers. Mr. McCone advised that he had set up a special group under Dr. Roddis to study the Chinese nuclear energy program. This group has made a report in which they pointed out the paucity of the information available. However, they had put together]

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a whole lot of intelligence information and had come to the conclusion that the Chinese Communists were making a tremendous effort in this field and were possibly nearer the stage of exploding some device. He reported that the Board of Estimates was making a new estimate on the subject at this moment and that the program was being supplemented by intensive overflights. Dr. Land asked whether the DCI saw any problems in using the A-12 over China, and Mr. McCone said that he didn't and, furthermore, that he personally didn't see any problem in using it over the USSR.]

8. Mr. McCone advised that he had taken some additional steps to pull together the Agency's scientific and technical assets. He had established a Research and Development Review Board. He said that it didn't seem wise at this time to relocate OSI and TSD. The Office of Scientific Intelligence analyzes and makes estimates on the basis of incoming intelligence, and its removal from DD/I would take away an essential link in the process of that area. He said further that TSD was directly linked to the operational aspects of DD/P, and he didn't feel it should be removed from that area. He noted that the Research and Development Review Board would meet under General Carter biweekly and would provide cross fertilization and coordination. He said that he would provide a copy of the memorandum establishing this Board and read to the Board the membership.

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9. Mr. McCone then turned to a discussion of Cuba and stated that he was giving the Special Group this afternoon a study showing the results of 51 days' reconnaissance over Cuba and that this was disturbing when the four principal targets were analyzed. There were 59 occasions when weather precluded any readout of what was going on in these four Soviet military camps. Some of the camps were not seen for five or six days in a row and in one instance for as long as 12 successive days. Mr. McCone then read from the memorandum on reconnaissance over Cuba dated 23 April 1963 and said he would provide the Board with a copy.

The DCI then reported that James Donovan during a nighttime drive to Veradero had passed a convoy of 25 very large trucks, the type generally carried on railroad flatcars. Mr. McCone stated that an examination of the photography for that day and the following day provided absolutely no trace of the convoy. Dr. Land stated that the DCI's previous statement may have provided the answer as to where this convoy might be. The DCI said he planned to recommend low-level flights in order to provide more information.

10. At this point Mr. FitzGerald was asked to give his presentation on operations in Cuba. He commenced by displaying the chart which indicated the number of resident agents, illegal teams, legal teams, shipboard agents and penetrations of Cuban installations. He noted that the number of illegal teams had risen to three as a result of a successful operation on Sunday, and one of these teams had as many as 100 subagents with extensive coverage in the province of Pinar del Rio. Dr. Langer asked what the subagents were looking for, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that their coverage was mostly military. Mr. Murphy asked if these agents were all strictly collecting intelligence, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was their primary purpose at the moment, but the illegals could create a resistance net if this was desired. He pointed out that the policy at the present time precluded attempting to develop a large scale dangerous activity.

Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the penetration of Cuban installations were mainly ²⁴[diplomatic] installations and that some ²⁴[14 Cuban diplomats] were our agents. Mr. Clifford asked how the information was gotten out of Cuba, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that it was mostly by secret writing transmitted ¹⁰to [Mexico City] by mail and then forwarded to Washington. He said there were four radios in Cuba and that we now had a greatly improved medium ²⁴ speed transmitter that was quite small, [the size of about two cigarette cartons] and it could get a message off in just 60 seconds. He said that there was a smaller and better transmitter currently in the process of development.

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Dr. Land asked if the loss of this transmitter would compromise others. Mr. FitzGerald replied that it would not compromise any other agents except the one apprehended, and the DCI noted that it would simply compromise the instrument.

Mr. Murphy asked concerning the quality of substantive reporting, and Mr. FitzGerald noted that the 1,040 reports looked impressive, but it was quite true that this was not a true indication. He said that some of the reporting was very good, and there were two [Cuban ambassadors] on the payroll who provided some first-rate reports and were closest to the bone in what Castro was thinking. Mr. Murphy asked if we had Castro's immediate entourage penetrated, and Mr. FitzGerald said his sister worked for us but that she didn't always have inside information. He pointed out that the 665 reports from resident agents were primarily on military targets, and the intelligence community felt they were really worthwhile as a supplement to overhead reconnaissance. General Doolittle asked if an illegal team was [two] men and Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes". Mr. Murphy asked whether these agents provided information on Soviet troop strength and equipment, and Mr. FitzGerald replied in the affirmative. Mr. Clifford noted that with just two illegal agent teams in Cuba at this time we were back to where we started from in 1962. Mr. FitzGerald commented that the casualty rates were very high and referred to the charts "Legal Resident Agents in Cuba" and "Illegal Agent Development".

(At this point Mr. McCone left the meeting and Mr. Cottrell came in.)

Mr. Gray asked if the modest number of agents was a result of policy or operations. Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was primarily a result of operations and noted that it was not the result of lack of effort, but because of the high attrition rate and the dangers involved. He went over the lists of what had happened to the agents that were put in. He noted that it was presently planned to carry out approximately five operations a month. Mr. Murphy asked if there was evidence of organized resistance in Cuba. Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes", but they were now small bands scattered throughout the island. He noted that Castro had broken up the large country-wide resistance networks last summer. He then produced the chart entitled "Illegal Infiltration -- Exfiltration Operations" and commented on this. Mr. Murphy asked if the groups on the island committed sabotage, and Mr. FitzGerald said the policy presently precluded major sabotage operations and limited it to "subtle sabotage". Mr. Murphy asked what constituted "subtle sabotage", and Mr. FitzGerald described it as tying a rock to a wire and throwing it across high tension lines.

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11. The Board then turned to Mr. Cottrell and asked him to describe the work of his group. Mr. Cottrell said the President had become concerned there were so many government agencies dealing with so many Cuban groups, and he had set up the group under Mr. Cottrell to coordinate all of this activity. He said that his immediate group consisted of a representative of Defense and CIA, and there were additional committees or groups reporting to them. He outlined the general policy guidance under which they were operating and under questioning from Mr. Murphy stoutly denied that the policy was basically defensive in nature, and it was directed toward getting rid of communism and Castro in Cuba. It was further explained that CIA's activities were coordinated through this group.

12. Dr. Killian then asked Bruce Clarke to give a brief report on the situation in Cuba, and with the aid of photographs Clarke analyzed the present Soviet troop strength on the island and explained how these figures were arrived at. At 12:00 this session was recessed to permit the presentation by DIA.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

LBK: drm: neg
Distribution:
cy #1 - DCI
#2 - DDCI
#3 - EX DIR
#4 - ER

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Subjects covered in briefing 23 April 1963:

1. Discussion of the release of the three American prisoners in Cuba.
2. Coordination on NRO agreement - "in effect and working well".
3. Report on photographic results of Corona ⁹⁹ and Tackle ¹⁰ flights ¹⁰ over China mentioned there would be one more Ox flight at Mach ^{2.5} ²⁴ and then be pushed to full speed and altitude.
4. Reported on establishment of Purcell Panel.
5. Discussion of U-2 flights ¹⁰ over China and results.
6. Establishment of R&D board to pull together the Agency's scientific and technical assets.
7. Discussion of Cuba; DCI said plans to recommend low-level flights to provide more information.
8. FitzGerald gave presentation on operations in Cuba.
9. Cottrell described the work of his group.
10. Bruce Clark gave report on the situation in Cuba.

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*Am. advised 1012 a.m.
22 April 1963.
LDR*

20 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kirkpatrick *LDR*

DCI does not want to meet the Board with Cottrell
and requests that you advise the Board that Cottrell is not privy
to many operational matters. Your suggestions seemed agree-
able to Mr. McCone.

W. Elder
W. Elder

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22 April 1963

**SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, 10:15 A.M., 23 APRIL**

to
11:15 A.M.

I Coordination.

- a. NRO Agreement--currently in effect.
- b. NPIC--agreement with DIA is fairly well solidified with not too many differences in opinion.
- c. Counterinsurgency--new system whereby DOD goes to the Special Group now in effect.
- d. Current Intelligence Reporting--now in negotiation stage with DIA.
- e. Clandestine Intelligence Collection--close coordination between CIA and DIA now in effect.

B USB —

II Recent CORONA Coverage plus Recent [TACKLE] Flights

Schedule of flights for 1963-1964

III Progress on OXCART.

- a. Establishment of the Purcell Panel.

IV Scientific and Technical Intelligence in CIA.

- a. Report of the Roddis Panel on Chinese nuclear energy capabilities.
- b. The CIA Research and Development Review Board.

L written order

*10/ Policy in Cuba
Review over Cuba*

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17 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Tuesday, 23 April 1963

1. The President's Board has asked that you meet with them on the 23rd from 10:15 to 11:15. They have suggested that the later half of this period be devoted to a review of both operations and intelligence on Cuba and have suggested that Mr. Cottrell attend for that period.

2. Assuming that the question of the Board's charter and procedures will have been settled prior to the 23rd, I would suggest that you may wish to give them a quick review of outstanding matters including their recommendations and perhaps a briefing on the latest C- and [T.]⁹⁹ flights.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

cc: DDCI

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
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P. 1111

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(DA)



28 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director *LBK*

Reference the attached memorandum from the Director, I will of course be pleased to meet with the President's Board on Tuesday, 23 April, and would appreciate very much your informing Pat Coyne accordingly. I hope that you will be able to be present also in accordance with your normal procedures. If not, I would appreciate your appointing an appropriate representative. If you can find out in advance from Mr. Coyne just what the Board may want, it would be most helpful. In the meantime, please ask the staff to prepare appropriate briefing memoranda on whatever will be appropriate at that time!!!

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "M. S. Carter".

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Attachment:

Memo to IDCI from DCI dated 28 March 1963 (ER 63-2540)

MSC:blp

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee w/att
- 1 - DDCI w/cy att
- 1 - ER w/cy att


A rectangular stamp with the date "MAR 30 2 02 PM '63" written in a stylized, slanted font.

Executive Registry
63-2540

28 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

In discussions with Dr. Killian, he mentioned that his Board were meeting for one day. He had been advised that I would be in Europe at that time. The meeting date is April 23rd. Dr. Killian specifically requested that you be available for an hour or so on that date, and I said I would convey this request to you.


John A. McCone
Director

APR 10 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DCI		<i>Noted by DCI</i>
2	<i>Exec Dir</i>		<i>Approved with</i>
3			<i>3 minor changes as</i>
4			<i>noted.</i>
5			<i>WEL</i>
6			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
Distribution to other than DDCI and yourself awaits your approval.			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Executive Director			31 Dec 62
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FORM NO.
2-61

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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O-587282 (40)

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28 December 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the DCI with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Friday, December 28, 0930 a. m.

Specific
Subject : Discussion of Cuba

1. At 0930 Dr. Killian opened the meeting with a statement to the Director that the Board had read the report and appreciated the great amount of work that had been put into it. He commented particularly on the lucidity of the report and said the Board had also looked at the changes which had been sent to them this morning. The Director commented on page 90, the final conclusions, and said that he still did not feel sufficient attention had been paid to important indicators. Mr. McCone then said that there were one or two other subjects that he wanted to mention to the Board before getting into the Cuban report. These are covered in separate memoranda.

2. After coverage of the other subjects, Dr. Killian then asked Mr. McCone whether he had any further comments to make on the report. The Director, referring to conversation the previous evening, said he had no further comments and that he thought it was understandable why his personal position had not been included in the report. He noted that these were covered in his October 31 memorandum for the record which the Board had. Dr. Killian asked if the Board did have this and Mr. Coyne

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noted that Dr. Killian had seen it at the previous meeting. Mr. McCone went on to say that the Board should realize that the people in receipt of his cables had been receiving intelligence on an hour to hour basis. Mr. Clifford noted that the Director's messages would be of tremendous interest in any Congressional investigation and thought that the Board should have copies of them. Mr. McCone replied that he realized this and would supply copies.

3. Mr. Gray asked if they could then turn to question 16. Dr. Killian asked the question, which was whether the existence of the Special Group had complicated the intelligence program and he noted particularly the detailed decisions made by the Special Group in relation to Mongoose. Mr. McCone replied no, in fact the Special Group had assisted. He noted the way it operated and said that the Augmented Special Group, with the Attorney General, served as authority to stimulate intelligence gathering through increased use of agents, refugee interrogations and third country activities. He noted that prior to Mongoose there had been a hiatus and that everything apparently had stopped after the Bay of Pigs. In December of last year there had been no interrogation of refugees, no agents and no Miami set up. At the instigation of the President, the Attorney General and himself, all of this had been built up. Mr. Murphy asked why operations against Cuba had stopped and whether this was for psychological reasons. The Director said it was psychological. There had been investigations and there was general discouragement. Dr. Killian said

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wasn't there a similar danger now and that there seemed to be a general euphoria and a feeling of success. Mr. McCone said there was a great danger inherent in Cuba. The SAM sites were still there as well as many other things. He said a week ago Monday he had brought this up forcefully in the Executive Committee and the President had issued instructions that word be gotten to the Soviets that any interference with our reconnaissance over Cuba would bring an instant reply with action from the United States. This word was communicated by Stevenson to Kuznetsov^S and by Thompson to Dobrynin. He said that the present understanding is that we will fly two or more high level flights a day, or if weather or other reasons forestall these flights, there will be a request made to the President for low level flights. He noted that low level flights could escalate a critical situation.

4. Mr. Pace asked if there were any prohibitions on intelligence collection on Cuba today. Mr. McCone replied yes. We would like a more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration. He said he thought it was important that in the next three or four months there be extensive intelligence operations to find out the trend of developments in Cuba. He said he thought the Soviets might move completely out of Cuba, and certainly this was one impression they were trying to convey; or second, that they would recognize they had a good piece of real estate which they would want to maintain for subversion through Latin America, and a base of operations. This would involve a control of Castro and while they might not re-install offensive missiles, they will always have the

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capability to do so. Mr. McCone said he was inclined to believe that the second alternative would be followed, and obviously the intelligence effort should be at a maximum to discover Russian intentions.

5. Mr. Murphy said obviously there should be an all out effort to penetrate the Cuban government. The DCI said yes, that every effort should be made to exploit cracks in the top in their monolithic structure and that more and more agents should be put in. He noted that only this week a team had been infiltrated and another team exfiltrated. Mr. Murphy asked how many there were in a team and the Director replied ²⁴ [three to five]

6. Mr. McCone went on to say that we are making extensive efforts to utilize third countries in the Cuban intelligence effort and mentioned the ⁸ [British], ⁸ [Canadians], ⁸ [French], ⁸ [Germans] and one or two Latin countries. He said that he expected some invaluable information would be produced by discussions with Donovan and Nolan. We already know that Castro had a fight with Che Guevara. Castro also spent three hours with the captain of the ²⁴ [African Pilot] and the captain had indicated that he wanted to talk to intelligence immediately on landing in Florida. Mr. McCone said that he intended to get the Special Group, immediately after the first of the year, to approve a program for extensive intelligence activities. He said that he did not believe that any efforts should be made at this time to stimulate an uprising and that all of our resources should be concentrated on intelligence collection.

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7. Mr. Pace asked whether this plan would include using Guantanamo. The Director replied that he did not recommend the use of Guantanamo. He noted that if it was used as a base for intelligence operations, and we got caught, Castro could mobilize world opinion against us. Dr. Killian said that Castro assumed that we used it in this way whether we do or not.

8. General Doolittle asked how frequently we are overflying Cuba now. The Director replied that there were two flights a day at present, but if the weather is bad and our program slips, there is authority to fly additional daily flights. General Doolittle asked how frequently this gave complete coverage of the island and Mr. McCone said that it worked out to about once a week. He noted that some areas such as harbors were covered more frequently, and that COMOR had worked out a system of priorities for aerial reconnaissance.

9. Mr. Pace then asked if we had studied the possibilities for the use of Guantanamo and what could be achieved in using it as a base for operations. The Director replied that we had made no such study.

10. Mr. Pace then inquired about restrictions on U-2 flights during September and said that apparently ^{NO} effort was made to penetrate critical areas by agents and therefore he thought we should have explored using Guantanamo. Mr. McCone pointed out that the operators had proposed a series of agent infiltrations ^{from Guantanamo} in August, but that this was not approved. Nobody at the policy level, including the JCS, would approve these operations.

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11. Mr. Gray then asked if the situation in January looks different than it did in August, would there be accelerated operations. The Director said he would re-open the whole question if that was the case. Mr. Pace returned to the subject of Guantanamo and said that in his opinion if effective use could be made of it this should be done regardless of policy inhibitions. Dr. Killian asked if ²⁴Guantanamo was used for SIGINT] purposes. Mr. McCone said that he was sure it was and referred to Mr. Kirkpatrick who read from ²⁹[the NSA memorandum] on their expanding activities in June, noting the additional positions ²⁴were activated in June and the fact that there some [floating positions] established near Santiago de Cuba.

12. Mr. Murphy then asked what was the difference between Mongoose and Mongoose B-plus. Mr. McCone replied that the first phase of the Mongoose operation was to determine the intelligence potential in Cuba. This was fairly successful despite extreme difficulties. He mentioned that there were 100,000 informers organized on a block and community basis throughout the island and that these people controlled ration cards and travel, thereby making all movement difficult. He said the second phase of the Mongoose operation considered three or four different levels of activity. "A" was the most violent, directed toward precipitating a revolution. "B" involved extensive sabotage. "B plus" was somewhere between the two and therefore involved even more activity, such as mining harbors. Mr. McCone said that his big problem

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is the question of United States policy. He did not wish to put CIA in the position of stimulating an uprising unless he was certain that U. S. policy would commit troops to back the uprising. He noted that on August 10, when he forecast MRBMs in Cuba to the Secretary of Defense, he had discussed the ramifications of an uprising in Cuba extensively. Dr. Killian asked who chaired the Special Group on Mongoose. Mr. McCone said he wasn't sure whether it was Bundy or the Attorney General and turned to Mr. Kirkpatrick, who didn't know.

13. Mr. Pace asked whether an assessment had been made of the accuracy of NPIC interpretations on Soviet missiles. He said he wondered whether there were flaws which might change some of our estimates. Mr. McCone replied that, quite to the contrary, there was no instance where NPIC failed. He said that, for example, the September photography of San Cristobol showed some construction equipment. In retrospect we know it was for developing missile sites, but the photography could be interpreted as being only a few trucks for agricultural purposes.

14. Dr. Killian said that he was very concerned about the clear implication that the Soviet Union would soon be developing better camouflage techniques. This, plus the lack of resolution in the photography, might pose considerable difficulties. Mr. McCone said that this was a different story. He noted that he was concerned about the adequacy of coverage of the Soviet Union. He noted that the targets for coverage were reviewed repeatedly, but at the present time of year the light was poor and the coverage was bad. He noted that there was a certain margin

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allowed in the estimates to take into account missile sites that might not have been seen. The DCI said that NIE 11-8 had just been reviewed and that an amending memorandum would be issued shortly. He said obviously it was impossible to say precisely what was going on in the Soviet Union.

15. Dr. Killian said that he was terribly concerned about the fact that the public now seems to feel that we have swung all the way from a missile gap to a great superiority over the Soviet Union, and that this was obviously the wrong way. Mr. McCone said he agreed that this was definitely wrong. Mr. Murphy asked whether the government was putting out this information. Mr. McCone said he didn't know and that he felt it was wrong and dangerous and would develop complacency and might even result in an economy minded Congress cutting the Defense budget drastically. Mr. Murphy noted that it was implicit that we should have precise knowledge on what was going on inside Russia. Mr. McCone said that in his presentations to Congress he specifically made the reservation each time that there were obviously things we didn't know. Dr. Killian noted that even photography can be wrong and can give an erroneous impression; e. g., that nothing is there. Mr. McCone acknowledged that this was a danger. Dr. Killian asked whether Congress, the President and the Secretary of Defense understood this danger. Mr. McCone replied that he always stressed it, and he also stressed that intelligence was commencing to have almost absolute dependence on photography.

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16. Mr. Pace commented that since November there had been 72 overflights of Cuba, and yet for a much greater length of time there had been no U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, which was a much more important target. He said that obviously there must be great gaps in our knowledge on the USSR. General Doolittle said it was even worse than that. He noted that CORONA had given no valuable intelligence on Cuba and that apparently the U-2 gave questionable intelligence so that low level reconnaissance was needed. The Director said this wasn't accurate, that the U-2 gave all of the intelligence that was needed to convince the OAS and our other allies. The low level flights were needed for backstopping possible military operations. Mr. Pace asked if it was correct that CORONA had produced no valuable intelligence on Cuba and Mr. McCone said that this was true. General Doolittle noted the closeness of the dangers and commented that if the Cubans had moved faster and gotten the camouflage up, we might never have discovered the missiles.

17. Dr. Killian noted that the time was drawing to an end and said that the Board would make a strong recommendation on an intensive research program [on sensors²⁴ to break through camouflage]

18. Mr. Murphy asked if the Director had noted any difference in the philosophy of the State Department in regard to intelligence. He noted that the Department had played quite a role during the Cuban

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crisis. Mr. McCone said yes, he thought there had been a change in the State attitude and noted that it and others had been quite timid on the U-2 and other intelligence activities. He said that he was having a recapitulation made of the inhibitions on intelligence operations which might interest the Board. He cited the fact that we had been prevented from covering ¹¹[China] North Vietnam and North Korea. He said that ^{However, recently} a second U-2 had been sent to ¹⁰[Formosa] and that the wraps had been taken off ¹⁰[Far Eastern] reconnaissance. On the other hand, every time there was an overflight State got very nervous and had made several telephone calls.

Cover up

19. Dr. Killian again expressed the Board's appreciation for the report and for Mr. McCone's taking the time to be with them. Mr. McCone replied that he would be happy to consider any suggestions the Board had concerning the report, except that he felt the conclusions should stand as presented. If, however, there were any additional substantive matters, there might well be additional conclusions that could be drawn.

20. This session was completed at 10:40.

Lyman Kirkpatrick
 Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
 Executive Director

LBK:rm

- Orig - DCI
- cy 2 - DDCI
- cy 3 - DD/P
- cy 4 - DD/R
- cy 5 - DD/I
- cy 6 - IG
- cy 7 - Exec Dir (PFIAB files)

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