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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET-SENSITIVE

January 29, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Daily Report

Information

Ambassador Linowitz' Meeting with Hussein: King Hussein is visibly delighted and gratified by your invitation to visit Washington for informal discussions and clearly views the invitation as an indication that the U.S. values him and is building back toward a close relationship. While most of his subsequent comments to Ambassador Linowitz on the peace process were familiar, Hussein sought to show understanding for our efforts and gave assurances that he would not do anything to make our task more difficult. In his only criticism during the entire meeting, Hussein stated that he was ignored by the U.S. and Egypt during the Camp David meetings and felt "betrayed" by Sadat who had assured him that he would let him know the outcome in advance. Hussein felt his outside stance affected his relation with you since you probably interpreted his actions as challenges, which was not at all his intention. (S)

If we can make real progress in the autonomy negotiations, Ambassador Linowitz now believes Hussein will find some way to participate, even if peripherally. (S)

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REVIEW ON JANUARY 28, 2000  
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

State Department review completed

NARA/NLC review(s) completed.

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Letter from Khalid: King Khalid has responded to your January 20 letter by confirming Saudi Arabia's support of a boycott of the summer Olympics unless the Soviets withdraw completely from Afghanistan within the next month. The king expresses hope that your "wise stand will have its effect upon the states which are friends of the rule of security and peace in the world." (C)

French Briefing on Kornienko Visit: Ambassador Hartman conferred with foreign affairs Secretary General De Leusse on Sunday concerning Kornienko's talks with De Leusse and Francois-Poncet last week, during which the Soviet reiterated the assertion that the U.S. was responsible for the intervention in Afghanistan. Kornienko gave no assurances on Soviet withdrawal, saying only that they would remain until the reasons for which they had entered were eliminated and that this would depend in part on the U.S. The French reportedly responded that the Soviet explanations were not convincing, charged the Soviets with dealing detente and Franco-Soviet relations a severe blow and called for a precise and early timetable for withdrawal. De Leusse seemed to feel that, while Kornienko had not budged from his hardline position, the French attitude had made a serious impression on him. Hartman expressed some doubt, noting that French actions not words would count. (C)

NSC Activity

Minority Employment on the NSC

More than a year ago when our only black professional staff member, Henry Richardson, left our staff, we advised Arnie Miller that we would be prepared to find a job in any area for any qualified black, Hispanic or any other minority. Arnie welcomed this request at the time, though he has not proposed anyone since. We recruit primarily from State, CIA and the senior military ranks where there are few minorities and the agencies are anxious to hold onto them. For example, in addition to Henry Richardson, we offered positions to Don McHenry and Colonel (now General) Colin Powell (USA), both of whom preferred to stay with their respective organizations, and to a black professor at the Harvard Law School (who eventually also declined). (U)

*It is not Arnie's responsibility to propose members of your staff. It is yours. It is silly to think for you to McHenry that you would please this position for an NSC staff post -*

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We have three women substantive officers on the staff now, and we have had two others previously. Moreover, the third ranking officer heading the NSC staff is a woman. This, of course, does not count Situation Room personnel. Over the last three years, we have had several women analysts in the Situation Room on a rotating basis from the Intelligence Community. (U)

I would like to increase the number of minorities on our staff but, frankly, we are blocked at present by your limit of "under 100" staff members. That quota must accommodate the Situation Room staff, all of the staff for message handling and file maintenance of classified traffic for the NSC, and the rest of the White House. This leaves only 35 professional staff. I would hesitate to fire any of my current professional staff members, but if we had some small easing of the ceiling, I am prepared to work with Arnie, as I have in the past, to secure minority personnel to perform substantive tasks. (U)

B.S.

*This is an inadequate & edictive answer. Do not propose the ~~too~~ filling of any vacancies without minor. least 50% representation being at*

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