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Gorbachev and the Military: Managing National Security Policy

An Intelligence Assessment

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Gorbachev and the Military: Managing National Security Policy [REDACTED]

Key Judgments

[REDACTED]

The sweeping criticism of the Soviet military's performance following its failure to intercept the Cessna aircraft that landed on Red Square this May brought into sharp relief the process of tightening party control over the military that had been under way since Gorbachev became General Secretary. Gorbachev's intention of challenging the military's priority status has been reflected in a series of actions from his first hours as party boss:

- He excluded senior officers from Chernenko's funeral and, at the first Central Committee plenum after his election, limited Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov to candidate Politburo membership (his two predecessors were full members).
- In his first meeting with the High Command, at Minsk in July 1985, he reportedly told the officers that the party ran the military, not the other way around; put them on notice that they had to conserve resources; outlined an economic and arms control strategy designed to reduce the defense burden; and announced a series of high-level personnel changes.
- He broke the military's traditional monopoly on arms control experts by giving a greater role to civilian advisers and creating a new sector within the Central Committee's International Department, headed by a senior military arms control expert, to provide an institutional check on military advice.
- He revoked the military's immunity from public criticism and exposed it to the same scrutiny as other segments of Soviet society through his policy of *glasnost*, or openness.
- In the wake of the Cessna incident, he replaced Defense Minister Sokolov with Gen. Dmitriy Yazov—an officer politically beholden to him. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev has also strengthened his control over the civilian national security establishment, a development facilitated by an accelerated generational turnover in the political leadership:

- He advanced several supporters of his policies to the Politburo and its national security subcommittee—the Defense Council—both of which he chairs, while the ranks of the old guard—whose views were shaped by World War II—dwindled.

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- He has also tightened his grip on the Secretariat, the Politburo's executive arm, by promoting close ally Lev Zaykov to senior party secretary for defense industry, designating foreign policy adviser Aleksandr Yakovlev as senior secretary overseeing public diplomacy, and naming Anatoliy Dobrynin and Anatoliy Luk'yanov as junior secretaries to oversee foreign policy and security policy, respectively.
- He further tightened his personal control over arms control decisionmaking by appointing a loyalist, Eduard Shevardnadze, as Foreign Minister and named new senior officials to oversee the defense industry complex.

Gorbachev's efforts to get a firmer grip on national security policy have been motivated by a realization that without such control he would be unable to achieve his modernization goals. When he took office two and a half years ago, he was determined to reverse the economic stagnation of the late Brezhnev period through massive new investments to rebuild the USSR's industrial base. His policy was designed to overcome the technological lag that threatened to erode the Soviet Union's long-term military competitiveness and hamper future economic growth. This policy went against the short-term interests of the military, which had been calling for the infusion of additional defense spending to counter increased military budgets in the West.

Gorbachev and his allies apparently believed that sagging economic growth had allowed the United States to apply pressure to the Soviet Union and, if continued unchecked, would threaten the USSR with becoming a second-class power. They rejected a resource-intensive approach to national security and argued that security could not be attained by military-technical means alone. Gorbachev sought to buy Moscow "breathing room" for its domestic goals through a more flexible foreign policy and a more aggressive arms control agenda designed to hold the foreign threat in check.

Gorbachev believed that former Soviet leader Brezhnev's low-investment strategy derived from a lack of political courage to confront competing demands for resources in an environment of slowing economic growth. By focusing investment resources on civilian machine building, Gorbachev's

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program resolved a heated debate over the nature of the military threat and the proper level of investment in the defense sector that had raged since the late 1970s. It culminated only six months before his election in the ouster of Nikolay Ogarkov, the assertive General Staff chief, for pressing too aggressively for increased military spending. [REDACTED]

Changes in military thinking on the nature of war and military doctrine helped Gorbachev gain support for his strategy and build a constituency within the military and defense industry:

- His arms control proposals generally accorded with shifts in military doctrine that deemphasized strategic nuclear warfighting and stressed the possibility of a future war being fought with new, high-technology conventional weapons.
- The substantial investment in the defense industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which, we believe, allowed the defense establishment to produce most of the weapon systems the military would have expected to procure through 1989, probably enabled him to argue that a larger amount of investment could now go to civilian machine building without seriously affecting defense.
- Finally, Gorbachev argued that existing Soviet military power was sufficient to deter aggression over the near term and that strict parity in all cases was not necessary. This concept of "reasonable sufficiency" is useful for supporting his squeeze on the defense sector. [REDACTED]

Despite his initial broad-based support, Gorbachev still faces a number of challenges in keeping the national security apparatus on board. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] some military and defense industry officials believe Gorbachev's policies adversely affect their interests:

- Few military leaders have endorsed his concept of "reasonable sufficiency," for fear of its use in justifying budgetary or force reductions, and some evidence suggests that the concept has generated a heated debate behind the scenes.
- Other reporting suggests that such Gorbachev proposals as the nuclear test moratorium, verification measures, troop cuts, and calls for significant cuts in central strategic and theater systems have generated tension.

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- [REDACTED] military officials are also concerned that Gorbachev's "new thinking" on foreign policy generates naive and pacifistic attitudes. [REDACTED]

Military dissatisfaction in itself does not pose a serious political problem for Gorbachev, for several reasons:

- The argument over "sufficiency," while couched in doctrinal terms, is in fact an issue of political and economic priorities and of political power. So long as Gorbachev retains overall backing within the party leadership, his concepts will underlie the doctrinal rationale for Soviet security policy.
- Yazov's appointment puts a politically compliant client at the head of the Ministry of Defense, where Sokolov's retirement and the firing of the Air Defense chief have probably cowed most senior officers. Some younger officers may even welcome a shakeup that provides additional headroom.
- An effective system of political control and a strong tradition of political loyalty among the military also work against military meddling in Kremlin politics and probably act to deter any thought of challenging the General Secretary.
- Moreover, the military is divided on Gorbachev's program, and some clearly expect it to benefit military interests in the long run. Some senior military theorists, for instance, have strongly endorsed the goals of modernization, stressing that the high-technology areas of the economy singled out for preferential development by the General Secretary are critical for the weapon systems of the future. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev's potential vulnerability on security issues is much more likely to come from his incomplete control over the Central Committee and the Politburo—where the majority of members are still independents rather than clients—than from unhappiness within the military:

- Senior members of the leadership—reportedly including President Andrey Gromyko, "Second Secretary" Yegor Ligachev, and Ukrainian party boss Vladimir Shcherbitskiy—appear to view Gorbachev as too

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optimistic about his ability to control US military programs through arms control and may prefer increasing near-term military spending to compete.

- The January Central Committee plenum's resolution took a sharp line in addressing US-Soviet relations, calling for more resources to strengthen defense, while Gorbachev, in his plenum speech, focused on efficiency and discipline among military personnel. [REDACTED]

The most recent military personnel shakeup and new arms control moves, however, strongly suggest that Gorbachev retains the initiative, and he apparently has the support of most of the younger members of the leadership, particularly those involved in formulating and executing foreign policy. His ability to decouple an INF agreement from SDI and agree to the global "double zero" options suggests he has sufficient backing to press ahead. [REDACTED]

While a coalescing of Politburo opposition on security issues seems unlikely in the near term—barring a crisis in East-West relations or the clear-cut failure of his arms control efforts—pressure will mount on Gorbachev by 1990 as the Kremlin begins to draft the next five-year plan. The need to decide on the modernization of Soviet defense for the 1990s could present Gorbachev with some hard policy choices and perhaps galvanize opposition to his current policies:

- If Gorbachev succeeds in achieving some significant economic improvement—even if he comes up short of his ambitious goals—or if he consolidates his political position, where he appears to have time on his side, he should be able to stay the course on security policy. The continuation of his policies over the next decade would probably mean the Kremlin would be better positioned to maintain its long-term military competitiveness with the United States. It might also be able to exploit a less confrontational environment to cause severe strains in Western unity—particularly with Western Europe, where Soviet proposals have had considerable public resonance—and better challenge the United States for global influence.

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- If his economic program fails to bring the promised results and his arms control policy bears no tangible fruit by 1990, he might be forced to retreat somewhat by increasing military spending despite its adverse implications for his overall modernization goals.
- All evidence to date, however, indicates Gorbachev is averse to backing down, and he may in fact be too committed to his policy course to do so. As key decision points for the next five-year plan approach, this could create the preconditions for a major policy showdown within the leadership, which is already anxious about many of his controversial and disruptive domestic policy reforms. [REDACTED]

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New Members of the Ministry of Defense

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Gorbachev and the Military: Managing National Security Policy (U)

Introduction

A critical component of our analysis of Gorbachev's national security agenda rests on a review of the record of party-military relations under Gorbachev's predecessors, when his policy perspective began to take shape. His move to the Politburo as a candidate member in 1979 (he became a full member in 1980) coincided with the emergence of a debate over national security policy that began in the late Brezhnev era. [REDACTED]

Our evidence on this debate is fragmentary, some of it is long after the fact, and much of our understanding depends on a reconstruction of events whose significance became apparent only in light of subsequent events and reporting. Nonetheless, the information now available makes a persuasive case that after a decadelong honeymoon in party-military relations following the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, the Politburo consensus on security policy began to fray during the late 1970s as party leaders tried to cope with growing military requirements in a period of declining economic growth. While some reports may exaggerate the level of differences within the political leadership or between it and the military, there is good evidence that a sharp debate over security has been going on since the early 1980s. Tensions were exacerbated by a protracted Politburo succession struggle that began as Brezhnev's health deteriorated in the late 1970s and continued during the Andropov and Chernenko interregnums. [REDACTED]

Because of the blanket of secrecy that the Soviets throw over their national security deliberations, our knowledge of the positions and maneuverings of various participants in the USSR's policy formulation process usually is based largely, if not solely, on secondary sources. Similarly, while signs of major debates and the substance of these debates usually are reflected in public vehicles, such as party plenums, the press, and specialized periodicals, they are often cast in delphic terms subject to differing interpretations.

Given the absence of unimpeachable information for this study, human-source reporting—which includes a considerable body of sensitive reporting—has been carefully cross-checked with public statements by Soviet civilian and military leaders and with our political and economic assessments to strengthen our confidence in our judgments. [REDACTED]

The Pre-Gorbachev Debate Over National Security Policy

The first decade of the Brezhnev era was a largely untroubled time in political-military relations, in contrast to the stormy period under Khrushchev (see inset). Brezhnev had personal ties to senior military leaders, including Defense Minister Andrey Grechko, dating from World War II and sustained through his tenure as party secretary overseeing the defense sector in the 1950s. He and most of his colleagues in the leadership shared a common perception with the military leadership of the primary importance of military power in securing the political interests of the Soviet system. They believed Khrushchev's risky foreign policy gambits in Berlin and Cuba had failed to bring the desired results because Moscow was unable to back up its threats with military power. A Politburo consensus backed Brezhnev's advocacy of a sustained military buildup, which started in the mid-1960s and resulted in the development and deployment of several generations of strategic weapons, the reequipping of Soviet forces in Central Europe, the dramatic buildup and modernization of forces on the Sino-Soviet border, and the creation of a formidable blue-water navy. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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The History of Soviet Political-Military Relations

During most of the regime's history, there has been a strong commitment on the part of the political leaders to building and maintaining a strong national defense and an acceptance by military leaders of subordination to the party. This fundamental congruence of outlooks, however, has not prevented the history of Soviet political-military relations from being stormy.

Under Lenin there was deep distrust of the military. Like most leftwing socialists, the Bolsheviks feared the potential counterrevolutionary nature of the army and Bonapartism—an allusion to Napoleon's success in subverting the French Revolution. When the Communists came to power in 1917, they initially disbanded the standing army and persecuted former officers. During the Civil War (1918-21) they relied on some Czarist-trained military professionals but kept them under tight political control through a system of political commissars.

Under Stalin relations remained rocky. Just when it appeared that the Soviet military was developing its own esprit de corps, Stalin moved to decapitate the military high command, executing numerous senior officers during the blood purges in the 1930s and assigning his political cronies to command positions. World War II led to a renaissance for the military—surviving purged victims were freed from the camps, ranks and insignia were reintroduced, and the role of

political officer became secondary to that of the line commander. But after the war Stalin was determined to reassert political control. Disturbed over the growing prestige of the army, he demoted several popular war heroes, including Marshal Georgiy Zhukov.

Under Khrushchev the military also had its ups and downs. Khrushchev was initially beholden to the military, on whom he relied to oust secret police boss Lavrentiy Beriia and defeat the so-called antiparty group in 1957, but relations eventually became conflictual. His economic agenda, which included improved consumption and industrial modernization, necessitated deep manpower and budget cuts for the military. In late 1957 Khrushchev unceremoniously ousted the Defense Minister, Marshal Zhukov, accusing him of Bonapartism amidst charges that Zhukov had tried to subordinate the Main Political Directorate to the Ministry of Defense rather than the party apparatus. After Zhukov's ouster, Khrushchev intervened heavily in military doctrine and policy in an effort to shift resources and manpower from the military to support his domestic policy agenda. He pushed the notion that the next war would be a nuclear one and created the Strategic Rocket Forces as a new branch of the military to reflect this perception. Khrushchev's last years were marked by tense relations with the military, which did nothing to block his ouster in 1964.

High rates of economic growth during most of this period made it possible for Brezhnev to avoid elite conflict and ensure social stability by satisfying all major resource claimants. From 1965-75, high levels of military spending were achieved without sacrificing growth in consumption and investment.

A Faltering Economy and a Slowdown in Defense Spending


By the mid-1970s, however, economic growth began to slow. Growth of Soviet GNP dropped from an average of 4.0 percent per year in the period 1966-75 to 2.3 percent in 1976-80, and to 2.2 percent in 1981-84.

If the growth rate of military spending in the first decade of Brezhnev's tenure had been maintained to the mid-1980s, defense would have come to absorb nearly 20 percent of Soviet GNP. But the growth of spending for military hardware leveled off in about 1976 and since then has remained at the relatively low average annual growth rate of 1 to 2 percent (see figure 1).

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Figure 1
Soviet Defense Expenditures and
GNP: Average Annual Growth



The reasons for the initial slowdown in defense spending growth are still not completely understood. Some Western analysts have postulated that it was from the outset a result of a conscious policy choice in response to a stagnating economy, but little evidence has been uncovered to support this judgment. Some experts saw signs of strain over the defense budget between Brezhnev and then Defense Minister Grechko shortly before the latter's death in 1976 and believe the selection of a civilian, Dmitriy Ustinov, as Grechko's successor reflected Brezhnev's desire to rein in the military. Although the strains between Brezhnev and Grechko may have been rooted in issues other than the budget and Ustinov had reportedly been Brezhnev's preferred choice as defense minister as far back as 1967, it is probable that Grechko was disturbed by

Brezhnev and Grechko

Before Defense Minister Grechko's death in April 1976, the personal relationship between Brezhnev and Defense Minister Grechko had taken a sharp downturn, in part because of Brezhnev's pretensions to high military rank. Grechko was given an unusually low-key funeral for a full Politburo member, reinforcing the image of cooling personal relations. Within a month of Grechko's death, Brezhnev was given the rank Marshal of the Soviet Union—a move that Grechko reportedly had opposed.

Brezhnev moved quickly to appoint a civilian, Dmitriy Ustinov, as Defense Minister. According to a variety of reports, when Grechko's predecessor, Marshal Malinovskiy, died in 1967, Brezhnev initially favored Ustinov, the party secretary for defense industry, as Malinovskiy's successor but was unable to get Politburo agreement in the face of military resistance. Brezhnev probably chose Ustinov in 1976 because his personal loyalty to the General Secretary and his vast experience in defense industry made him the ideal candidate to exercise party control in a period of resource constraint and to firm up support for Brezhnev's detente agenda.

Brezhnev's increasing tendency to manage security through arms control rather than through big new increases in military procurement (see inset).

While deliberate reduction of the defense spending growth rate would have been an uncharacteristically decisive action by a Brezhnev leadership that was notable for temporizing and procrastinating, other developments at the time could have caused the growth rate in procurement spending to taper off for at least a few years. The Strategic Rocket Forces, for example, were coming off the peak of a major modernization program. The Soviets also began a major modernization of the defense industry about that time

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to prepare for the upgrading of industrial technology required for the more advanced systems they had under development. Whatever the initial causes of the procurement slowdown, however, the fact that the Soviets did not make the kind of resource commitment needed to return the growth rate of defense spending to something resembling the earlier high levels probably was at least in part a result of decisions relating to the USSR's continuing poor overall economic performance. [REDACTED]

Diverging Views on Investment Policy

The mid-1970s was also a period when the Brezhnev leadership had become concerned over the declining efficiency of capital investment. The amount of investment required to sustain a given level of capital output (the ratio of new investment to incremental output or ICOR) had climbed steadily since the mid-1960s. To reverse this trend, Brezhnev instituted in the 1976-80 Five-Year Plan an "intensive growth" strategy; increased efficiency was to provide higher growth in output with smaller increments of investment. The average increase in investment specified in the 1976-80 plan was 3.2 percent, well below the average actual growth of 6.9 and 7.5 percent for the previous two five-year periods. [REDACTED]

The ensuing dismal economic performance through the late 1970s stimulated opposition to the low-investment strategy. Andrey Kirilenko, then the party secretary for industry and an early patron of several of the people who now occupy positions in the Gorbachev regime, led a "high investment" faction that called for the modernization of the economy through application of new technologies in civilian machine building. This opposition was initially overridden by Brezhnev and his supporters, however, and the original version of the 1981-85 Five-Year Plan continued to adhere to the low-investment strategy. The draft directives issued in late 1980 set fairly low investment targets, and these were reduced even further when the 26th Party Congress approved the directives in March 1981: the five-year average specified for 1981-85 was about 2 percent. The formulation of the plan coincided with Kirilenko's political decline, which culminated in his retirement in late 1982. [REDACTED]

The Brezhnev leadership probably favored a low-investment strategy in part because it offered a rationale for sidestepping hard choices. A high-investment policy would have forced the regime to make difficult decisions on competing demands for resources:

- By the late 1970s a growing social malaise, reflected in poor worker morale, crime, and alcohol problems, had compelled Brezhnev to focus more attention on the needs of the consumer. The food riots in Poland in 1976 and the deterioration of political control there in the subsequent years served as a stark example to Moscow. But despite growing leadership realization that there was a connection between unsatisfied consumer demands and the potential for social unrest in the system, the expectations of average Soviet citizens continued to outrace the ability of the economy to satisfy demand. Quality remained abysmally low and dissatisfaction grew as increasing corruption and privilege siphoned off the best resources for the well-placed members of the elite.²
- Despite the slowdown in the *growth rate* of military spending in the mid-1970s, the high *absolute level* that spending had reached by that time and the fact that it continued to creep upward meant that defense continued to claim a heavy share of resources during a period of poor economic performance. By 1976 defense spending, even in the narrow sense, amounted to about 14 percent of Soviet GNP, and this share was maintained (and may even have increased slightly, measured in current rubles) into the 1980s. In the same time frame, moreover, Soviet defense industry received a large increment of investment for construction and new machinery. Between 1971-72 and 1976-80, average annual investment in the nine military machine-building ministries climbed by 83 percent, nearly double the rate of civilian machine building. [REDACTED]

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Apparently unwilling to confront the problem of the large military burden and concerned over the implications of a further squeeze on the already shortchanged consumer, the Brezhnev group tried to muddle through. They apparently hoped that with some minor reforms—embodied in the 1979 decree on state planning—construction and transportation would somehow “do better” and enable the economy to achieve planned growth even with lower investment. [REDACTED]

After 1981, however, the Soviet leadership could no longer avoid facing up to the reality that the USSR was confronting severe economic problems, and the earlier investment decision came under sharper challenge. In early 1982, Abel Aganbegyan—a prominent exponent of the high-investment strategy and now a key member of Gorbachev’s economic brain trust—published an article in *Pravda* arguing that the level of investment had to be dramatically increased over that provided by the five-year plan. Later that year Nikolay Ryzhkov—a Kirilenko protege and another forceful advocate of the high-investment strategy—was named party secretary to oversee economic reform. [REDACTED]

Before his death in November 1982, Brezhnev was apparently being forced to back away from the low-investment strategy. The actual increase in investment in 1981 (3.7 percent) was larger than the average increase projected in the 1981-85 plan (2 percent). A further upturn in investment growth, to 5.6 percent in 1983—nearly three times the five-year plan average—significantly added to the competition for resources among the principal claimants, one of which was the military. Investment growth dipped dramatically again in 1984, however, suggesting that the issue was still not entirely settled and perhaps subject to high-level political factors such as the party succession sweepstakes. [REDACTED]

Crumbling Detente and the “War Scare”

The sharp deterioration in East-West relations in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the subsequent refusal of the United States to ratify the SALT-II Treaty also appear to have contributed to growing tension between the Brezhnev leadership and the Soviet military. By this time the West, led by the United States, had already begun to

step up defense efforts and increase defense budgets in real terms. The Soviet military’s concern over a potential military breakthrough by the United States grew with the development of the MX and Trident D-III missiles, the planned deployment of US long-range INF forces in Western Europe, a string of successes with the space shuttle, and the unveiling in March 1983 of President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). [REDACTED]

The early 1980s saw the emergence of the “war scare” phenomenon in the USSR as Soviet leaders began publicly to portray an increased threat of nuclear conflict brought on by what they charged was a more bellicose, “neoglobalist” US policy. One of the early signals of this line was a June 1980 Central Committee resolution—after the invasion of Afghanistan and the downturn in US-Soviet relations—that first noted an increased threat of war. A variety of evidence has confirmed that the KGB and GRU were tasked to increase their efforts to collect indications of US and NATO preparations for a nuclear attack. While the amount of genuine fear, if any, that lay behind the so-called war scare remains unknown, the evidence is clear that succession politics and the military’s concern for sustaining its preferential claim on resources figured heavily in the treatment of the issue. [REDACTED]

Brezhnev’s health was demonstrably deteriorating by this time, and he had begun overtly to groom his protege, Konstantin Chernenko, as his successor. Both of them argued that the USSR should not overreact to alleged American provocations or engage in an arms race that would exacerbate social problems. Their determination was probably fortified by the worker unrest in neighboring Poland beginning in August 1980. The US grain embargo—a sanction imposed after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan—gave impetus to their efforts to decrease dependence on foreign grain by devoting more attention to agriculture. [REDACTED]

At a Central Committee meeting in October 1980, Brezhnev called for food and consumer goods programs and demanded a greater defense industry contribution to the civilian economy. In a series of

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articles and addresses, Chernenko argued that the failure to make the economy more responsive to consumer demands risked social instability like Poland's. Some intelligence suggests the military and defense industry lost some priority to the sectors supporting the food program at about this time. [REDACTED]

Brezhnev and Chernenko coupled their own statements on the war threat with references to "sensible voices" in the West. In a speech in Tbilisi in October 1982, for example, Chernenko said "neither sanctions nor warlike poses frighten us . . . we believe that sooner or later—and the sooner the better—reason will prevail and the danger of war will be averted." [REDACTED]

KGB Chief Andropov, Chernenko's succession rival who entered the party secretariat in May 1982—at the plenum that formally approved the food program—pressed an alarmist line, implying that the world was tottering on the brink of conflict. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Andropov sought to curry favor with the military—and presumably hard-line political factions—by posturing as the succession contender most capable of dealing with the alleged growing threat. [REDACTED]

Andropov argued that the solution to the impending crisis lay in discipline and a struggle against corruption. He strongly implied that the exaggerated consumer promises by Brezhnev contributed to the dissatisfaction of the masses. He also portrayed the imperialist powers, particularly the United States, as more determined to undermine the Soviet Union, and therefore a greater threat. All this required greater vigilance and more attention to national security. In addition to appealing to the military and political hardliners, Andropov may have hoped that portraying the international situation in starkest terms would accentuate Chernenko's inexperience in foreign affairs. [REDACTED]

Andropov was joined in his alarmist rhetoric by Marshal Ogarkov and several other prominent military leaders, although Defense Minister Ustinov took a more balanced line. Ogarkov, for instance, wrote in 1982 that "militant US circles have openly adopted a

policy aimed at undermining detente, engagement in a massive arms race, and active preparations for a nuclear war." He went on to note "underestimation of the threat of war today and, as a consequence of this, unconcern, complacency, and calm placidity are a dangerous phenomenon fraught with serious consequences." Ogarkov's primary motivation for playing up the threat was probably to build the case for greater attention to military needs. In his writings of the period, he called for the preparation of the economy to achieve a war footing, increased indoctrination for youth, and implicitly for a new infusion of resources into the military to meet the "imperialist threat." [REDACTED]

The pattern of inflation in the USSR in the late 1970s probably also contributed to a divergence between the military and civilian leaderships' perspectives on defense spending. Our analysis indicates that the rate of inflation in the Soviet defense sector has for some time been somewhat higher than in the Soviet economy as a whole. Consequently, while the growth rate in military hardware procurement remained relatively flat when measured in *constant rubles*, civilian leaders looking at the *current ruble* spending figures would have seen the levels as going up. Perhaps more important, defense spending would have appeared to be an increasing proportion of the current ruble figure for the overall state budget. Military leaders, on the other hand, would have been more concerned with the declining rate of military hardware deliveries to the operational forces and the real growth of spending by the United States. [REDACTED]

At an extraordinary meeting with the military leadership in late October 1982—attended by the senior members of the civilian leadership, including Andropov and Chernenko—Brezhnev sought to justify his economic priorities. Ustinov's brief opening remarks had a defensive cast, stressing Brezhnev's past solicitude for the military. While Brezhnev pledged to "tirelessly strengthen the defense of our country" and acknowledged that a lag in military technology with the West was "inadmissible," he argued that continued economic problems and the needs of the transport and energy sectors and the new Food Program—

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approved five months earlier—necessitated more efficient use of the great resources at the military's disposal. He stated that it was "exceptionally important to master [already deployed] weapons and utilize their full combat potential" and suggested the military should show itself "worthy of the concern the party leadership has shown."

Military Concern During the Interregnums

Brezhnev died several days after this meeting, initiating a protracted succession interregnum. His failure to satisfy the military's resource claims and Chernenko's relatively benign portrayal of US intentions apparently contributed to a lack of military support for Chernenko. Some Soviet sources even speculated that support from the military may have been important within the Central Committee in securing Andropov's election. Andropov, in his initial statement as party leader, appeared to acknowledge military support and pledged that the military would have everything it needed to defend the homeland, explicitly underscoring Politburo solicitude for the army. In the months after his election, Andropov authorized several promotions of senior officers to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union or to full membership in the Central Committee, which may have been a payoff for some political support.

The resource allocations issue, however, continued to plague the leadership and complicate political-military relations. This dispute was compounded by a sense of political weakness stemming from a series of old and sickly General Secretaries.

The party elite during Andropov's brief tenure also was apparently concerned about excessive military involvement in policymaking.

Central Committee officials expressed concern in early 1983 over a growing military involvement in foreign policy that was reflected in the General Staff's earlier creation of its own Arms Control and Negotiations Directorate. Some civilian officials, in what may have been an apocryphal characterization, complained that Soviet officers traveling to Poland—where the military was in control under martial law introduced in December 1981—"liked what they saw."

Even though Andropov evidently sought military support in his bid to succeed Brezhnev, available evidence suggests that once in power he considered ways to restrict the policy influence of the military and strengthen civilian control over security policy, perhaps reflecting the concern of the party elite.

predicted that the military's role in decisionmaking would decline if Andropov "stays alive long enough." According to two independent sources,

Andropov decided to weaken the military control over threat assessment and thus over arms control and resource decisions by creating a civilian staff for the Politburo's military policy subcommittee, the Defense Council. Perhaps because of his ill health or resistance from the military, these plans apparently did not come to fruition.

After Chernenko became General Secretary, tensions over resource allocation and military assertiveness came to a head. Military professionals were never happy about his election or his continued rhetorical support for a consumerist line. Despite Chernenko's attempts to placate the military by promising in his first speech as General Secretary to strengthen defense "to cool the hotheads of Western militant adventurists" and his apparent support of a decision to free the military from its obligation to assist in the harvest, the initial editorials in the military newspaper *Red Star* were lukewarm and private comments by most Soviet officers were critical.

Chernenko's inability to win over the military was probably due in part to his apparent reluctance to sink additional resources into defense. In a tour of a Moscow factory in late April 1984, he rejected calls in letters to the Central Committee for an extension of

the Politburo decided to free the military from the obligation of providing trucks and personnel to support the harvest in March 1984, several weeks after Chernenko's election. Harvest support was significantly curtailed with the exception of some emergency support. In previous years thousands of military trucks and personnel had been involved for periods of up to six months. While the decision may have been in the works for a long time, it was probably viewed as a major concession to the military and an economically inexpensive way of improving military readiness and defense.

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the workweek and creation of a special fund for national defense. He argued that "our economic potential and new technical means that improve defense efficiency make it possible, without taking the steps proposed, to reliably safeguard the security of the Soviet state and its allies." Sounding a defensive note, he promised that he would make no unilateral concessions, that the lessons of World War II would not be ignored, and that the military balance would be ensured, but he promised no additional resources.

Ogarkov's Ouster

Marshal Ogarkov's insistent efforts to press for a resource commitment to deal with the US military buildup apparently brought him into conflict with Chernenko. In an interview on VE-Day in May 1984, Ogarkov expressed deep concern about Soviet abilities to fight a high-technology conventional war. He warned of the advent of weapons based on new physical principles that could change the very nature of warfare and implicitly called for a costly modernization of Soviet conventional forces.

Ogarkov confronted Chernenko with his assessment of the inability of the economy to meet defense needs, which Chernenko refused to accept.

Ogarkov pushed hard behind the scenes for restructuring to meet the needs of military modernization. A major disagreement about resource allocation between Ogarkov and the General Secretary was partially corroborated by the appearance of editorials in *Pravda* and *Red Star* on the day of Ogarkov's demotion affirming Chernenko's proconsumerist priorities.

Several signs also point to a succession-related element in the decision to demote Ogarkov.

Chernenko and Ustinov took the lead in removing the assertive chief of the General Staff so he would not be in a position to garner support for the Defense Minister job and a seat on the Politburo when Ustinov passed from the scene.

claimed Ogarkov was removed because he had become too stubborn in pushing his "strategic concepts," suggesting he had overstepped

the bounds of what was considered appropriate for a chief of the General Staff.

Ogarkov was ousted because of his "nonparty" attitude, implying that some of Ogarkov's actions had been viewed as insubordination toward the party at a time when many party elites were nervous about the contrast between a dynamic General Staff chief and a frail party General Secretary.

The fact that Ogarkov was appointed commander in chief of Soviet forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations rather than being dismissed from the service strongly suggests he retained some political protectors (see inset). His assignment to an important post also suggests he had not been disloyal to the party per se, which would have led to his complete disgrace. It is more likely he failed to hide his contempt for Chernenko and refused to take no for an answer to his resource pleadings.

Ogarkov's demotion apparently generated some grumbling within the military. In Ustinov's last public appearance, on 27 September 1984, he identified Chernenko as Chairman of the Defense Council and Supreme Commander in Chief, a move that appeared calculated to bolster the authority of the General Secretary over military policy at a time of increased political-military strain.

As in the case of Ogarkov's demotion, political factors appear to have played an important role in the selection of Ustinov's 74-year-old first deputy, Sergey Sokolov, to succeed him as Defense Minister after his death in late December 1984. Sokolov's age and low political profile made him an ideal interim candidate who could be counted on to be obedient to civilian leaders and to steer clear of involvement in Politburo politics. Lacking Politburo membership when Chernenko died in March 1985, Sokolov did not directly participate in the selection of a new General Secretary—in contrast to Ustinov, who was viewed as a powerful influence in the two preceding political successions.

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Possible Ogarkov Sympathizers in the Politburo

The alignment of various Politburo members on the demotion of Marshal Ogarkov is subject to conflicting evidence. Succession hopeful Grigoriy Romanov reportedly had some sympathy for Ogarkov and may have helped save him from a more precipitous fall; Gorbachev's role is less clear. [REDACTED]

Romanov—the party secretary for defense industry—was out of the country when the decision was announced. According to several reports, Romanov had been trying to build support within the military and more hardline domestic constituencies for his bid to become General Secretary. According to one report, he even promised Ogarkov the job of Defense Minister when Ustinov passed from the scene. Romanov's identification of Ogarkov as commander of Soviet forces in the west at a Helsinki press conference—the initial leadership confirmation that Ogarkov had an important operational command—appears to corroborate reports that Romanov was a backer of Ogarkov's. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev's attitude toward Ogarkov is the subject of more contradictory evidence. As senior party official on the scene during Chernenko's illness, Gorbachev clearly participated in the train of events leading to Ogarkov's dismissal. It is unclear whether he believed Ogarkov was overstepping the bounds in pushing the military's case, but considerable evidence suggests he would be no more sympathetic than Chernenko to Ogarkov's pleadings for more resources. He may have been suspicious of Romanov's reported efforts to cultivate the military and Ogarkov in particular. [REDACTED]

Despite Ogarkov's assertiveness and his views on spending issues, several sources suggested he would make a comeback soon after Gorbachev became party

chief, perhaps because they appear to share many similar views on the long-term security challenge:

- They have both stressed the need for technical modernization, improved management, and efficiency in defense industry and the military, and both apparently believe that nuclear weapons have only limited military utility.

• [REDACTED] Gorbachev respected Ogarkov's realistic appreciation of the relationship between military power and foreign policy, and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] claims that Gorbachev liked Ogarkov's 1985 book *History Teaches Vigilance*. [REDACTED]

There is some evidence that Gorbachev briefly toyed with the idea of having Ogarkov assume a senior military position in Moscow after his election in March 1985. Rumors began to circulate widely after July 1985 that Ogarkov would take the job of Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Viktor Kulikov or even replace Defense Minister Sokolov. Gorbachev may have been dangling this prospect to persuade the still-influential Ogarkov to support his investment and arms control strategy. [REDACTED]

After the middle of 1986, however, rumors of Ogarkov's comeback stopped, perhaps because of his age—he will be 70 this year—and his reported continued assertiveness on resource and personnel questions. The appointment of Dmitriy Yazov as Minister of Defense clearly signaled that Ogarkov's career had peaked and that the General Secretary was turning to a younger crop of military leaders to implement his policies. [REDACTED]

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Gorbachev's Agenda

[REDACTED] Gorbachev in 1983 had already come down on the side of the Kirilenko faction—in opposition to his political patron Andropov—by favoring high investment in the civilian economy and containment of military expenditures. In late 1984, several months before becoming General Secretary, he began publicly pushing for rapid increases in the machine-building sector.⁴ Since his accession, he has established economic modernization as his top policy priority, emphasizing that it is essential for the regime's long-term viability. [REDACTED]

In his very first statements as General Secretary, Gorbachev labeled Brezhnev's decision to reduce the growth of investment as disastrous because it precipitated an economic slowdown that eventually hurt both defense and consumption. At his first major Central Committee plenum, in April 1985, Gorbachev indicated he had Politburo approval for major structural shifts in investment patterns. And at the Conference on Science and Technology in June 1985, he announced ambitious targets for increased investment and output growth for the civilian machine-building sector. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev has emphatically characterized the revitalization of the economy as a national security issue with serious implications for future military strength, stressing that the economy is the real base of the USSR's superpower status and that without modernization the country will eventually become a second-rate world power. For example:

- [REDACTED] Gorbachev told colleagues after the Geneva summit with President Reagan in 1985 that the USSR must employ all means at its disposal to close the economic gap with the United States because it was having serious negative impact on research and development and hampering Soviet ability to match the United States militarily.
- [REDACTED]

• He reportedly asserted [REDACTED] in June 1986 that the West is no longer afraid of Soviet missiles but is afraid that the USSR might successfully modernize.

• He [REDACTED] told CEMA leaders in late 1986 that accelerated socioeconomic development was necessary to maintain military-strategic equilibrium and the existence of socialism. He went on to note that, if peaceful coexistence is the only long-term alternative, economic strength and attaining a competitive position are the only way to implement this policy.

• In several speeches, most recently at the Trade Union Congress in February 1987, he implied that opponents of his modernization program lacked patriotism, noting that the West was counting on the failure of his reform program. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev and some of his advisers have also explicitly linked the resurgence of Western assertiveness to Soviet economic problems in Brezhnev's last years. In a January 1986 speech, Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Department, noted that the United States stepped up pressure on the USSR in the late 1970s because it perceived growing Soviet economic problems but began to moderate its behavior after Gorbachev's election and an improvement in economic performance. Similarly, Gorbachev noted in an interview with a Czechoslovak journalist in September 1986 that "if we become stronger and more solid economically, politically, and socially, the capitalist world will show greater interest in normal relations with us." [REDACTED]

The Politburo apparently was already moving toward the same conclusion. Several supporters of a rapid modernization strategy had been promoted under Andropov, including party secretaries Yegor Ligachev and Nikolay Ryzhkov. Both were vaulted directly to full membership on the Politburo at Gorbachev's first Central Committee plenum, in April 1985, and KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov, another Andropov stalwart

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and modernization backer, was promoted from candidate member. Along with strong support from some Brezhnev holdovers like Andrey Gromyko, this gave Gorbachev the broad political base he needed to immediately shift to a strategy favoring rapid modernization of civilian machine building. [REDACTED]

Implications for Military Spending

Whereas the Brezhnev group's low-investment, intensive-growth strategy was expressly designed to avoid a confrontation with the military on resource issues, Gorbachev's high-investment, industrial modernization goals make such confrontation virtually unavoidable. To achieve his ambitious modernization goals, Gorbachev has called for the renewal of one-third of the fixed capital stock—including up to one-half of all machinery—by 1990. Such a dramatic acceleration in the refurbishment of the USSR's industrial base means that a larger share of the output of the Soviet machine-building and metalworking industries—which turn out Soviet military hardware—must go into the civilian sector. [REDACTED]

A critical factor in Gorbachev's ability to sell his modernization strategy to Politburo skeptics was probably the cushion provided by major investments in defense industry infrastructure that took place during the preceding decade. These investments in the late 1970s and early 1980s resulted in a substantial expansion of the defense industry, putting it in a better position to forgo new investment and still produce most of the weapon systems required by the military until 1988 or 1989. The shifting of some basic materials, skilled labor, and certain high-technology components needed in modern machining to civilian machine building, however, is still likely to have a negative impact on the defense industry. [REDACTED]

Nevertheless, Gorbachev is reported to have hinted on numerous occasions during the past two and a half years that some diversion of resources away from defense will be required to achieve his economic goals. For example, when he was in Bucharest this spring, he said that postwar efforts to "create heavy industry, strengthen defense, and achieve military parity" had created increasing "unevenness" and that the restoration of economic balance was needed. [REDACTED]

Several Soviet party officials have told their contacts—including members of fraternal Communist parties—that Gorbachev intends to moderate the near-term burden of defense spending to help support his modernization drive. One of the more authoritative statements was by one of Gorbachev's closest advisers, [REDACTED] who told [REDACTED] that Gorbachev believes he must cut back on defense spending to realize his economic goals. And one of the starkest assertions was made by the former editor of the party's theoretical journal, who told [REDACTED] that Gorbachev could achieve only half of his goals for modernization without diverting resources from defense. [REDACTED] this August conceded to a Western interviewer that defense spending was a major economic drain and asserted that Gorbachev intended to cut it, even without an arms control agreement. [REDACTED]

Some of the statements—including the three cited above—were intended to come to the attention of the United States. They are consistent, however, with a large volume of reporting [REDACTED]

Taking Charge of Defense Policy

The priority Gorbachev has attached to modernizing Soviet industry and the background of tensions over military-political relations and resource-allocation issues that immediately predated his election constitute strong incentives for establishing firm control over defense policy. His lack of close ties to the high command may have made establishing personal control even more imperative (see inset). He has taken a series of actions designed to shake up the military establishment, reduce its earlier stranglehold over defense-related decisions, and strengthen the hand of the General Secretary. [REDACTED]

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Gorbachev's Lack of Military Ties

Unlike Brezhnev and many of the older generation, Gorbachev never served in the armed forces. His career as a Komsomol and party official specializing in agriculture rarely brought him into close professional contact with the military. Gorbachev's military service reportedly was limited to reserve training as a student at Moscow State University in the early 1950s. Until his promotion to Moscow in 1978, his main exposure to the military probably came when local units were called on for help in gathering the harvest. Even after coming to Moscow as party secretary for agriculture, his focus was primarily domestic. He became intensively involved in national security issues only after his promotion to full membership in the Politburo in 1980, and particularly after Yuriy Andropov succeeded Brezhnev in 1982.

Symbolic Actions. Gorbachev's determination was evident from the first hours of his accession in political moves that appeared designed to put the military in its place symbolically:

- In his first move as party leader, Gorbachev—as head of the Chernenko funeral commission—was reportedly responsible for excluding the military from the funeral as a means of reducing its political profile.
- Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov was promoted to candidate membership on the Politburo at the first routine Central Committee plenum after Gorbachev's election but never advanced beyond this status—which formally allowed him to participate in discussion, but not vote. Sokolov's secondary role was underscored by the higher Politburo standing of the KGB chief and Foreign Minister and by the fact that his two immediate predecessors as Minister of Defense had full Politburo membership. Several reports indicated this was a conscious decision by Gorbachev to put the military in a subordinate position. Sokolov's failure to advance to full member reportedly was interpreted by senior Soviet officers as a slap at the military.

- In November 1986 the military's representation at the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution was dramatically reduced. At May Day ceremonies this year, Sokolov stood lower in protocol terms than the junior party secretaries despite his Politburo candidate rank.

Some reporting suggests that Gorbachev sought in internal forums to justify his treatment of the military in terms of the need to project a more peaceful image to the West. He reportedly argued that such protocolary slights did not signify a diminution of party concern for the military or security. Gorbachev's efforts to project a less threatening image of the USSR may in fact have played a role. Moscow's war-scare rhetoric and the spectacle of having Marshal Ogarkov explain Moscow's threadbare rationale for shooting down the Korean 747 in August 1983 had contributed to a Western image of predominant military influence, which was at cross-purposes with Gorbachev's policy approach.

The Minsk Meeting. Gorbachev's initial symbolic actions, however, were soon followed by more decisive steps to impose his economic and political agenda on the military. In July 1985 Gorbachev held a major meeting with the military leadership in Minsk to demonstrate that he was in charge, that he intended to make changes in the military command, and that he would tolerate no opposition to his modernization plans.

While the speech was never published in the Soviet media, an official readout given by an officer in the General Staff to *Newsweek* confirmed that Gorbachev outlined his economic program and discussed "needed personnel changes." A major *Pravda* article in August 1985—reportedly a synthesis of Gorbachev's speech in Minsk—argued that the military must assist in the restructuring of the economy, including helping with the harvest, from which the military had won a reprieve under Chernenko. An account in Moscow claims Gorbachev told the assembled military brass that the party must rule the army and not the reverse. He also reportedly outlined his plans to achieve arms

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control progress through new proposals and concessions and told them of his plans for "zero growth" in the military budget during the 12th (1986-90) Five-Year Plan. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Gorbachev argued that the military must share the blame for the country's problems because defense spending was a key obstacle to reform and economic growth. He complained about the failure to transfer technology from defense industry to the civilian sector, pointed to waste and redundancy in the military, and said the high command would have to be more efficient before they could ask for more spending. He went on to argue it was the military's duty to save resources and threatened that "if you do not reform your house, other military people will do it."

[REDACTED] Gorbachev also stressed the need to modernize conventional forces—referring to agreement on this by "our best military minds," a possible reference to Ogarkov—but implied that the expense necessitated cuts elsewhere. Gorbachev reportedly went on to note that a new arms race made no sense and that arms agreements had the highest priority in order that the enormous expenditures on arms could be slowed down. While he promised not to bow to an imperialist "diktat," he noted that both sides would have to make concessions—for instance, on verification—and that the military would have to think about how this could be achieved. [REDACTED]

While these specific assertions cannot be corroborated, and it is difficult to assess the motivations of the Soviet officials who acted as conduits for information about Gorbachev's speech, their accounts are broadly consistent with known facts. The reports, for instance, claim Gorbachev laid out arms control "concessions" shortly before the actual announcement of the Soviet unilateral nuclear test moratorium on 6 August 1985 and the tabling of new arms control proposals containing the offer of a 50-percent cut in strategic warheads in September. The reporting also suggests that Gorbachev couched the core message to the military—you need to be more efficient, responsible, and flexible on

arms control—in terms of the long-term benefits to national security and conventional arms modernization that would make it more palatable to some of the more forward-looking military leaders. [REDACTED]

Leadership Turnover

Gorbachev's efforts to pursue new policies have been greatly aided by the leadership turnover that began under Andropov, slowed briefly under Chernenko, and then advanced rapidly from the first months after Gorbachev's election.⁴ Personnel moves since then have fundamentally changed the composition of the most important security policymaking bodies—the Politburo and Defense Council—and resulted in an important shift in the leadership's relations with the military (see figures 2 and 3). [REDACTED]

The Politburo. Representatives of the old guard with strong personal ties to the military are dwindling on the Politburo and their influence has diminished. KGB Chief Viktor Chebrikov, ideology secretary Aleksandr Yakovlev, and Ukrainian party boss Vladimir Shcherbitskiy are the only full Politburo members who have served in the military (there were six in 1981), and Yakovlev is a strong Gorbachev supporter. Most of the old guard members, like Gromyko, now appear reconciled to a somewhat more flexible and dynamic arms control policy and probably lack the power to challenge Gorbachev on their own. [REDACTED]

Many of the newer members of the Politburo are younger and generally less tied into the military or defense industry establishment than their predecessors. Members of Gorbachev's generation, whose views were not shaped by World War II, also predominate in the ranks just below the top—as Politburo candidate members and party secretaries. The older generation, believing that the planned economy and the massive influx of men and equipment into the struggle led to the defeat of Nazi Germany, tended to define military security in terms of sheer numbers of

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Figure 2
The Soviet Leadership—
Changes Since Gorbachev

☐ Promoted since March 1985, when Gorbachev became General Secretary


Party			Government			
Politburo			Other Post	Secretariat	Council of Ministers	Presidium of Supreme Soviet
Full Members	Age*	Election				
Mikhail Gorbachev	56	10/21/80		General Secretary		Member
Geydar Aliev	64	11/22/82			1st Deputy Chairman	
Viktor Chebrikov	64	4/23/85			KGB Chairman	
Andrey Gromyko	77	4/27/73				Chairman (President)
Yegor Ligachev	66	4/23/85		Personnel and ideology		
Nikolay Ryzhkov	57	4/23/85			Chairman (Premier)	
Vladimir Shcherbitskiy	69	4/ 9/71	Ukraine party chief			Member
Eduard Shevardnadze	59	7/ 1/85			Minister of Foreign Affairs	
Mikhail Solomentsev	73	12/26/83	Party Control Committee			
Vitaliy Vorotnikov	61	12/26/83	RSFSR Premier			
Lev Zaykov	64	3/ 6/86		Heavy industry; defense		
Viktor Nikonov	58	6/26/87		Agriculture		
Nikolay Slyun'kov	58	6/26/87		Economy		
Aleksandr Yakovlev	63	6/26/87		Propaganda, culture, ideology		
Candidate Members						
Petr Demichev	69	11/ 3/64				Deputy Chairman
Vladimir Dolgikh	62	5/24/82		Extractive and heavy industries; energy		
Nikolay Talyzin	58	10/15/85			1st Deputy Chairman, (Chairman Gosplan)	
Boris Yeltsin	56	2/18/86	Moscow party chief			Member
Dmitry Yazov	63	6/26/87			Minister of Defense	
Yuriy Solov'yev	61	3/ 6/86	Leningrad party chief			Member
Secretaries Only						
Aleksandra Biryukova	58	3/ 6/86		Light industry		
Anatoliy Dobrynin	67	3/ 6/86		Foreign policy		
Anatoliy Luk'yanov	57	1/28/87		General Department; defense; security		
Vadim Medvedev	58	3/ 6/86		Relations with socialist countries		
Georgiy Razumovskiy	51	3/ 6/86		Personnel		

* Current as of 1 July 1987

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Figure 3
Likely Defense Council Membership,
1980-Present



arms and favored retaining a highly centralized economic structure. Gorbachev's generation has focused its attention on the economic and systemic social problems that emerged in the late Brezhnev era and sees the resolution of these problems as essential to effective competition today when economic and military power is measured as much by qualitative improvement as by quantitative output.

The Defense Council. Soviet sources have confirmed that Gorbachev chairs the Defense Council and is Commander in Chief by virtue of his position as

General Secretary, giving him—like his predecessors—control over the most important defense policy-making body. Gorbachev himself publicly announced his post of chairman of the Council in his INF proposal of 28 February 1987.⁷

⁷ Gorbachev's decision to reveal his chairmanship of the Defense Council in print was unusual, suggesting he wanted to underscore his authority over military policy. Previous General Secretaries have rarely referred openly to their chairmanship of the Council, although Defense Minister Ustinov publicly identified Andropov and Chernenko in that capacity.

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Gorbachev's personnel changes have resulted in nearly a clean sweep of Defense Council incumbents since his election; the tenure of most likely members is thus less than three years. Party secretaries Yegor Ligachev and Lev Zaykov, Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov, and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze are civilian members who are new to the Defense Council since Gorbachev's election. President Gromyko—a member since perhaps 1973—and KGB chief Chebrikov—probably a member since late 1982—provide the only continuity. [REDACTED]

On the military side, the retirement of Defense Minister Sokolov and his replacement with Gen. Dmitriy Yazov, a political neophyte, will fortify Gorbachev's personal dominance. General Staff Chief Sergey Akhromeyev—who acts as secretary but may not formally be a member—has participated only since late 1984. Given Akhromeyev's less assertive approach and Yazov's comparative lack of political independence and familiarity with Council operations, it seems likely that they will be much more cautious than earlier incumbents Ustinov and Ogarkov in pushing their own points of view. [REDACTED]

The Secretariat. One of Gorbachev's boldest strokes in eliminating a potential focal point of opposition to his unfolding agenda was the ouster of his succession rival Grigoriy Romanov—who sat on the Defense Council as senior secretary for the military and defense industry. According to several sources, Romanov attempted to ingratiate himself with the military, although his widely reputed arrogance appears to have deterred many military leaders from embracing him. Comments [REDACTED] suggest that Romanov's ouster in July 1985 had been a de facto blow to the "weapon industry lobby" and foreign policy "hardliners." [REDACTED]

Romanov was replaced with Lev Zaykov, a Gorbachev ally with defense industry experience. Gorbachev's ties to Zaykov can be traced to June 1983 when he presided at Zaykov's installation as First Secretary of the Leningrad party organization. Zaykov had at one time headed a major defense factory, but his career languished while Romanov was party boss in Leningrad. Even before his move to the Secretariat in

July 1985, Zaykov had been an advocate of Gorbachev's modernization drive, and Gorbachev strongly endorsed Zaykov's record on economic intensification during a visit to Leningrad in May 1985. Zaykov's career was given a further boost in March 1986 when he was promoted directly to full membership of the Politburo, making him at that time one of only three senior secretaries, along with Gorbachev and "Second Secretary" Ligachev. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Zaykov told West European Communist leaders in mid-1986 that 100 percent of Soviet effort should go toward modernization and not to defense—an obvious exaggeration, perhaps for the sake of emphasis. He has also publicly endorsed defense industry assistance to retooling consumer goods industry, trade, and services. In a speech in Czechoslovakia last February, he echoed Gorbachev on the need to "hold armaments at levels of reasonable sufficiency . . . with a lasting tendency toward reduction." [REDACTED]

In January 1987 Gorbachev reportedly orchestrated the promotion of Anatoliy Luk'yanov as junior secretary, apparently in an effort to improve his control over the security portfolio in the Secretariat. Luk'yanov is particularly close to Gorbachev, whom he has reportedly known since they went to law school together in the early 1950s. He headed the Central Committee General Department, which controls the paperwork for the Politburo and Secretariat, from December 1985 to May 1987. While Luk'yanov probably had good contacts with a number of senior leaders—reportedly including Ligachev—his long association with Gorbachev apparently contributed to his being given the sensitive mission of overseeing internal security and defense issues for the leadership. [REDACTED]

Luk'yanov has made a number of appearances at defense industry and military-related functions, including Armed Forces Day and Border Guards Day. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] he has some oversight responsibilities for the military, perhaps assisting Zaykov. [REDACTED]

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Defense Industry. The leadership also retired several ministers involved in defense industry production, including one who had implicitly criticized the feasibility of Gorbachev's modernization program. A younger generation of defense industry managers has replaced several older officials who attained their posts in the Brezhnev years. Leonid Smirnov, for 22 years the chairman of the Military Industrial Commission—the government's coordinating body for defense industry—was replaced in October 1985 by the then 49-year-old Yuriy Maslyukov, first deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee and former defense plant director. Smirnov was a longtime Ustinov protege who was reportedly opposed to shifting resources from the defense industry sector to the civilian economy. The 76-year-old head of the party's defense industry department, Igor Dmitriyev, also retired in 1985 and was replaced by then 50-year-old Oleg Belyakov. It is doubtful, in our view, that these individuals would have been selected for such senior positions if they did not share many of the concerns of Gorbachev and Zaykov on the need to modernize the technological base. [REDACTED]

More changes may be in the works. The party leadership last year and again this June criticized several defense industry ministers for their failure to produce quality consumer goods. [REDACTED]

Foreign Policy Apparatus. Gorbachev also moved rapidly to gain control of the foreign policy making apparatus, putting the key levers of policy in the hands of his allies:⁹

- Less than four months after his election, he eased Andrey Gromyko—who had been Foreign Minister since 1957—into the Presidency and replaced him with Eduard Shevardnadze, an ally who could be counted on to execute policy loyally.
- Gorbachev also moved Aleksandr Yakovlev and Anatoliy Dobrynin—the former ambassadors in Ottawa and Washington—into the Secretariat with responsibility for public diplomacy and foreign policy, respectively. The elevation of these "Americanists," both of whom are reportedly close to the [REDACTED]

General Secretary, reflects the heightened priority Gorbachev is giving to arms control and US-Soviet relations generally. [REDACTED]

Asserting Control Over the Military

Gorbachev also advanced military leaders more in tune with his policies. This culminated in the naming of a new Defense Minister this May. [REDACTED]

Changing the Defense Minister

The meteoric rise of Dmitriy Yazov to Defense Minister following the Cessna incident dramatically underscored Gorbachev's intention to gain personal control over the military. Soviet dissident historian Roy Medvedev—who cited well-informed Soviet officials—claimed that Gorbachev made his surprise move of proposing Sokolov's retirement and the appointment of Yazov after consulting only his closest political allies. According to Medvedev, Gorbachev was "livid" about the incident and decided to exploit it to overcome what he saw as the "unacceptably" slow pace of restructuring in the military. Two independent reports claim that Gorbachev met with the military leadership several days later—in a move reminiscent of his meeting in Minsk—to push his restructuring and to spell out how this would result in force reductions, personnel retirements, and weapons reductions. The report suggests he is exploiting the incident to press his policy agenda across a broad front. [REDACTED]

As a darkhorse selection—he was the most junior of 14 deputy ministers—Yazov will initially lack the political clout of his predecessors and appears completely dependent on Gorbachev. Gorbachev apparently decided to give Yazov the candidate Politburo seat held by Sokolov in order to strengthen his authority within the military. Yazov's lack of a strong independent base in the military will limit his independence and help guarantee that he initially will be more a supporter of regime policies than a strong advocate for military interests. The fact that Yazov never served in the General Staff—where the military

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expertise on resource allocation and security policy resides—and has no arms control background could also work to strengthen Gorbachev's control in these areas. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev apparently tapped Yazov because he was a strong backer of his policies. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] he got his initial posting to Moscow last winter as deputy minister for personnel because he had impressed Gorbachev with a speech in support of "restructuring" during the General Secretary's visit to the Far East last summer. Over the last several years, he has stressed in his speeches and public statements the need for better discipline and training, themes that also fit well with "restructuring." At a meeting of Ministry of Defense personnel in July 1987, Yazov pointed out that the party's demands for restructuring had not yet affected command and political cadres, including those within the central apparatus, and called for an end to "the most flagrant incidents of negligence, carelessness, and irresponsibility." [REDACTED]

Yazov's remarks probably portend a housecleaning within the military. Numerous Air Defense Forces officers have reportedly already been removed, and some—possibly including the branch's former chief, Aleksandr Koldunov—are under criminal investigation. Army Gen. Ivan Tret'yak—who as commander of the Far East Military District was Yazov's superior (1977-78 and 1984-86)—has been named to replace Koldunov, and the Air Defense Forces leadership has reportedly been purged by a forced retirement of many senior officers. Several sources have suggested that Yazov has already sacked a large number of senior ministry officers—one source gave a figure of 40—and that Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Kulikov and Deputy Minister Kurkotkin, who is in charge of rear services, will be the next to go.

[REDACTED] Military Intelligence Chief Petr Ivashutin—who was rumored to be going soon—retired in September. [REDACTED]

The decision to vault Yazov over senior officers suggests Gorbachev lacks confidence in much of the senior military leadership. Ranking officers, particularly those from the older generation, are now on notice they will lose their jobs if they fail to carry out

Gorbachev's policies aggressively (as Gorbachev reportedly threatened as far back as July 1985, in his Minsk speech). Yazov's promotion will probably be viewed favorably by younger officers, who will look forward to career opportunities created by the shakeup. [REDACTED]

Other Changes in the High Command

Even before Yazov's appointment, there had been several major changes resulting from the retirement of older officers (see table 1 and appendix). Personnel changes before the Cessna incident had already affected over one-third of the top military leadership. All of those retired were over 65 and most were in their seventies. Retirements of some senior leaders, like Chief of the Main Political Directorate Yepishev and First Deputy Minister Petrov can probably be explained by poor health (Yepishev died within weeks of his retirement), but they nonetheless demonstrate Gorbachev's preference not to have incapacitated leaders languish in office—a practice often allowed by Brezhnev. [REDACTED]

The appointments of Strategic Rocket Forces Chief Yuriy Maksimov and Main Political Directorate Chief Aleksey Lizichev just after Gorbachev's Minsk speech and the promotion of Petr Lushev a year later stood out as early moves to bring some fresh blood into responsible positions. Some recent evidence, however, suggests they did not pursue restructuring fast enough to suit Gorbachev:

- Maksimov, for instance, had never served in the Strategic Rocket Forces; his background was in general purpose and combined-arms commands, most recently as commander in chief of forces in the Southern Theater of Military Operations. He has been generally supportive of Gorbachev's policies, although he did make critical comments on the nuclear test moratorium last September.
- Lizichev—who was earlier a deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate—was vaulted over several senior officers in the directorate's hierarchy from his post as head of the political directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Immediately

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Table 1
Changes in Defense Ministry Leadership

	Post	Gorbachev Appointee	Age When Appointed	Incumbent	Age When Removed
July 1985	Chief, Main Political Directorate	Army Gen. A. D. Lizichev	58	Army Gen. A. A. Yepishev	77
	CINC, Strategic Rocket Forces	Army Gen. Yu. P. Maksimov	62	Mar. V. F. Tolubko	70
December 1985	CINC, Navy	Flt. Adm. V. N. Chernavin	58	Flt. Adm. SU S. G. Gorshkov	76
July 1986	1st Deputy Minister	Army Gen. P. G. Lushev	62	MSU V. I. Petrov	69
	Deputy Minister for Civil Defense	Army Gen. V. L. Govorov	61	Army Gen. A. T. Altunin	65
	Deputy Minister, chief of Main Inspectorate	Army Gen. I. M. Tret'yak	63	Army Gen. V. L. Govorov *	61
February 1987	Deputy Minister for Personnel	Army Gen. D. T. Yazov	63	Army Gen. I. N. Shkadov	73
May 1987	CINC, Air Defense Forces	Army Gen. I. M. Tret'yak	64	Ch. Mar. Avn. A. I. Koldunov	63
	Minister of Defense	Army Gen. D. T. Yazov	63	MSU S. L. Sokolov	75
July 1987	Deputy Minister for Personnel	Army Gen. D. S. Sukhorukov	64	Army Gen. D. T. Yazov	63
	Deputy Minister, chief of Main Inspectorate	Army Gen. M. I. Sorokin	65	Army Gen. I. M. Tret'yak *	64

* Unlike the other incumbents, Generals Govorov and Tret'yak made what is technically a lateral transfer and retained their deputy minister rank.

after his appointment, he became one of Gorbachev's most outspoken supporters among the military leadership, echoing his themes of party control, improved discipline and efficiency, and the need to modernize the economy. Recent sharp criticism of the work of party committees and political officers, however, reflect poorly on Lizichev.

- Lushev—an apparent friend of Lizichev's who rose rapidly under Gorbachev and publicly echoed his themes—was named in July 1986 to the post of first deputy minister and was frequently touted as a candidate to succeed Sokolov until Yazov's selection. His most recent statements, however, have been less in tune with Gorbachev's more radical recent statements, and Yazov reportedly plans to retire him.

The replacement of the Commander in Chief of the Navy, Sergey Gorshkov, with his chief of staff and first deputy, Flt. Adm. Vladimir Chernavin, also reflected the General Secretary's preferences for younger, more economy-minded managers. Chernavin's public statements reflect a clear understanding of current economic constraints, suggesting he might be more circumspect in pressing for a large blue-water navy—Gorshkov's major goal during his 30-year tenure. Gorshkov's successor may lack both the clout and commitment—as a submarine officer rather than a surface-ship commander—to press for the approval of aircraft carriers and other costly and controversial power-projection instruments.

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Chernavin also seems more comfortable than his predecessor with the notion of conserving resources, which Gorbachev has stressed. In one of his first speeches as the Navy's Commander in Chief, he called for economical use of resources in training. Since his appointment, the Navy has apparently significantly cut its operational expenses by reducing days at sea in 1986. According to reliable information, naval operations in all major categories except strategic submarine operations have declined significantly, perhaps reflecting a major cut in resources to the Navy or possibly movement of resources within the naval budget.* Such a decision would have been taken about the time that Gorbachev reportedly told the military leaders at Minsk that they would have to make much more efficient use of resources. [REDACTED]

Greater Reliance on Civilian Advice

[REDACTED] Gorbachev believes that the military lacked the flexibility needed to advance the arms control process, which he has privately identified as a critical cog in his efforts to manage US-Soviet relations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Gorbachev is paying closer attention to advisers like Academy of Sciences Vice President Yevgeniy Velikov, Space Research Institute Director Roal'd Sagdeyev, and US and Canada Institute Director Georgiy Arbatov in framing his security policy. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev has moved to institutionalize this civilian input in several ways:

- He authorized the creation of an arms control department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The department, which includes some former military personnel provides a civilian center of advice on security policy.

* To date, however, we have not observed similar dramatic changes in training or operational activity for the other services. [REDACTED]

Starodubov's Role Under Dobrynin

Lt. Gen. Viktor Starodubov—who served as a senior military representative at the arms control talks in Geneva—may be a key player in Gorbachev's arms control proposals. He is widely respected as an expert on the technical details of arms control. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] his boss at the General Staff supported his move to the Central Committee's International Department because he felt this would lead to better party-military coordination of arms control policy. While Starodubov's sympathies and friendship probably remain with the military, his transfer puts a recognized expert on verification and arms control under the direct control of the party leadership. Along with the earlier transfer to the International Department of former First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko—one of the most knowledgeable arms control experts in the Foreign Ministry—Starodubov's posting provides the party apparatus with an independent check on the complex details on arms control. [REDACTED]

How these moves affect the traditional predominance of the military is still somewhat unclear. [REDACTED]

- He expanded the responsibilities of the Central Committee's International Department under Dobrynin to include the complete range of East-West and security issues, thereby bolstering his personal control over national security and foreign policy.
- Dobrynin arranged the transfer of Viktor Starodubov from the General Staff's arms control directorate to become chief of a sector dealing with arms control in the International Department. This apparently was an effort to strengthen the party's oversight of the defense policy formulation (see inset). [REDACTED]

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Glasnost Comes to the Military

Another part of Gorbachev's efforts to tighten personal control over the military is the exposure of security issues to the same scrutiny and criticism as other aspects of policy through his policy of *glasnost*, or openness. Until recently, the military had been immune from such criticism, which was even slow to develop under Gorbachev, largely because of the Soviet fetish for secrecy about anything dealing with national security. This also may have reflected an understanding between the party leadership and the military since Brezhnev's time to limit political meddling in military affairs, which had been a major irritant during the Khrushchev period. [REDACTED]

This approach began to change under Andropov and Chernenko, but public exposures of lax military discipline and wastefulness have considerably intensified under Gorbachev, particularly in the last nine months. While these themes parallel Gorbachev's pillorying of other bureaucracies, they also make clear the military is no longer above criticism. [REDACTED]

Since the beginning of 1987, Gorbachev has sanctioned sharp press criticism of military incompetence and corruption:

- The commander of the Northern Fleet was publicly reprimanded last winter for failing to provide for support to civilian economic tasks.
- *Red Star* carried a sharply worded account of a March Ministry of Defense meeting in March 1987 that criticized the General Staff and Main Political Directorate, scored unconcern for soldiers' welfare, and mentioned the prevalence of "favoritism" in selecting officers and the dismissal of some generals for serious personal abuses.
- Over the last few months, *Pravda* has carried letters criticizing privilege and nepotism among the senior ranks of the military and has run an expose of corruption by a Soviet general who created a slush fund by exploiting his post as head of a military academy. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev apparently has even sanctioned some criticism of the military on substantive policy issues. In March 1987, for instance, Aleksandr Bovin, a prominent journalist and strong supporter of wider boundaries for *glasnost*, questioned the decision to deploy the SS-20 missiles, asking why such an expensive weapon system had been deployed at all now that negotiations were seriously under way for its dismantlement. Bovin's article was subsequently rebutted by a deputy chief of the General Staff's Arms Control and Negotiations Directorate, who justified the initial decision by claiming it had contributed to the West's willingness to negotiate on its "forward based systems." Like other bureaucracies, the military is reacting defensively but has grudgingly begun to admit serious problems of discipline, corruption, and nepotism. [REDACTED]

The crescendo of *glasnost* for the military occurred in connection with the Cessna incident. It led to the public condemnation of the Ministry of Defense and the Air Defense Forces—and the resultant firings of Defense Minister Sokolov and Air Defense Commander in Chief Koldunov—for "impermissible lack of concern" and "serious shortcomings in organization and combat readiness." The leadership's acute embarrassment over the buzzing of Lenin's Tomb and the Kremlin by a 19-year-old German, which evoked invidious comparisons with the Nazi invasion in June 1941, probably contributed to the severity of the reaction. At the June Central Committee plenum, Gorbachev held up the incident as an example of what happens when leaders fail to follow through on restructuring. [REDACTED]

The incident set off a wave of public criticisms, the most damning coming at a major meeting of the Moscow Air Defense District attended by Moscow party boss and candidate Politburo member Boris Yel'tsin and Army Gen. Aleksey Lizichev, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces. The *Red Star* account of the meeting painted a picture of an officer corps of "toadies, bootlickers,

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sycophants, and window dressers" who ignored pressing problems. Yel'tsin sharply criticized nearly the entire district command by name, including its recently appointed commander, for "favoritism, nepotism, individual whim, and secrecy" in personnel appointments and lambasted the work of the political and party organizations. The newspaper account reported the expulsion from the party of several senior officers as a result of the incident. [REDACTED]

The public treatment of such failings sharply contrasts with the 1983 KAL shootdown, when Marshal Ogarkov stood center stage to explain away the incident—the spotlight being on Western "provocation" rather than the Soviet military's bungling. Moreover, in 1983, the handful of lower-level demonstrations that occurred were handled without publicity, in sharp contrast to the recent incident. [REDACTED]

Shaping Military Doctrine

Given the Soviet penchant for basing policy on doctrinal tenets, Gorbachev also moved quickly to impose his vision of doctrine for national security policy. The revised party program, a major theoretical document issued in October 1985 after four years of work and the first such revision since the Khrushchev version of 1961, reflected his heightened emphasis on party control of military affairs. It contained a provision, lacking in Khrushchev's version, which stressed the party's formulation of military doctrine. While the principle of party preeminence in doctrinal matters has been acknowledged by numerous military writers since 1961, Brezhnev appears to have abdicated that responsibility until the late 1970s, and then to have only partially succeeded in reimposing party dominance on issues like the "winability" of nuclear war and no first use of nuclear weapons. [REDACTED]

When Gorbachev became chairman of the commission that revised the program after Chernenko's death, he apparently approved the inclusion of the principle of party control of doctrine, reflecting his efforts to strengthen his personal influence over this crucial issue. In the final edition of the program approved by the party congress in March 1986, the section dealing with the role of party committees in the military was also strengthened to highlight their responsibility for carrying out the party line. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev has co-opted for his own purposes certain aspects of theories espoused by military theoreticians in various writings and speeches since the early 1980s. Ogarkov, Akhkromeyev, and other General Staff theorists have discussed [REDACTED] the view that changing military technology and economic realities have made the earlier concept of nuclear superiority outmoded:

- They have conceded that the size and diversity of the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers are now such that neither could achieve a victory in a nuclear war. Even the victim of a first strike would retain sufficient weapons to inflict a devastating retaliatory attack on the other side's homeland.
- They have, therefore, concluded that, because of the inhibitions on the introduction of nuclear weapons, prolonged conventional warfare has become a realistic possibility. It would be fought with high-technology, "smart" weapons that would increase the dependence of the military on the ability of the economy to master new technologies. [REDACTED]

We believe Ogarkov's intent, and almost certainly the intent of many others espousing this view, was to support a case for a return to higher growth rates of military spending. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that by the early 1980s the military had become concerned about the prolonged period of low growth in defense spending. They touted the condition of nuclear standoff as something achieved through their own military buildup, and while accepting the implausibility of "war-winning"—in the military sense—as a measure of the adequacy of their strategic nuclear forces, they nonetheless emphasized the need for a sustained effort to maintain the standoff. In addition, Ogarkov, in particular, pressed for the commitment of increased resources to the development of new weapon systems and forces for prolonged, multitheater, non-nuclear war. [REDACTED]

The military's own characterization of the nuclear balance as one of stalemate, however, has been used by Gorbachev to rationalize proposals for sizable but "equitable" reductions in strategic nuclear arms. And

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unilateral nuclear test moratorium in August 1985, unveiled a proposal for 50-percent cuts in strategic forces in Geneva in September 1985, called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons in January 1986, agreed to go down to global INF limits of 100 warheads in Reykjavik, and by August 1987 agreed to negotiate on the global "double zero" option for both long- and short-range INF. Moreover, all these moves—which would have been inconceivable under his predecessors—were backed by a willingness to accept, at least in principle, much more stringent verification measures, including on-site inspection.

Gorbachev apparently sees the benefits of a more flexible arms control policy mainly in the context of cost avoidance, rather than out of a belief that it can save major resources in the short run (see inset). The immediate benefit to his modernization program from reducing or even eliminating particular strategic systems would be small because production facilities take time to convert to nonmilitary products and spending on strategic offensive systems currently represents only about 10 percent of the overall spending on defense. Prospects of agreements or even forward momentum in negotiations, however, can significantly help him allay concerns of potential domestic critics who might argue that investment in defense industry and military procurement should be increased to respond to major increases in the US military budget since 1981.

The Concept of Military Sufficiency . . .

These developments are closely linked to Gorbachev's new formulation for military requirements, the concept of "reasonable sufficiency." On the most basic level, Gorbachev appears to be arguing that the Soviet Union has sufficient military power in the near term to deter Western aggression and that to stay competitive for the longer term the USSR needs to focus on economic modernization and technology. The notion of military sufficiency was initially broached by Brezhnev in his Tula speech in 1977 but never embraced by the military or formalized in party or military doctrine. Gorbachev revived it in his report to

Cost of Dealing With SDI

Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly claimed that the USSR could counter US space-based strategic defenses for only about 5 percent of what it would cost the United States to deploy the defenses, but admit SDI might still spur an expensive arms race in strategic offensive weaponry. While insisting that they will bear whatever burden is necessary to prevent the United States from gaining strategic superiority, Gorbachev and other officials have expressed a desire to avoid such an arms race in order to devote additional resources to civilian needs.

Although the Soviets probably believe it would be cheaper to counter US strategic defenses than to emulate them, their public claims about the level of cost to respond are almost certainly unrealistically low. The Soviets would probably have to develop a number of countermeasures as a hedge against uncertainty. These could include deployment of large numbers of antisatellite weapons to attack US defenses, ballistic missiles to saturate them, and cruise missiles to circumvent them. Taken together, such countermeasures could push Soviet defense spending to unprecedented levels and would absorb key technical and industrial resources vital to other Soviet military and civilian programs.

Moreover, despite the Soviets' public insistence that they have no intention of deploying their own space-based ballistic missile defenses, privately they have not ruled out that possibility if SDI proceeds to deployment. Some reporting suggests there is support for this costly approach within the Soviet military and defense industry establishment. Gorbachev's eagerness to halt SDI stems in large measure from his concern that the cost of matching a US system could be prohibitive.

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the party congress in February 1986, and the congress's final resolution endorsed his call to "restrict military potential within the bounds of reasonable sufficiency."

Use of the term to characterize the USSR's defense policy objectives clearly has propaganda value for a regime hoping to project a new and more "enlightened" image on military issues. At the same time, however, the signs of disagreement on the meaning of the term and the military's resistance to its use indicate that it is linked to internal debates that the defense establishment considers threatening to its interests.

Several Gorbachev political allies have used the term—including Dobrynin and Yakovlev, who called on social scientists to give the term content—but most of the military leadership has studiously avoided it. According to a senior Central Committee Propaganda Department official, the term signified that the USSR was close to saying it possessed enough military power, that the military balance is "rather stable," and that superiority could not be achieved easily by either side. This approach appeared to presage the line that Moscow took in minimizing the technical breach of SALT II by the US deployment of additional B52s armed with cruise missiles in December 1986 when Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh argued that this action was not enough to break parity.

A year after he reintroduced the concept, Gorbachev elaborated on it in his speech to the Moscow Peace Conference on 6 February 1987, suggesting he had belatedly gotten agreement from at least the party leadership to push the terminology. In that speech, he not only expressed his desire to limit defense to "reasonable sufficiency" but characterized parity at higher and higher levels as "madness," arguing that even a conventional arms race made no sense and must be avoided. At the Trade Union Congress two weeks later, Gorbachev again promised that "we shall not make a single step in excess of the demands and requirements of sensible, sufficient defense. Let us not

repeat—without thinking and automatically—what imperialism is seeking to impose on us in the arms race." In May the Warsaw Pact party leaders embraced the concept of sufficiency in their statement on military doctrine, enshrining it for the first time in a major programmatic document, clearly at Gorbachev's behest.

While the concept on the surface differs little from the previous argument that defense spending should be kept at an "appropriate level," several reports indicate the political leadership believes it implies a more flexible interpretation of parity:

- A senior Soviet diplomat told an American in early 1986 that the Soviet leadership—under the influence of civilian advisers—was moving away from the military's narrow numerical approach to parity.
- According to an account of Gorbachev's unpublished speech to Foreign Ministry officials in May 1986, he reportedly argued it was desirable to worry less about numerical parity because the USSR already had enough nuclear weapons to carry out a retaliatory strike.
- Recent statements by prominent academics and foreign policy commentators indicate the concept is being used as a rationale to argue against mindlessly increasing defense spending and "combat capability," to justify some asymmetries within a flexible concept of parity, and to legitimize concessions in arms control negotiations. One Central Committee member indicated these doctrinal changes could lead to the total reorganization of training and operations.

... And Reaction From the Military

Senior Soviet military leaders, on the other hand, have tended to avoid the concept of military sufficiency. Instead, they have echoed the promise in the party program that Soviet military spending will be high

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enough to prevent opponents from gaining strategic superiority, which seems like a clearer commitment to parity:

- Defense Minister Sokolov repeated the sufficiency concept only once after Gorbachev used it at the Moscow Peace Conference, and Defense Minister Yazov has equated sufficiency to parity—which he called the “decisive factor” in preventing war—and insisted on a strong defense effort to preclude imperialist superiority.
- Even though Marshal Akhromeyev in June 1986 asserted the USSR would be satisfied with a “reasonable sufficiency” of conventional forces, he failed to endorse the concept fully until after Gorbachev’s February 1987 speech. Even then, he balanced his endorsement with a reference to the party program commitment to prevent imperialist superiority.
- Of the other deputy defense ministers, only Vitaliy Shabanov—the official responsible for weapons procurement—has publicly endorsed the concept.
- A Soviet academic recently reported that the concept had led to a heated debate, with lines clearly drawn between military and civilian strategists. He claimed that the military were still seeking to define military sufficiency as synonymous with parity, although this approach is clearly at variance with Gorbachev’s intent in raising the issue. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev’s Political Vulnerability on Military Issues

The argument on “sufficiency,” while couched in a doctrinal framework, is in fact an issue of political and economic priorities and of political power. To reorient resource priorities to support his industrial modernization program, Gorbachev must be able to show that doing so does not jeopardize the USSR’s military security and that in fact it will enhance military strength over the longer term. The Soviet military’s resistance to the concept of sufficiency is—as indicated by several assessments—precisely because they see it as a basis for an argument that the

Soviet Union has “enough” military power and can afford, for the time being at least, to reorient resource allocation more toward industrial modernization:

- A retired general told a Westerner that the USSR cannot relinquish military superiority to the United States for the sake of a military sufficiency doctrine based on Soviet economic requirements.
- According to a Soviet official [REDACTED] defense industry managers resisted Gorbachev’s efforts to introduce the concept of sufficiency even more than the military because their careers had been built around the introduction of new weapon systems.
- According to another reliable report, senior Soviet military officers are concerned that they are losing their influence and that military considerations have been ignored in Gorbachev’s attempts to realign the economy and secure an arms treaty with the United States. While Gorbachev reportedly has sought to reassure them of their status, he has had only limited success.
- An article in the military newspaper *Red Star* in 1985 advocated restoring to the 1986 party program a promise in the 1961 program—to supply the military with all “modern means” to secure the national defense; the implication was that the military feared its deletion from the 1986 program signified a decrease in regime commitment to military spending.

- Marshal Akhromeyev told [REDACTED] that Gorbachev’s ideas for higher standards of productivity and better consumer goods were sound, but he and other military officers deplored Gorbachev’s idea that defense industry should make consumer goods. He feared that “better televisions and washing machines today will cause us to have poorer tanks tomorrow.” [REDACTED]

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Gorbachev may have decided to press ahead with his recent shakeup of the military precisely because of such resistance:

- [redacted] after unveiling the sufficiency concept, Gorbachev complained to East European allies this spring that the military continued to adhere to outmoded ideas on the "winability" of war and he had to personally force them to change public rhetoric and the image of Soviet military doctrine. Another reliable report indicated that the military was reluctantly going along with Gorbachev in public but was resisting implementing changes.
- The *Red Star* account of the meeting of the Moscow Air Defense District after the Cessna incident linked the emergence of "new provisions of Soviet military doctrine" with the need for restructuring in the military. Defense Minister Yazov took the same tack in his July meeting with Defense Ministry personnel. [redacted]

Arms Control and Security Policy

There have also been persistent reports of military anxiety over Gorbachev's more flexible approach to arms control and foreign policy. His approach has generated particular skepticism from elements in the military who probably worry about what they see as a trend toward unilateralism in his policy, which they fear may be interpreted by the West as a sign of weakness. There probably is also some deep-grained uneasiness, particularly among senior officers who lived through World War II, about the notion that security can be guaranteed through skillful diplomacy. [redacted]

Evidence suggests that some senior military officers view Gorbachev as having an overly optimistic view of his ability to influence US policy in directions beneficial to the Soviet Union. After the Geneva summit in November 1985, some military leaders reportedly disagreed with the upbeat evaluations by Gorbachev and his allies on the prospects for US-Soviet relations, perhaps with a view to the broader resource questions. The military press took a generally downbeat line, and Marshal Akhromeyev's public and private comments were more pessimistic than Gorbachev's. [redacted]

Our assessment of Soviet proposals in Geneva and Reykjavik suggest that they have been well crafted to protect Soviet military interests—undoubtedly after extensive consultation with the General Staff. Nevertheless, those whose careers are linked to designing and fielding the systems facing destruction—like the SS-20—are probably unenthusiastic about Gorbachev's willingness to scrap them. Marshal Tolubko, the head of the Strategic Rocket Forces, was one of the first two senior officers retired after Gorbachev's election. After the Reykjavik meeting, [redacted]

[redacted] alluded to opposition from General Staff Chief Akhromeyev to the elimination of certain classes of missiles, and a reliable report indicated that Gorbachev's 28 February INF proposal was delayed by opposition from the General Staff. More recent reporting suggests continued military unhappiness with the proposed INF agreement. [redacted]

Similarly, Gorbachev and other Soviet officials have publicly and privately alluded to military opposition to the nuclear test moratorium first announced in August 1985 and extended several times until testing resumed this February. This interpretation is seemingly corroborated by Marshal Akhromeyev, who noted the "military costs" of the decision, and by his deputy for arms control, General Chervov, who admitted there were "differences of opinion" over the decision. Military officers who took Western newsmen on a tour of Soviet test facilities in September 1986 openly referred to their unhappiness about the moratorium. [redacted] the military was also uneasy about the decision to permit a nongovernmental US monitoring team to set up its equipment in the USSR and opposed some proposed instrument sites. [redacted]

There are indications of initial military concern about Gorbachev's more flexible approach on the issue of verification as well. In articles in early 1986, Akhromeyev and Deputy Defense Minister Vasily Shanov argued that in most cases national technical means rather than on-site inspection were adequate and warned that verification could not be used as a

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military. According to an earlier report, senior officials fearing retirement had already sent a letter to Gorbachev on the eve of the 27th Party Congress seeking reassurance. [REDACTED]

Yazov's appointment might remove a major roadblock on these troop cuts issues. A recent report indicates Gorbachev has decided to downgrade many billets and cut all senior staffs by 15 percent, reassigning officers to combat units or retiring them if they are over 60. Another report suggests that Yazov has agreed to the proposals made by senior scientists advocating more university deferments as a way of supporting Gorbachev's modernization program, even though the proposals were publicly disputed by a deputy chief of the General Staff. [REDACTED]

Pacifist Danger. Gorbachev's peace program and "new thinking" on foreign policy is apparently posing problems for military training and patriotic propaganda. His remarks about Afghanistan being a "bleeding wound" and his public emphasis on the goal of world peace probably are reinforcing longstanding concerns of the military that youth are developing a negative attitude toward military service. [REDACTED]

Signs of military concern on this score abound. Two military officers lecturing the public in Leningrad earlier this year criticized some elements of the Gorbachev foreign policy line for contributing to pacifism. They particularly railed against foreign policy commentators who dispute the notion that war—even a conventional one—is a viable political tool in the nuclear age. In May a deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate accused journalists of sowing seeds of confusion among military forces who must be poised to retaliate if attacked and scorned pacifists who believe in unilateral disarmament. He complained that "now it has become unfashionable to discuss the 'image of the enemy'" even in military propaganda and criticized journalists who disparaged "understandable" calls for vigilance. [REDACTED]

Military Loyalty and the Limits of Discontent

Despite diverse signs of unhappiness within the military over many of his security policies, Gorbachev is not likely to encounter a concerted political challenge from the high command. Since the 1917 revolution,

the Soviet military has been thoroughly conditioned to accept the primacy of the party. The high command failed to react forcefully to the purging of most of its senior leaders in the 1930s, the sacking of its wartime military hero Marshal Zhukov immediately after World War II and again in 1957, or the restructuring of the services under Khrushchev. We can expect private grumbling about the Politburo's harsh handling of the Cessna incident, but probably little more. According to Valentin Falin, head of the Novosti press service and a Central Committee member, no one understands "loyalty" better than the Soviet military. [REDACTED]

Most important, this tradition is strongly reinforced by the presence of a number of control mechanisms. The military officer corps is composed almost entirely of party members, and the Main Political Directorate runs a vast network of party and Komsomol committees throughout the military. The Secretariat also maintains its oversight through its Administrative Organs Department, under the effective control of newly appointed party secretary Anatoliy Luk'yanov, a close confidant of Gorbachev's. This party network is backstopped by an independent system of military counterintelligence run by the KGB's Third Chief Directorate, which sees to the political loyalty of the military command. For the military leadership to pose any direct threat to Gorbachev's position would require, at a minimum, the cooperation of these KGB and party watchdog bodies. [REDACTED]

Yazov's appointment has further reduced the military's capacity for political intervention, as has the memory of Ogarkov's removal from the General Staff for being too aggressive on resource allocation. The military hierarchy lacks the sort of close personal ties and access to Politburo members that some of the high command enjoyed under Brezhnev and even under Khrushchev. Moreover, most available evidence points to ambivalence within the military about Gorbachev's program or to differences in interests and orientation between generations and services in the military, which probably work to dilute the military's ability to influence decisionmaking. [REDACTED]

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But while it is highly unlikely that military leaders would seek on their own to confront Gorbachev, his would-be political opponents might hope to capitalize on any military unhappiness to portray the General Secretary as irresponsible in a system that has traditionally given a high priority to security. This is where the real risk of simmering military unhappiness could lie. [REDACTED]

So long as leadership backing within the party for Gorbachev's industrial modernization promotion holds up, however, his concept of "sufficiency" and "new thinking" will provide the basis for Soviet security policy. In the late 1950s Khrushchev was able to impose on the military a doctrinal concept advocated by only a minority of the military's theoreticians. By the early 1960s, however, he had to begin retreating from his insistence on this doctrinal view as his political position began to erode. As in the case of Khrushchev, Gorbachev's ability to sustain his doctrinal revisions will depend on his overall political strength. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev's foreign and security policies evidently command support from younger leaders on the Politburo. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Aleksandr Yakovlev, both full members, and junior party secretary Dobrynin are the primary architects and implementors of Gorbachev's foreign policy strategy. While far from conclusive, occasional public and private statements by Premier Ryzhkov, Russian Republic boss Vitaliy Vorotnikov, and economic secretary Nikolay Slyunkov, all full members, as well as candidate members Boris Yel'tsin and Yuriy Solov'yev suggest they support Gorbachev's diplomatic strategy and the need to link security to modernizing the economy. [REDACTED]

In the short term, Gorbachev's operational control over the foreign policy apparatus and the General Secretary's traditional monopoly of initiative allow him considerable leeway to pursue his goals. Few of the current leaders other than those on his immediate team have foreign or security policy expertise. [REDACTED]

Most Politburo members, however, are independents rather than Gorbachev loyalists and are not bound to support him if they feel it is not in their interests or that of the country (see table 2). Some reporting and

Table 2
Political Loyalties of Gorbachev's Politburo

Full Members	Candidate Members
Closest Allies or Proteges	
Propaganda secretary Yakovlev	Moscow party boss Yel'tsin
Industry secretary Zaykov	Defense Minister Yazov
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze	
Independents	
Premier Ryzhkov	Gosplan Chairman Talyzin
"Second Secretary" Ligachev	Leningrad First Secretary Solov'yev
Economics secretary Slyunkov	
Agriculture secretary Nikonov	
KGB chief Chebrikov	
RSFSR Premier Vorotnikov	
Control Committee Chairman Solomentsev	
Old Guard	
President Gromyko	Vice President Demichev
Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy	Energy secretary Dolgikh
1st Deputy Premier Aliyev	

public statements after the Geneva and Reykjavik summits have suggested his foreign policy initiatives have already met with a certain amount of skepticism within the Politburo:

- Gorbachev's speech to the November 1985 Supreme Soviet session after the Geneva summit seemed defensive, and Premier Ryzhkov, apparently a close Gorbachev ally on this issue, found a need to criticize—in a speech in the Baltic in December 1985—those who "belittled" the results of the meeting.
- The wording of the Politburo communique following the Reykjavik summit appeared to give a weaker endorsement than that issued after the Geneva summit, and the final resolution of the January

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1987 Central Committee plenum took a much tougher line than Gorbachev's opening speech on US-Soviet relations by calling for a "comprehensive strengthening of defense."

- [redacted] after both summits opponents to Gorbachev's policy rallied around President Gromyko, who criticized Gorbachev for being too conciliatory.
- [redacted] Ukrainian party boss Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, a full member of the Politburo and longtime supporter of defense interests, acted as a spokesman for those in the military who challenged the wisdom of the 1985 summit.

"Second Secretary" Ligachev may be a particularly important constraint on Gorbachev's foreign policy. While he expressed hope to some foreigners about obtaining an arms control agreement with the United States early last year and again in Budapest in April 1987, he appears somewhat less sanguine about Moscow's ability to manage the threat through diplomacy rather than increased outlays for defense:

- Ligachev's speech to the Academy of Sciences after the Reykjavik summit suggested skepticism over US intentions, noting "the Washington administration does not desire genuine accords . . . it is more important than ever to strengthen scientists' role in . . . strengthening the country's defense capability."
- Ligachev has also stressed a growing threat of war in several statements after the Reykjavik summit, in contrast to most other leaders.
- Ligachev's speech on Revolution Day referred to unnamed people so "naive" as to have expected a rapid turnaround in US policy. [redacted] Ligachev criticized Gorbachev for counting on American flexibility after the Reykjavik meeting.
- More recently, he attacked a Soviet editor in September 1987 for permitting his journal to publish articles sharply critical of the military. [redacted]

The personal risk to Gorbachev of pursuing such contentious national security policies and being so closely identified with them should not be minimized given the fact that Gorbachev has pressed a domestic policy agenda that has antagonized many members of the most powerful bureaucratic groups—the party, the economic apparatus, and the KGB—upon which a General Secretary's power has traditionally rested. Like Khrushchev, Gorbachev has seriously shaken the system with his vision of reform, unleashed many forces he may not be able to control, and may be alienating those groups who could provide support in a political crisis. When Khrushchev was challenged in 1957, he was able to count on the military to assist in getting his supporters to the Central Committee in Moscow, which gave him a vote of confidence, but it is less certain that the military would be united in protecting the General Secretary today if the Politburo tried to move against him. [redacted]

Prospects

Gorbachev is approaching a crossroads in his security and foreign policy as the current US administration enters its last year and the Soviet leadership faces decisions on military spending for the 1990s. In a speech during his February tour of the Baltic region, he noted that the next two or three years will be crucial for his program. Barring a crisis in East-West relations or serious economic problems, most Politburo members probably are willing to give him this much time to prove the effectiveness of his economic and foreign policy strategies. [redacted]

Even if such a crisis occurred in this short time frame and strong opposition to his policies surfaced, we judge that Gorbachev would probably still press ahead with his agenda. So far, most signs suggest he is averse to backing down in the face of resistance, viewing this as tantamount to acknowledging failure. On other fronts, he has responded to challenge by mounting even bolder assaults—such as the release of Andrey Sakharov from exile, stepping up the personal attack on Brezhnev, and calling for political reform through "democratization." He may believe that he

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has so completely identified himself with a new approach in foreign as well as domestic policy that retreat is not a politically viable option for him and that a change of course would result in discrediting his personal leadership and contributing to, rather than arresting, an erosion of his power. [REDACTED]

If Gorbachev attempted to pursue more radical initiatives, however, we believe that strong opposition would coalesce within the defense establishment and among its allies in the political leadership. Among the things that probably would be viewed as overstepping his bounds are:

- Reduced military spending—rather than the current trend of a slight increase or leveling. Currently the General Staff and the services probably can procure most of the high-priority equipment without sacrificing readiness or cutting essential training. A major cut—of 5 percent or more—would force painful trade-offs.
- A demonstrably concessionary approach to arms control, unilaterally cutting significant numbers of weapons—especially strategic systems—causing the General Staff to reevaluate its current willingness to go along with Gorbachev's arms control policies (see inset).
- Large multidivisional unilateral withdrawals of troops from Europe or the Sino-Soviet border, or a withdrawal from Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

As 1990 approaches, the success of his current programs, both foreign and domestic, probably will be the crucial factor in determining whether the modernization program will continue to channel resources away from defense or whether a further increase in military spending is necessary. If Gorbachev succeeds in significantly improving economic performance, which is far from certain, and his initiatives in the foreign policy area bear fruit, he should be able to stay the course. If his economic program fails to bring the promised results and his arms control policy produces little success, pressures will mount to redirect resources toward defense. [REDACTED]

Possible Radical New Moves To Advance Arms Control

Gorbachev has already tested the limits of the bureaucracy's patience in other areas, but his security policies have largely been cautious, carefully protecting Soviet equities by crafting arms control proposals to benefit the Soviet side. His nuclear test moratorium, however, suggests that Gorbachev may believe that dramatic Soviet moves can be effective in galvanizing Western public support for the sort of arms control agreements he wants. Therefore, such proposals by Gorbachev cannot be ruled out. While an exhaustive list cannot be compiled, such an approach might include some of the following, which would probably move onto even more contentious ground within the political leadership:

- *Moves to gain increased credibility on the SDI issue, possibly including the dismantling or significant modification of the Krasnoyarsk radar and the scrapping of their existing rudimentary ASAT system, or other moves to cut back on Soviet defensive systems.*
- *Gorbachev might also press for the unilateral introduction of the first stage of conventional troop cuts initially proposed in Budapest in June 1986, although these would presumably not be concentrated in the forward area. Some rumors have already suggested he intends to withdraw up to 13 divisions from Eastern Europe, in an asymmetrical exchange for smaller NATO cuts.*
- *Gorbachev could possibly risk proposing the unilateral retirement of older ICBMs or SSBNs nearing the end of their usable service in the hopes that such demonstrative action might generate support in the US Congress to step up the pace of the Geneva arms control talks. [REDACTED]*

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Appendix

New Members of the Ministry of Defense

Army Gen. Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov
Minister of Defense



Briefly deputy minister for personnel . . . has held key commands facing both NATO and Chinese forces . . . most recently commander of Far East Military District (1984-87) . . . earlier commanded Central Asian MD (1980-84) and Central Group of Forces headquartered in Czechoslovakia (1970-80) . . . classmate of Akhromeyev's at General Staff Academy in 1967 and deputy to General Tret'yak from 1976 to 1978, when Yazov was deputy commander of Far East Military District. [REDACTED]

Army Gen. Petr Georgiyevich Lushev
First Deputy Minister of Defense



Previously had 11 consecutive years of high-level command experience as commander of Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (1985-86), Moscow Military District (1980-85), Central Asian Military District (1977-80), and Volga Military District (1975-77). [REDACTED]

Army Gen. Aleksey Dmitriyevich Lizichev
Chief of the Main Political Directorate (MPD) of the Army and Navy



Gorbachev confidant, according to one Soviet official . . . spent entire career as military political officer . . . served as chief of political directorate of Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (1982-85), deputy chief of MPD (1980-82), chief of Transbaikal Military District political directorate (1975-80), and earlier as deputy chief of the GSFG and Moscow Military District political directorates. [REDACTED]

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Army Gen. Yuriy Pavlovich Maksimov
Commander in Chief, Strategic Rocket Forces

Specialist in combined-arms combat . . . has held diversified command and staff posts . . . commander of Turkestan Military District (1974-80) . . . major player in Soviet involvement in Afghanistan . . . promoted to newly created post of commander in chief of forces in Southern Theater of Military Operations when it was organized in the fall of 1984. [REDACTED]



Flt. Adm. Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin
Commander in Chief, Soviet Navy

Noted for administrative ability and operational expertise . . . from 1981 until 1985 was chief of Main Naval Staff and concurrently a first deputy commander in chief of the Navy . . . served almost 30 years in prestigious Northern Fleet, rising through the ranks to become fleet commander in 1977. [REDACTED]



Army Gen. Ivan Moiseyevich Tret'yak
Commander in Chief, Air Defense Forces (PVO)

Apparently delegated by Yazov, with whom he has worked closely, to clean house in the PVO . . . from summer 1986 to June 1987 he was chief of Main Inspectorate . . . his posting to Inspectorate continued recent trend of staffing it with relatively young officers with high-level command experience . . . formerly commander in chief of forces in the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations (1984-86) . . . previous commands include the Far East (1976-84) and Belorussian (1967-76) Military Districts. [REDACTED]

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Army Gen. Vladimir Leonidovich Govorov
Chief of Civil Defense

Replaced Civil Defense chief Aleksandr Altunin in wake of Chernobyl' incident . . . took over ineffective, geriatric Main Inspectorate in 1984 at a time when improving the armed forces' operational capability was being emphasized . . . son of famous World War II general . . . previously commander in chief of forces in the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations (1980-84) and commander of the Moscow Military District (1972-80). Other assignments include tours of duty in Group of Soviet Forces in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s and command of Baltic Military District (1971-72). [REDACTED]



Army Gen. Mikhail Ivanovich Sorokin
Chief of Main Inspectorate

Previously was first deputy commander in chief of Western Theater of Military Operations under Nikolay Ogarkov (1984-87) . . . like many of new Defense Minister Yazov's deputies, served in the Far East: was first deputy commander of the Far East Military District (1974-76) . . . commanded Leningrad Military District (1976-81) . . . served as chief of Military Advisory Group in Afghanistan (1981-84). [REDACTED]



Army Gen. Dmitriy Semenovich Sukhorukov
Chief of Main Personnel Directorate

Spent almost entire career in Soviet Airborne Troops . . . served as both deputy commander (1969-71) and commander (1979-87) . . . other assignments include stints as first deputy commander of Transcaucasus Military District (1974-76) and commander, Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia (1976-79). [REDACTED]