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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ✓

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: LONDON MEETINGS ✓

I had a good series of meetings Monday in London: Hurd, Kinnock, Woerner, Ordonez, and Poos.

✓ Hurd was solid, and he appreciated my reading your letter to Saddam Hussein to him. In that connection, he asked that we commit to consult with HMG before going beyond military targets in any operation; e.g., if we wanted to hit non-military targets like Takrit in the wake of chemical or biological weapons use. He also asked some questions we need to consider promptly. Specifically, how do we avoid significant civilian casualties and ecological damage if we strike BW storage facilities? Also, are we prepared to handle massive numbers of Iraqi POWs and wounded? I know our military is working hard on these issues, and I will discuss them with Norm Schwarzkopf in Riyadh on Thursday.

Kinnock was relatively firm, though he is getting pressed by his far left wing to give sanctions more time. His shadow foreign minister published an op-ed today, which called for full implementation of UNSC resolutions but suggested more time before force is considered. Kinnock, however, said categorically that he supported the use of force if necessary.

Woerner confirmed that Kohl and Genscher had both been furious at the Turks for the way the ACE Mobile Task Force deployment was handled -- or, he said, that was at least the reason they gave for slowing it down. Woerner said he thought the FRG would be supportive on PATRIOT deployments to Turkey, but only if it did not leak before I brief them in Bonn. Woerner also said he owed the Soviets an answer on when Gorbachev should visit NATO (Woerner is thinking March) and whether the meeting would be at the ministerial or head of state/government level. I told him we would get back to him on this issue, which we need to consider in light of current developments.

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Ordonez came from Madrid via a lunch with Dumas in Paris. I thanked him for their assistance on Gulf deployment and especially their recent decision to permit staging of B-52 flights (he said this decision must be kept quiet until hostilities). He fished a little bit for support of the French linkage idea, but he backed down when I said flatly no to the French idea. Ordonez said he had talked to Bendjedid after the latter's recent trip to Baghdad. Bendjedid said Saddam had doubts about whether we really would attack him and whether our real goal is his withdrawal or his destruction. Ordonez and I also spoke about the executions in El Salvador, which he said he and his government abhorred. I also got him to agree to have his government weigh in strongly with the FMLN to move to genuine negotiations.

Poos said the strong EC Council statement of last Friday was very tough to get. (The Dutch and British really helped us on this one.) However, that base now having been laid, Poos thinks we should stick solidly to our position, though he kept suggesting we look for diplomatic "opportunities" between January 9 and 15. Poos hopes to come to Washington in his Council Presidency role on January 28; I told him that could be a busy time, but if he came we wanted to make progress on the Uruguay Round.

I also was called by Dumas, who reported the following on the Vauzelle meeting with Saddam:

- o ✓ Vauzelle left with "some hope" for a peaceful solution.
- o ✓ Saddam did not say he would not withdraw and did not refer to Kuwait as the 19th Province. But he also did not say he would withdraw.
- o ✓ Saddam wants guarantees against attack.
- o ✓ Any solution must have an "Arab wrapping;" i.e., Saddam would want to cut a deal with the Saudis.