THE LEBANON OPERATION OF 1958: A STUDY OF THE CRISIS ROLE OF THE SIXTH FLEET (U)

George S. Dragnich

Research Contribution 153

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The Lebanon Operation of 1958:
A Study of the Crisis Role
of the Sixth Fleet (U)

George S. Dragnich

September 1970

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ABSTRACT

By July 1958 the pro-Western government of Lebanon was in a precarious position following two months of severe civil war. When the pro-Western government of Iraq was overthrown on July 14, in what appeared to be a UAR-directed coup, President Chamoun of Lebanon, fearing a similar fate, requested armed intervention by the United States, Great Britain, and France. Concerned lest the coup in Iraq spread elsewhere, the United States landed approximately 2000 Marines in Lebanon on July 15. The U.S. force, which eventually topped 14,000 men, was withdrawn completely from Lebanon by October 25, after Lebanon elected and inaugurated a new President.

This paper is an examination of that crisis and military operation. While much has been written on this subject, the political aspect or the military aspect has usually been studied to the exclusion of the other. Because the two were closely interwoven in the Lebanon case, this paper has examined them together.
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PREFACE

This is an examination of the role played by the Sixth Fleet in the Lebanon landing of 1958. It examines the complexities of a fleet operation in a major international crisis, discusses in detail the diplomatic aspects of that landing, and studies the coordination of fleet operations with U.S. policy objectives and accommodation of these objectives to the sensitivities of the Lebanese.

The report is timely; it discusses operational experience pertinent to analyses of tradeoffs between land-based and sea-based tactical aircraft, as well as studies of future force levels in the Mediterranean and the effects of changing political patterns in the Middle East on military operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

One often hears the question: "Would the U.S. intervene in Lebanon again?" Usually, the question implies that the U.S. would not intervene because of the new, inhibiting presence of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron. As this paper points out, the military uncertainties of a tactical engagement between the Sixth Fleet and the Soviet squadron are not the only issue. The author asks, more pertinently, whether Lebanon would invite another intervention and whether the U.S. would assume the risks once again of becoming embroiled in Lebanese factional disputes.

The paper notes that President Chamoun sought U.S. intervention for months before it finally took place. The U.S., for its part, intervened only after realizing that the coup in Baghdad might induce a chain reaction in Beirut and Amman. Since the Six-Day War of 1967, it has become increasingly difficult for the governments of moderate Arab states to maintain relations with the United States. In the October 1969 crisis, for instance, Lebanon apparently preferred UAR mediation to great-power involvement.

Any answer to the question of possible U.S. intervention must grapple with the policy issues that intervention would raise.

- Jack M. Schick

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SYNOPSIS

On 14 July, the pro-Western government of Iraq was toppled in what appeared to Washington to be a UAR-directed coup d'état. Lebanon had been in a state of civil war since May, and President Chamoun, fearing a similar fate, requested Western intervention.

Virtually all 75 ships of the 6th Fleet sailed at first light, 15 July, for the eastern Mediterranean. Both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets were placed on 4-hour alert. SAC was placed in a condition of "improved readiness", MATS was alerted, and a TAC Composite Strike Force took off from the United States for Incirlik AB, Adana, Turkey.

A Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT), already near Lebanon, landed its 1800 Marines near Beirut at 1500 Beirut time, 15 July. On the morning of 16 July another BLT from the 6th Fleet landed, and Admiral Holloway flew in from London to head the operation. Army troops in Germany began their airlift to Lebanon via Adana, Turkey, that day.

On 17 July, Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State, arrived in Lebanon as a special emissary of President Eisenhower. Following a request for assistance from King Hussein of Jordan, Great Britain airlifted the first of 2500 British troops from Cyprus to Amman the same day. By the end of 17 July, virtually all of the 6th Fleet was in the eastern Mediterranean, including 44 ships in the Lebanon operational area.

The 6th Fleet's third BLT and a Marine group that had been flown from the United States landed at Beirut on 18 July, bringing the total to more than 6000 men. On 19 July, Army troops from Germany, held over in Turkey, began their airlift to Beirut. The same day, the alert level for the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets was relaxed from 4 hours to 12 hours. However, SAC continued to heighten its alert; by 20 July, much of its force was on 15-minute alert. Troop landings continued in Lebanon; by the end of 20 July, over 11,000 troops were there.

Most of the troops were kept out of Beirut, and American policy was to avoid contact with the rebel forces. As the danger of a larger conflict passed, the alert levels of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets were again reduced on 23 July, from 12 hours to 24.

Undersecretary Murphy and Ambassador Robert McClintock had, meanwhile, been working to see that the Presidential elections in Lebanon, scheduled for 31 July, were held. Gen. Chehab, the commander of the Lebanese Army, was popular with both sides and won easily. The settlement of the Lebanese internal crisis then became much easier. On 2 August, the United States recognized the new government of Iraq, which had feared that the United States would use Lebanon as a springboard for operations against it.

Adm. Holloway was ordered to begin planning for withdrawal on 5 August, and the Navy announced on 7 August that the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets had resumed normal operations. U.S. forces in Lebanon reached a peak strength of more than 14,000 by 8 August. On 12 August, the day before the U.N. General
Assembly met to discuss the Middle East situation, the United States announced that one battalion of Marines would begin withdrawing on 13 August. The carrier strike force left the Lebanon area for Italian ports on 5 September, and 2 more Marine battalions began to withdraw on 14 September.

General Chehab was inaugurated on 23 September, but severe disturbances broke out in Beirut when he appointed a leader of the former opposition forces as his Prime Minister. American troop withdrawals continued, however, and the United States announced on 8 October that withdrawal would be complete by the end of the month. The Lebanese government formed a compromise cabinet on 14 October, and the country began to return to normal. The last American troops left Lebanon on 25 October.
INTRODUCTION

When U.S. Marines landed near Beirut on 15 July 1958, Lebanon had already undergone 2 months of civil war. On 14 July, however, the pro-Western government of Iraq had been overthrown in what appeared to Washington to be a UAR-directed coup d'état. The U.S. had evidence that the UAR (Egypt and Syria) had already given significant assistance to the Lebanese rebels, and Washington now felt it had to give an affirmative response to President Chamoun's request for intervention if Nasser and Communism were to be stopped in the Middle East.

To meet this challenge, the United States Congress had passed the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East (the Eisenhower Doctrine) in 1957. According to Herman Pheger, who helped Secretary of State Dulles draft it, the Eisenhower Doctrine was a direct result of the Suez crisis of 1956. Dulles foresaw further troubles and wanted the United States to be in a position to act promptly.  

The Eisenhower Doctrine offered economic assistance and declared:

 Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism. . . .

Secretary Dulles explained:

What we are trying to create in the area is a greater sense of security, greater degree of calm, more stability of government, and elimination of the influence of the Communists.


2 Department of State Bulletin 36 (25 March 1957), p. 481. See appendix for complete text.

President Chamoun of Lebanon readily subscribed to the Eisenhower Doctrine in March 1957.

Although regional and international factors intensified the Lebanese crisis of 1958, its origins were internal. Since Lebanon represents a balance of conflicting forces -- a "precarious republic" -- some discussion of these forces and of Lebanon itself should facilitate an understanding of the 1958 crisis.

Lebanon is a very small country, occupying an area no more than 125 miles from north to south and 34 miles from east to west. In 1958 it had approximately 1.5 million inhabitants. Today there are approximately 2.5 million. In addition, more than a million Lebanese live abroad.

Lebanon is a prosperous country. That prosperity, however, is dependent on external sources. Though Lebanon has some light industry, its primary product is services. In this role, Beirut, the capital, plays the major part. Beirut has more banks than London, and these encourage a steady flow of goods and capital through Lebanon. Its airport is the main air link between Europe and Asia, and its harbor is one of the most active in the region.

Beirut is also the center of United Nations activity in the Middle East. Moreover, the American University of Beirut and other colleges and universities in Beirut have made Lebanon a clearing house for ideas -- for the Middle East especially, but also for the rest of the so-called Third World. In 1958, most countries maintained larger embassies in Beirut than anywhere else in the Middle East.

Other Lebanese port cities -- Tripoli in the north and Sidon in the south -- serve as outlets for more than half of all the Middle East oil piped to the Mediterranean. Tourism, too, is an important source of income; large numbers of people come from Europe and elsewhere in the Middle East.

4UNRWA Headquarters, UNICEF Mediterranean Office, UN Regional Social Affairs Office for the Middle East, ILO Area Office, UN Information Center.
Despite its small population and size, Lebanon is very complex because of its diverse religious groupings. It is, to begin with, the only Arab country with a significant number of Christian inhabitants. In fact, the mountain area in central Lebanon, known as Mount Lebanon at the time of the Ottoman Empire, is almost totally Christian. After World War I, this area and Syria were given to France as mandates. Lebanon finally became independent in 1943, the last French soldier leaving in 1946. However, when forming Greater Lebanon as a separate mandate in 1920, France had assigned a greater area to Lebanon than the Sanjaq of Lebanon had under the Ottoman Empire, and the Christian-Moslem ratio became 6:5. By 1958, the population was probably divided evenly. Today it seems likely that the Moslems are slightly in the majority (no complete census has been conducted officially since 1932). This is attributable to the higher Moslem birth rate, especially among the Shia sect, and to the greater Christian emigration.

The words, "Christian" and "Moslem," give no inkling of Lebanon's religious complexity. On the Christian side, there are (in order of size in 1958): Maronites (with allegiance to Rome), Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic (Melkites), Armenian Orthodox (Gregorian), Armenian Catholic, Protestant, Syrian Catholic, Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites), Roman Catholic, Nestorians, and Chaldeans. On the Moslem side are the Sunni and Shia sects. Officially, the Sunnis are the larger of the two, but the Shites declare that they have become the major Moslem sect since the 1932 census. Another large and important sect in Lebanon is the Druze, who broke off Islam in the 11th century and established themselves in southern Lebanon. There are also Jews, mainly in Beirut.

The founders of the Lebanese Republic realized, given this religious complexity, that no single leader could hold the loyalty of more than one-third of the population. To create a workable form of government, Lebanon's two most prominent leaders, Bechara Khoury (Maronite) and Riad Sulh (Sunni), worked out in 1943 an oral compromise called the National Covenant. Basically, the National Covenant held that Lebanon was an Arab country with a special character. Christians were to forego seeking foreign (Western, especially French) protection, and Moslems were to recognize Lebanon's sovereignty and to forego any attempt to bring Lebanon into a larger Arab union. Lebanon was to remain neutral in any inter-Arab struggle. Non-technical public offices were to be divided along religious lines, and the three leading positions in the government were to be divided according to the majority sects. Thus the President would be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem, and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shia Moslem.

1 An administrative unit in the Ottoman Empire.
Similar allocations were made in the cabinet. The Chamber of Deputies itself is divided by religion in accordance with the 6:5 ratio. There are at least 17 political parties in Lebanon, but the religious aspect of Lebanese politics blunts much of their significance. Political parties that do endure usually have some religious association. Most of the Deputies, however, do not belong to any party.

The Lebanese Constitution limits the President to a single 6-year term. Parliament elects him, and he appoints a Prime Minister who, in turn, forms a Cabinet. During the French Mandate, power was centralized around the French High Commissioner; since Lebanon's independence, this centralization has been carried over to the position of President. Thus the presidency is much the stronger office. Bechara al-Khoury was the first elected President of the Republic (1943), and he appointed Riad Sulh as the first Prime Minister.

In 1948, President Khoury used his majority representation from the 1947 parliamentary elections (which many believed to have been rigged) to suspend the part of the Constitution that deals with succession, so that he could be re-elected in 1949. Many Lebanese leaders -- Moslem and Christian -- feeling that his administration was corrupt, finally succeeded in unifying the growing opposition. Prime Minister Riad Sulh broke with Khoury in 1951, taking many Moslem notables out of the government. Sulh was assassinated in July 1951. During the spring and summer of 1952, the opposition (aided by effective demonstrations, rallies, and general strikes) was able to bring Khoury's government to a near-standstill.

In September 1952, Khoury's new Prime Minister, Sami Sulh (Riad Sulh's cousin), publicly charged Khoury with corruption and resigned. Unable to form a new government, President Khoury resigned later in the month after naming Gen. Fuad Chehab, the Army's Commander, as Prime Minister.

Gen. Chehab, who had commanded the Army since its formation under the Allies in World War II, had refused to let the armed forces become involved in the dispute. Still maintaining his aloofness, Chehab was acting head of state for less than a week, when new elections could be held. Camille Chamoun, a Maronite Deputy, had been one of the original opposition leaders (expecting to be the next President); promising sweeping reforms, he was elected.

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BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS

It is ironic that 6 years after ousting President Khoury, President Chamoun, his administration clouded by corruption, was attempting to amend the Constitution in order to run again. Fahim Qubain\(^1\) suggests two main causes for the Lebanese crisis of 1958: First -- and basic to the trouble -- Chamoun attempted to eliminate important traditional leaders from political life. By the beginning of 1958, almost every major Lebanese political leader (many had supported him in 1952) was his personal enemy. Second, Chamoun tried to succeed himself in contravention of the Constitution.

Before Chamoun's refusal to break diplomatic relations with France and Great Britain over Suez in November 1956, the Lebanese opposition had been an amorphous grouping of individuals and political groups. Between November 1956 and March 1957, however, the government and opposition gradually drifted to extreme poles. Chamoun's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine in March and the coming parliamentary elections of June accelerated this trend. Many members of the opposition formed the United National Front in April 1957. It was made up largely -- but by no means exclusively -- of Moslems.

Though the Front was "Nasserist" in orientation, it included political elements from the right and left. Communists supported the Front, but there was no official link and their aid was not solicited.\(^2\)

On 30 May, the Front sponsored a demonstration in Beirut, which was cut short by police and gendarmes, who killed some demonstrators and wounded many more. According to Qubain, Chamoun's administration, in a certain sense, ceased to be a government in the proper meaning of the word from that day on.\(^3\) Instead of the re-establishment of order, lawlessness and terrorism became widespread. The opposition did not lose power; its strength grew until it virtually became another government.

In the parliamentary elections of June 1957, Chamoun managed -- by fraudulent means and intensive electioneering -- to defeat most of the Deputies who were opposed to the constitutional amendment that would allow him to run again. Though Chamoun is a dedicated anti-Communist, he is also a dedicated politician; his

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\(^1\)Qubain, Fahim I., "Crisis in Lebanon," the Middle East Institute, Washington 1961, p. 169. Qubain's book, the most comprehensive English-language discussion of the Lebanese crisis of 1958, is used extensively in this section.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 55.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 50.
crusade for reelection was probably, in large part, a result of his personal ambition. Besides increasing the personal animosity to him, the denial of parliamentary expression led many members of the moderate opposition into the radical camp. Compromise is indispensable in Lebanese politics; Chamoun's hard-line style was rare for that country.

Most of the opposition leaders were prestigious, powerful personalities. The Front included three of President Chamoun's former Prime Ministers: Abdallah Yafi, Saeb Salam, and Rashid Karami. It also included Kamal Jumblat, the Druze leader and founder of the Progressive Socialist Party, who had supported Chamoun in the 1952 presidential crisis.

Although the Moslems did most of the fighting on the opposition side (the opposition leaders mentioned above were Moslem), the crisis was not a Moslem-Christian fight per se. Chamoun was largely responsible for giving the conflict a religious color by his attempt to win Christian support away from strong Christian leaders in the opposition.  

Many prominent Christians, such as former President Khoury, Butros-Boulos Meouchy (the Maronite Patriarch and Khoury's cousin), Charles Helou (who was elected President in 1964), and Suleiman Franjieh (who was elected President in 1970), were members of either the Front or other opposition groups. In addition to the Front, a group known as the Third Force appeared on the political scene. It was composed primarily of Christians, led by Henri Pharoan (Greek Catholic), opposed in principle to Chamoun's contravention of the Constitution. Though the Third Force was formed to act as a neutral mediator, time brought it very close to the Front.

It should be noted that in 1957 the opposition platform did not include resort to violence or early removal of President Chamoun. The Syrian leaders wanted Lebanon to be part of the UAR, but the Lebanese rebel leaders' enthusiasm for such a move did not last. The rebels were grateful for aid from the UAR but, even in 1958, during the most violent stage of the crisis, they generally confined their demands to removal of Chamoun.

Chamoun's alienation of political personalities and attempt to succeed himself may have been the primary causes of the Lebanese crisis, but regional and international factors, absent from the 1952 presidential controversy, accounted for the violent nature of the 1958 crisis.²

A regional factor in the Lebanese crisis was the intervention in Lebanon's affairs by the United Arab Republic, which had been formed by Egypt and Syria on 1 February 1958. Chamoun had been at odds with the two countries since 1956, when he had refused to break diplomatic relations with France and Great Britain over Suez. Chamoun's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine in March 1957

¹Qubain, op. cit., p. 83.
²Ibid., p. 170.
exacerbated this animosity. By 1958, in spite of the National Covenant, Chamoun had placed Lebanon in the Iraqi-Jordanian camp, which was solidly opposed to the UAR.

The UAR infiltrated men into Lebanon, but its primary role was to satisfy the opposition's greater need: money and arms. The UAR fanned the crisis by carrying on a vituperative radio and newspaper campaign in what Ambassador Robert McClintock has called "audio-visual aggression." In this intensive effort, the UAR also gave financial support to Lebanese opposition newspapers and clandestine radio stations operating within Lebanon.

On the international level, the National Covenant was ignored when Chamoun placed Lebanon under the aegis of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Chamoun, as American officials in Beirut reported in 1957, set Lebanon firmly on the side of the United States in the struggle between the West and "international communism" for the Middle East.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was approved by Congress\(^1\) on 9 March; a few days later, Congressman James Richards was sent on a Presidential mission to the Middle East to solicit support for it. President Chamoun has said that the United States wanted his country to be the first to subscribe to it; and, indeed, Ambassador Richards' first stop was Lebanon.

Certainly, Lebanon was important to the Eisenhower Doctrine. As Secretary of State Dulles said before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (8 January 1957):

"Lebanon is a country which particularly needs our help and support at this present time. It is one of the most western-oriented of the countries of the area. It is very concerned about what is going on in its neighborhood.

I think very much can be done and needs to be done to bolster up a government like Lebanon. Perhaps the example set there would have an influence in the rest of the area." \(^3\)

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1. Both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were "very conscious of the necessity of proceeding in accordance with Constitutional power and authority" and Herman Phleger believes that it would not "have been possible to make the Lebanese landings, unless the Eisenhower resolution had been passed." Phleger, op. cit., p. 87.


3. Congress-House Committee on Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 68.
Richards also received a favorable reception in Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Ethiopia, and Israel, but Lebanon was the only country to make a firm commitment to the Eisenhower Doctrine. President Eisenhower had hoped that King Saud of Saudi Arabia might eventually rival Nasser as an Arab leader, but Saud did not find it politically expedient to accede to the Eisenhower Doctrine. As for Jordan, young King Hussein's tenuous hold on his throne made it "...preferable to extend U.S. economic assistance through other means." 2 As for Egypt, President Nasser sent word privately to Ambassador Richards saying that he would like to see him; Richards, however, refused, Dulles having instructed him to accept an official invitation only. 3 Egypt and Syria then assailed the Eisenhower Doctrine vehemently.

Before Ambassador Robert McClintock took up his post in Lebanon, in January 1958, he was warned by the Department of State that volatile issues were involved. 4 On his arrival in Beirut, he sought out all sides of opinion, to the chagrin of President Chamoun. The new Ambassador leaned at first to the view that Chamoun should be reelected; he later switched to the opposite opinion. 5 After investigation, McClintock recommended to the Department of State that the United States tell Chamoun that we hoped he could support some other candidate in 1958, with the idea of running again in 6 years. 6 Although the British Ambassador, Sir George Middleton, had similar misgivings, this view was not shared by all American officials in Beirut. The Department of State, however, realized that any other course of action might result in an internal conflict of unpredictable dimensions, and instructed the Ambassador to query Chamoun on this point. 8

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2 Ambassador James P. Richards' radio and television address of 8 May, Department of State Bulletin, 36 (27 May 1957), p. 841.
5 Copeland, op. cit., p. 198.
7 Copeland, op. cit., p. 198.
Accordingly, the Ambassador met with President Chamoun on 5 March but found him very confident of victory. Ambassador McClintock felt that Chamoun's confidence was unwarranted, but State did not feel it advisable to press Chamoun further at the time. 1

On 1 April, Gen. Chehab, still in command of the Army, told Ambassador McClintock that Chamoun's attempt at reelection would bring on civil strife and possibly civil war. The General expressed a similar view to Chamoun's foreign minister, Charles Malik. 2 In mid-April, Chamoun made a spurious offer of the presidency to Gen. Chehab, knowing that the General's aloofness from politics would cause him to refuse. 3 Chamoun lost no time announcing the rejection, implying that he himself was the only suitable candidate for President.

On 15 April, Chamoun told an American official that he would attempt to secure the necessary constitutional amendment in the middle of May. If he failed, he would try again in July, but he noted that he expected success in May. Foreign Minister Charles Malik also reported this plan to the Ambassador on 18 April. 4 George Akl, a pro-Chamoun Deputy, announced on 24 April his intention to submit a constitutional amendment that would allow Chamoun to run again. 5 Throughout this period, President Chamoun, Malik, and the loyal Moslem Prime Minister, Sami Sulh, greatly overestimated their popular following.

On 3 May, the French, British, and American ambassadors met to discuss a request from President Chamoun for support in his bid for reelection. They were sure that Chamoun would confront them with the affirmative answers of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Jordan. For this reason, and because of the fear that any other candidate might call for new parliamentary elections 6 that might change its pro-Western orientation, each ambassador recommended to his government that Chamoun be supported. 7 They added the caveat, however, that a different candidate (either Gen. Chehab or someone whom Chamoun would agree to) would be a better alternative.

1Ibid., Secret, p. 7.
2Ibid., Secret, p. 8.
3Ibid., Secret, p. 8.
5Middle East Mirror, 10 (27 April 1958), p. 6.
6When the Presidential elections were held, this fear did not materialize.
The Department gave Ambassador McClintock an affirmative reply, with instructions to caution President Chamoun that our support must be covert. Secretary Dulles, who was in Copenhagen attending a NATO meeting, sent the Ambassador a telegram stating that the Department's conditional response would only demoralize Chamoun and that, once a decision was made to back Chamoun, it should be done wholeheartedly, though the message of support should still be given orally. According to, Ambassador McClintock gave Chamoun oral assurance of American support on 7 May; this was followed by similar assurances from the French and British.

\[1\textit{Ibid.}, \textit{Secret, p. 9.}\]
THE CIVIL WAR

On 8 May, the Christian editor of an anti-Chamoun newspaper was murdered in Beirut. The incident sparked severe rioting in Tripoli the next day. A general strike was declared in the Basta, the Moslem quarter of Beirut, and fighting soon spread throughout the country. It was already evident that the UAR was supplying the rebels with money and arms as Egypt and Syria stepped up their radio and press campaign against Chamoun.

On 11 May, when the insurrection was only 2 days old, Foreign Minister Malik, declared that Syria had sent a "horde" of soldiers into Lebanon the night before and asked Ambassador McClintock to have the 6th Fleet's Marines ready to land in the event that Lebanese forces were overwhelmed. ¹ Chamoun, in reference to Malik's remark, told McClintock that same day that the landing of a Marine division would be necessary if Syria invaded Lebanon. ² On 13 May, President Chamoun summoned the American, British, and French Ambassadors individually and requested that their governments consider the possibility that he would ask them to land armed forces in Lebanon within 24 hours after such an appeal. ³

President Eisenhower met with Secretary Dulles and others that day to consider President Chamoun's request. According to President Eisenhower, "Behind everything was our deep-seated conviction that the Communists were principally responsible for the trouble, and that President Chamoun was motivated by a strong feeling of patriotism." ⁴ During this meeting, Secretary Dulles argued for an immediate affirmative response, while his brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles, argued for a delay of 24 hours before answering Chamoun. ⁵

⁴Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 266.
⁵Ibid., p. 266.
The President decided to answer Chamoun’s request affirmatively but, not wanting to let Chamoun think that he had a blank check, the President made his statement conditional. On 14 May, Ambassador McCloy was authorized to inform President Chamoun of the conditions for direct military assistance:  

2. Some Arab states must be prepared to give public support to a request for assistance.
3. Intervention must not center on the domestic issue of the Lebanese Presidential election.
4. An appeal for aid must come from the government of Lebanon, not from the President alone.

On May 15, Chamoun informed the Ambassador that more Syrian partisans had entered Lebanon and that he might need help "not in forty-eight or twenty-four hours, but in six hours."  

A basic assumption underlying direct military assistance was that Lebanon's own forces would prove inadequate. The Army's small size -- 9000 men -- did not cause as much concern as its degree of willingness to engage the rebels. Gen. Chehab had told the Ambassador a few days earlier (11 May) that, though opposed to Chamoun's reelection, he would support the President until the end of his term in September. As in the 1952 presidential crisis, the Army tried to remain aloof from the struggle. Gen. Chehab felt that the crisis was an internal conflict which would disintegrate the Army along religious lines if he committed it too strongly on the side of the government. Chamoun, on the other hand, believed that Chehab had presidential ambitions and that "...no revolution would have started, except by the full consent of Chehab."

3Ibid., Secret, p. 11.
4In many countries, Gen. Chehab's reluctance to help his President would be considered treason; in Lebanon, the Constitution is ambiguous on the relationship between those two positions. Hudson, op. cit., p. 299.

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from political activity kept it and Gen. Chehab (a Maronite Christian) popular with most of the Lebanese population. It should also be noted that Chehab came from an aristocratic Lebanese family and must have been influenced by the fact that most of the opposition leaders did, too. All of the opposition leaders, according to Qubain, were his personal friends.  

The rebels had three strongholds: Rashid Karami, a Sunni Moslem, led the insurgents in Tripoli, which was largely Moslem in population. Abdallah Yafí and Saeb Salam led the rebel forces who were centered in the Basta, Beirut’s Moslem quarter. Kamal Jumblat led his Druze forces in the Chouf, the mountain area in the south. The army fought these forces only when attacked or when the rebels had overstepped the imaginary boundaries that the Army had created. Although total suppression of the rebels might not have been easy, especially in the Chouf, there is no doubt that the Army had the military capability to destroy the Basta in a matter of hours. But, then, the government had the power to cut off electricity, water, and telephone service to the Basta—which it never did.  

Estimates of the forces on the insurgent side have varied greatly. Some run as high as 15,000, but Ambassador McClintock has stated that the number probably never exceeded 6 or 7 thousand, the bulk of these being Lebanese.  

The rebels operated in lightly armed bands of 400 to 2000 men, but without central leadership.  

Because Beirut was the key city, most of the UAR aid went to the rebels there. As mentioned earlier, the UAR’s primary role in the crisis was to send money and arms to the rebels. The UAR also infiltrated troops.  

Until June 1958, the UAR preferred to infiltrate Palestinians, anti-Chamoun Lebanese emigrants, and Syrian Druze into Lebanon. Many of the last were Druze whom the UAR had released from the Syrian 1st Army to join Kamal Jumblat’s Druze forces in the Chouf. Shawgat Shukair, former Syrian Chief of Staff, infiltrated into Lebanon on 18 May and took command of Jumblat’s forces.

1Qubain, op. cit., p. 81.  
5Copeland, op. cit., p. 197.  
8Ibid., p. 9, & Qubain, op. cit., p. 142.
In all, about 45,000 Druze joined Jumblatt. On 6 June, Syria openly established recruiting stations for Syrian volunteers to fight in Lebanon. Most of the UAR regular army troops who infiltrated into Lebanon were Syrian; there were a few Egyptians.

Because the Army's troops were loyal to Gen. Chehab, Chamoun was forced to depend on his armed civilian supporters to meet the insurgents. There were about 2500 men in the Lebanese gendarmerie, under an officer loyal to Chamoun, after the opposition's first demonstration (30 May 1957), however, the Army had assumed command of this force. A year later (26 May 1958), the government announced the formation of a Militia of National Volunteers, ostensibly to relieve the gendarmerie, and issued arms to them. Chamoun's two largest bands of armed civilians came from the militant Christian Phalangist (Kataeb) Party and the Parti Populaire Syrien; the doctrines of these parties are opposed, but both felt at the time that their very existence rode with Chamoun. These civilian bands were sent plane-loads of arms -- and some money -- clandestinely from Jordan, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Although the U.S. was often asked to help arm the civilian bands, all such requests were refused, and Ambassador McClintock stated publicly on 27 May that U.S. arms shipments to Lebanon would be stopped if they were diverted from the official security forces.

In compliance with the conditions set by the U.S. on 14 May, President Chamoun told Ambassador McClintock, on 20 May, that he was not going to run again and that the question of his reelection was no longer an issue. The State Department, however, directed McClintock to make certain that Chamoun still did not think he had a blank check on American intervention. On the night of

1 Ibid., p. 9.
2 The UAR alerted its military personnel in Lebanon, June 19, to be ready to return immediately in the event that UN troops or Anglo-American forces landed in Lebanon. New York Times (Herter's report) 17 July 1958, p. 9.
3 According to Qubain, this move was part of a compromise settlement to end a general strike called by the United National Front. Qubain, op. cit., p. 56.
4 The PPS was outlawed after an abortive coup against President Chehab in 1962. It was legalized (along with the Communist and Baath parties) again, two days before the 1970 presidential election.
5 McClintock, "An American Embassy to Lebanon," Secret, p. 15. Iraq's role was revealed at the public trials of royalties when the Iraqi revolutionary government opened many of the state papers left by the monarchy. Qubain, op. cit., p. 135.
6 Middle East Mirror, Beirut, Lebanon, 10 (3 June 1958), p. 6.
23 May, Chamoun summoned the French, British, and American ambassadors to tell them what he had already told McClintock -- that he was not going to run again. The ambassadors felt that this meeting complied with the State Department directive to McClintock. On 23 and 27 May, Prime Minister Sulh announced publicly that his government had no intention of seeking a constitutional amendment concerning succession for President Chamoun.

On 21 and 22 May, Lebanon filed a complaint against the UAR with both the Council of the Arab League and the U.N. Security Council, thus fulfilling another condition for American assistance. The Security Council met on 27 May, just long enough to postpone further discussion pending the outcome of the Arab League deliberations, which were to begin on 1 June.

The Arab League Council held four sessions, the outcome of which was a compromise draft resolution that condemned neither party. The resolution was unopposed by the UAR delegation and approved by the Lebanese delegation. The Lebanese government, however, rejected the resolution on 5 June, to the surprise of its delegation. On 6 June, Foreign Minister Malik lodged a formal protest with the United Nations Security Council against the UAR's intervention.

It appears that the Lebanese Government never gave the Arab League Council serious thought. Malik bypassed the meetings and went directly to New York instead. To be sure, the dismal record of the Arab League, along with the fact that the rest of its members were Moslem, partially explains Chamoun's behavior. Furthermore, by internationalizing the crisis at the U.N. level, Chamoun hoped to expose Nasser to world opinion. Chamoun might have been holding out for foreign intervention, which would bolster his regime. He was pleased when the 100-member United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was authorized by the U.N. Security Council on 11 June, and the first officers began arriving on 12 June.

Contrary to Chamoun's expectations, UNOGIL was an ineffective operation; Chamoun never tried to hide his bitterness. On 18 June, U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold arrived in Lebanon for a short stay, at the conclusion of which he said that he had seen no evidence of "massive infiltration." In its first official report, dated 1 July, UNOGIL likewise reported no evidence of the "massive infiltration" from the UAR charged by the government of Lebanon. Yet, at this time, the UNOGIL group had access to only the 18 kilometers under government control of the 300-kilometer Lebanese-Syrian border. Permission from the opposition forces for full access to their areas did not come until 15 July and was not implemented until 31 July.
The Lebanese-Syrian border runs along a mountain range and is difficult to patrol, as was recently demonstrated again when the Lebanese Army attempted to curb infiltration of fedayeen from Syria. Initially, UNOGIL had very few aircraft, and physical accessibility to even the border areas not under rebel control was nearly impossible for motor vehicles. For a long while, UNOGIL did not work at night, when infiltration would be most likely.\(^1\) U.N. Secretary Hammarskjold, however, told the U.S. delegation in New York (2 July) that he had been convinced from the beginning that the UAR had intervened in Lebanese affairs, and that he had told Nasser that he should stop at once. While most countries eventually recognized the fact of UAR interference, most also felt, as did Hammarskjold, that its effect was minimal compared with Chamoun’s own handling of the crisis.

On 7 June, President Nasser approached the U.S. Ambassador to Cairo, Raymond Hare, with a plan to end the crisis.\(^2\) According to the plan, President Chamoun would appoint Gen. Chehab Prime Minister, as in 1952, with the understanding that Chehab would become President at the end of Chamoun’s term in September. Further, amnesty was to be granted the rebel leaders. Chamoun flatly refused it and any other coming from Nasser.\(^3\) The actual resolution of the crisis followed Nasser’s plan closely.

June began routinely for the 6th Fleet, although Ambassador McClintock refused a Naval request that a 6th Fleet port call be granted for Beirut, because he felt that such a move could aggravate the tense situation. On 14 June, the heaviest fighting that Beirut was to experience took place,\(^4\) and Malik asked if the U.S. would intervene at once if so requested. On the following day, Gen. Chehab told the Ambassador that his army had lost the initiative to the rebels.\(^5\) Ambassador McClintock asked the Department of State to consider Lebanon in a "state of alert," a request that was granted and announced that day. Also on that same day (15 June), President Chamoun told McClintock that he would sack Chehab after U.S. troops had landed.\(^6\)

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4. Qubain, op. cit., p. 75.
Washington's reaction was one of alarm, since the cooperation of the Lebanese Army was considered basic to a U.S. military operation in Lebanon. At Secretary Dulles' direction, McClintock again went over the 14 May conditions for intervention with Chamoun on 16 June. Later that day, Chamoun's cabinet voted him the power to request unilaterally the assistance of foreign troops if necessary, thus fulfilling the last condition, that such a request would have to be made by the government of Lebanon, not by the President alone. Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey had already agreed to support such a request publicly.

Both Iraq and Turkey felt that Chamoun was indispensable. Iraq offered on 11 June to intervene militarily if the United States would furnish the necessary air cover. Turkey exerted pressure for direct U.S. intervention. Though the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri Said, told U.S. Ambassador Waldemar Gallman (16 June) that his government would not hesitate to back a Lebanese request for "western military assistance," the Iraqi Foreign Minister later (23 June) added the caveat that Anglo-American intervention would be undesirable and that Lebanon should request troops from the Arab Union (Iraq and Jordan) under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. On 25 June, Lebanon asked for U.N. forces to seal its frontiers, and President Chamoun announced that he might find it necessary to request outside intervention under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

Although British Ambassador Middleton shared Ambassador McClintock's view that Western intervention was undesirable, the British government was more responsive to its ambassadors in Iraq and Jordan, who argued that British interests in these countries would benefit from forceful action in Lebanon. The British Foreign Office also argued that the West must help Chamoun if Nasser was to be stopped. Dulles told the Canadian Ambassador on 21 May that "we were extremely reluctant to see matters in Lebanon develop in such a way as to require armed intervention... We had, however, the impression that the British were trying to 'crowd' us on military intervention."

1 Ibid., Secret, p. 19.
4 Gallman, op. cit., p. 165.
All of the three major leaders in the Lebanese government desired Western intervention. Prime Minister Sulh wanted a 19th century solution, in which U.S. ships would destroy the rebel sector of Beirut by naval gunfire. At times, he also asked for British and French ships. He was probably the most vehement in wanting to remove Gen. Chehab. The most alarmist governmental leader was probably Foreign Minister Malik, who also wanted to dismiss Gen. Chehab. Chamoun shared Sulh's and Malik's dislike of Gen. Chehab but worried more about the General's popularity. Like Sulh and Malik, however, Chamoun was persistent in seeking U.S. military assistance. Twice in June, Chamoun came very close to making a formal request. Both times, Ambassador McClintock felt that the requests were not in line with prevailing conditions and was able to dissuade Chamoun from pursuing them.  

President Chamoun had been cooped up for weeks in the presidential palace, behind steel shutters. Rebels had been firing at it with small arms for much of this time, and the Ambassador felt that this situation was enough to unnerve anyone. But while urging President Chamoun to be patient, Ambassador McClintock had taken significant precautionary measures. In response to his earlier request, and unknown to President Chamoun, 26th Fleet destroyers had been cruising 30 miles (one hour's steaming time) off the Lebanese coast since May. A special communications circuit kept the Ambassador in constant touch with these ships, which also acted as a relay to the 6th Fleet flagship, which was then in the western Mediterranean.  

The French, British, and American ambassadors again met simultaneously with Chamoun on 1 July and found him still unwilling to go beyond Prime Minister Sulh's statement of 27 May. The ambassadors felt that the President's reelection was still a major issue and that Chamoun would refuse to make a public announcement himself until he had exhausted all possibilities. Finally, during an interview with Newsweek and UPI reporters on 8 July, Chamoun acknowledged publicly that he would not run again.

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1 Thayer, op. cit., p. 24.
2 Ibid., p. 25.
3 New York Times, (Sam Pope Brewer), 2 July 1958, p. 3.
4 Newsweek, 52 (14 July 1958), p. 35.
Meanwhile, top officials in Washington had been debating potential military involvement in Lebanon since May. Publicly, the government had shown itself receptive to such a possibility. During his press conference of 20 May, Secretary Dulles was asked if the Eisenhower Doctrine was applicable to Lebanon. Dulles answered that, while the United States did not perceive an armed attack from a country under the control of international Communism, the provision in the Eisenhower Doctrine that declared the independence of the Middle Eastern countries vital to peace and to the national interest of the United States was "certainly a mandate to do something" if such a threat existed. As to the actual use of troops, Dulles answered: "I would not want to give a categorical yes-or-no answer to that particular question." \(^1\)

When the severe rioting of 14 June erupted in Beirut, Allen and John Foster Dulles cut short their stay at a Princeton reunion to return to Washington. Meetings of the President, Secretary of State, and other key officials filled Sunday, 15 June; Foreign Minister Malik, who had flown to Washington, joined one of these conferences. It was not certain that intervention could be avoided. Plans were therefore developed in great detail.\(^2\)

During his press conference of 17 June, Dulles stated that "...even though at the moment the disturbance /in Lebanon/ assumes, in part at least, the character of a civil disturbance, it is covered by the United Nations resolution of 1949 on indirect aggression. This denounces the fomentation from without of civil strife."\(^3\) Dulles went on to say that if a U.N. effort in Lebanon called for U.S. military participation, the U.S. "would be inclined" to go along, but that United States military action in Lebanon would not be limited to a U.N. call.\(^4\) It should be noted, however, that in public and classified discussions, Dulles did say that military intervention in Lebanon was a "measure of last resort."\(^5\)

By the time the National Security Council met on 18 June, the Lebanese situation had calmed down somewhat; it did not flare up again until the Iraqi coup of 14 July.\(^6\)

There were those in the Department of State who were opposed to Dulles' willingness to intervene and, in fact, thought that a Lebanon landing would be

\(^1\)Department of State Bulletin, 38 (9 June 1958), p. 945.
\(^4\)Ibid., p. 10.
\(^5\)For example, the Dulles press conference of 1 July 1958, Department of State Bulletin, 39 (21 July 1958), p. 106.
\(^6\)Dulles, op. cit., p. 133.
a terrible mistake.\textsuperscript{1} There was certainly the risk that it might create as much trouble as it would solve. It would be fuel for Communist propaganda, and the Chamoun government might fall as soon as American troops withdrew. Moreover, as some military experts in the Pentagon argued, the United States might find itself stuck in a protracted guerrilla war such as the one that the French were then experiencing in Algeria.\textsuperscript{2} The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, felt that intervention was a sound move.\textsuperscript{3}


\textsuperscript{3}Twining, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 13.
"In early July it appeared that the Lebanon crisis would pass without Western military assistance," but the situation changed radically and suddenly on 14 July. Iraqi troops under Brig. Gen. Abdul Karim Kassem were being sent to Jordan. Instead, they turned aside at Baghdad that morning and overthrew the pro-Western government of Nuri Said and the royal family of Iraq in what appeared to be a UAR-directed coup d'état.

President Chamoun, fearing a similar fate, requested foreign intervention. Chamoun summoned separately the United States, British, and French diplomatic representatives that morning and asked for British and French assistance within 24 hours and American assistance within 48 hours. The latter request was based on the belief, derived from newspapers, that the 6th Fleet was largely deployed in the western Mediterranean and could not reach Lebanon sooner. Chamoun made his decision 2 to 3 hours after learning of the Iraqi coup. He based it on no more than radio reports from Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad, and one telegram from the British Embassy in Baghdad. Ambassador McClinrock felt that this was insufficient for such a serious request and noted in his telegram to Washington that, while the State Department would probably decide on the request in the perspective of the whole Middle East situation, circumstances in Lebanon itself did not warrant intervention. A similar opinion was expressed by the American charge d'affaires in Jordan.

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1Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 269.
3McClinrock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," p. 69. Most of the major combatants were indeed in the western Mediterranean. Chamoun, however, was not aware of the amphibious units operating near Lebanon.
4Chamoun, op. cit., p. 12.
The coup in Iraq took Washington by surprise. CIA Director Allen Dulles learned of it at 0300 EDT on July 14. At 0730 EDT, when the first fragmentary reports had been clarified, President Eisenhower was informed of the events in Iraq. Secretary Dulles arrived at the State Department at 0815 EDT for an intelligence briefing and a look at the most urgent cables. Chamoun's request reached Washington at 0835 EDT. President Eisenhower met with the National Security Council at 0930 EDT. Secretary Dulles joined the conference at 1030 EDT. According to Karl Harr, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, the Secretary of State had quickly decided for intervention and marshaled his arguments to that effect before he met with the President. As soon as Secretary Dulles entered the room, President Eisenhower said, "You don't have to say a word, Foster, I've already made up my mind. We're going in."

The Iraqi coup was the catalyst in the decision. Eisenhower was concerned that the Iraqi coup might "...result in a complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East." Washington had reliable information that a similar coup was planned against King Hussein for 17 July. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge told the U.N. Security Council on 16 July:

...the grave developments in Iraq and the recently organized plot to overthrow the lawful government of Jordan... were prime considerations which prompted the United States response to the Lebanese request for assistance in maintaining its independence.

Though the immediate purpose of intervention was to blunt a regional threat by the UAR, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles felt that intervention in Lebanon was necessary to reaffirm U.S. support to the remaining members of the Baghdad Pact, as well as to allies around the globe who depended on U.S. commitments. The decision to intervene was also taken out of regard for its effect on small nations, especially those still unsure of what their relationship with the West should be.

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1 Shulimson, op. cit., p. 6
2 Dulles, op. cit., p. 143.
4 Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 269.
7 Observer, op. cit., p. 45.
UNCLASSIFIED

It is not surprising that, for Secretary Dulles at least, the East-West confrontation overshadowed the Middle East situation, however important the latter was in itself.\footnote{Murphy, Robert (Deputy Under Secretary of State in 1958), Murphy Transcript, The Dulles Oral History Collection, The Princeton University Library, 1967, p. 57.} Earlier, in 1956, the United States had found itself powerless to stop the Soviet invasion of Hungary and, now, after Sputnik, the credibility of U.S. power was in question.\footnote{New York Times (Hanson Baldwin), 31 July 1958, p. 4.} President Chamoun had put the U.S. dilemma succinctly when he told Ambassador McClintock on 14 July that he wanted an answer "Not by words but by action."\footnote{Chamoun, op. cit., p. 13.} President Eisenhower saw this as a chance to do something concrete toward improving the United States' stature in the world.\footnote{Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 266.}

As for the Soviets' reaction, U.S. leaders were convinced that they would not intervene.\footnote{Murphy, Dulles Oral History Transcript, p. 52.} They felt that the United States was in an excellent position militarily and that the Soviets were aware of this fact.\footnote{Twining, op. cit., p. 13.} As Secretary Dulles told Senator George Aiken, "I know well enough that if we land in Lebanon the Russians won't do a damn thing about it, even though they have threatened to."\footnote{Aiken, George, (U.S. Senator in 1958), Aiken Transcript, The Dulles Oral History Collection, The Princeton University Library, 1967, p. 6.}

Having decided to intervene, the President met with his political and military advisors in the morning and afternoon of 14 July to work out the nature of that intervention and to amend contingency plans where necessary. Operations in Iraq were viewed as remote, since the deaths of the royal family and Prime Minister Nuri Said put direct intervention there "out of the picture."\footnote{Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 271.}

As for Lebanon, troops were to be landed in Beirut; contrary to the recommendations of some of the U.S. military, however, occupation of the hinterland was not contemplated. Eisenhower reasoned that the government of Lebanon would have to be at least that popular or the United States probably should not be in Lebanon.\footnote{Ibid., p. 275.}
Although contingency plans for a Lebanon operation envisioned British participation, President Eisenhower felt that U.S. forces would be adequate. The British agreed to keep their troops in Cyprus as a reserve for expected, but unplanned-for, operations in Jordan. This arrangement also met French objections. The Middle East had traditionally been an object of Anglo-French rivalry. Accordingly, the French, though aware that their Algerian troubles, added to their colonial experience in Lebanon, made it advisable for them to avoid association with Western intervention, were, nevertheless, suspicious of British intentions and wanted to take part in any intervention where the British were represented.\(^1\) The French were amenable to intervention in Lebanon by the United States alone, however. Even so, Great Britain and the United States did not consult France during these final deliberations.\(^2\) Fortunately, the French were satisfied with a token port call to Beirut by the cruiser De Grasse, 17-18 July.

At 1430 EDT 14 July, President Eisenhower met with a bipartisan group of key members of Congress to explain the situation.\(^3\) At 1716 EDT, President Eisenhower told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Nathan Twining: "Send them in."\(^4\) It was agreed that the Marines could land by 0900 EDT (1500 Beirut time), and the news announcement was released at that time.\(^5\)

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\(^3\)Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 271.
UNCLASSIFIED

THE MILITARY BACKGROUND AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING

At the time, United States contingency plans for a Middle Eastern crisis were based on CINCSPECOMME (Commander-in-Chief Specified Command Middle East)\(^1\) Operational Plan 215-58. The position of CINCSPECOMME, then held by CINCNELM (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic, and Mediterranean) in London, had no assigned forces until a Middle Eastern operation was officially opened by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The command had been activated once before, during the Suez crisis of 1956,\(^2\) and the original contingency plan was concerned with Arab-Israeli hostilities.

In November 1957, the JCS had informed CINCNELM that the critical situation in the Middle East, and the fear of an anti-Western coup in Jordan — and, to a lesser extent, in Lebanon — required an immediate updating of Operational Plan 215-56 to take into account potential operations associated with the Eisenhower Doctrine.\(^3\) The resulting updating, CINCSPECOMME Operational Plan 215-58, was drawn up in close liaison with USCINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE and COMSIXTHFLEET. As in the earlier operational plan, the 6th Fleet, with its Marines, was the lead force to be committed.

The normal operational area of the 6th Fleet extends from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Bosphorus at Istanbul. The normal deployment of the 6th Fleet in 1958 consisted of two 6-month cruises. During a cruise, the Fleet spent 2 months each in the western, central, and eastern Mediterranean.

In 1958, the normal organization of the 6th Fleet was:\(^4\)

- Task Force 60 - Attack Carrier Striking Force
  - Attack Carrier
  - Aircraft Carrier
  - Frigate
- Task Force 61 - Amphibious Force
  - Assault Craft Unit
  - LST
- Task Force 62 - Amphibious Troops
  - Marine Expeditionary Unit
- Task Force 63 - Service Force
  - Support Aircraft
  - Support Ships
- Task Force 64 - Special Task Force
  - Escort
  - Patrol
- Task Force 65 - Surface Action and Patrol Force
  - Destroyer
  - Frigate
- Task Force 66 - Antisubmarine Force
  - Anti-submarine Warfare Unit
- Task Force 67 - Fleet Air Forces Mediterranean
  - Marine Aircraft
- Task Force 68 - Mine and Mine Countermeasures Force
  - Mine Countermeasures Unit
- Task Force 69 - Submarine Force
  - Submarine

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\(^1\) A specified command differs from a verified command principally in that forces are commonly from a single service. Temporary allocation of units from other services does not change the character of the command.


\(^3\) Shulimson, op. cit., p. 7.

The CVA strike force consisted of 2 aircraft carriers; usually, one of these was of the Midway or Forrestal class. Approximately 20 destroyers operated with the 2 CVA's. A guided missile cruiser, either the Canberra or Boston, ordinarily operated with this force, too. The ASW force, consisting of one CVS and approximately 6 ASW destroyer escorts, joined the Fleet for 3 months a year. The amphibious force of about 6 ships carried a Battalion Landing Team (BLT) of approximately 1800 Marines. The submarine force normally included only 2 submarines. The entire 6th Fleet comprised 50 ships, although 58 ships were deployed in the middle of May 1958.\(^1\)

While many of the support ships were homeported in the Mediterranean, COMSIXTHFLT's flagship, a cruiser, was the only combat vessel in the Mediterranean on a continuous basis. The attack carriers, the destroyers, the amphibious ships, some service ships, and submarines rotated with ships from the Atlantic Fleet after tours lasting from 2 months for submarines to 6 months for attack carriers.

The 6th Fleet's peacetime mission in May 1958 was:\(^2\)

1. To help preserve the peace.
2. To assure Mediterranean countries of our friendship and readiness to help them.
3. To protect and support U.S. citizens, interests, and policies in the Mediterranean area.
4. To be prepared to carry out such wartime assignments as superior U.S. or NATO commands may order.
5. To perfect working relationships with our friends and allies.
6. To provide realistic wartime training for ships and men of the Navy.
7. To familiarize U.S. Navy personnel with this strategic area of the world.

According to VAdm. Charles Brown, COMSIXTHFLT in 1958, the Fleet's primary mission was readiness for its NATO role.\(^3\) In 1958, the 6th Fleet had A-3 Skywarrior aircraft, which were capable of carrying nuclear weapons to potential targets in the Soviet Union, and the Fleet's mobility gave it an excellent chance of surviving a Soviet first strike against it. Adm. Brown, however, was not oblivious to the crisis role of the 6th Fleet: "I'm sitting on a volcano. When it rumbles, I shift the Fleet's center of gravity toward the rumble."\(^4\)

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\(^1\) Monthly Memorandum of Composition of Task Forces, Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Operations Division, Navy Department, 15 May 1958.

\(^2\) U.S. Navy, "Facts About the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean," Public Information Office, Commander Sixth Fleet, 7 May 1958, pp. 3-4.


On 2 May 1957, CNO had issued a directive that, while the broad mission of the 6th Fleet remained the maintenance of stability in the area and protection of U.S. nationals, Fleet support would be available, if directed in an emergency, in support of the Eisenhower Doctrine. In April 1957, with Department of State concurrence, the 6th Fleet (including the CVA's Forrestal and Lake Champlain) had moved into the eastern Mediterranean for a show of force while King Hussein of Jordan weathered an internal threat to his throne. The Forrestal stayed out of sight of land, while other units, including the Marine force, made a port call to Beirut. Units of the British Navy joined the 6th Fleet in this show of force. Both were able to leave the eastern Mediterranean after 2 weeks. The 6th Fleet, including the CVA's Randolph and Intrepid, returned for another show of force, from August to November 1957, during a period of Turkish-Syrian tension.

In May, a few days after the Lebanese internal crisis took a violent turn, as mentioned earlier, the Lebanese government stated that it might have to request Western intervention. On 14 May, the day the U.S. told Chamoun the conditions for intervention — the U.S. Navy announced that the 6th Fleet and British Naval units were about to begin "routine" maneuvers in the central Mediterranean. Within a week, both forces were operating in strength in the eastern Mediterranean. By 19 May, the Atlantic Fleet had been put on a 4-day alert and was said to be "regrouping to improve our defense capabilities during the present unsettled period." On the same day, the British Admiralty announced that the NATO naval exercise had been shifted to the eastern Mediterranean so that warships of Britain and the United States could evacuate their nationals from Lebanon if necessary.

When the crisis broke out, British troops in Cyprus were, for the first few days, the only Western forces close enough for an immediate response to a Lebanese request for troops. On May 14, the United States also announced that it was doubling its amphibious strength in the Mediterranean. Previous planning now proved its worth.

In part response to the November 1957 JCS directive, Headquarters, 2nd Provisional Marine Force (under BGen. Sidney Wade) was established at Camp Lejeune, N.C., on 10 January 1958, to plan and conduct Combine II. This exercise was to be a practice landing operation off the coast of Sardinia.

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2.Ibid., p. S10495
7.The author has used Shulimson's Marines in Lebanon 1958 as his main source of information on the Marine buildup.

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involving the U.S. Marines, British Royal Marines, and Units of the Italian Navy. The 2nd Provisional Marine Force was composed of 2 BLT's: BLT 1/8 (1st Battalion, 8th Marines) in the Mediterranean and BLT 2/2 in North Carolina. TRANSPHIBRON 6, carrying BLT 2/2, arrived in the Mediterranean on 14 May to replace TRANSPHIBRON 4 (BLT 1/8), which had been the 6th Fleet landing force since January, when it was announced that both amphibious task forces would remain in the Mediterranean.

On 13 May, Gen. Wade was ordered to suspend planning for Combine II (which was not canceled until 1 July) and move his headquarters to the Mediterranean area immediately. The General and his staff departed the following day. Gen. Wade had been briefed twice before, 31 March and 14 April, for just such a move in connection with the Lebanon situation.

BLT 1/8 had drawn up a Lebanon contingency plan for itself early in 1958 after sending its battalion operations officer incognito on a tour of Beirut's beaches. On 18 May, Gen. Wade and RAdm. Robert Carrenagh, the amphibious task force commander, established their headquarters aboard the AGC (amphibious force flagship) Mount McKinley, then off the coast of Crete, and began work on amending that plan to include 2 BLT's. Most of the details had been completed by 21 May when they were joined, off the coast of Cyprus, by 2 British generals from Cyprus to formulate plans for an Anglo-American landing in Lebanon. On 22 May, BGen. David Gray of the U.S. 11th Airborne Division arrived in Cyprus to preside over the meeting. At a one-day conference, the group established the position of CINCAMBRITFOR (Commander-in-Chief American British Force) and agreed that it would be held by CINCNELM, and developed a contingency plan for a joint Lebanon landing, Operational Plan 1-58, known as Bluebat. An advance party of CINCAMBRITFOR was deployed to the Mediterranean for 3 weeks and then returned to London.

Operation Bluebat envisioned 2 possible military actions. One was a simultaneous landing of 2 Marine BLT's; one was to land south of Beirut to seize the airport, while the other BLT landed northeast of Beirut to secure that sector of the city, including the bridges and water supply systems situated there. The other course of action was for 2 American airborne battle groups to land or be dropped at the airport. On 17 May, 2 U.S. Army battle groups in Germany were placed on alert; they were still on alert when President Chamoun requested American troops on 14 July. In either case, a British airborne group was to be flown in when the airport had been secured. When the British brigade had landed, the American troops at the airport were to move into the city and take control of the port area. The object of the plan was to support the Lebanese government against invasion, specifically against the Syrian 1st Army, which was near the Lebanese border.

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1 Shulimson, op. cit., p. 8.

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Military aid was already being given to Lebanon. On 14 May, the United States also announced that it was rushing police equipment, ordered in 1956, to Lebanon. On 28 May, 18 M-41 light tanks were delivered under a similarly accelerated assistance program. The United States delivered several landing craft for moving troops along the Lebanese coast. On 10 June, the United Kingdom and the United States announced that they would give jointly 12 Hawker Hunter jets to Lebanon and 38 other jets to Jordan and Iraq.

In June, 6th Fleet and British Naval units continued operations in the eastern Mediterranean. U.S. Marines conducted landing exercises north of Izmir, Turkey, in the middle of the month; the addition of an ASW task force, whose schedule was slightly accelerated, brought the number of ships in the 6th Fleet to 64. The British continued their buildup of troops into Cyprus, peaking at 37,000 men by 23 June. So large a force was on Cyprus largely because of the volatile situation in Cyprus itself, although at least 5000 troops were set aside as a strategic reserve for operations in Lebanon.

Since by late June, the immediate danger had passed and the hostile Arab press was well aware of the 6th Fleet’s presence, the Department of State wanted the Fleet to relax, to avoid needlessly provocative deployments. About 1 July, most of the Fleet left the Lebanon area for various ports in the Mediterranean, leaving TRANSPHIBRON 6 (BLT 2/2) approximately 100 miles from Lebanon and 2 destroyers just over the horizon from Beirut. On 12 July, RAdm. Howard Yeager, on the AGC Pocono, relieved Adm. Cavenagh as Amphibious Task Force Commander off the coast of Crete, and Gen. Wade transferred his headquarters from the Mount McKinley to the Pocono.

According to former President Chamoun, the UNOGIL report of 1 July, showing no massive infiltration from the UAR, had an immediate repercussion on American policy and the 6th Fleet’s departure was a direct result of this report. Some British units also left the eastern Mediterranean. The British attack carrier, Ark Royal, returned to the United Kingdom, to be replaced later in the Mediterranean by the CVA Eagle.

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3. Ibid., p. 3.
When the pro-Western government of Iraq was overthrown on 14 July, the 6th Fleet was spread over much of the Mediterranean. There were 74 ships with the Fleet: 2 CVA’s, one CVS, 2 cruisers, 22 destroyers, and 47 other ships. CVA Saratoga in company with 7 destroyers was at Cannes, the cruiser (and 6th Fleet flagship) Des Moines was at Villefranche, the ASW carrier Wasp in company with 7 destroyer escorts was at Naples, CVA Essex in company with 3 destroyers was at Piraeus (Athens), the guided missile cruiser Boston in company with 3 destroyers was at Rhodes, and 2 destroyers were near Beirut.

The Fleet was in an unfavorable position, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Arleigh Burke, took steps to improve the situation. He telephoned RAdm. Duerfeldt (Deputy CINCNELM) in London at 0930 EDT (1330 Z, 1530 Beirut time) to issue preparatory orders that Marines might have to be landed in Lebanon within 48 hours. Gen. Wade was similarly alerted at 1115 EDT. Moreover, Adm. Burke advised CINCNELM, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCLANTFLT, and CINCPACFLT about 1500 EDT that the decision to land Marines was imminent. At 1823 EDT (0023 Beirut time), CNO relayed President Eisenhower’s order to land, and directed Adm. Holloway, CINCNELM, in London to land the Marines, sail the 6th Fleet eastward, and join the command ship Taconic in Beirut as CINCSPECOMME.

The 6th Fleet units that were in port were ordered to sail at first light 15 July, to avoid the speculation that would accompany a night-time departure. Less than 2 hours after the Marines landed, CNO placed the Atlantic Fleet on 4 hours’ sailing notice; Adm. Burke (with Presidential approval) placed the Pacific Fleet on the same alert, on the assumption that Communist China might try to take advantage of U.S. involvement in the Middle East.

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1 Braestrup, op. cit., p. 25.
5 Shulimson, op. cit., p. 9.
6 Shulimson, op. cit., p. 10.

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THE LANDING

Adm. Burke, despite State Department opposition to his buildup of the 6th Fleet's amphibious force, sought to maintain that increased force level. When TRANSPHIBRON 2 (BLT 3/6) was sent to relieve TRANSPHIBRON 4 (BLT 1/8), the relief maneuver in the Mediterranean was stretched from the usual one or 2 days to 11 or 12 days. 2 TRANSPHIBRON 2 arrived in the Mediterranean on 8 July, and TRANSPHIBRON 4 was on its way out of the Mediterranean when the Iraqi coup occurred on 14 July.

Adm. Holloway had argued successfully that, in the event of intervention, a Marine landing across the beach was preferable to a paratroop drop at the airport, that a Marine landing could be confined to a smaller area, was much more controllable and, in the event of resistance, had the advantage of naval gunfire support.

Of the 3 TRANSPHIBRONS, only TRANSPHIBRON 6 (BLT 2/2) was close (120 miles) to Lebanon on 14 July. It was decided, however, not to wait for another, and BLT 2/2 was directed to land south of Beirut and seize the airport, implementing as much of Bluebat as possible. TRANSPHIBRON 6 consisted of 6 ships: the command ship (AGC) Taconic, the attack transport (APA) Monrovia, the attack cargo ship (AKA) Capricornus, and 2 tank landing ships (LST's) Walworth County and Traverse County. The 6th ship, the dock landing ship (LSD) Plymouth Rock, was enroute to Malta for emergency repairs. The Essex was to provide air support. The destroyers Wadleigh and The Sullivans, already off Beirut, were to be used as gunfire support ships. Their effectiveness in this role would have been seriously limited if the landing had been opposed, since the destroyers previously stationed there had neglected to turn over the necessary grid chart and naval gunfire support operations overlay upon being relieved.

The first ship appeared offshore at 1330 Beirut time, 15 July. By 1400, all 5 available ships from TRANSPHIBRON 6 (notified at 0400 Beirut time) and the 2 destroyers could be seen on the horizon; they reached their positions off the landing beach by 1430. The landing site was 4 miles south of Beirut and 700 yards from the airport.

LVTP's (Landing Vehicles Tracked, Personnel) were launched first, followed by regular landing craft. The first Marines hit the beach at 1504, 26 hours and 20 minutes after President Chamoun had requested them. Startled but friendly sunbathers were on hand to greet the Marines. Ice cream and soft drink vendors immediately hiked their prices for what became as good a market as any American

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1This initiative seems to have been Adm. Burke's. When asked whether the State Department had nudged him in this direction, he answered, "No, they nudged the other way." Burke Transcript, The Dulles Oral History Collection, The Princeton University Library 1967, p. 34.

tourists had ever been. Meeting no resistance other than upset airport administra-
tors, the Marines were able to secure Beirut National Airport within 40
minutes. 1

The Plymouth Rock's absence greatly hindered the landing because the
Marine shore party, the Naval beach group, and the underwater demolition
team were all on the Plymouth Rock. They were badly needed, and Lt. Col.
H. A. Hadd, the commander of BLT 2/2, has concluded that the delay in getting
the material to the beach "would have been disastrous if the landing had been
opposed." 2 All of BLT 2/2's artillery and 2 of its 5 tanks were also on the
Plymouth Rock. The 3 tanks available to the 2/2 Marines did not reach the beach
until 12 hours after the Marines had landed. Five tanks from BLT 3/6 arrived
on board the Fort Snelling 5 hours after the landing, but short of ammunition;
a peacetime safety precaution (since rescinded) kept the two in separate ships.
Twelve days later (27 July), a U.S. Army tank battalion landed 78 M-48 tanks
and 17 armored personnel carriers.

The State Department had instructed Ambassador McClintock on the morning
of 15 July to inform Chamoun no later than noon that Marines would be landing
at 1500. State had also instructed McClintock to tell Chamoun that the United
States would expect "full cooperation from the Lebanese armed forces." 3
The United States was deeply concerned with the reaction of the Lebanese Army
to an American landing, 4 especially since Gen. Chehab had told Ambassador
McClintock on 23 May that if allied forces landed in Lebanon to protect Chamoun,
the army would give no support to the intervention. 5 Later (15 June) the General
had said that he would resign if our troops landed. 6 As a precaution, therefore,
the U.S. Marines were instructed to consider all Lebanese Army units unfriendly
until they proved otherwise. 7

When Ambassador McClintock informed President Chamoun of the impending
landing, the latter, fearing repercussions from the Lebanese Army, requested
that the Ambassador withhold that information from Gen. Chehab until 1330.
As the Ambassador and the General were speaking, the landing ships appeared

1Newsweek, 52 (28 July 1958), p. 17.
2Shulimson, op. cit., p. 17. Shulimson notes: "That statement dramatized
the political nature of the Lebanon operation. Military logistical effectiveness
on this first day of the landing had to be sacrificed in order to meet the time
limits of President Eisenhower's announcement."
6Ibid., Secret, p. 19.
7Shulimson, op. cit., p. 20.
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- Route of 2/2 to 2nd Objective 16 July 1958
on the horizon. The General declared that the landing would provoke many of his troops into joining the rebels and asked if the Marines could be kept aboard ship in the harbor, until he could be sure of his own forces.\(^1\) As Chehab later told the U.S. Army Attaché, some Lebanese Army officers had, that morning, proposed a coup to forestall a landing.\(^2\) However, when the Ambassador tried to radio the close-in destroyers on his special communications link-up, the circuit was dead.

Ambassador McClinton had not been informed of the Marines' landing site but finally learned from journalists that the Marines were landing near the airport; he sent his Naval Attaché to the immediate commander of the troops, Lt. Col. Hadd, requesting a delay. Lt. Col. Hadd, who received the request 20 minutes after he had actually landed, referred the request to the senior officer present, Capt. McCrea in the Taconic. Capt. McCrea, feeling bound by what he felt were inflexible orders, informed the Ambassador that he took his orders from the Commander of the 6th Fleet and the military chain of command, and that "all troops have landed and will remain ashore in vicinity of airport until further orders."\(^3\)

That his orders were so inflexible is not certain. Adm. Brown, in his message to Capt. Victor McCrea regarding the latter's denial of the Ambassador's request, stated "your action approved...Decision to use beach or harbor belongs to the commander on the scene."\(^4\)

A similar incident occurred less than an hour later. President Chamoun telephoned McClinton to tell him that an Army coup was planned for that afternoon. When McClinton asked for Marines and tanks to guard the Presidential Palace as Chamoun had requested, Lt. Col. Hadd refused on the grounds that his troops were already overextended.\(^5\) The Ambassador then called Gen. Chehab and told him that "the most disagreeable consequences" would arise from any attempt at a coup. Gen. Chehab, not knowing that the Ambassador was bluffing, replied that he had tried to dissuade his officers before and that he would "recommend" to them that they stay the coup.\(^6\)

\(^1\)McClinton, "The American Landing in Lebanon," p. 70.
\(^2\)Shulimson, op. cit., p. 12.
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 13. Quoting Ambassador McClinton's message to Department of State, 15 July 1958.
\(^4\)Ibid., p. 14.
\(^5\)Hadd, op. cit., p. 84.
Gen. Chehab was able to stop the planned coup, but Ambassador McClintock has noted, "That these measures proved successful in no way diminishes the risk which was run, nor the possible consequences if, in fact, the President of Lebanon had been assassinated while the Marines had landed and, according to the traditional doctrine, had the situation well in hand."\(^1\)

Because of the controversy as to whether the Ambassador, as the personal representative of the President, was the senior officer present, Secretary Dulles sent a telegram: "In case of difference between the military commander and the local U.S. Diplomatic Representative in regard to political matters relating exclusively to Lebanon the views of the latter shall be controlling."\(^2\)

In Washington, contingency planning regarding the State Department's relation to the military in a Lebanon operation had been conducted by the Counselor's office.\(^3\) Since this office was very small (Counselor Reinhardt and one assistant) and operated on an ad hoc basis, two additional men were added as soon as intervention in Lebanon was decided upon. The Counselor's office became the focus of the State Department's liaison with the JCS and Secretary of Defense, dealing with questions of overflight rights and other political problems.\(^4\) President Eisenhower, on Secretary Dulles' recommendation,\(^5\) sent Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy to Lebanon on 16 July (D-day + 1) to be a political advisor to Adm. Holloway.\(^6\)

\(^3\)The Counselor's office was the forerunner of State's 7th floor Operations Center.
\(^4\)Reinhardt, G. Frederick, (Counselor, Department of State in 1958), Reinhardt Transcript, The Dulles Oral History Collection, The Princeton University Library 1967, p. 27.
\(^5\)Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 279.
\(^6\)Murphy, Dulles Oral History Transcript, p. 52.
THE MOVE INTO BEIRUT AND BUILDUP OF FORCES
IN THE LEBANON OPERATIONAL AREA

Adm. Holloway arrived at Beirut International Airport with the London
element of his Joint Staff at 0400 Beirut time on 16 July (D-day + 1) and went
directly to his command ship Taconic. The Taconic was barely ready for
Adm. Holloway, with Capt. McCrea disembarking as he came aboard. After
the Lebanon operation, it was Adm. Holloway's recommendation that, for the
near future, a suitable flagship should be ready in the Mediterranean at all
times for his quick embarkation.

Gen. Wade and Adm. Yeager arrived at Beirut at 0615 on the AGC Pocono
and joined Adm. Holloway on the Taconic. Landings of men and equipment
continued through the night of 15 July; by midday 16 July, there were approximately
5000 Marines in Lebanon. Marine Battalion Landing Team 3/6 landed at 0730
16 July and relieved BLT 2/2 of its airport position so that the latter could move
into the port area at 0930. When the port was secured, the Pocono and Taconic
were to move into the harbor.

Following Adm. Holloway's instructions, Gen. Wade left at approximately
0800 on 16 July to see Ambassador McClintock at the Embassy, stopping off at
the command post of BLT 2/2. Gen. Wade, on arriving at the Embassy, found
the Ambassador on the telephone with Gen. Chehab, both of them concerned
about possible Lebanese Army resistance.1 It should be recalled that Chamoun
had not consulted or even informed the military authorities about his request,
and many Lebanese officers tended to regard the landing as an invasion.2

The Ambassador, with some difficulty, persuaded Gen. Wade to postpone
the movement of his troops into the city. The two men then called on President
Chamoun, who urged immediate entry. On their return to the Embassy, the
Ambassador telephoned Gen. Chehab, who urged that the Marines hold up their
advance for another 30 minutes. Gen. Wade agreed to this request and ordered
Lt. Col. Hadd to begin his advance at 1030.

However, while Gen. Wade was with Ambassador McClintock, the Beirut
garrison formed a roadblock of tanks and artillery between the airport and the
city. Hearing of this, the General returned to his troops, passing through the
roadblock without interference. It was his opinion then that the Lebanese Army
would not fire, and the BLT began to move out at 1030. Just then, a Lebanese
captain approached Gen. Wade and Lt. Col. Hadd with information that the
Ambassador and Gen. Chehab were in conference; he requested that the Marines
wait 30 minutes more. Gen. Wade refused on the grounds that he had firm orders
to proceed without delay, but, when the Marine column came face to face with
the Lebanese Army roadblock, it became obvious that the latter was serious in
its suicidal stand, and Gen. Wade delayed the move until 1100.

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2Qubain, op. cit., p. 116.
Adm. Holloway arrived from his ship shortly thereafter and set out for the Embassy to consult with the Ambassador; he came upon the Ambassador and Gen. Chehab at the roadblock. The Ambassador, feeling the situation grow graver by the minute, had persuaded Chehab to accompany him to the roadblock in an effort to clear that impasse. A compromise solution was reached on the spot: A smaller force, escorted by Lebanese Army patrols, would move along the outskirts of Beirut to the port area. The Ambassador, Adm. Holloway, and Gen. Chehab then went to a nearby military school, which had a direct telephone link-up with the Lebanese General Staff, and Chehab persuaded his staff to halt its resistance. 4

President Chamoun has charged that the officers' resistance was clearly known to Gen. Chehab beforehand. 2 Gen. Chehab did, in fact, tell Ambassador McClintock later that he had known of a conspiracy against Chamoun but had no idea of its magnitude, that, on the morning of 16 July, he thought that perhaps a squad of rebellious troops had confronted the Marines, and was shocked to see the whole Beirut garrison there. 3 Fahim, Qubain, in his book Crisis in Lebanon, asserts that Chehab did, in fact, know that Col. Y. Shamit at Lebanese Army headquarters had given the order to fire if the American troops attempted to enter the city. 4 Ambassador McClintock has said that he suspected this at the time but, with the incident resolved and given the need for future Lebanese Army cooperation, he felt it unwise to press Chehab on this point. 5

Adm. Holloway assumed personal tactical command of the Marine column and, at 1230, with the Ambassador and Gen. Chehab in the lead car, the troops began their advance to the port area. By 1900 on 16 July (D-day + 1), the Marines had taken control of the port area, secured the bridges over the Beirut River, and furnished guards for the Embassy and the Ambassador's residence.

A second dangerous incident occurred on the morning of 16 July, when Company 4 of BLT 3/6 found its objective north of the airfield already occupied by a Lebanese armored detachment, which refused to leave. Fortunately, after BLT 2/2's confrontation with Lebanese troops was resolved, the commander of BLT 3/6 was able to settle these differences.

1The author has tried to reconstruct this incident accurately. For slightly different views see Qubain's Crisis in Lebanon, Ambassador McClintock's article and book, Shullimon's Marines in Lebanon 1958, Gen. Sidney Wade's article in the Marine Corps Gazette, Thayer's Diplomat, and President Chamoun's contribution to The Dulles Oral History Collection.

2Chamoun, op. cit., p. 18.


4Qubain, op. cit., p. 117.

5Personal interview with Ambassador McClintock, spring 1969.
Gen. Wade met with Gen. Chehab, 17 July (D-day + 2), to discuss cooperation between the Lebanese Army and the Marines. Gen. Chehab, who feared that continued Marine movement into the city would split his army, was especially concerned that American troop deployment might give the appearance of occupation forces.\(^1\) Gen. Wade acknowledged his concern and agreed to attach Lebanese officers immediately to his headquarters staff and to each of the Marine battalions.

These liaison officers proved extremely useful in developing a rapport between the two nations' military forces. For example, on 17 July (D-day +2), the Lebanese officer assigned to BLT 2/2 requested the two Marine companies guarding the bridges over the Beirut River and the eastern approaches to the city be withdrawn so that the Lebanese Army units already there could save face. After consultation with Embassy officials, this action was taken the same day; on 18 July (D-day + 3), it was agreed that the two Marine companies would be stationed further east of Beirut, but still close enough for a rapid response if danger arose in that sector.

The 6th Fleet continued its buildup in the eastern Mediterranean. The CAG Boston was in the Lebanon operating area on 15 July, and the CVA Essex and CVS Wasp arrived the following day. By the end of the day on 17 July (D-day + 2), 44 ships of the 6th Fleet (32 of them combatants, including CVA Saratoga, CVS Wasp and CA Des Moines) were operating east of 31 degrees E. longitude. Five more non-combatant ships entered the operational area on 18 July (D-day + 3), bringing the number there to 49. By this time, 70 ships of the 6th Fleet were in the eastern Mediterranean.\(^2\) On 23 July (D-day + 8), the 6th Fleet reached its peak strength east of 31 degrees E. longitude. On that day, 52 ships, including 33 combatants, were operating in the Lebanon operational area.\(^3\)

On 18 July (D-day + 3) COMSIXTHFLT, Adm. Brown, took his flagship, the Des Moines, into Beirut for a one-day conference with Adm. Holloway and then returned to the same general operating area as the CVA's (33 degrees N-33 degrees E). During the period of CINCSPECOMME activation, COMSIXTHFLT served as Commander American Naval Forces Specified Command Middle East (COMAMNAVFOR), as provided for in CINCSPECOMME Oplan 215-58.

Meanwhile, the troop buildup had continued at a rapid pace. BLT 1/8 landed 4 miles north of Beirut on 18 July (D-day + 3), and a Marine airlift carrying 1200 troops from Camp Lejeune, N.C. via Port Lyautey, Morocco, arrived later that day.

On 19 July (D-day + 4), the 1st Airborne Battle Group (TF Alpha), 187th Infantry, 24th Division, which had been stationed in Germany, landed at Beirut.

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\(^1\)Wade, _op. cit._, p. 14.
airport. The troop lift was staged through Incirlik AB, leased from Turkey, just outside Adana. Although it left Germany on 16 July, the force did not fly on to Beirut until 19 July (D-day + 4), following negotiations with the Lebanese government. TF Charlie, a support unit, was flown into Beirut on 20 July (D-day + 5), bringing the total force level to approximately 11,400 troops. TF Bravo, the second Battle Group in the Anglo-American Bluebat plan, was not sent but was kept on alert in Germany until 12 September (D-day + 59). A Pentagon spokesman announced that the Army troops were a reserve force and had no mission other than to await developments.²

With the arrival of U.S. Army troops, a problem of command arose. According to the Bluebat plan, the American general was to command the joint land forces, but since another American contingent had come in place of the British, Adm. Holloway was faced with the dilemma of two American brigadier generals of different services. In response to his request for an officer of higher rank, Maj. Gen. Paul Adams, U.S. Army, arrived in Beirut on 24 July (D-day + 9) to become Commander American Land Forces Specified Command Middle East. The increase in American troops brought other problems as well.

Adm. Holloway, who had moored the Taconic in Beirut harbor on 17 July, had left most of his CINCNELM staff in London under Rear Admiral Duerfeldt, Deputy CINCNELM. CINCSPECOMME Oplan 215-58 did not provide for a separate administrative staff, and the absence of such a staff proved unsatisfactory for the organization and functioning of the operation. Though temporary measures were successful, Oplan 215-58 was revised accordingly after the Lebanese operation.

Given the absence of British participation in Lebanon, CINCAMBRITFOR Oplan 1-58 was largely ignored. In fact, the operational plan for Bluebat was available to most commands in outline form only. On 16 July (D-day + 1), U.S. subcommanders were directed to follow CINCSPECOMME Oplan 215-58 for detailed American operations.

As mentioned earlier, Great Britain on 14 July anticipated an appeal from King Hussein, and took "certain precautionary moves" the following day.³ The British light cruiser Sheffield, already operating near Cyprus, sailed near the Lebanese coast. On 16 July (D-day + 1), CVA Eagle and light cruiser Bermuda sailed from Malta to join the Sheffield.⁴ On that same day, King Hussein requested military intervention from the United States and Great Britain.

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¹See the section on Air Operations for a further discussion of these airlifts.
King Hussein would have been happy with only token American participation. British troops had left Jordan in 1956, when King Hussein had abrogated the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty during the Suez crisis. Hussein obviously feared that intervention by Great Britain alone would look like re-occupation by a colonial power. Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, likewise, urged President Eisenhower to make the Jordan expedition an Anglo-American operation. The President refused, however, on the grounds that he did not have Congressional authorization to go into Jordan.\(^1\) On 17 July (D-day + 2), the British began an airlift of 2600 troops from Cyprus to Amman.\(^2\)

In other British actions, the Admiralty sent the commando carrier Bulwark from Mombasa, Kenya, on 16 July toward the Persian Gulf. When British troops were flown into Jordan, another brigade on Cyprus was held on 24-hour alert for a similar move to Sudan, but the second unit was never requested.\(^3\) Lest the Iraqi coup be repeated in Libya, the cruiser Bermuda and frigate Torquay put 400 Royal Marines ashore at Tobruk on 19 July (D-day + 4), to reinforce an infantry battalion that was already there under an existing Anglo-Libyan treaty.\(^4\) A brigade of troops was sent from Kenya to Bahrein and another brigade from Great Britain to Cyprus. The Royal Rhodesian Air Force flew a squadron of jets and 1-1/2 squadrons of transports to Aden, where they were attached to the RAF.\(^5\)

\(^1\)Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 279.
\(^2\)See the Air Operations section of this paper for a further discussion of the British airlifts to Jordan.
\(^3\)New York Times, 19 Oct 1958, p. 27.
LEBANESE REACTIONS TO UNITED STATES INTERVENTION

The 6th Fleet was well known in Lebanon; Beirut was a customary port of call. Moreover, units of the 6th Fleet had stood by in Beirut during the Jordanian crisis of April 1957.

When the United Front's anti-American press campaign began in earnest on 16 May 1958, the Front accused the United States of "secret movements of the 6th Fleet" and declared that "the people were not taken in by such intimidation and threats in the past" and would resist "this interference to the end."

Rumors of 6th Fleet intervention in May were widely believed by Jumblat's forces in the south, who also believed that Americans might be piloting the Lebanese Air Force planes being used against them.

Their alarm however, was not typical of Lebanon. For example, on 9 June, news agencies reported that major 6th Fleet units were in the eastern Mediterranean, but the only comment in the Beirut opposition papers was that there would be no American intervention in Lebanon because the United States feared the Soviet reaction. When the 6th Fleet did intervene, the following month, the opposition's reaction could best be described as stunned.

Although vehement in its denunciation of the landing, the opposition's actions in no way matched its previous threats. Of like importance was the fact that Gen. Chehab had, on 14 July, asked the rebel leaders not to take action in the wake of the Iraqi revolt.

Saeb Salam had told an American correspondent two weeks earlier: "You tell those Marines that if one Marine sets foot on the soil of my country, I will regard it as an act of aggression and commit my forces against them." After the landing, on 15 July, Salam announced: "We declare that we shall repel this aggression with all our strength and means, and we will appeal for help of all sorts from all free people in the world without discrimination." In fact, he did nothing of the kind.

The Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, who had some weeks earlier told the Ambassador that he would personally lead armed resistance to an American landing, confined his protest to a condemnatory telegram sent to Secretary-General Hammarskjold and President Eisenhower. In time, some opposition leaders would admit that the landing was beneficial, in that it speeded a resolution of the internal political conflict.

2 Murphy, Dulles Oral History Transcript, p. 49.
3 Shulimson, op. cit., p. 12.
The Lebanese Army held together; the desertion rate was no higher than before the landing. The bitterness in the officer corps subsided quickly after it became evident that American troops had not come to keep Chamoun in power. Chehab later told Ambassador McClintock that the landing had indeed foiled an army coup that had been scheduled for 15 July. Although the Iraqi Army's successful coup on 14 July was probably an influencing factor, the Army's planned coup apparently was independent of direction by the UAR or the opposition. In fact, some important officers seem to have questioned the latter's sincerity. A group of different officers, disgruntled with the Army's inaction, may have even planned to overthrow Gen. Chehab and suppress the opposition, but this plan never materialized.

President Chamoun and his supporters were, of course, jubilant at the landing; they soon became dismayed and openly bitter, however, because the American troops did not engage the rebels. Pierre Gemayel, the Phalangist leader, had "solemnly warned" against a "Lebanese Munich" and, to many of Chamoun's supporters, this is what was happening. According to Ambassador McClintock, many of the militant Christians believed that the sole purpose of the 6th Fleet's intervention was to squelch the Moslem opposition by a classic bombardment of the Basta. Chamoun himself wanted the Marines to move on the Basta. Instead of bombs, USAF aircraft on 21 July (D-day + 6) dropped a million leaflets over Lebanon with an explanation from President Eisenhower concerning the presence of U.S. troops.

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1 Hudson, op. cit., p. 114.
2 Qubain, op. cit., p. 83.
3 Middle East Mirror, 10 (8 June 1958), p. 9.
5 Copeland, op. cit., p. 203.
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INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE LANDING
AND THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE

According to Henry Cabot Lodge, the most difficult U.N. encounter the Eisenhower Administration faced "...not the most dramatic or the most publicized -- but the most complicated, arduous, the most difficult thing we ever had was the Lebanon crisis in 1958." 1 Joseph Sisco has said that there was a general feeling that "sufficient consideration had not been given to how this United States action could be defended politically." 2

Sisco and his associates, however, were able to convince Secretary Dulles that the U.S. should "make a simultaneous move in the U.N. at the very time that we were scheduled to land our Marines." 3 The U.S. strategy was to emphasize that we were responding to a specific request from the government of Lebanon and that the United States was "perfectly prepared to have the United Nations take over this role." 4

Therefore, the United States took the position that our landing had been in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and such U.N. statements as the "Essentials for Peace" and "Peace through Deeds" resolutions. Article 51 states:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Accordingly, Ambassador Lodge announced on 15 July that U.S. troops "... will be withdrawn as soon as the United Nations can take over." 5

Secretary Dulles had sent a message to Ambassador McClintock on 14 May, telling him that the circumstances of the moment would not allow intervention to fall under Section 2 of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which mentioned action by a Communist or Communist-directed outside power. 6 When President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, Waging Peace, said that "Our intervention would be a response ... in accordance with the Middle East Doctrine," 7 he probably had in mind the general aspect of the Doctrine, which was "the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East."

3 Ibid., p. 14.
7 Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 271.
The landing had repercussions throughout the world and immediately became the major issue at the U.N. Security Council. By going into Lebanon alone, the United States was able to dissociate itself from the French and British colonial tradition, and to have much more latitude in its diplomatic, as well as military, activity.

On 16 July, Ambassador Lodge formally submitted a draft resolution which called for a U.N. force to replace the American troops in Lebanon. Since many countries felt that we were legally justified in sending troops, but that it was desirable to get them out as soon as possible, the Lodge resolution was an integral part of the U.S. policy in the U.N.

It is interesting to note that Quincy Wright, in a detailed analysis of the American intervention in Lebanon, has concluded that its legal premises were inadequate. According to Wright, the U.S. charge of "indirect aggression" cannot meet the traditional interpretation of "armed attack," which Article 51 demands as justification for intervention. While he does not recognize the applicability of Article 51, Wright does grant that the invitation from the government of Lebanon was sufficient to legalize the intervention if President Chamoun's government was the de facto government of Lebanon. Since the rebels were in control of much of Lebanon, this point was certainly open to question. If, however, the United States could prove that the insurrection was primarily the result of subversive intervention from outside Lebanon, the American response to the de jure government's request would be legal under international law. The United States did, in fact, go to great lengths to detail the extent of UAR subversion in Lebanon, including a memorandum from Under-Secretary Herter.

Although President Eisenhower and his advisors did not believe that the USSR would be a serious threat, they did not treat the Soviet reaction lightly. Thus, when Secretary Dulles went to New York, he communicated immediately with the Soviet U.N. representative, Andrei Gromyko, to "...try to work out a formula for getting them (the Marines) out, that would solve the problem in the area and diminish the confrontation with the Soviet Union."

The Soviet Union had begun a vitriolic propaganda campaign in May, accusing the United States and Great Britain of sending their fleets to the eastern Mediterranean in preparation for a Marine landing in Lebanon. The propaganda attacks, however, often ended hopefully:

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"The leading USSR circles express confidence that no power will resort to interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon, no matter what form this interference might take, and that no power will permit the formation of a dangerous hotbed of war in the area."^1

The Soviets, according to their radio and press, appear to have been fully aware of the United States' capability to intervene in Lebanon, and of their own inadequacy in preventing such action.

After the Marines landed, Tass reported (16 July) that,

"The Soviet Government declares that the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to events creating a grave menace in an area abutting on its frontiers, and reserves the right to take the necessary measures dictated by the interests of peace and security."^2

The one possibly significant threat from the Soviet Union was that it would invade Iran if the United States invaded Iraq. The USSR carried on regularly scheduled maneuvers (but with more than usual fanfare) along the Turkish and Iranian borders and in the Black Sea, and airlifted troops from Odessa to Bulgaria. Both Turkey and Iran dismissed this activity as empty "saber rattling."

The Soviet inability to influence events by the threat of armed force became clearer on 19 July, when Khrushchev urged an immediate summit conference be held at any time and at any place, including Washington.^3 President Eisenhower replied on 22 July: "I am not aware of any factual basis for your extravagantly expressed fear of the danger of general war,"^4 and reminded Khrushchev that the USSR had broken off negotiations for a Berlin summit conference only a month earlier (16 June). Two more letters were exchanged between the two leaders. On 5 August, however, Khrushchev charged that the United States had wrecked all chances for a summit proposal and withdrew his support for a summit meeting.

Soviet propaganda during the Lebanon operation stressed that the U.S. buildup in Lebanon was intended for a larger operation in the Middle East, especially against Iraq. Western intervention in Lebanon and Jordan aroused Iraqi fears of a similar operation there and initially had the effect of moving Iraq's revolutionary government closer to the local Communist party and the USSR for support and protection.

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^1Tass, 18 May 1958.
^4Ibid., p. 229.
The coup in Iraq changed some countries' opinions about intervention in Lebanon. For example, Iran had previously warned that Western intervention in Lebanon would be unwise, even if U.N. action failed. However, Iran readily joined on 16 July (D-day+1) with the remaining Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact in giving strong public approval to the landing. Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Jordan all felt that Baghdad Pact intervention in Iraq was justified. King Saud of Saudi Arabia also privately urged intervention in Iraq. Turkey told the United States that it had decided to move into Iraq and asked for material and moral support, but the United States dissuaded the Turkish government from the move.

Perhaps the Lebanon operation had its most significant effect on President Nasser of the UAR. General Chehab told Ambassador McClintock that a number of Moslem sources had told him that Nasser was quite shaken by the swift and effective American military intervention. Deputy Under Secretary Murphy also felt, from his visit to Cairo, that the effect on Nasser personally was great. Nasser had been visiting President Tito in Yugoslavia when the landing occurred, and he immediately flew to Moscow before returning to the UAR. The inability of the Soviets to do anything for him became quickly and painfully clear.

Raymond Hare, Ambassador to Cairo during both the Suez and Lebanese crises, has said that in 1956 no doubt existed in Nasser’s mind that it had been the United States, not the Soviet Union, that kept France, the United Kingdom, and Israel from succeeding during the Suez war. Arab propaganda between 1956 and 1958, however, had emphasized and exaggerated the role of the USSR, and, if Nasser had not come to believe his own rhetoric, many other leaders and much of the population had. Egyptian propaganda stressed that "when the Western fleets steam in the Mediterranean, the Eastern fleets move, too, to maintain the balance of power"; the Soviets, however, remained in the Black Sea. In this context, the impact of the Lebanon operation was significant throughout the Middle East.

Perceptions of the 6th Fleet itself changed. To Nasser and to many other observers in the Middle East, the most obvious role of the 6th Fleet was to show the flag and exhibit rare shows of force. A typical view at this time was that "...the 6th Fleet’s main purpose in the Mediterranean is a political one, a threat directed at the Middle Eastern countries," but that it was an empty threat, mainly because of the Soviet Union:

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1Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 270.
2Ibid., p. 277.
3Murphy, Dulles Oral History Transcript, p. 49.
4Cairo Home Service, 24 June 1958.

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"As a 'conviner' the 6th Fleet and its attendant weapons suffer from two disabilities. It is far too large and imposing to allow its active participation in the "smallest little war" where it loses(sic) much of its value as an active factor for its very presence might provoke a large war for which it is inadequately equipped. Its super carriers and guided missile cruisers loose(sic) their capacity to impress by their very invitation to the Russians, spectacularly accepted by these to go one better; what with their intercontinental missiles and Sputniks the Soviets seem to have successfully stolen the 6th Fleet's thunder. In the process even the 6th Fleet's role as a somewhat blundering political and diplomatic weapon has been neutralized without the firing of a single shot."

Before the Lebanon landing, Nasser did not believe the United States capable of firm action. According to Ambassador Hare, after the landing, Nasser saw the 6th Fleet as a very real threat (backed by an American willingness to use it) and as a factor to reckon with in future foreign policy decisions. Nasser, it appears, perceived a definite threat of invasion during the Lebanon operation itself. He had a particularly adverse reaction to the U.S. note verbale of 17 July (D-day+2), which said, in part, that "...any attack on United States forces by military units of the United Arab Republic or under UAR control could involve grave consequences seriously impairing our relations." According to President Eisenhower, the Egyptians viewed the U.S. warning as an ultimatum.

The British troop buildup on Cyprus, the largest since the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956, when Cyprus and Malta had been used as staging grounds, sure enough was ominous note after British troops were flown from there to Jordan on 17 July (D-day+2). On 19 July, the UAR established a 30-mile "defensive zone" off Alexandria. After the British landed troops in Libya, Nasser deployed troops west of Alexandria against a perceived threat of attack from that territory.

Nasser flew to Syria on 21 July (D-day+6) and conferred with the command of the Syrian 1st Army on defense planning while the Syrian border was being strengthened. On 23 July, Alexandria and Latakia (Syria) were closed to night shipping. On 30 July (D-day+15), the UAR Foreign Ministry went so far

1. Ibid., p. 20.
3. Hisham Sharabi suggests that it may not be far-fetched to suppose that the U.S. intervention in 1958 was among the stimuli of the Egyptian belief that planes from the 6th Fleet intervened during the June War of 1967. "Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma," Pegasus, New York, 1969, p. 70.

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as to call in the West German, Italian, Ethiopian, Libyan, Tunisian, and Moroccan ambassadors to ask them what their position would be if the United States and the United Kingdom were to launch an attack on the United Arab Republic. 1

THE CONTINUING PRESENCE

Chehab later told the French Ambassador that, though our landing had saved his state, its catalyst had been the Iraqi coup, and that the intervention had taken place for larger strategic reasons. After the Iraqi revolution turned out to be a localized event, Chehab went on, the American forces found that their Middle Eastern theater had shrunk to the Basta, and they were confronted with a completely different problem. That problem, the Lebanese internal crisis, was resolved by joint military-diplomatic efforts.

General Wade, accompanied by the Airborne commander, Brig. General David Gray, met with General Chehab again on 21 July (D-day+6). Arrangements were made for the assignment of Lebanese officers to the airborne staff, and an agreement was made that integrated military police patrols composed of men from the Lebanese Army, the U.S. Army, the Navy, and the Marines, be formed. General Chehab also announced that he was placing Lebanese troops between the Basta and the American forces, to prevent clashes. 1

General Wade has noted that "The most unusual problem encountered in the Lebanon operation was that of the need to negotiate for objectives in lieu of seizing them." 2 American troops replaced some Lebanese troops in the guarding of supply routes and the American section of the city, ostensibly to relieve them for other duties. 3 The Lebanese troops, however, usually moved to another position that would put them between the rebels and the American troops. The Lebanese troops continued to maintain the status quo and, despite the American presence, did not make any serious attempts to crush the rebels, even in Beirut.

While the buildup in Beirut continued, other theaters and forces were active, but at a slower pace. On 19 July (D-day+4), the alert levels of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets were relaxed from 4 to 12 hours. The CVA Antietam and 2 chartered Victory ships had begun loading a Marine air group and regimental landing team (composed of 2 BLT’s) in Norfolk on 18 July (D-day+3) for duty in Lebanon; by the time the loading was completed on 21 July (D-day+6), however, a decision was made to send the force to Puerto Rico for maneuvers, instead. This was done because Adm. Holloway’s situation reports advised restraint for "acclimating the Lebanese to our presence," and because space ashore was becoming scarce. 4 More important, President Eisenhower had indicated that he was not in favor of further movements of sizable reinforcements to Lebanon.

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1 Wade, op. cit., p. 15.
2 Ibid., p. 19.
Similarly, the Department of State had the Army return its atomic weapons, which had been brought by ship from Germany. The Marines had their own tactical atomic capability, but this was left on board their ships. The Department of State also reversed the seaborne movement of BLT 3/3 from Okinawa to the Persian Gulf. Following the Iraqi coup, the JCS had recommended that a BLT be sent to the Gulf to guard against a possible Iraqi move into Kuwait or any other threats to friendly governments in the area. When it became obvious that the Iraqi coup was localized, State felt that such a move would only aggravate the delicate political situation in that area. Likewise, the British Foreign Office reversed the course of the commando carrier Bulwark, which was steaming toward the Persian Gulf from Kenya.

The area occupied by American troops in Lebanon was, itself, a small area, 20 kilometers at its base and extending 16 kilometers at its deepest point. The tactical posture was that of a regular military beachhead. There was a reconnaissance and security line in front of a main line of resistance (MLR), with reserves centrally located. The troops were prepared to converge inward as well as move outwards. U.S. military vehicles were confined to well marked main supply routes (MSR’s), which were patrolled 24 hours a day by American troops. Strong points were strengthened by tanks and troops when necessary.

Until the Marines began their withdrawal, the Army troops were kept in the airport area. Most of the Marines were also in this general area, although, as mentioned earlier, there were Marines stationed in the port area and north of the city from the beginning of the Lebanon operations. General Adams had established COMAMLANFOR headquarters at the American Community School – then in summer recess. The AGC’s Taconic and Pocono were in the harbor nearby.

The first American troops were granted liberty to go into Beirut on 9 August (D-day+25). As the American land forces lived under regular field conditions, including pup tents and C-rations, liberty was an important morale factor.

1 Twining, op. cit., p. 16.
4 Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 278. Similarly, the DD Holder - operating in the Strait of Tiran - was notified (17 July) that it need not stay out of sight of land; its presence was considered likely to stabilize the local situation. This action was not reversed.
Liberty, however, was limited to 15 percent of the American personnel daily, and was confined to the coastal area of Beirut (on the other side of town from the Basta). The fact that most American troops were kept out of sight resulted in minimal damage to national sentiments and made it easier for the opposition to accept their presence in Lebanon. Similarly, the bulk of British troops in Jordan were kept at the Amman airport, away from the city itself.

It should not be thought, however, that the American presence was never emphasized. Since no combat operations ensued, the political role of the United States forces became much greater and was carefully manipulated for maximum effect. For instance, the American troops were given strict orders not to fire unless fired upon and then only when the target could be seen. Even then, the troops usually held their fire, the result being that not a single Lebanese was killed by the American forces.

Not surprisingly, this led to troublesome sniping, until Ambassador Murphy called on Saeb Salam's subordinates. Murphy pointed out that though Admiral Holloway was a patient man, he could not, as a military commander, tolerate continued sniping. Surely, Murphy went on, the rebels understood that the Basta could be destroyed in a matter of minutes, and that Admiral Holloway could only be expected to impose "grave sanctions" if it continued. Murphy's warning had an immediate effect; the sniping dropped dramatically.

Similarly, Admiral Holloway insisted that the 3rd Medium Tank Battalion from Bremerhaven be landed, even though the military need had passed before they arrived on 27 July (D-day+12), because he felt that the display of armored might would impress the Lebanese. Armored teams made up of 2 to 3 tanks, 3 LVTP's, and an infantry platoon were occasionally deployed for shows of force. In addition, tanks were placed at major street intersections, when it was felt that their presence could dampen otherwise volatile segments of the population. On the other hand, American troops were kept out of the city when

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1. Wade, op. cit., p. 15.
5. Shulimson, op. cit., p. 31.
6. Ibid., p. 31.
it was felt that their presence would have the opposite effect, such as during the presidential inauguration on 23 September.1

The Lebanon operation is a good example of a situation in which an American troop presence was used selectively and judiciously, aided by close military and diplomatic cooperation. Despite their bad start, the military and diplomatic personnel developed a rapport which has been praised by both. CINCSPECOMME was given copies of all Embassy message traffic, Admiral Holloway and Ambassador McClinton jointly drafted many policy messages, and most of Ambassador McClinton's reports were dictated in the presence of the Admiral.2 Ambassador Murphy met daily with Admiral Holloway.3

Despite the presence of U.S. troops, however, Ambassador McClinton felt that a solution to the Lebanese crisis could not be forced, that it could best be resolved by negotiation. Robert Murphy, who arrived in Beirut on 17 July (D-day+2), soon accepted this view. Consequently, both men put their efforts into assuring that the Presidential election was held on 31 July, the scheduled date.4

As part of this effort, Murphy met with key figures in Lebanon:

18 July - General Chehab, Prime Minister Sulh, and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies
19 July - President Chamoun
20 July - Monseigneur Meouchy (Maronite Patriarch)
21 July - Abdallah Yafi (United National Front) and Henri Pharoan (Third Force)
22 July - Greek Orthodox Primate and the Greek Catholic Bishop of Beirut
23 July - Pierre Gemayel (Kaateb - Christian Phalangist Party)
25 July - President Chamoun and Kamal Jamblot (Druze opposition leader)
26 July - President Chamoun.

3Shullimon, op. cit., p. 33.
4Murphy, "Diplomat Among Warriors," p. 404.

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Murphy did not meet with the most extreme rebel leader, Saeb Salam, until 4 August, but Chamoun was, not surprisingly, upset that Murphy met with the opposition at all. During his meetings with the opposition, Murphy sought to convince them that the United States had not intervened simply to promote the political ambitions of one man, namely, Chamoun. 

When Murphy met with President Chamoun, on 19 July, the latter had not left his palace for 67 days. Murphy found him nervous and depressed. As time passed, Chamoun became quite bitter at the United States' restraint. Chamoun felt that, after his staunch anti-Nasser stand, his adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine, and words of support from the Western powers, the United States had betrayed him. Indeed, the United States threatened to withdraw its troops if Chamoun delayed the elections.

Foreign Minister Malik was perhaps even more disappointed in the performance of the U.S. forces, since he wanted the military operations in Lebanon to be part of a total Middle East operation, and said that if they were not, our action would be one of the greatest farces in history. At the very least, the foreign ministers, Chamoun, Malik, and Sulh, expected that the U.S. presence would enable them to sack General Chehab if he still refused to intensify his campaign against the insurrectionists. Both McCloy and Murphy, however, felt that Chehab's wide appeal made him the only acceptable compromise candidate. Consequently, McCloy told the Prime Minister that if trouble followed Chehab's dismissal, the use of American

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1Murphy, Dulles Oral History Transcript, p. 54.
2Murphy, "Diplomat Among Warriors," p. 400.
3"La pression Américaine étaient telle que l'amiral commandant la Sixième Flotte menaçait de retirer ses forces si le vote n'intervenait pas à cette date." ("The American pressure was such that the Admiral commanding the Sixth Fleet threatened to withdraw his forces if the election did not take place at that date.") Chamoun, Camille Crise au Moyen-Orient, Gallimard, Paris 1963, p. 428.
4Malik was less than perfectly discreet. Almost exactly the same wording appeared in an article written for an American magazine by "a top authority from the Middle East - a man who cannot be identified by name but who has been in close contact with developments in the current crisis." "Nasser and the Reds - Can They be Stopped?" U.S. News and World Report, 45 (1 August 1958), p. 50.

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troops was out of the question. Chehab finally agreed to run and was elected by an overwhelming vote (48 to 8) on 31 July, by the Chamber of Deputies that had been elected in 1957.

Murphy temporarily left Lebanon, on the eve of the election, to minimize the appearance of U.S. influence. While in the Middle East, Murphy visited Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, and Ethiopia (at Haile Selassie's request). His objective in these visits was to convince Middle Eastern leaders that the American landing was a stabilizing influence. Looking back, Murphy has said: "I think the impact of American force, the way it was used, on the Arab mind was one of the best things that we possibly could have done." In addition to Ambassador Murphy's efforts, the Voice of America tripled its broadcasts to the Middle East.

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2 Murphy, "Diplomat Among Warriors," p. 408.
3 Murphy, Dulles Oral History Transcript, p. 50
4 New York Times, 22 July 1958, p. 6
AIR OPERATIONS

American air power, both combat and logistical, was very important during the Lebanon operation:

First, air — rather than naval — attack was the main danger the U.S. forces faced during the Lebanon operation. The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean was minimal, Syria's navy was practically nil, and Egypt's submarines — which were a potential threat — and destroyers rarely sortied far from Alexandria. Both Syria and Egypt, on the other hand, were equipped with modern Soviet-built aircraft. Further, a Soviet air attack could be launched from the USSR or Bulgaria.

Second, aircraft were responsible for much of the troop buildup after the Marines had secured the Beirut airport. Furthermore, though the greater volume of materiel was sent by sea, aircraft were given the responsibility for much of the resupply of priority materiel.

This section is an examination of air activity during the Lebanon operation. Emphasis is placed on the period from 15 July, when the Marines landed, to 5 September, when Task Force 60 and the Saratoga left for Naples; during this period, 6th Fleet aircraft flew approximately 11,000 sorties of all types.¹

As mentioned earlier, there were 3 aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean on 15 July: CVA Saratoga at Cannes, CVS Wasp at Naples, and CVA Essex at Piraeus (Athens). Operation Bluebat had envisioned joint air support with the British for a Lebanon landing, with RAF planes flying air cover and 6th Fleet aircraft providing close air support during the actual landing. In anticipation, however, that British troops would have to be sent to Jordan to bolster King Hussein's government, a contingency not envisioned in the operational plan, U.S. aircraft, as well as troops, assumed the entire burden of the Lebanon operation.

CVA OPERATIONS

The Essex, at Athens 700 miles away, was the closest carrier and was given responsibility for air cover. Although the Essex sailed at least 4 hours before the rest of the 6th Fleet (15 July), its planes had to stage through Cyprus to reach Beirut. There is some dispute about their arrival time. The Captain of the Essex has stated that his planes were on station over Beirut by 1430, but the official time has been placed at about 15 minutes after the Marines landed.²

²Shulimson, op. cit., p. 40.
In his Project Recap, an after-action evaluation, CINCSPECOMME says that, given the improbability of armed opposition, the military risks involved were justified by the political necessity of landing the troops at 1500, before President Eisenhower's announcement that they had already done so. According to a member of the British training mission in Lebanon, however, "5 Lebanese planes in the air during the landing were ordered by an element of the Lebanese General Staff to attack the Marines, but refused on the grounds that the order had not come through their squadron commander." 1

By 17 July, all 3 carriers were on station southwest of Lebanon (33°N-35°E). On that day, more than 50 aircraft from the Saratoga and Essex flew a one-hour- and 10-minute low-level show of force over the west bank of Jordan before the first arrival of British troops.2 The Saratoga was alerted on 17 July (D-day + 2) for possible air evacuation of King Hussein; the alert was canceled the same day.

The British carrier Eagle, which had been in Malta when the crisis broke, operated between the American carriers and the coast of Israel to provide air cover for the British airlift to Amman.3 The Eagle operated there from 18 July (D-day + 3) to 23 July, after which it sailed to Cyprus waters.

On 18 July, 24 aircraft (12 from the Essex and 12 from the Saratoga) flew a show of force over Lebanon.4 Likewise, the Navy conducted a 2-hour flyover of Lebanon's major cities on 23 July (D-day + 8). This and other such flyovers during the Lebanon operation were billed as "a salute to the people of Lebanon." 5 As might be expected, air operations were most intensive during the first phase of the Lebanon operation. For example, the CVA's were on flight alert 24 hours a day for at least the first 10 days. In the first 20 days of air operations, there was a launch or a recovery every 90 minutes, day and night.

When both CVA's were on station, they often sent out a total of 250 sorties a day,6 although the modernized WW II carrier, Essex, was able to send out 148 sorties by itself during the critical move into Beirut on 16 July (D-day + 1).7 Together, the Essex and Saratoga passed the 3000-sortie mark by 3 August.8

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6 Newsweek, 11 August 1958, p. 17.
8 New York Times, 4 August 1958, p. 4.
During the period of CVA air operations, 15 July to 5 September, the Essex and Saratoga sent out 6985 sorties in support of the Lebanon operation, an average of more than 200 a day for the total time that both carriers were on station. Throughout the Lebanon operation, refueling of the aircraft carriers was done at night so as to minimize interference with air operations.

**CVA AIR OPERATIONS, 15 JULY TO 5 SEPTEMBER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Flying hours, day</th>
<th>Flying hours, night</th>
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<tr>
<td>Saratoga</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>7,452</td>
<td>1,424</td>
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<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>2,785</td>
<td>5,066</td>
<td>758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,985</td>
<td>12,518</td>
<td>2,182</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: COMCARDIV 6 to COMSIXTHFLT 061145Z, confidential, September 1958.

Throughout the period of air operations, the CVA task force generally operated near 33°N-33°E, but never in a compact group. Instead the 6th Fleet was deployed in a scattered formation, the "Haystack" mode, for protection against nuclear attack. Since the CVA's were operating away from Lebanon itself, CVA planes on missions over that country were directed from the Tactical Air Control Center aboard the AGC Pocono at Beirut, when they were within 60 miles of Beirut. At first, Army and Marine helicopters and Army light planes operated under COMAMMLANFOR without reference to the TACC, as did commercial, United Nations, and Lebanese military aircraft. Although the original plans called for separate air control by the services, the resulting confusion, the small size of Lebanon, and the need to coordinate RAF operations from Cyprus led to the transfer of U.S. air control to COMAMNAVFOR. (See map.)

The Beirut airport itself, already crowded with civilian, Lebanese military, and UNOGIL aircraft, quickly became saturated when land-based Navy patrol planes, Army and Marine helicopters, Army light planes, and Air Force transports became additional users. Had there been even minor combat operations, the need for additional air personnel, facilities, and more precise operating procedures would have been critical.

By 23 July (D-day + 8), the crisis had lessened to the point where the Essex was able to take a 3-day rest in the eastern Mediterranean, after which the Saratoga did the same. On 5 August (D-day + 21), the Navy announced that about half of the 6th Fleet, including the Essex, was heading for liberty ports in Turkey, Greece, and Italy. The Saratoga took a similar rest period when the Essex returned on station after a 9-day absence. On 20 August (D-day + 36),

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1 New York Times, 4 August 1958, p. 4.  
3 CINCSPECOMME, U.S. Specified Command Middle East, "Project Recap (U)," Secret, 7 November 1958.  
4 New York Times, 6 August 1958, p. 3.
NOTE: OUTLINED AREAS REFER TO AIR DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES

1 inch = 77 statute miles

Source: Air Operations in the Lebanon Crisis of 1958,
USAF Historical Division, Liaison Office

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the Essex left the eastern Mediterranean for a short port visit to Naples and then, with 4 destroyers, transited the Suez Canal on 28 August enroute to the Formosa Straits to strengthen the 7th Fleet, which was then involved in the Quemoy-Matsu crisis.\(^1\) No replacement for the Essex was sent to the 6th Fleet at the time.

On 26 August, Adm. Brown, who felt that the mobility and atomic striking capability of the 6th Fleet had been compromised, recommended to Adm. Holloway that he be allowed to operate as far west as the Tyrrhenian Sea. This request was granted and, on 5 September, Task Force 60 left for Naples. CVA's Forrestal and Randolph joined the 6th Fleet on 12 September to relieve the Saratoga, which left the Mediterranean on 21 September. The Randolph was in the Lebanon operational area from 23-25 September and sent aircraft over Lebanon to familiarize its pilots with the area.\(^2\) An operational visit to Beirut was canceled, however, lest it be misinterpreted; the Randolph went to Turkey instead.

**ASW OPERATIONS**

When the internal crisis in Lebanon first surfaced in May 1958, the CVS Wasp was operating on the East Coast of the United States. It was ordered to the Mediterranean, ahead of schedule, with its 7 Dealey-class ASW DE's. Wasp moved, with other major units of the 6th Fleet, into the eastern Mediterranean and made port calls at Soudas Bay (Crete) and Rhodes with CVA Saratoga. Its complement was approximately 50 ASW aircraft (S2F's and helicopters).

Having departed the eastern Mediterranean after the Lebanese internal crisis subsided in June, the Wasp was in Naples when the Iraqi revolution erupted on 14 July. The Wasp left Naples for the eastern Mediterranean the following day, and after passing through the Strait of Messina, slowed down to reduce the distance separating it from the Saratoga, which had sailed from Cannes. During the passage to the Lebanon operational area, the Wasp ran as much as 100 miles ahead of the Saratoga. Although the submarine threat during this transit was minimal, planes from the Wasp flew patrols around the Saratoga. It might be noted here that both CVA's, Saratoga and Essex, had a limited ASW capability, but the presence of the Wasp task force allowed them to devote their time to other air operations.

As soon as Wasp arrived in the operational area on 17 July (D-day + 2), it sailed directly to Beirut and offloaded a contingent of Marines. Later in the Lebanon operation, the Wasp also escorted a troopship from the middle of the Mediterranean to the operational area. For the first few days, the Wasp's 7 DE's operated near it; after that, however, they scattered, operating to a larger extent as separate units. Sometimes the DE's operated together to form submarine barriers. Generally, the Wasp held 3 DE's and sent out 4. The 4 searchers usually operated in conjunction with the Wasp's planes.

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\(^2\) *Middle East Mirror*, No. 10, (28 September 1958), p. 3.
During daylight hours, the Wasp operated as a distinct unit; at night, it was assigned to one of the CVA's, mainly to provide an emergency deck. Although the Wasp tried to maintain aircraft in the air around the clock, land-based P2V's also flew patrols around the carriers at night.

There were 2 VP (land-based patrol aircraft) squadrons in the Mediterranean, each comprising 12 P2V's. VP 10 was at Port Lyautey, Morocco, and VP 21 at Sigonella, Italy. VP 21 had already moved to a semi-permanent staging base at Malta when the Marines landed in Lebanon on 15 July. The following day, VP 21 flew to Soudas Bay (Crete), and VP 10 flew to Malta. On 17 July (D-day + 2), in deference to the Greek government's sensitivity over use of its airspace, P2V squadrons were ordered not to fly out of Soudas Bay unless a serious submarine threat evolved. That day, 3 of the aircraft flew to Beirut (all that could be accommodated), and the rest of VP 21 flew back to Malta. After the Army trooplift to Lebanon had passed through Adana, Turkey, 6 planes from VP 21 flew there and conducted daily patrols after 21 July (D-day + 6). VP 10 continued to fly patrols between Malta and Port Lyautey.

The submarine threat was minimal during the Lebanon operation; no submarines were found in the eastern Mediterranean. A destroyer and submarine patrolled the area around Alexandria, but the Egyptian submarine activity was almost nil.

During the Lebanon operation, the Wasp took 2 long rests in August and then left the Mediterranean in the middle of September without a replacement. Whenever the Wasp left the operational area, it was replaced by a single P2V and 2 destroyers. Had there been a serious submarine threat, the land-based facilities alone would have been inadequate. When the Wasp was withdrawn in September for duty on the East Coast (its tour in the Mediterranean had already been extended), Adm. Holloway had space at the Beirut airport to accommodate only 6 more P2V's as a replacement.

AIR FORCE OPERATIONS

As provided in the operational plan for a Lebanon operation, a TAC Composite Air Strike Force consisting mainly of F-100's and B-57's from the United States, flew to Incirlik AB, Turkey (230 miles north of Beirut and 460 miles from the USSR). In 1965, TAC had been given the mission of setting up a rapid-response "theater deployment" force for peripheral or brush-fire wars. Since the Department of State had vetoed earlier Air Force deployment to Adana as potentially provocative, the Lebanon operation provided a real test for TAC's Composite Air Strike Force. TAC's reaction time was slower than expected; in all fairness, however, it should be recognized that these aircraft had to fly 6400 miles to get there.

Two squadrons of F-100 D/F's at Cannon AFB, New Mexico, had been assigned for the move to Turkey but could not take off with full loads because

\footnote{Braestrup, op. cit., p. 26.}
of runway construction. Instead, 2 squadrons from Myrtle AFB, South Carolina, were ordered to Turkey. However, these squadrons had no over-water or night refueling experience and of the first squadron (12 planes), sent on 15 July, only 4 planes made it nonstop to Adana by 16 July. On 17 July (D-day + 2), 8 of the second 12-plane groups made it to Adana, although all had to stop at Chateauroux, France, and Wheelus AB, Libya, because tankers were unavailable. Bad storms snarled the refueling; the assigned KB-50J tankers could not fly above the weather.

The follow-up jets for the TAC force had to be held in France until the saturation, caused by the USAFE (United States Air Force Europe) trooplift from Germany, subsided at Incirlik AB. By 20 July (D-day + 5), the full complement of 26 planes had reached Adana. The 12 assigned B-57’s, left Langley AFB, Virginia, on 15 July, two-and-a-half hours before the first fighters got off. However, because of mechanical and communications difficulties, 8 were forced to land at Ernest Harmon AB, Newfoundland. The first 2 B-57’s finally reached Adana on the morning of 17 July; the rest arrived by the end of 17 July. The B-57’s also made a scheduled stop at Chateauroux, France.

By the end of 18 July (D-day + 3), there were 33 TAC combat aircraft in Adana (out of 54 committed) plus 2 TAC C-130’s. Forty other logistical aircraft were being held enroute, in Europe, until the saturation at Adana could clear.

Incirlik AB reached saturation on 16 July (D-day + 1). For this reason a USAFE airlift of 198 sorties bringing a support task force for the Army Battle Group had to be held in Europe after its first 7 planes reached Adana. The airlift was resumed on 19 July (D-day + 4), when the Battle Group flew from Adana to Beirut, following negotiations with the Lebanese government. TAC fighters from Adana provided air cover for this flight.

Originally, USAFE planned to send combat aircraft to Turkey, but the TAC force from the United States was substituted, because of the possibility of a spread of hostilities to Europe. Similarly, TAC was directed to use its own transports -- instead of MATS -- wherever possible, against the possibility that the Army Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), in the United States, might have to be airlifted.

Although the operational plan for a Lebanon operation recognized the improbability of atomic warfare, all component forces were nonetheless ordered by the JCS to maintain that capability. This requirement was waived for TAC, however, since the 6th Fleet already had the capability. Had the TAC been required to maintain such a capability, the additional aircraft, personnel, and support material would have placed an even greater strain on Adana's facilities. In its after-action report, the 19th Air Force noted that the Lebanon operation had been the "lightest requirement" and that the problems and deficiencies would have been greatly magnified in a "graver situation."\(^1\)

As provided in the operational plan, a SAC medium bomber wing was earmarked for CINCSPECOMME operations. On 15 July, SAC was ordered into an "improved readiness condition" and SAC tankers were deployed to a forward position. This was done openly; President Eisenhower wanted our determination to be clearly known.\(^2\) By 20 July (D-day + 5), much of SAC was on 15-minute alert,\(^3\) remaining in this posture throughout July.\(^4\)

**OVERFLIGHT PROBLEMS**

When the Marines had secured the Beirut airport, the Army Battle Group in Germany was sent to Beirut by way of Adana. Initially the C-130's flew over Austria to Italy, and then continued to Adana. The C-119's and C-124's followed the longer route of Marseilles, Naples, Athens, Adana. Austria, however, closed her airspace to all military overflights on 17 July (D-day + 2). Austria took this action even though the Austrian Foreign Minister expressed full approval and understanding of the U.S. action on 15 July.

It had been assumed that where overflight rights in support of a CINCSPECOMME operation were not granted, they would be ignored.\(^5\) The United States continued to overfly Austria until 20 July (D-day + 5),\(^6\) when the American Ambassador in Vienna reported that the continuation of unauthorized overflights would weaken seriously our moral and propaganda position, and after the Defense Minister of Austria announced that the Austrian Air Force had orders to shoot down "any intruding military aircraft."\(^7\) The Swiss government had denied a U.S. request for use of its airspace on 15 July and 16 July,\(^8\) and virtually closed it on 17 July (D-day + 2) by requiring 4 days' notice for all military overflights.

\(^1\) Burch and Little, *op. cit.*, Secret, p. 79.
\(^8\) *New York Times*, 26 July 1958, p. 3.
More serious was the partial closure of Greek airspace on 16 July (D-day + 1). Fortunately, the airborne Battle Group had left Germany that morning and was able to land at Adana the same day. The Greek government announced: "We shall observe all the obligations springing from our friendship to the United States, short of acting in hostility against the Arabs," but also announced that requests for use of air bases would be denied unless NATO was involved. The Greek government, in 1958, was bitter at its NATO allies because of Cyprus. In the Greek campaign for Cypriot independence, Foreign Minister Averoff had just finished conferring with Presidents Tito and Nasser when the American landings began.

On 17 July, Greece restricted landings at Athens to westbound traffic only and required 48 hours' notice. Later that day, Greece refused all except emergency landings; high overflights were permitted. Overflights per se were of relatively little value, since refueling at Athens was urgently required. On 20 July (D-day + 5), eastbound traffic was granted permission to land at night, at airfields other than Athens; mass flights, however, were prohibited.

Wheelus AB, Libya, was unexpectedly swamped when many aircraft had to take this longer — but open — route to Beirut. Italy was a key country on this route. Moreover, maximum usage of the C-119's in Europe was not possible when the shorter route was closed, necessitating a request, 18 July, that the number of C-124's in Europe be increased by one-third (from 36 to 54). Spain and Portugal were two of the most cooperative countries. They quickly gave full approval for the staging of troop airlifts from the United States through their countries.

On the other hand, the most erratic response came from Israel. King Hussein of Jordan requested Western intervention on 16 July, and an airlift of British paratroopers left Nicosia, Cyprus, for Amman very early on the morning of 17 July (D-day + 2). The airlift was forced to turn back while airborne, because Israel had not yet granted clearance for overflights. Before granting permission, the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, called President Eisenhower, 0230 EDT (0830 local time), to make sure that the United States backed the British move to Jordan. The first contingent of 300 paratroopers began arriving at Amman 0930 local time, 7 hours after the airlift had returned.

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3 "Where They All Stand," The Economist, 188 (26 July 1958), p. 273. Permission for overflight privileges is still difficult to receive. The present Greek government restricted U.S. military overflights during the June War of 1967 to evacuation flights only.
4 Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 279.
to Cyprus. The first phase of this airlift took 18 hours longer than originally planned. The airlift (approximately 2600 men) was completed on the afternoon of 18 July. During the airlift, British fighters from Cyprus and, later, from the British aircraft carrier Eagle provided an escort for the troop planes.

Jordan faced a critical shortage of oil almost immediately after the coup in Iraq. The United States and Britain decided to satisfy Jordan's emergency needs by a U.S. airlift of FOL from the British base at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf via the American air base at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Faisal refused permission for the FOL overflight, however, and it was decided to fly the oil from Beirut instead. "In an extreme emergency it might have become necessary to ignore the Saudi Arabian decision." 2

Israel did grant clearance for this airlift from Beirut, but only if flown above 14,500 feet; this meant that C-119's, which would have been more economical on this shorter run, could not be used. 3 Thirteen C-130's from the support task force being held in Adana were diverted to help 17 C-124's, then in Beirut, complete this airlift.

The British requested American aid for a second airlift of supplies from Cyprus, to run from 24 July to 1 August. Israel granted clearance for this overflight, although it had requested on 22 July (D-day + 7) that the British find another route to Jordan. 4 No other route was open. The Israelis complained that the flights had been disorderly and had lasted too long.

On 28 July (D-day + 3), the British requested American aid for an indefinite cargo lift to run after 1 August. The JCS, however, authorized one until 6 August only, since there were not enough transports for a continuing lift. Plans were made in the full expectation that Israel would continue permission for overflights. On 3 August, however, Israel denied permission. 5 On 4 August, Israel announced that it would be constrained to fire on U.S. and British planes if they continued to overfly Israel. 6 On 5 August, Israel opened her air space for night overflights, but for 5 days only, and then closed it again. 7

Israel's behavior is difficult to understand, since its government was fully aware that the survival of the existing regimes in Lebanon and Jordan was to its advantage. Ben-Gurion declared publicly that Israel feared encirclement by

1 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 26 July-2 August, 1958, p. 16308.
2 Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 280.
Nasser\(^1\); on the night of 14 July he had urged that the United States take “forthright action” in the Middle East.\(^2\) A possible explanation for Israel’s behavior may be traced to the Sinai campaign of 1956. The consequences of that campaign, in which the Israelis played a key role, had left them with little appetite for further involvement with great powers. Moreover, Israel’s continuing effort to improve relations with the Third World had suffered as a consequence of its participation in the Sinai campaign. Finally, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion found it necessary to mollify leftists in his coalition government.

Sudan banned British military overflights on 20 July.\(^3\) On 1 August, Sudan gave the United States permission for aircraft “not on military missions” to overfly that country at high altitude and with no attempt to contact any control towers. An air resupply from the Pacific would have been even more difficult because Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia blocked all access to Lebanon and Jordan from the east, except for Jordan’s port of Aqaba. In addition, India was adamantly against the Lebanon operation, and, on 29 July, Ceylon served notice that no military overflights would be allowed over its territory.

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\(^3\)New York Times, 22 August 1958, p. 3.
LOGISTICS

Bluebat envisioned a joint military transportation board (JMTB), but none was established. In his after-action report, CINCSPECOMME stated that a board should have been created, both to improve coordination of logistical activities and to relieve the operational commanders of administrative tasks. As mentioned earlier, American planes flew a large share of the British supplies and operated the POL airlift from Beirut to Amman. American port, transportation, and oil-handling experts were also sent to Aqaba.¹

Though resupply was automatic, the fact that the land forces alone drew their logistical support from many, widely separated organizations strengthens CINCSPECOMME's recommendation that one command, such as CINCUSAREUR, should oversee logistical support in future operations.

Fortunately, detailed plans had been developed in November 1957, had been tested during the alert of May 1958, and were closely followed. Pre-stocking - in expectation of a Middle Eastern crisis, by the Army at Livorno, Italy, by the Air Force at Adana, Turkey, and by the Marines in North Carolina - proved valuable.

POL usage, however, was greater than anticipated, for both the Navy and Air Force. At Incirlik AFB, the high consumption of aviation fuel made resupply a critical problem, even though the pipeline from Yumurtalik was used to capacity and fuel was trucked from Iskenderun.

³ Similarly, the carriers' sustained air operations greatly increased the Navy's consumption of aviation fuel. The increased size of the 6th Fleet itself (about 70 percent larger than normal in August) placed an added strain on POL resupply. CINCSPECOMME, in his after-action report, noted that "a critical shortage would have resulted if full scale combat operations had ensued."² Adm. Holloway, in fact, felt that the shortage of POL was critical whenever the Fleet operated in the eastern Mediterranean, both because of the shortage of oilers and because supply depots were few. In this regard, he recommended greater use of indigenous supplies and establishment of NATO Common Infrastructure POL storages at Soudhas Bay, Crete. There were some shortages of certain types of ammunition; increased storage space was built in Spain afterward to remedy this situation.

The Military Sea Transport Service first diverted 15 of its cargo vessels to resupply the Lebanese operation; it soon had to lease 27 commercial vessels.³ Resupply by MSTS was satisfactory throughout the operation. Air resupply, on the other hand, founedered on the problem of overflight rights.

Further, had the Quemoy-Matsu crisis flared up at the same time (instead of a month later), "both TAC and MATS might have found their resources either

inadequate or seriously strained.\textsuperscript{1} During the Lebanon crisis, the Military Air Transport Service tried to contract aircraft from private airlines, but these refused without a declaration of national emergency,\textsuperscript{2} probably because it was the height of the summer tourist season.

There was also a serious shortage of landing space.\textsuperscript{3} In Lebanon itself, Beirut International Airport, the largest and most modern in the Middle East, quickly became overcrowded.

Similar problems were encountered in the port area. The Beirut Harbor became saturated and, had the operation been opposed, would have become a serious bottleneck. Too much reliance was placed on indigenous labor in unloading and, in Adm. Holloway's judgment, the rate could not have met the requirements of a combat situation. The fact that there were no actual combat operations even became a negative factor, in that combat supplies were not used up.\textsuperscript{4} Space, naturally, was a problem, and the storage of so much unused ammunition in the heart of the city was dangerous.

The Marines, adhering to their traditional role as a striking force, landed with only 30 days of combat supplies. Initially, Marine rifle companies were pulled off the line to handle supplies.\textsuperscript{5} The Marines soon formed a Logistical Support Group from the support elements of the 3 BLT's in Lebanon. They were given valuable logistical aid by the Army Logistical Command, which had been brought into Lebanon to support 2 Army battle groups.\textsuperscript{6} Troop replacements were no problem, since the Marines were at 3 times their normal 6th Fleet strength and the crisis never reached the proportions feared and only one of the 2 Army battle groups planned came from Germany.

Regarding units of the 6th Fleet itself, all regular maintenance had to be suspended during the Lebanon operation. The Amphion, a repair ship, was deployed with an ocean-going tug to the 6th Fleet for the amphibious ships and other heavy units, while the regular 6th Fleet tender was used primarily for destroyer repairs. The CINCHEL Annual Report concludes that, if the Amphion had not been deployed to the Mediterranean, the 6th Fleet tender could not have kept up with essential repairs.\textsuperscript{7} Indeed, COMDEASTFOR's (11 August) request for another destroyer east of the Suez Canal was denied by Adm. Brown, largely because the extended operations in the Lebanon area had resulted in a serious backlog of necessary repairs.

\textsuperscript{1}Burch and Little, \textit{op. cit.}, Secret, p. 80.
\textsuperscript{2}Braestrup, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{4}Wade, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{5}Braestrup, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{6}Of the Army troops, 47 percent were in Logistics, in contrast to 17 percent of the Marines. Shulimson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{7}The reasons were the Fleet's increased size (over 80 ships in August) and the pressures associated with a crisis operation.
UNCLASSIFIED

As a result of the burden that the extended operations placed on the 6th Fleet, CINCLANTFLT recommended (October 1958) that, in addition to the existing 2nd and 6th Fleets in the Atlantic Fleet, a third numbered fleet (to be called the 4th Fleet) be formed. This plan contemplated the periodic rotation of the 3 fleets for duty in the Mediterranean as integrated forces, in place of the rotation of individual ships into the 6th Fleet. One fleet would be relatively inactive, undergoing necessary shipyard work, while the other two operated in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. It is not surprising that this expensive suggestion was not accepted. For a time, CNO was led to believe that no additional funds would be allotted to the Navy budget for the Lebanon operation.

1New York Times, 26 October 1958, p. 34.
2Robert Murphy has estimated the total cost of the Lebanon operation at $200 million. Murphy, "Diplomat Among Warriors," p. 409.

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(REVERSE BLANK)

UNCLASSIFIED
COMMUNICATIONS

Adm. Brown had complained about the inadequacy of communications space in the Fleet flagship, Des Moines, as early as June 1957. His problem was symptomatic of the general communications condition.

Even before the Lebanese crisis broke out, Navy facilities in Washington were handling 40,000 messages a week, far above the peak Korean War load. Classified message traffic alone was running 50 percent heavier than in 1957. Nonetheless, the Navy's personnel reduction of FY-1958 had cut communications personnel by 12 percent.1

Although Minimize (restrictions on all non-essential messages that would ordinarily be transmitted electronically) was immediately imposed, the message backlog quickly reached gargantuan proportions. For example, a COMSIXTHFLT Priority Sitrep issued one hour after the landing took 10 hours to reach CNO. Top Secret message traffic increased 500 percent, and Secret traffic increased 92 percent. In an attempt to speed their own messages, many unit commanders over-rated them, thereby nullifying Minimize. Few messages carried lower than a Priority precedence.

The shortage of qualified communications personnel was critical at both ends. Although the Bureau of Naval Personnel, through its "Augment East" program, sent additional personnel, their unfamiliarity with the specifics of CINCSPECOMME Oplan 215-58 severely limited their contribution during the critical early stages of the Lebanon operation. In both CINCSPECOMME Oplan 215-58 and CINCAMBRITFOR Oplan 1-58, the communication plans were not standard operating procedure, and their high classification prevented many people from becoming familiar with them. Although the Air Force and the Army provided qualified personnel, these proved insufficient and Adm. Holloway was forced to request additional communications personnel from CNO. Although there were instances of inadequate communications facilities -- neither the Des Moines, Taconic, nor the relay station for the Persian Gulf was adequate -- the lack of qualified personnel appears to be the main reason for the failure of Minimize.

1Lott, op. cit., Secret, p. 98.
WITHDRAWAL

On 31 July (D-day + 16), the day that 1800 reinforcements arrived in Beirut, Secretary of State Dulles announced that the withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon would begin as soon as the Lebanese government requested it. The credibility of the Secretary's statement was not helped when 2200 more troops reached Beirut by ship from Bremerhaven, 3 days later. Adm. Holloway explained that these were chiefly support troops and were simply part of the "pipeline" of the original force. They were, but many Arabs did not believe this. By 8 August (D-day + 24), U.S. forces in Lebanon were at a peak strength of 14,357 men (8515 Army, 5842 Marines).

On 5 August (D-day + 21), Adm. Holloway was ordered to begin planning for withdrawal. President-Elect Chehab, however, was in no hurry to see the American troops go, and said that the Moslem leaders felt the same way. Most of the Moslem leaders were aware that the United States had pressed Chamoun to hold elections, and, for the time being, troop withdrawal was not an immediate issue. Murphy nonetheless believed it might be possible to withdraw troops and still avoid a heavy U.N. buildup, and Adm. Holloway convinced Chehab of the political advantages of at least a symbolic withdrawal. Chehab wanted no more than a token withdrawal though, until the security situation improved.

The Security Council held its third meeting on 7 August. Both the United States and the Soviet Union called for an emergency session of the General Assembly. A meeting was held on 8 August, with a second meeting set for 13 August to allow various delegates to arrive. On 12 August, Adm. Holloway announced the withdrawal of Marine BLT 2/2, beginning on the following day. This force did not withdraw immediately from the eastern Mediterranean, but stayed as a "floating reserve." Adm. Holloway decided to withdraw the Marines first, since he did not favor their continued use as a static - rather than striking - force. The withdrawal was meant to coincide with the meeting of the General Assembly to show the world that the United States was withdrawing - not building up - its forces in Lebanon before an official Lebanese request. The USSR had said:

1 New York Times, 4 August 1958, p. 4.
2 Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 286.
3 Shulimson, op. cit., p. 34.
4 Murphy, "Diplomat Among Warriors," p. 408.
6 Shulimson, op. cit., p. 34.
7 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 11-18 October 1958, p. 16441.
8 Shulimson, op. cit., p. 34.
"However, in all cases we know of American troops staying on foreign territory, there is not a single case of the Americans leaving any one of them of their own free will."  

According to Andrew Cordier, the U.N. staff felt that the Lebanese crisis was already settled when the Marines landed on 15 July. "Agreement had been reached between and among the parties on Sunday, 2 days before the Marines came in on Tuesday, and, therefore, the task from that moment on had to be on what means to get the Marines out."  

UNOGIL grew rapidly after the landing, probably because of the fear of international conflict. Interestingly enough, it grew most after the crisis was on the downturn, as indicated in the following data.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of observers</th>
<th>25 Jun 94</th>
<th>15 Jul 113</th>
<th>10 Aug 190</th>
<th>20 Sep 287</th>
<th>Oct Not available</th>
<th>14 Nov 591</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of permanently manned stations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>Number of vehicles</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of air sorties per month</td>
<td>15 Jun</td>
<td>160 Jul</td>
<td>210 Aug</td>
<td>317 Sep</td>
<td>305 Oct</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On 18 August, President Chamoun said that he saw no prospect of asking for a U.S. withdrawal before he left office on 23 September. On 23 August, he told Ambassador McClintock that he would be willing to make secret arrangements whereby American troops could stay in Lebanon. On 5 September, he said American troops should remain indefinitely, so that the United States would have a foothold in the Middle East. On the same day, President-Elect Chehab asked the Ambassador if a second Marine battalion could be withdrawn to shake up the more fanatic pro-Chamoun elements. The United States went further and began the withdrawal of 2 more Marine battalions on 14 September. The external factor at this time was minimal. On the night of 25 August, Lebanese Army trucks had even transported the Syrian forces in the Basta back to their own border.

The internal crisis flared again, however, when a journalist of the Phalangist Party was murdered on 19 September. In response, the Phalangists called a general strike, which was far more paralyzing than the United Front's earlier strike, since the principal business and financial enterprises of Beirut were owned by Christians. The opposition now became those who had earlier been described as the government forces. On 20 September, the United States secretly flew Prime Minister Sulh, at his request, to Turkey.

President Chehab, inaugurated on 23 September, aggravated the crisis when he appointed Rashid Karami, the rebel leader from Tripoli, as his Prime Minister. Karami formed a Cabinet of moderate members of the former opposition and the Third Force. While it is hard to believe that Chehab really thought the Karami Cabinet was a Cabinet of reconciliation, as he told McClintock, it should be noted that on 5 September he had offered Chamoun a hand in selecting the Cabinet, and the latter had refused.

With 2 armed camps in Beirut, the impasse grew more serious as large numbers of Chamoun's partisans gathered at his mountain retreat to call for action against the new government. Chehab held Chamoun responsible for the long duration of the crisis and for the failure of the 2 sides to find a solution. Chamoun could hardly have been expected to be happy with the turn of events.

On 27 September, Prime Minister Karami and his Foreign Minister urged Ambassador McClintock to speak with leaders of both factions. The following day, Pierre Gemayel called on the Ambassador with a similar request, suggesting a "peace without victory" solution. Accordingly, the Ambassador

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3Ibid., p. 33, Secret.
assembled the Phalangist leaders and members of Karami's group at his residence on the night of 30 September, but Karami himself withdrew at the last minute. Nevertheless, the meeting was very important because it drew together important figures from the 2 opposing groups for the first time since the crisis had begun.

Unfortunately, the clashes continued. As a last resort, President Chehab tried to set up a military cabinet but failed (9 October) when Karami's own street mobs forced him to back down on resigning, as he would have had to do for this plan to succeed.

Although the initial Lebanese crisis moved into a new phase, Ambassador McClintock suggests that the continuing presence of the American troops did much to dampen the explosive situation in Beirut. For example, American tanks rumbled through Beirut streets on the night of 8 October and into the late evening of 9 October, in an attempt to deter violence between the 2 factions.

Efforts at settlement were given a needed boost when, on 10 October, the Lebanese trade unions called for a general strike. The specter of this calamity, aided by an all-day effort at mediation (Karami, Gemayel, Chehab, and McClintock met together) led to a solution that night. Under a "no victor--no vanquished" settlement, Karami remained as Prime Minister but invited Gemayel into his new cabinet. The country began to return to normal immediately and, on 17 October, the Chamber of Deputies (still unchanged from 1957) gave the new government a unanimous vote of confidence.

The last Marines in Lebanon commenced re-embarkation on 28 September (D-day + 75), and sailed from Beirut on 1 October, leaving 7500 Army troops in Lebanon. On 4 October, the Army began its withdrawal of combat troops. Secretary Dulles had said on 9 September, "I don’t think that the developments, as yet, indicate a total withdrawal at any date which we could now fix." A month later, on 8 October, the United States unilaterally announced its intention to leave Lebanon by the end of the month, "barring unforeseen developments."

On 9 October, Adm. Holloway and Adm. Ekstrom, who had relieved Adm. Brown as COMSIXTHFLT on 30 September, reviewed their withdrawal plans with Prime Minister Karami.

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1 New York Times, 1 October 1958, p. 11.
7 Middle East Mirror, 10 (12 October 1958), p. 7.
The replacement force (BLT 2/6) for the 6th Fleet was sent directly from the United States to Beirut as a "reserve force" during the final stages of withdrawal. While at Beirut, 29 September - 18 October, its Marines remained billeted on their ships and went ashore for liberty only.¹

Gen. Wade and Adm. Yeager left Lebanon in early October. On 18 October, the Department of State authorized the dependents of U.S. officials to return to Lebanon. Adm. Holloway left Lebanon on 22 October, and the military operation in Lebanon was closed on 25 October.

U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon was linked to the British withdrawal from Jordan, ² and for this reason the Department of State rejected Ambassador McClintock's request that the United States withdraw its troops from Lebanon by 15 October. The United Kingdom announced on 1 October that it would begin withdrawal on 20 October.³ After U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjold negotiated with the UAR and Great Britain, the UAR agreed on 11 October to let British planes overfly Syria on their return to Cyprus. After a test flight on 24 October, ⁴ the airlift was begun in earnest the following day; it lasted through 29 October. On 27 October, the 6 RAF fighters that had been stationed in Amman flew back to Cyprus.⁵ The last British troops left Jordan on 2 November from Aqaba.

Although the resumption of completely normal operations by the 6th Fleet was not ordered until 1 December 1958, the Fleet had, in effect, returned to normal operations on 5 September (D-day + 52) when the entire Attack Carrier Striking Force (Task Force 60) left the Lebanon operational area for central Mediterranean ports. The only restrictions on the 6th Fleet's movements from the Marine withdrawal until the Army completed its withdrawal were that one carrier group would operate east of 13 degrees E (Naples), one amphibious force east of 5 degrees E (Marseilles), one amphibious force east of 20 degrees E (Benghazi), and 2 destroyers on the EASTMED patrol, with one in the Beirut area. Naval gunfire support was withdrawn from Beirut itself on 1 October.

² "The Lebanese Muddle," The Economist, 18 August 1958, p. 381.
⁵ "Review of Events in the Middle East," Army Quarterly and Defense Journal, 78, April 1959, p. 28.
The alert for Atlantic and Pacific Fleets had been reduced to 24 hours on 23 July (D-day + 8)\textsuperscript{1} and was gradually reduced until both went off alert on 7 August (D-day + 23).\textsuperscript{2} Subsequent alerts were associated with the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, not the Lebanon operation. On 13 November, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy announced that the 55,000-man cut in American armed forces, delayed by the Lebanon operation, would be resumed.

On 5 December, Ambassador McClintock handed Prime Minister Karami a $10 million check from the United States to help the Lebanese economy recover from the months of civil war it had undergone.\textsuperscript{3} On 10 December, Prime Minister Karami announced that the government of Lebanon considered the Eisenhower Doctrine "...out of date and we no longer feel bound by the terms of this declaration." \textsuperscript{4}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1} Murphy, Charles, "New Mix," p. 182.
\textsuperscript{2} New York Times, 8 August 1958, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{3} New York Times, 6 December 1958, p. 10.
\end{flushleft}
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CONCLUSIONS

State Department officials expressed the view on 26 October that the Lebanon operation had resulted in a net political gain for the United States. Their reasons were:

1. It had dampened Nasser's ardor for intervention, and Lebanon's independence had been preserved.

2. It had shown that the United States keeps its word and is capable of forceful action, without using such action for permanent gain.

3. The American intervention gave heart to other Arab leaders — notably Bourguiba of Tunisia — who were concerned about their countries' independence.

According to Secretary Dulles (7 November) the 2 major accomplishments of the landing were the "reassurance to small countries in the world that if they felt imperiled they could get help" and the stabilized situation in the Middle East.

Critics of American intervention saw the Lebanon operation in a different light:

1. It had been decided in a moment of panic on the incorrect assumption that the Iraqi coup was the start of a UAR chain reaction.

2. The intervention stiffened the intransigence of the Chamoun forces against a compromise solution, and then infuriated these forces when the Americans declined to use force against the rebels or move into rebel territory. At the same time, the fact of foreign intervention strengthened the rebel cause.

3. The net result was that the Lebanese crisis was aggravated and prolonged.

4. The propaganda benefit to Cairo was greater than any encouragement the U.S. action might have given to independent Arab leaders — if, indeed, any such assurance was given.

A variation on these 2 sets of views is that "we went in there [Lebanon] for the wrong reason [Iraq] and the results were quite salutary." This writer is sympathetic to such a view, but hastens to add that the salutary results were not a matter of chance but of skillful diplomacy, in the Middle East and in Washington, even if the policies that put troops into Lebanon in the first place are more controversial.

"For our part, we perhaps should not have permitted our Cold War concerns to draw us so deeply into an intra-Arab struggle." If it appeared to many Arab


\[2\] Department of State Bulletin, 39 (24 November 1958), p. 84.


\[5\] Observer, op. cit., p. 46.

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leaders before the landing that the United States wanted to keep Chamoun in power to carry on his struggle with Nasser, U.S. behavior after the landing did much to alter this image.

In Lebanon itself, this change was largely the result of the continuing efforts of Ambassador McClintock and, later, of Ambassador Murphy. By following an impartial course, McClintock raised the ire of both the opposition and President Chamoun, but the end result was a more realistic and durable relationship between the United States and Lebanon. After the election, but still at the height of the American presence in Lebanon, Saeb Salem (perhaps the most extreme rebel leader) said: "United States Ambassador McClintock is one of the best ambassadors we have had in understanding Lebanese problems. Perhaps he came too late on the scene." 1

In dealing with the rest of the Middle East, the United States was fortunate in having capable representatives in other key states — Iraq, Jordan, and the UAR — who were able to ameliorate much of the damaging effect of the Iraqi coup d'etat and maximize the positive effects of American intervention. The sending of a senior diplomat, Robert Murphy, to the area has been labeled the Great White Father approach. 2 Even so, Murphy's presence proved valuable in coordinating American diplomatic efforts in the Middle East. Badly handled, the Lebanon operation would have been a disaster for the United States. The potential for political gain was just as great for the Soviet Union and the UAR.

The advantage of 12 years' hindsight allows one to look back to discern whether American intervention really stabilized the area. This writer believes that the intervention did have a stabilizing effect. The Lebanese themselves seem to have realized how close they came to disaster. The next parliamentary elections were peaceful and, in 1964, Charles Helou was inaugurated President, following a peaceful election. Likewise, after Suleiman Frangieh was elected in 1970 by a very close vote, newspapers of all political orientations urged cooperation with the new government.

Hubert Humphrey's charge that the landing was an "act of desperation capping 7 years in which we groped for a policy without ever succeeding in producing one," 3 seems too harsh in retrospect. Granted, in one sense it was a stopgap measure — by Secretary Dulles' own definition it was "a measure of last resort" — but Western military intervention did block Nasser's attempt to subvert Lebanon and did help to preserve the sovereignty of Jordan. The Lebanon operation also bolstered the credibility of U.S. commitments 4 and made it clear

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1 The Christian Science Monitor, 11 August 1958, p. 4.
2 Copeland, op. cit., p. 204.
4 The Lebanon operation of 1958 has been compared to the Vietnam conflict of today on the issue of U.S. commitments (Observer, op. cit., p. 45), but Robert Murphy has added the caveat that he finds "a rather thin analogy between Lebanon and Vietnam." Robert Murphy, "The Lebanon Experience," Foreign Service Journal, 44 (July 1967), p. 20.

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to the USSR, as well as to the UAR, that the United States was determined to protect its interests in the area. As a "limited war for limited objectives," the Lebanon operation was a success.¹

The successful military-diplomatic coordination after the landing demonstrates the close interdependence between military power and diplomacy when troops are on foreign soil. Above all, the Lebanon operation of 1958 should not be thought of in strictly military or political terms. Without diplomatic direction, the American military presence in Lebanon would have been pointless. Without that same military power to give it credibility, the associated diplomatic effort would have been less effective.

Similarly, the absence of actual combat operations during the Lebanon operation demonstrates that use of the military in diplomacy need not lead to hostile action and that it can be a flexible instrument in crisis management. In the case of Lebanon, military restraint proved the most effective course of action.²

Ambassador McClintock and Robert Murphy have both called the Lebanon operation an exercise in limited war. Given the time frame of the Lebanese crisis, this is an important point in the perspective of United States military strategy. Secretary Dulles may have "discarded massive retaliation as an effective instrument of policy" by 1957, after the experience of the Hungarian and Suez crises in 1956.³ Even so, the theory of limited war was still a much-debated topic in 1958. In October 1958, Gen. Twining still challenged the Army's thesis that limited wars were more likely than a general war.⁴ But though the doctrine of limited war did not come into its own until the Kennedy administration, the Lebanon operation of 1958 gained many converts.

Secretary McElroy said in May 1958 that a limited war between the United States and the USSR was unlikely.⁵ After the Lebanon operation, he announced that the United States was recasting its military power to meet Communist harassments in "peripheral" areas outside of the main fronts of Europe and Asia.⁶

This strategy provided for building up the ground forces of our allies around the world. Reductions in manpower would continue, with the emphasis on the quality of the remaining forces. The Navy's role was to be enhanced, to keep the sea lanes open if Marines or Army units had to be moved quickly. Secretary

¹Quibain, op. cit., p. 175.
⁵Ibid., 22 May 1958, p. 9.
McElroy noted that airport facilities in underdeveloped countries were usually inadequate and that the Lebanon situation had shown the importance of keeping the sea lanes open for military movements.1

The Lebanon operation also demonstrated that the 6th Fleet is a powerful political instrument. Its reason for existence may still be its function in a general (NATO) war situation, but the Lebanon operation showed that it has a significant crisis role, as well. Perceptions of the 6th Fleet may be positive—that its deployment may be used constructively toward the resolution of a crisis—or negative—that it is a provocative "world's policeman" that makes resolution of a crisis more difficult—but there can be little doubt that it will be a significant factor in any Mediterranean crisis. With the precedent of the Lebanon landing, no Mediterranean statesman will ignore the 6th Fleet.

Today the impact of the Lebanese operation of 1958 is still evident. During the fall 1969 crisis in Lebanon, involving Palestinian fedayeen operating from Lebanon, there was frequent reference to the American landing of 1958 and speculation about the possibility of a recurrence, especially when the 6th Fleet moved into the eastern Mediterranean.

Iraqi newspapers charged: "The 6th Fleet's course toward the eastern Mediterranean can have only one interpretation: To provide support for the agent Lebanese authorities in suppressing the fedayeen action..."2

Syrian papers said that "the steadfast people in Lebanon strongly believe that present U.S. concern over Lebanon's independence is similar to the U.S. concern in 1958 when Marines of the 6th Fleet occupied Lebanon with the help of the agent groups."3

The semi-official Al-Ahram in Cairo charged that the United States had seriously considered another landing in Lebanon but decided against it.4

The Soviet Union charged: "Ships of the U.S. 6th Fleet and other American Armed Forces which took part in these [NATO] maneuvers operated particularly close to the Lebanese coast at the time when the internal political crisis in that country suddenly took a sharp turn."5

The question of a similar Lebanon landing today is often discussed in the West. Debate on this question usually revolves around the greatly increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. Many question the determination or the capability of the United States to risk a confrontation with the USSR over Lebanon. This writer believes the debate has ignored the basic questions:

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2Al-Jumhuriyah, Baghdad, 28 October 1969.
3Al-Bath, Damascus, 15 October 1969.
4Al-Ahram (M. Heikal), 30 October 1969.
5Moscow to Yugoslavia (radio) 30 October 1969.
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First, would the Lebanese government request another intervention? Second, what would be the Lebanese — rather than the Soviet — reaction?

First, it is unlikely that the Lebanese Government would make such a request today. During the October 1969 crisis, President Helou was reported to have told an Islamic delegation: "...there are some who claim that there is a plan to summon U.S. protection forces. My answer is that this plan is an illusion. We do not think of committing such high treason." Helou is further reported to have informed the Soviet Ambassador that Lebanon did not intend or have any plan to call for the 6th Fleet.  

Likewise, Lebanon's current President, Suleiman Franjieh, who was Minister of Justice and Economics under Helou, would probably hesitate to call for American intervention. In 1958, Franjieh was opposed to President Chamoun. Although he and Chamoun were later reconciled — indeed, Chamoun dropped out of the 1970 Presidential race in his favor — Franjieh’s main support in the close election came from the Center Bloc headed by Saeb Salam. Thus the realities of Lebanese internal politics would seem to dictate moderation and compromise. Moreover, Franjieh is noted for following the unwritten rules (the National Covenant, etc.) of Lebanese politics, which keep ties with the West from being very close.

Since the June War of 1967, with its attendant charges of U.S. collusion, it is unlikely that any Arab leader would risk calling for American intervention.

In any event, the same hostile public reaction that would confront an Arab leader would also work against the United States' accession to such a request in the first instance. This consideration is a result of more than the June War alone. As the pro-Phalangist editor of Le Soir predicted in November 1958, "If the conditions that led to their landing were to arise again, there would not be another landing." In 1958, American intervention stunned the rebels. Today, because a similar surprise is almost impossible and because of the hostile climate caused by the June 1967 War and the raids and reprisals that have followed, the reaction to another American intervention would almost certainly be more vigorous.

During the October 1969 crisis, Mohammed Heikal wrote in Al-Ahram that the United States had considered a landing in Lebanon, "but it appears that it has now been excluded from the list of immediate exigencies in view of what it might cause in the Arab world, especially in the event of an armed clash between U.S. forces and Arab fedayeen." Though the accusation may be false, the reasoning is sound.

The United States itself, after its Vietnam experience, would be less than enthusiastic about risking involvement in another such war.

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1 Al-Anwar, Beirut, as quoted by the Middle East News Agency, 26 October 1969.
2 An-Nahar, Beirut, as quoted by the Middle East News Agency, 28 October 1969.
4 Al-Ahram (M. Heikal), 30 October 1969.
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Bruce, David K.
Burke, Arleigh
Chamoun, Camille
Cordier, Andrew
Eban, Abba
Freers, Edward L.

**Interviewee's position in 1958**

U.S. Senator
U.S. Ambassador to Germany
Chief of Naval Operations
President of Lebanon
Executive Assistant to U.N. Secretary General
Ambassador to U.S.A.
Director, Office Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
Gates, Thomas
Hagerty, James C.
Harr, Karl
Hertzog, Yaacov
Irwin, John

Lambert, Gerard
LeMay, Curtis
Lisagor, Peter
Lodge, Henry Cabot
Malik, Charles
Murphy, Robert
Pheleger, Herman
Reinhardt, G. Frederick
Richards, James P.

Sisco, Joseph
Twining, Nathan

Secretary of the Navy
Presidential Press Secretary
Special Assistant to President Eisenhower
Staff, Embassy of Israel, Washington
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Friend of John Foster Dulles
Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Force
Diplomatic Correspondent, Washington
U.S. Representative to the U.N.
Foreign Minister, Lebanon
Deputy Under Secretary of State
Legal Advisor, Department of State
Counselor, Department of State
Ambassador, American Mission to the Middle East (1957)
Political Advisor, U.S. delegation, U.N.G.A.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

Interviewee
Anderson, George

Interviewee’s position during Lebanon crisis of 1958
Commander Task Force 60 (Attack Carriers, Sixth Fleet)
Executive Officer, CVS WASP

Barnett, Marvin E.
(and other officers of CVS WASP)
Burke, Arleigh
Hare, Raymond

Hart, Parker T.
Howard, Harry N.
Irwin, John

McClintock, Robert
Murphy, Robert
Rockwell, Stuart

Zogby, Ghosn

Chief of Naval Operations
U.S. Ambassador to the United Arab Republic
U.S. Consul General, Damascus
Staff, U.S. Embassy, Beirut
Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon
Deputy Under Secretary of State
Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
Staff, U.S. Embassy, Beirut

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APPENDIX A
14 July 1958

CIA Director Allen Dulles learned of Iraqi coup.

President Chamoun officially requested U.S. military intervention in Lebanon.

CNO telephoned (FONECON) RAdm. Duerfeldt (Deputy CINCNELM) in London to warn of the situation, and issued preparatory orders for NELM and SIXTHFLT.

CNO alerted General Wade of 2nd Provisional Marine Force.

CNO, that afternoon, directed COMIDEASTFOR to keep one DD in the vicinity of Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

CNO informed CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, CINCNELM, and COMSIXTHFLT of the imminence of President Eisenhower's decision.

President Eisenhower told General Twining, Chairman of the JCS: "Send them in."

CNO directed CINCNELM and COMSIXTHFLT to land Marines at 1500B Beirut time.

CNO also directed CINCNELM/CINCSPECOMME and COMSIXTHFLT to:

(a) Follow Bluebat concept so far as possible. There is still some question whether British will follow U.S. Marines into Lebanon or will go to Iraq.

(b) Submit hourly SITREPS.

CINCUSAREUR alerted Force Alpha (1st Airborne Battle Gp, 187th Inf. Reinforced) in Germany.

French carriers Lafayette and Arromanches sailed from Toulon.

Iran mobilized.

USAF C-124's flew to Germany.

15 July

CNO directed CINCPACFLT to send all available Marine R5D (transport) aircraft from the West Coast to Cherry Point, N.C. for a troop lift to the Eastern Mediterranean.

CNO directed CINCLANTFLT to load troops and equipment in R5D and R4Q aircraft and send them to Port Lyautey, Morocco, for onward routing by COMSIXTHFLT.

TRANSPHIBRON 6 landed the 2/2 Marines at Beirut at 1500B.
CNO, that afternoon, put the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets on 4 hours sailing notice.

The American Embassy in Amman reported that POL situation in Jordan was critical and requested an immediate airlift.

CNO suspended deactivation of 4 carriers, 4 cruisers, one destroyer and 4 submarines.

COMIDEASTFOR in Greenwich Bay (AVP 41) moved to a station in the northern Persian Gulf and ordered Meredith (DD-890) to remain in the Dhahran area.

TF-24 (in Scandinavian ports) was ordered to continue the scheduled midshipmen cruise but be on 4 hours notice to sail to Gibraltar.

TF-23 (COMCARDIV 4) in Forrestal with Randolph and appropriate DD's was organized to assemble at Norfolk and operate off the Virginia Capes.

COMASDEPLOY cleansed an air-submarine intelligence barrier between Greenland-Iceland-Faeroes using 5 SS from Fish Play exercise and 2 SS from the midshipmen cruise and increasing VP aircraft at Iceland from 6 to 12.

COMASDEPLOY cleansed ASW surveillance flights off the East Coast increased to one daily from both Norfolk and Bermuda (normally alternate days from these stations).

Nine hundred replacement troops of the 2nd Marine Division began an airlift to Beirut from Cherry Point, N.C. via Brazil and Morocco.

TF-14 was alerted. It comprised 3 CVA task groups and 2 CVS task groups on the West Coast.

Turkey completely approved the landings. De Gaulle backed the United States. West Germany didn't commit itself, and Italy asked for a NATO meeting.

16 July

Beirut airport opened to civilian aircraft as long as they didn't interfere with military operations.

Adm. Holloway (CINCSPECOMME/CINCNELM) arrived at Beirut airport 0400B with London element of his joint staff and broke his flag in TACONIC.

TRANSPOLIBRON 2 landed the 3/6 Marines at Beirut.

CNO concurred with COMIDEASTFOR that Holder (DE-819) operating in the Strait of Teharn need not stay out of sight of land because this presence of U.S. Naval power was considered likely to stabilize the local situation.

TF-Alpha began its departure from Germany. TF-Bravo (503rd Airborne) on 12-hour alert in Germany.

Naval aircraft couldn't use Adana for 3 days because of TF-Alpha movement; directed to use Nicosia, Cyprus.
President Eisenhower sent Undersecretary of State Murphy to Lebanon as his special political representative. United States said no action was planned against the Lebanese rebels.

British transports concentrated at Cyprus.

Nasser conferred with Khrushchev 16 and 17 July in Moscow and warned that an attack on Iraq would be considered an attack on the UAR.

Permanent Council of NATO endorsed the U.S. landing. Moslem members of Baghdad Pact (Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan) approved U.S. landing.

Red China, the USSR, Ghana, Japan and India disapproved of U.S. landing.

17 July

CNO directed CINCPACFLT to load and sail one Marine BLT from Okinawa to the Persian Gulf, and warned of possible augmentation to an RLT.

CNO directed CINCPACFLT to cancel relief of Holder in MIDEASTFOR, and it was ordered to patrol in the vicinity of the Strait of Tehran at the northern end of the Red Sea.

Enroute refueling at Athens reported as an urgent requirement.

British troops airlifted from Cyprus began landing in Jordan 0930 local time. SIXTHFLT aircraft made a demonstration over the West Bank of Jordan immediately after the landing at Amman by British troops.

CINCSPECOMME advised CNO that the 6th Fleet was ready to evacuate King Hussein. CNO cancelled the alert 13 hours later.

COMSIXTHFLT directed that P2V combat patrols would not be flown out of Soudias Bay, Crete unless a serious submarine threat evolved.

Aircraft directed to leave Beirut as soon as possible because of insufficient parking space.

TF-Bravo on 24-hour alert in Germany.

CINCLANTFLT directed the Atlantic Fleet to execute a dispersal measure which restricts type and number of ships that can be concentrated in port.

British cruiser Sheffield and 2 DD's off Tripoli, Lebanon.

French CLAA De Grasse and 3 DD's arrived at Beirut, stated purpose possible evacuation of French nationals. No present intention to become embroiled in local situation.

Three-fifths of SIXTHFLT off Lebanon.

Robert Murphy arrived in Beirut to do "everything possible to restore peace and tranquillity in Lebanon and to assist the government of President Chamoun in so doing."
Greece drastically restricted landings at Athens. United States was required to give 48-hour notice.

Greece refused further U.S. aircraft landings. High overflights and emergency landings approved.

No overflights of Austria permitted.

18 July

British CVA Eagle operated off Haifa, Israel to provide aircover for British troop airlift. CL Sheffield off Tripoli, Lebanon.

Nicosia to Amman airlift completed.

TRANSPHIBRON 4 landed the 1/8 Marines at Beirut.

Airlifted Marine replacements from CONUS began arriving at Beirut.

Augmentation of 36 C-124's in Europe to 54 requested as soon as possible since closure of Athens prevents maximum usage of C-119's.

British cruiser was off Libya for the possible evacuation of King Idris, fear of a UAR coup.

CNO directed CINCNELM, CINCSPECOMME and COMIDEASTFOR to be in complete liaison with the British, both in London and the Middle East.

CNO informed CINCPACFLT that MSTS shipping in WESTPAC did not have to be held for the Marine RLT lift.

Bulgarian army began well-publicized maneuvers, using Soviet air support, near the Turkish border.

19 July

French ships departed Beirut. When the French ships were off Sidon, Lebanon, on the 19th, they precipitated rebel operations to repel an expected French landing.

Turkey considered the Bulgarian maneuvers "big stick" propaganda and was not greatly concerned. Large scale Russian maneuvers in Trans-Caucasus, Turkmen SSR, and Black Sea began on 17 July.

CINCLANTFLT ordered preparations for an attack carrier striking force under COMSECONDELT by combining TF-23 (COMCARDIV 4 in Forrestal with Randolph and 10 DD's in Norfolk) and TF-24 (midshipmen cruise force arriving 19 July in North Sea ports).

The alert status of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets was relaxed from 4 hours to 12 hours.

Khrushchev sends message to Eisenhower asking summit on 28 July.

British landed commandos in Libya to bolster government there.
Combat Air Logistic Support unit from USAFE arrived at Beirut airport.
Composite Air Strike Force from CONUS closed at Adana, Turkey.

20 July
Force C (1400 troops) began landing at Beirut airport.
CINCLANTFLT ordered a Mine Division to the Mediterranean to join the
6th Fleet (they were used to protect the amphibious ships from possible enemy
small craft).

Much of SAC now on 15-minute alert.
Bluebat westbound cargo allowed to overfly Greece. Eastbound could land,
at dark, at bases other than Athens.

Saeb Salam (rebel leader in Beirut) was reported to have said that he would
call for volunteers from the USSR and UAR if U.S. forces tried to enter rebel
territory.

Jordan breaks relations with the UAR.

21 July
TAC aircraft delivery problems, could not overfly North Africa, Greece
or Crete.

British had strengthened their Bahrain garrison to 1000 men.

No overflights of Saudi Arabia.

Necessary to use lighters for unloading; congestion on docks and storage
was a major problem.

USAF dropped one million leaflets over Lebanon explaining American
military presence in Lebanon.

CNO advised CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT and CINCNELM that present
commitments in the Middle East would have to be met within current personnel
and fiscal limits.

22 July

The Soviet Navy in the Baltic and Arctic Seas was on alert.

CNO directed CINCLANTFLT to sail TG-44.0 (amphibious shipping with
2 Marine BLT) to Vieques, Puerto Rico for training.

MSTS chartered 12 dry cargo ships and 15 tankers for Middle East support.
23 July

UK CVA Eagle withdrew to Cyprus area since aircover no longer needed for troop airlift to Jordan.

CNO directed that cruiser Salem remain active; proceed with inactivation of all other ships which have reported for inactivation.

Essex and 2 DD’s withdrew to 34N 28E for a 3-day rest period. Wasp suspended flight operations for 24 hours on-station rest period, but kept 2 ASW planes ready.

24 July

CNO notified that Spanish authorities gave immediate and favorable response to U.S. request for clearance to use Rota and other joint-use bases in support of the Lebanese operation.

CTF-61 reported that all amphibious offloading at Beirut was completed and a rotation schedule was set up to permit visits away from the area.

Status of Forces Agreement forwarded to Department of State.


The Pacific Fleet was placed on 24-hour sailing notice.

Regular joint American-Lebanese patrols began in Beirut.

25 July

Eisenhower, in reply to latest Khrushchev note, agreed in principle to a summit meeting, but declared that 28 July was too early a date.

The first American troops were granted liberty to go into Beirut.

26 July

CINCSPECOMME recommended to USCINCEUR that, in view of the tenuous U.S. position resultant from the current Mideast events, every reasonable precaution be taken to avoid actions which may be interpreted as provocative or hostile.

Constant use of air transport led to a serious maintenance backlog by this date.

Sixth Fleet and Air Force planes conducted an aerial demonstration over Lebanon.

28 July

Gen. Adams, as COMAMLANFOR, established his headquarters in the American Community School which was on vacation.

Gen. Fuad Chehab agreed to run for President.
29 July
Another aerial demonstration was flown over Lebanon.
Status of Forces Agreement approved by Department of State.

31 July
Gen. Chehab was elected President.

1 August
U.S. aircraft not on military missions allowed to overfly Sudan if no
tool was made to contact control towers and if flown at high altitudes.
CNO directed COMIDEASTFOR to transfer his command to CINCSPECOMME
with forces assigned.
USNS Upshur, first troop transport, arrived with 1800 soldiers of Force
Delta.
Alert Status of Force Bravo in Germany reduced to one company at 12 hours,
the rest at 24 hours.

2 August
COMIDEASTFOR and assigned forces reported to CINCSPECOMME for
operational control.
French ships departed Eastern Mediterranean for Toulon.
Ambassador McClintock declared that the present situation was better than
at any time since the revolt broke out in May.
The United States recognized the new Iraqi government.
Israel told the United States and Great Britain to stop overflights immediately;
Soviet protests given as reason.
USNS Gen. Randall arrived with 2260 soldiers of Force Delta and Force Echo.
CNO directed CINCSPECOMME and CINCPACFLT to return TF-74.1
(amphibious ships) in the Indian Ocean, enroute to the Persian Gulf, back to
Singapore, at request of Department of State.

4 August
CTF-61 ordered the TRANSPHIBONS to be prepared to reembark Marine
BLT’s if directed.
A conference of component commanders and subordinates concerned, was
held at COMAMLANFOR Headquarters in Beirut to establish jointly acceptable
operational procedures by which air operations would be directed and controlled.
Israeli overflights canceled.

A-7
5 August
Khrushchev withdrew his proposal for a summit conference.

6 August
CTF-60 (carrier strike force) gave detailed orders and schedules for his force to operate in the eastern Mediterranean with one CVA, one cruiser and about half of the DD's at sea and the other half of TF-60 in port.

Status of Forces Agreement accepted in full by the Government of Lebanon.

8 August
CINCLANTFLT, in reply to CNO's request for his views on the relief of the ASW carrier group in the Mediterranean, recommended:

(a) Reduce amphibious forces in the Sixth Fleet to 2 PHIBRONS with 2 BLT and RLT headquarters.

(b) Reduce from 2 to one AGC (amphibious force flagship) after the Marines are withdrawn from Lebanon.

(c) Return the HUK group to CONUS in September without relief.

9 August
First liberty for U.S. forces in Lebanon.

TF-Bravo in Germany reduced to 48-hour alert.

11 August
First Marine resupply shipping arrived.

COMIDEASTFOR requested one more DD from CINCSPECOMME. Request denied by COMSIXTHFLT because of:

(a) Increased demands on 6th Fleet DD's.

(b) Maintenance problems caused by extended operations associated with the Lebanese crisis.

13 August
CINCSPECOMME concurred with JCS proposal to release Force Bravo in Germany from alert.

Marine BLT 2/2 commenced reloading into TRANSPHIBRON 6 at Beirut.

14 August
CNO canceled earlier orders on readiness for ships in port to get underway, and put the Fleets on normal steaming notice.
15 August
TRANSPHIBRON 6, with BLT 2/2 embarked, sailed from Beirut to operate at sea. Operational control passed from COMAMLANFOR (Gen. Adams) to COMAMNAVFOR (Adm. Brown).

16 August
Greenland-Iceland-Faeroes ASW surveillance drastically reduced.

19 August
CINCPACFLT directed sailing TF-74.1, 74.3 and 74.4 (amphibious task force with DD's) from Singapore to the Indian Ocean about 25 August.

22 August
CNO advised CINCSPECOMME that Wasp and its DE's would be withdrawn from the Mediterranean at the end of September without relief, and that CINCLANTFLT would deploy additional VP aircraft if CINCNEELM required.

23 August
CINCPACFLT ordered reversion to normal ASW patrols in the Japan, Philippines and Alaska areas to begin on 1 September.

24 August
COMSEVENTHFLT deactivated TG-74.3 (2 DD's) and TG-74.4 (1-AO and 1-AF) ordering all except the oiler to sail from Singapore.

26 August
COMSIXTHFLT recommended to CINCSPECOMME that Saratoga and TF-60 be released from the eastern Mediterranean to resume normal operations as far west as the Tyrrhenian Sea.

27 August
CINCSPECOMME requested 6 additional P2V aircraft from CONUS to replace Wasp.

CINCSPECOMME authorized Saratoga and TF-60 to operate as far west as 13 degrees East (allowed port visits to Naples) after 4 September. COMAMAIRFOR ordered to conduct air operations in Lebanon through 21 September.

28 August
Essex transits Suez Canal enroute to Pacific Fleet (then involved in Quemoy-Matsu crisis).

31 August
Wasp and DE's depart eastern Mediterranean for Adriatic ports.
2 September

A NELM relief force (TF-25 comprised of CA’s Salem and Newport Nws, CVA’s Forrestal and Randolph, and DD’s) sailed from Norfolk to arrive in the Mediterranean on 12 September.

4 September

CVA Saratoga, CAG Boston, and escorts departed operational area for central Mediterranean ports.

11 September

Wasp returned to eastern Mediterranean, left again on 17 September.

12 September

Forrestal, Randolph, and Newport News chopped to COMSIXTHFLT. COMSECONDFLT in Salem remained under the operational control of CINCLANTFLT.

15 September

Boston left Gibraltar and chopped to CINCLANTFLT.

16 September

TRANSPHIBRON 4 with the 1/8 and 2/8 Marines embarked sailed from Beirut to stop at Gibraltar on 23-24 September enroute to CONUS.

18 September

CINCSPECOMME submitted a plan to JCS for withdrawal from Lebanon to be completed by 15 October.

19 September

JCS approved CINCSPECOMME plan for withdrawal from Lebanon, to be directed by JCS.

20 September

CINCSPECOMME established limits on 6th Fleet movements during the period following the Marines withdrawal until the Army withdrew:

1 - CVA group east of 13 degrees East
1 - CVA group unrestricted
1 - BLT embarked in a TRANSPHIBRON east of 20 degrees East
1 - BLT embarked in a TRANSPHIBRON east of 5 degrees East
2 - DD’s on EASTMED patrol of which one will be in the Beirut area

Thereafter, employment will be normal.
22 September

Salem and Saratoga leave the Mediterranean for CONUS.

TRANSPHIBRON 8 arrived at Gibraltar with the 2/6 Marines and RLT Hdq. Co. of the 6th Marines. After refueling, it proceeded to Beirut.

CNO gave the new target date for withdrawal from Lebanon as the end of October.

23 September

Wasp chopped to CINCLANTFLT at Gibraltar.

Gen. Chehab was inaugurated as President of Lebanon.

24 September

CINCSPECOMME shifted the responsibility for air operations in the Lebanon area from COMAMNAVFOR (COMSIXTHFLT) to COMAMAIRFOR to be effective on 27 September.

TRANSPHIBRON 4 with the 1/8 and 2/8 Marines embarked sailed from Gibraltar and chopped to CINCLANTFLT.

28 September

The 3/6 Marines commenced reembarking in TRANSPHIBRON 2 at Beirut.

29 September

COMCARDIV 14 in Wasp, with 7 DE's, sailed from Gibraltar enroute to CONUS.

30 September

Adm. Ekstrom relieved Adm. Brown as COMSIXTHFLT and COMAMNAVFOR on board Des Moines at Villefranche.

TRANSPHIBRON 2 completed retraction of the 3rd Battalion 6th Marines from Beirut.

1 October

TRANSPHIBRON 2 sailed from Beirut to visit Naples. TRANSPHIBRON 6 sailed from Beirut for CONUS.

Naval gunfire support withdrawn from Beirut.

7 October

TRANSPHIBRON 6 departed Gibraltar for CONUS and Taconic (AGC-17) departed Beirut for CONUS.
CINCLANTFLT informed CNO that 2 TRANSPHIBRONS could be marginally maintained in the Mediterranean on a watch-and-watch (period of duty alternating with period of rest) basis. He recommended early reduction back to one BLT in the Mediterranean, as well as early return of Amphion (an augmenting repair ship).

12 October

CINCSPECOMME advised that during Lebanon phase-out operations he intended to:

(a) Maintain 1 TRANSPHIBRON/BLT in the EASTMED
(b) Maintain 1 TRANSPHIBRON/BLT east of 5 degrees East
(c) Maintain 1 CVA Group east of 11 degrees East

18 October

TRANSPHIBRON 8 with the BLT 2/6 embarked sailed from Beirut for landing exercises in Soudhas Bay during 20-23 October.

21 October

COMSIXTHFLT established COMSIXTHFLT Op Order 150-58 to become effective 25 October. The EASTMED patrol was ordered to maintain 1 DD at sea in the vicinity of Beirut, prepared to protect American lives and property. Another DD was to be maintained off Haifa to provide SAR (search and rescue) facilities for possible air evacuation from Jordan.

CINCLANTFLT explained the TRANSPHIBRON/BLT problem to CNO and concluded that LANTFLT did not have adequate lift capability to maintain 2 standard BLT's in the Mediterranean. Recommendations were to reduce that force to one BLT in the Mediterranean, and if this was not practicable, to form 6 TRANSPHIBRONS in LANTFLT of reduced size and capability.

22 October

CINCSPECOMME/CINCNELM departed Beirut and shifted his flag and administration to London as of 23 October. Further:

COMAMAIRFOR to be deactivated as of 24 October
COMAMNAVFOR to be deactivated as of 25 October
COMAMLANFOR to be deactivated as of 25 October
COMIDEASTFOR report to CINCNELM for operational control 25 October

25 October

CINCNELM chopped CINCNELM to USCINCEUR for operational command.
APPENDIX B
UNCLASSIFIED

COMMAND STRUCTURE DURING LEBANON OPERATION OF 1958

CINCSPECOMME

JOINT STAFF

COMMANDER AMERICAN

NAVAL FORCE

COMMANDER AMERICAN

LAND FORCE

COMMANDER AMERICAN

AIR FORCE

2015 LOG COMMAND

U.S. ARMY

TROOPS ASSIGNED

TF 60

CVA STRIKE

FORCE

TF 61

AMPHIBIOUS

FORCE

TF 62

U.S. MARINE

CORPS TROOPS

ASSIGNED

TF 66

ASW FORCE

U.S. MARINE

CORPS TROOPS

ASSIGNED

CASF BRAVO

U.S. MARINE

CORPS TROOPS

ASSIGNED

322 AD

TURKISH

AIR FORCE

UK

B-1

(REVERSE BLANK)

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

The Eisenhower Doctrine
Public Law 85-7
85th Congress, H.J. Res. 117
March 9, 1957
JOINT RESOLUTION

To promote peace and stability in the Middle East.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

SEC. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: Provided, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

SEC. 3. The President is hereby authorized to use during the balance of fiscal year 1957 for economic and military assistance under this joint resolution not to exceed $200,000,000 from any appropriation now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, in accord with the provisions of such Act: Provided, That, whenever the President determines it to be important to the security of the United States, such use may be under the authority of section 401 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (except that the provisions of section 105 (a) thereof shall not be waived), and without regard to the provisions of section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1957: Provided further, That obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first sentence of section 2 of this joint resolution shall be paid only out of appropriations for military

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UNCLASSIFIED
assistance, and obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first section of this joint resolution shall be paid only out of appropriations other than those for military assistance. This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations. None of the additional authorization contained in this section shall be used until fifteen days after the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and, when military assistance is involved, the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives have been furnished a report showing the object of the proposed use, the country for the benefit of which such use is intended, and the particular appropriation or appropriations for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1957, as amended, from which the funds are proposed to be derived. Provided, That funds available under this section during the balance of fiscal year 1954 shall, in the case of any such report submitted during the last fifteen days of the fiscal year, remain available for use under this section for the purposes stated in such report for a period of twenty days following the date of submission of such report. Nothing contained in this joint resolution shall be construed as itself authorizing the appropriation of additional funds for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the first section or of the first sentence of section 2 of this joint resolution.

SEC. 4. The President should continue to furnish facilities and military assistance, within the provisions of applicable law and established policies, to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, with a view to maintaining the truce in that region.

SEC. 5. The President shall within the months of January and July of each year report to the Congress his action hereunder.

SEC. 6. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress.

Approved March 9, 1957.
EISENHOWER DOCTRINE X MISSION OF SIXTH FLEET

"BROAD MISSION OF SIXTH FLT REMAINS THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY IN AREA AND PROTECTION OF US NATIONALS X FLEET SUPPORT AVAILABLE IF DIRECTED IN EMERGENCY IN SUPPORT OF EISENHOWER DOCTRINE X OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS ALSO REQUIRED X

JOINT RESOLUTION OF 7 MARCH 1957 APPROVED BY PRESIDENT STATED "THE US REGARDS AS VITAL TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND WORLD PEACE THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY OF THE NATIONS OF MIDDLE EAST X

TO THIS END, IF THE PRESIDENT DETERMINES THE NECESSITY THEREOF, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO USE ARMED FORCES TO ASSIST ANY NATION OR GROUP OF SUCH NATIONS REQUESTING ASSISTANCE AGAINST ARMED AGGRESSION FROM ANY COUNTRY CONTROLLED BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM PROVIDED, THAT SUCH EMPLOYMENT SHALL BE CONSONANT WITH THE TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES" REQUEST FOR MILITARY AID FROM GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ WOULD RECEIVE PROMPT CONSIDERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS DOCTRINE QUOTED ABOVE X"
APPENDIX D

FORCE LEVELS OF THE 6TH FLEET IN 1958

The following graph follows the buildup and return to normal size of the 6th Fleet during 1958. The normal complement of the 6th Fleet was approximately 50 ships. As the graph shows, the peak was reached after the Marines had landed in Lebanon.

The information shown was drawn from the "Monthly Memorandum of Composition of Task Forces, Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Operations Division, Department of the Navy," for each month except July. The New York Times was the source for that month. Each entry is made on the 15th day of the month except August, which is on the 20th day of the month.

FORCE LEVELS OF THE SIXTH FLEET IN 1958
APPENDIX E
Oilers and gasoline tankers

AUCILLA (AO 56)
   22-23 Aug 58
   2-4 Sep 58

MARIAS (AO 57)
   10 Aug - 2 Sep 58

SEVERN (AO 61)
   25-29 Jul 58
   10-27 Aug 58

CHUKAWAN (AO 100)
   29 Aug - 12 Sep 58

PAWCATUCK (AO 108)
   26-30 Sep 58
   13-18 Oct 58

WACCAMAW (AO 109)
   26 Jul - 11 Aug 58
   5-8 Sep 58
   19-23 Sep 58

MISSISSIPPI (AO 144)
   19-23 Jul 58
   2-8 Aug 58
   25-29 Aug 58
   24-26 Sep 58

CHEWAUCAN (AOG 50)
   22 Oct 58

MATTABESSET (AOG 52)
   22-25 Jul 58
   14-16 Aug 58
   23-27 Sep 58
   13 Oct 58

Fleet ocean tug

ATAKAPA (ATF 149)
   29-30 Aug 58
Utility aircraft carriers
CORREGIDOR (CVU 58)
22 Jul 58

Destroyer tender
SHENANDOAH (AD 26)
22-24 Jul 58

Ammunition ships
SHASTA (AE 6)
22 Jul - 11 Aug 58
20 Aug - 1 Sep 58

Store ships
ALDEBARAN (AF 10)
9-17 Aug 58
HYADES (AF 28)
29-30 Aug 58
5-9 Sep 58

Stores issue ship
MERCURY (AKS 20)
22-25 Aug 58
4-9 Sep 58
23-26 Sep 58

Cargo ships
ANTARES (AK 258)
6-7 Oct 58

TRIPOLI (CVU 64)
15 Oct 58

WRANGELL (AE 12)
16-25 Jul 58
30-31 Jul 58
15-22 Aug 58
2-11 Sep 58

DENEBOA (AF 56)
19-28 Sep 58
RIGEL (AF 58)
15 Oct 58

ALCOR (AK 259)
11-12 Aug 58
21-26 Aug 58
SPIEGEL GROVE (LSD-32)
18 Jul - 6 Aug 58
23 Aug - 7 Sep 58
14-16 Sep 58

Tank landing ships
TRAVERSE COUNTY (LST 1160)
14-24 Jul 58
5-23 Aug 58
16 Sep - 1 Oct 58
WALWORTH COUNTY (LST 1164)
14-24 Jul 58
5-23 Aug 58
16 Sep - 1 Oct 58

Utility landing craft
LCU 1466
15 Jul - 3 Oct 58
16-25 Oct 58
LCU 1467
17-21 Jul 58
5-23 Aug 58
16-30 Sep 58
LCU 1469
17-21 Jul 58
5-23 Aug 58
16-30 Sep 58
LCU 1474
29 Sep - 18 Oct 58

SUFFOLK COUNTY (LST 1173)
29 Sep - 18 Oct 58
YORK COUNTY (LST 1175)
29 Sep - 18 Oct 58

UNITED STATES NAVY SHIPS
(MSTS troop ships)
USNS GENERAL GEORGE M. RANDALL
(T AP 115)
2-3 Aug 58
USNS GENERAL R. M. BLATCHFORD
(T AP 153)
13-17 Oct 58
USNS GENERAL LEROY ETINGE
(T AP 154)
3-5 Oct 58
23-24 Oct 58
USNS GEIGER (T AP 197)
5 Aug 58
USNS UPSHUR (T AP 198)
1-3 Aug 58
UNCLASSIFIED

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS AND CRAFT

Amphibious force flagships

MOUNT MC KINLEY (AGC-7)  POCONO (AGC-16)  TACONIC (AGC-17)

Attack cargo ships

CAPRICORNUS (AKA-57)  OGLE THORPE (AKA-100)
13-24 Jul 58  29 Sep - 18 Oct 58
5-23 Aug 58
16 Sep - 1 Oct 58

VERMILION (AKA-107)
16-23 Jul 58
9-22 Aug 58
5 Sep - 1 Oct 58
6-25 Oct 58

MULIPHEN (AKA-61)
18 Jul - 6 Aug 58
23 Aug - 6 Sep 58
14-16 Sep 58

Attack transports

MONROVIA (APA-31)
14-24 Jul 58
5-22 Aug 58
16 Sep - 1 Oct 58

FREMONT (APA-44)
18 Jul - 6 Aug 58
23 Aug - 6 Sep 58
14-16 Sep 58

CAMBRIA (APA-36)
29 Sep - 18 Oct 58

OLMSTED (APA-188)
18 Jul - 6 Aug 58
23-30 Aug 58
15-16 Sep 58

CHILTON (APA-38)
16-23 Jul 58
7-22 Aug 58
5 Sep - 1 Oct 58
16-25 Oct 58

ROCKBRIDGE (APA-228)
16-23 Jul 58
7-22 Aug 58
5 Sep - 1 Oct 58
16-25 Oct 58

Dock landing ships

SAN MARCOS (LSD-25)
29 Sep - 18 Oct 58

FORT SNELLING (LST-30)
15-23 Jul 58
7-22 Aug 58
5 Sep - 1 Oct 58
16-25 Oct 58

PLYMOUTH ROCK (LSD-29)
17-21 Jul 58
5-23 Aug 58
16-30 Sep 58
LESTER (DE-1022)  
30 Jul - 11 Aug 58  
22-31 Aug 58  
16-17 Sep 58  

JOHN WILLIS (DE-1027)  
16-26 Jul 58  
11-21 Aug 58  
31 Aug - 16 Sep 58  

VAN VOORHIS (DE-1028)  
17 Jul - 11 Aug 58  
22-31 Aug 58  
16-17 Sep 58  

HARTLEY (DE-1029)  
1-11 Aug 58  
22-31 Aug 58  
16-17 Sep 58  

JOSEPH K. TAUSIG (DE-1030)  
17 Jul - 10 Aug 58  
22-31 Aug 58  

WILLIAM M. WOOD (DER-715)  
19-23 Jul 58  
28 Jul - 4 Aug 58  
16 Aug - 3 Sep 58  

Submarines  

THORNBACK (SS-418)  
1 Jul - 30 Sep 58  

TRUTTA (SS-421)  
1 Jul - 30 Sep 58  

POMPON (SSR-267)  
1 Jul - 30 Sep 58  

Ocean minesweepers  

AGGRESSIVE (MSSO-422)  
15-23 Aug 58  
2-9 Sep 58  

SAGACITY (MSO-469)  
17 Jul - 2 Aug 58  
21 Aug - 20 Oct 58  

FIDELITY (MSO-443)  
15-23 Aug 58  
2-9 Sep 58  

SKILL (MSO-471)  
17 Jul - 15 Aug 58  
9 Sep - 2 Oct 58  

NIMBLE (MSO-459)  
17 Jul - 15 Aug 58  
9 Sep - 2 Oct 58  

STALWART (MSO-493)  
15 Aug - 2 Sep 58  

PINNACLE (MSO-462)  
17 Jul - 2 Aug 58  
21 Aug - 2 Oct 58  

ADROIT (MSO-509)  
15 Aug - 4 Sep 58  

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UNCLASSIFIED

WILLIAM C. LAWE (DD-763)
  21 Sep - 7 Oct 58

ROOKS (DD-804)
  17-25 Jul 58
  11-14 Aug 58

NEW (DD-818)
  17 Jul - 1 Aug 58
  11 Aug 58

RICH (DD-820)
  17 Jul - 11 Aug 58

SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (DD-823)
  20-24 Aug 58
  2-10 Sep 58

BASILONE (DD-824)
  26 Jul - 11 Aug 58

POWER (DD-839)
  21-24 Sep 58

NOA (DD-841)
  17-24 Jul 58

ROBERT L. WILSON (DD-847)
  17 Jul - 11 Aug 58

CHARLES H. ROAN (DD-853)
  20-26 Aug 58

HAROLD J. ELLISON (DD-864)
  17-23, 28-31 Jul 58
  4-11 Aug 58

CONE (DD-866)
  17 Jul - 2 Aug 58
  11-21 Aug 58
  2-7 Sep 58

STRIBLING (DD-867)
  17-23 Jul 58

DAMATO (DD-871)
  1-9 Aug 58

FORREST B. ROYAL (DD-872)
  20-26 Aug 58

MEREDITH (DD-890)
  31 Aug - 7 Sep 58

FORREST SHERMAN (DD-931)
  20-28 Aug 58

BARRY (DD-933)
  17-25 Jul 58
  29 Jul - 1 Aug 58
  11-20 Aug 58
  27-31 Aug 58

JONAS INGRAM (DD-938)
  21-26 Sep 58

TURNER (DDR-834)
  17 Sep - 7 Oct 58

STEINAKER (DDR-863)
  17-25 Jul 58
  30 Jul - 16 Aug 58
  31 Aug - 14 Sep 58

VESOLE (DDR-878)
  17 Jul - 1 Aug 58
  11-20 Aug 58
  16-17 Sep 53

LEARY (DDR-879)
  1-10 Aug 58
  19-31 Aug 58

DEALEY (DE-1006)
  26-31 Jul 58
  1-22 Aug 58
  31 Aug - 14 Sep 58

CROMWELL (DE-1014)
  26-31 Jul 58
  11-22 Aug 58
  31 Aug - 14 Sep 58

UNCLASSIFIED
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft carriers</th>
<th>Combatants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ESSEX (CVA-9)</strong></td>
<td><strong>RANDOLPH (CVA-15)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Jul - 1 Aug 58</td>
<td>24-26 Sep 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20 Aug 58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SARATOGA (CVA-60)</strong></td>
<td><strong>WASP (CVS-18)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-25 Jul 58</td>
<td>16 Jul - 11 Aug 58</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Jul - 11 Aug 58</td>
<td>21-31 Aug 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Aug - 15 Sep 58</td>
<td>16-17 Sep 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cruisers</strong></td>
<td><strong>NEWPORT NEWS (CA-148)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BOSTON (CAG-1)</strong></td>
<td>21-27 Sep 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jul - 1 Aug 58</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-21 Aug 58</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-5 Sep 58</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DES MOINES (CA-134)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Jul - 10 Aug 58</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-29 Aug 58</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Destroyers and destroyer escorts</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MILLER (DD-535)</strong></td>
<td><strong>MC GOWAN (DD-678)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jul - 21 Aug 58</td>
<td>15 Jul - 1 Aug 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6 Sep 58</td>
<td>11-20 Aug 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE SULLIVANS (DD-537)</strong></td>
<td><strong>MC NAIR (DD-679)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>14 Jul - 1 Aug 58</td>
<td>15 Jul - 1 Aug 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-20 Aug 58</td>
<td>11-20 Aug 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Aug - 7 Sep 58</td>
<td>31 Aug - 12 Sep 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HAILEY (DD-556)</strong></td>
<td><strong>WADLEIGH (DD-689)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jul - 21 Aug 58</td>
<td>14-24 Jul 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6 Sep 58</td>
<td>6-11 Aug 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ABBOT (DD-629)</strong></td>
<td>19 Aug - 7 Sep 58</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Aug - 22 Sep 58</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HALE (DD-642)</strong></td>
<td><strong>AULT (DD-698)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-25 Aug 58</td>
<td>8-31 Oct 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HUNT (DD-674)</strong></td>
<td><strong>HAYNSWORTH (DD-700)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 Aug 58</td>
<td>8-31 Oct 58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SIXTH FLEET DEPLOYMENT EAST OF 31°E LONGITUDE
DURING THE LEBANON OPERATION, July-October 1958

E-2
APPENDIX E

6TH FLEET DEPLOYMENT EAST OF 31°E LONGITUDE
DURING THE LEBANON OPERATION, JULY-OCTOBER 1958

The following charts, showing 6th Fleet deployment to the Lebanon operational area, were prepared from the Navy's Awards Manual, 1 Matched with other information sources, the Awards Manual appears fairly accurate. Some explanatory remarks may be useful. The ships' names can be ascertained from the lists that follow the charts.

It can be seen from the charts that the CVA's Essex and Saratoga took turns on station. While off station, they were never farther than Rhodes from the operational area. The major 6th Fleet units, CVA Saratoga, CVA Essex, CVS Wasp, CA Des Moines, and CAG Boston are also covered in the map plots appendix. American Naval presence in the Lebanon area decreased dramatically when Task Force 60 (CVA Saratoga, CAG Boston, and escorting DD's) departed for Mediterranean ports on 5 September. The Randolph (CVA 15) appears briefly on the chart after the Forrestal and it had replaced the Saratoga and the Essex in the Mediterranean. The Randolph's short stay east of 31°E longitude was to familiarize its pilots with the Lebanon operational area. Similarly, the cruiser Newport News made a short trip into the operational area in late September.

Regarding smaller units, the minesweepers doubled in number during August because they were needed in "flycatcher" roles, to guard the amphibious force against small hostile units. The apparently erratic behavior of the amphibious ships on the chart is attributable to the fact that many left the operational area after disembarking their Marines and cargo and came back later.

---

APÉNDICE F
# UNCLASSIFIED

**LEBANON OPERATION OF 1958**  
**6F DETAILED COMPOSITION**  
20 August 1958

## TF 60 (Attack Carrier Striking Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Aircraft Carrier</th>
<th>Destroyer Division 61 (less Noma, Stirling)</th>
<th>Destroyer Division 362</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saratoga</td>
<td>CVA 60</td>
<td></td>
<td>DesDiv 61 (less Noma, Stirling)</td>
<td>DesDiv 362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>CVA 9</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cone</td>
<td>Basilone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Des Moines</td>
<td>CA 134</td>
<td></td>
<td>Meredith</td>
<td>Damato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>CA 61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wilson, R. L.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DesDiv 62

- **Steinaker**: DDR 863, New, DD 818, Basilone, DD 824
- **Leary**: DDR 879, Rich, DD 820, Damato, DD 871
- **Vesole**: DDR 878, Ellison, DD 864, Wilson, R. L., DD 847

### DesDiv 202

- **The Sullivans**: DD 537, Sherman, DD 931, Abbot, DD 629
- **Wadleigh**: DD 687, Roan, DD 853, Benham, DD 796
- **McNair**: DD 679, Roberts, DD 823, Hale, DD 642
- **McGowan**: DD 678, Royal, DD 872, Hunt, DD 674

## TF 61 (Amphibious Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Aircraft Carrier</th>
<th>Destroyer Division 101</th>
<th>Destroyer Division 102</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pocono</td>
<td>AGC 16</td>
<td></td>
<td>DesDiv 101</td>
<td>DesDiv 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilton</td>
<td>ADA 38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockbridge</td>
<td>APA 222</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermilion</td>
<td>AKA 107</td>
<td>Plymouth Rock</td>
<td>LST 1160</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Snelling</td>
<td>LSD 30</td>
<td>Traverse Co.</td>
<td>LST 1164</td>
<td>Wood, DDR 715</td>
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## TF 68 (Mine and Mine Counter-Measures Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Aircraft Carrier</th>
<th>Destroyer Division 101</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skill</td>
<td>MSO 471</td>
<td>Fidelity</td>
<td>MSO 443</td>
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<td>Pinnacle</td>
<td>MSO 462</td>
<td>Adroit</td>
<td>MSO 509</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nimble</td>
<td>MSO 459</td>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>MSO 422</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sagacity</td>
<td>MSO 469</td>
<td>Stalwart</td>
<td>MSO 493</td>
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</table>

## TF 63 (Service Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Aircraft Carrier</th>
<th>Destroyer Division 101</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand Canyon</td>
<td>AD 28</td>
<td>Shasta</td>
<td>AE 6</td>
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<td>Shenandoah</td>
<td>AD 26</td>
<td>Wrangell</td>
<td>AE 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. Monthly Memorandum of Composition of Task Forces, Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Operations Division, Department of the Navy 20 August 1958.  
   The Sixth Fleet was at peak strength at this time.

2. Assigned to amphibious objective area as protection against possible hostile small craft.
## UNCLASSIFIED

### TF 63 (Service Force) continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcor</td>
<td>AK</td>
<td>AK 259</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aucilla</td>
<td>AO</td>
<td>AO 56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chukawan</td>
<td>AO</td>
<td>AO 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marias</td>
<td>AO</td>
<td>AO 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississinewa</td>
<td>AO</td>
<td>AO 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Artesian&quot;</td>
<td>AOG</td>
<td>AOG 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphion</td>
<td>AR</td>
<td>AR 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atakapa</td>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>ATF 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda Co.</td>
<td>AVB</td>
<td>AVB 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallahatchie</td>
<td>LST</td>
<td>LST 115</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### TF 65.9 (East Med Patrol Force)\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hailey</td>
<td>DD</td>
<td>DD 556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miller</td>
<td>DD</td>
<td>DD 535</td>
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</table>

### TF 66 (Anti-submarine Force)

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wasp</td>
<td>CVS</td>
<td>CVS 18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cromwell</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>DE 1014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hartley</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>DE 1029</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taussig</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>DE 1030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealey</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>DE 1006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Von Voorhis</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>DE 1028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willis</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>DE 1027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lester</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>DE 1022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry</td>
<td>DD</td>
<td>DD 933</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TF 69 (Submarine Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trutta</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>SS 421</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pompon</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>SS 267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thornback</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>SS 418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Assigned to Beirut area.
APPENDIX G

MAP PLOTS, 15 JULY - 5 SEPTEMBER, 1958

Key:  A Saratoga  
      B Essex  
      C Wasp  
      D Des Moines  
      E Boston
The Lebanon Operation of 1958: A Study of the Crisis Role of the Sixth Fleet (U)

Research Contribution - September 1970

Dragovich, George S.

September 1970

N00014-68-A-0091

Institute of Naval Studies
Research Contribution No. 153

None

None

Office of Naval Research
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20350

By July 1958 the pro-Western government of Lebanon was in a precarious position following two months of severe civil war. When the pro-Western government of Iraq was overthrown on July 14, in what appeared to be a UAR-directed coup, President Chamoun of Lebanon, fearing a similar fate, requested armed intervention by the United States, Great Britain, and France. Concerned lest the coup in Iraq spread elsewhere, the United States landed approximately 2000 Marines in Lebanon on July 15. The U.S. force, which eventually topped 14,000 men, was withdrawn completely from Lebanon by October 25, after Lebanon elected and inaugurated a new President.

This paper is an examination of that crisis and military operation. While much has been written on this subject, the political aspect or the military aspect has usually been studied to the exclusion of the other. Because the two were closely interwoven in the Lebanon case, this paper has examined them together.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY WORDS</th>
<th>LINK A</th>
<th>LINK B</th>
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<tr>
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<td>PDR-directed coup</td>
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<tr>
<td>military operation</td>
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None