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RCS: AU-D5

SMIC

SIXTEENTH AIR FORCE

1 July - 31 December 1958

(Unclassified Title)

SUBORDINATE UNITS

- 4310th Air Division
- 65th Air Division (Defense)
- 3977th Support Group
- 3906th, 3922nd, 3926th, 3970th, 3973rd, 3974th Air Base Groups, 3936th Air Base Squadron
- 13th Air Postal Squadron
- 49th Communications Squadron
- 3971st Reconnaissance Technical Squadron
- 3927th Reconnaissance Technical Flight

CLASSIFIED BY
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTHORITY ONLY FORTHINGWASO AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS DULATED ON DECEMBER
1997

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CHAPTER IV

ALERT FORCE

The establishment of the first alert force in the European-African area at Sidi Slimane Air Base, Morocco, provided for B-47's to be "ready to go" at all times. Expansion of the program, known as Reflex was accomplished from 1 July 1957 through 1 July 1958 at the Moroccan and Spanish sites, with the last two bases in Spain accepting Reflex aircraft on 1 July 1958. Thus, from the original 20 aircraft at Sidi Slimane the force had been spread to 36 aircraft: six bases in the two countries accommodating six aircraft each. (u)

After this first year of adjustment, Reflex settled into a fairly even operation. Essentially, the concept was to deploy the aircraft non-stop from the United States to the forward sites, with one air refueling in the area of Bermuda. The planes remained on alert status for 14 days, then were redeployed non-stop with refueling in the Azores area, if the southern route was used, or in the northwest Atlantic if the northern route was flown. Ground staging was limited, being used only when necessary; i.e., when high winds precluded reaching the base with the required gas reserves, or when the aircraft developed trouble in-flight. The crews for the planes remained at the forward bases for 23 days, with the aircraft/crew ratio placed at 1/1.5; six aircraft with nine crews. (u)

¹ Background information on Reflex may be found in 16AF History, January-June 1958, Chapter II, pgs. 38-87 (~~SECRET - NO FOREIGN~~)

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Three aircraft were deployed to each forward base each week, with the aircraft scheduled for redeployment remaining in alert configuration until the replacements were completely pre-flighted and armed. (u)

An exception to this deployment-redeployment was made during July when, due to tension in the mid-east, SAC forces were placed in a ready alert status. For the period of 15 July through 28 July no Reflex aircraft were rotated, and those at the various bases were maintained in alert status until the crisis had eased. The advisability of this was questionable since studies conducted by the Seventh Air Division in England had determined that a two-week period was the longest that B-47's could remain without flying and still be completely operational. It was necessary to exercise the various systems of the aircraft, such as the electrical, fuel and oxygen systems, to assure their reliability. This was particularly true at the Moroccan bases where high temperatures prevailed during the summer months. Thus, the Sixteenth recommended that during such alert periods the rotation of aircraft be continued if all possible. (u)

Assignment of Bomb Wings

The bomb wings assigned to Reflex operations in Spain and Morocco³ were from the Second Air Force during the last half of 1958. This included the 19th, 305, 306th, 308th, 379th, and 384th Bomb Wings.

2 Interview, 16AF Historian with Major Julian B. Upton, Tactical Operations Branch, Operations Division, Operations Directorate, 13 April 1959.

3 On 1 Jan. 1959 the 305, 306, 19, 308, 379 BW switched from 2nd AF to 8th AF in a SAC reorganization.

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Each wing continued rotation at the same base during this six months period, thus permitting personnel to become completely familiar with one base in the area. A map showing these locations may be found on the following page. (u)

Crew Schedules

With nine crews for six aircraft, 14 of the 23 days in a forward area were spent on alert by each crew. Varying schedules were submitted from each base in July 1958 showing the days on - and off-duty desired by each group: (u)


(u)

ALERT CREW SCHEDULES, JULY 1958									
Base	Off	On	Off	On	Off	On	Off	On	Off
<u>Morocco</u>									
Ben Guerir Air Base	1	7	6	7					
Nouasseur Air Base	2	3	2	4	1	4	2	3	1
Sidi Slimane Air Base	1	4	3	3	1	3	3	4	
<u>Spain</u>									
Moron Air Base	1	4	4	7	3	3			
Torrejon Air Base	1	4	2	4	1	3	3	3	1
Zaragoza Air Base	1	7	6	7	1				

Primarily, such schedules reflected the lack of nearby recreational spots for such sites as Ben Guerir and Zaragoza. Thus, the six-day off-duty time could be utilized for flights to Spain, England and Germany, as availability of aircraft permitted. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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By the end of the year the Sixteenth had given permission to adjust the schedules at each base as desired by the various crews, as long as the requisite number of personnel were available for manning the alert aircraft. During the July increased readiness period, an additional requirement was levied for each site.⁴ One of the three off-duty crews had to remain on the base as a replacement for any crew that might be pulled from alert duty due to illness or injury of one of its members.⁵ (U)

During the period on alert, crew integrity had to be maintained to permit all personnel to arrive at the aircraft at the same time when alerts were called. One vehicle was assigned to each crew, and certain freedom of the base was given. Klaxon horns, used for alerting, were installed in such places as base exchange, theatre, mess halls, and alert force quarters. Maximum use of base facilities was desired for duty crews in keeping with alert launch requirements. Provisions for "hot-line" alerting was made at each base, to be used in event of failure of klaxon horns.⁶ (UNCLASSIFIED)

Alert Schedules

Three types of alerts were practiced by Reflex crews, with one or more being accomplished during each 24-hour period. These were:⁷

- 4 Msg, 16AF to All Bases, C-2232, "(U) Reflex Alert Schedules," 24 July 1958 (~~SECRET~~), on file, Historical Division, 16AF.
- 5 Listed as DNIF, Duty Not Involving Flying.
- 6 Hot-Line alerting points were the alert force quarters, base operations, fire crash station, dining halls, officers club, NCO club, and Service club.
- 7 Msg, SAC to 16AF, ZIPPO-02-001, subj: Definition of Type of Test Alerts, 1 Jan. 1958 (~~SECRET~~), on file, Plans, 16AF.

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Alpha: Crews proceed to aircraft and when ready to start engines, contact control and report "Ready to start engines." (S) (u)

Bravo: Crews proceed to aircraft, start engines, contact control room and report "Ready to taxi." (S) (u)

Coca: Crews report to aircraft start engines, report to control tower (announcing taxiing for take-off, taxi to runway, hold brakes, apply take-off power, reduce power and taxi to parking area. (S)

Romeo: Test launch of alert aircraft. (S) (u)

Only Headquarters SAC, could direct the Romeo alert, in this case SAC was to provide sufficient advance warning, and the ground rules, concerning the mission to be flown. During the year and a half no Romeo alerts had been conducted in the Sixteenth area. (u)

If local circumstances dictated, a local Reflex Commander could downgrade coca type alerts. Such factors that could call for this decision included local weather phenomena; emergencies in progress at the base; or a local situation where movement of aircraft could indicate action that might be locally misinterpreted. If decision was made to downgrade such a directed alert, the reasons had to be forwarded to Sixteenth. ⁸ (u)

Sixteenth's control personnel scheduled alpha, bravo, and coca alerts, following coordination with SAC. In addition, the local commanders were permitted, upon approval at Sixteenth, to conduct alpha type alerts on their own. They also could coca alert up to 50 per- cent of the alert force at one time. (u)

⁸ Msg, 16AF to All Bases, DOCD-3031, "(U) Ground Exercise of SAC Alert Forces, " 9 Oct. 1958 (CONFIDENTIAL), on file, Historical Division, 16AF.

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Accomplishment of such alerts was standardized by SAC Manual 55-2A, Command Post Operations, that outlined the step by step procedures to be followed. This included the use of klaxon horns for the alerting of personnel, as well as the detailed instructions required for passing along execution instructions from command post to air crews. Such standardization then permitted any crew to operate at any Reflex base to which they might be assigned. Utilization of these procedures was stressed within the Sixteenth, particularly during the first months of the complete six base alert force. (U)

Launch time for B-47's and KC-97's, as outlined by SAC in mid-1958, called for the first aircraft to be airborne within 20 minutes after receipt of the execution message, with subsequent aircraft at one-minute intervals. (U)

Alpha alerts in July took an average time of 5.8 minutes at the Sixteenth's bases, but by the end of the year this had been reduced to 4 minutes. September's bravo alerts averaged 9.1 minutes, with a reduction to 8.6 minutes in December. Coca test required 14.8 minutes in September in contrast to 13 minutes in November. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) (U)

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- 9 Msg, 16AF to All Bases, DOCD-2685, " (U) Reflex Action Alert Schedules, " 5 Sept. 1958 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~), on file, Historical Division, 16AF.
- 10 Msg, 16AF to All Bases, DO-1892, " (U) Alert Procedures, " 20 June 1958 (~~SECRET~~), see Exhibit 44; msg, 16AF to SAC, DOCD-1948, "(U) Testing SAC Manual 55-21 Execution Procedures, " 26 June 1958, See Exhibit 45; msg, 16AF to Spanish AACS Region, Madrid, Spain, DOCEC-1940, "Operating Agreement on Reflex Alerting Procedures, " 26 June 1958 (~~SECRET~~), see Exhibit 46.
- 11 For B-52 and B-36: first aircraft to be airborne within 30 minutes after receipt of execution message, with subsequent aircraft at two-minute intervals. (~~SECRET~~)

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An additional exercise was devised by the Sixteenth's control center when a requirement was levied that the normal alerting systems at the base not be utilized, i.e., the klaxon horns or telephones. Thus, the alert personnel had to be notified by methods that would be required during a communications failure. This normally called for command post personnel going by jeep to the area where the crews were located. A test of this method, on 9 December, increased the readiness time on a bravo alert at Sidi Slimane by only two minutes - from 6 minutes shown on 4 December to 8 minutes on 9 December. At Nouasseur, the increase was from 12 to 31 minutes, at Ben Guerir from 8 to 19 minutes. The following table contains the comparative data for all phases of the alert. ¹⁶ (u)

(u)

COMPARISON OF BRAVO ALERTS, MOROCCAN AIR BASES 4 and 9 December 1958			
	Relay Time	Ready To Start	Ready To Taxi
<u>Ben Guerir Air Base</u>			
4 December, Normal Bravo Alert	2	6	8
9 December, Lost Communications	10	14	19
<u>Nouasseur Air Base</u>			
4 December, Normal Bravo Alert	1	6	12
9 December, Lost Communications	7	27	31
<u>Sidi Slimane Air Base</u>			
4 December, Normal Bravo Alert	1	2	6
9 December, Lost Communications	3	6	8
Source: Sixteenth Air Force, Operations			

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Sixteenth's Guidance for Reflex

To further delineate the responsibilities of each portion of the alert force, the Sixteenth Air Force published an Alert Procedures Manual in September 1958. In general it covered such items as intelligence procedures, billeting, maintenance, and munitions. Also outlined were the command and reflex action organization structures to be utilized within the area. These are shown in two charts on the following page. (U)

Alert Reliability

Upon arrival of the aircraft scheduled for alert duty, and following parking in the designated areas, crew baggage, baggage racks, and aircraft equipment not required for alert action were removed from the aircraft. This was followed by the after-flight (exterior walk around) inspection, and removal of the camera magazines, with their replacement by loaded magazines. In addition, the chaff dispenser side panels and ammunition cans were removed. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Subsequent operations to enable placing the aircraft on the alert


- 12 SAC Manual 27-1, "(U) Planning Factors Manual on Alert," August 1958 (~~SECRET~~), on file, Historical Division, 16AF.
- 13 The times given here were to apply from 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1960 (~~SECRET~~).
- 14 Data prior to September incomplete.
- 15 Excludes Zaragoza, no coca alerts due to runway stabilization project.
- 16 Report on Alert Exercises, Six Bases of Sixteenth Air Force, for the period of July-December 1958 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~), see Exhibit 47.
- 17 Doc., 16AFM 55-12, Vol. I (UNCLASSIFIED), and Vol. II (~~SECRET~~), "Alert Procedures Manual," Sept. 1959, see Exhibit 48.

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
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(REFLEX ORGANIZATIONS)



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BASE LEVEL



* This solid line indicates command responsibility.
 ** Indicates coordination responsibility.

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line were outlined in the Alert Procedures Manual cited above. The optimum time required to completely service and arm the plane had been established by SAC at nine hours, and efforts were made within the Sixteenth's area to conform to this criteria. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The first step was to ascertain the status of the aircraft fuel system booster pumps from the incoming aircrews, and to visually inspect for fuel leakage. The Field Maintenance personnel then installed the ATO racks, and checked out the aircraft circuitry. Personnel of the Flight Line Maintenance Section then took over to perform the following functions: (UNCLASSIFIED)

Service aircraft with water alcohol mix, and perform specific gravity tests; (U)

Service with JP-4 fuel; (U)

Submit known parts requirement to Base Supply via their vehicle radio facilities; (U)

Accomplish unscheduled maintenance preparatory to loading; (U)

Service oxygen system; (U)

Install drag and approach chutes. (U)

Following completion of these activities, the Aviation Depot Squadron personnel took over to install ATO bottles, load weapons, install ammunition cans, and put chaff tapes in strippers. The final action, prior to placing the aircraft in a cocked status, was the preflighting of the aircraft by the assigned flight crews. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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While, as stated above, the desired preparation time had been established at nine hours, the Sixteenth's average for the last six months of 1958 was 10.9 hours. This figure was based on data telephoned by each base upon completion of cocking of each aircraft.¹⁸ Thus, while the times were known, the reasons for deviations were not always available. To permit additional analysis of delays, the Directorate of Maintenance had established a more complete reporting system that went into effect in January 1959, and this would then permit more accurate data to be compiled. For the last half of 1958 the following table shows the average cocking times per month.¹⁹ (u)

(u)

COCKING TIMES FOR ALERT AIRCRAFT, 16AF JULY - DECEMBER 1958							
Base	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Average
16AF Average	10.5	11.1	11.6	11.4	10.4	10.8	10.9
<u>Spanish Bases</u>							
Moron	12.4	13.5	10.9	10.8	13.2	11.8	12.1
Torrejon	8.8	9.2	11.4	10.7	12.1	13.4	10.9
Zaragoza	8.1	8.3	7.1	7.6	7.5	9.2	7.9
<u>Moroccan Bases</u>							
Ben Guerir	12.8	13.4	12.5	20.5	9.0	10.8	13.1
Nouasseur	10.5	11.5	18.0	9.7	7.0	10.3	11.1
Sidi Slimane	8.2	11.4	9.8	9.0	13.5	10.7	10.4

¹⁸ Source, Ltr, 16AF, DMW, "Alert Force Maintenance Statistics," undated, w/Incl., "Alert Force Maintenance Statistics, dtd. 19 Jan. 1959 (SECRET).

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By November concern was felt over the maintenance discrepancies being found on the aircraft deployed to Morocco and Spain. An analysis over a sixty day period found 280 discrepancies on 190 aircraft that became evident during the deployment, alert and redeployment phases. This number represented only those discrepancies which prevented aircraft from either being placed, or being retained, in a cocked configuration, and did not include numerous discrepancies of a minor nature that were corrected during the uncocked period. For this reason, special efforts were being made at the end of the year to isolate the various causes and to pinpoint, if possible, responsibility so as to permit less down time for Reflex aircraft. (u)

The alert reliability, i.e., the actual number of hours that alert aircraft were available for exercise as compared to the number of hours on the alert line, was affected by down-time resulting from malfunctions. During the last six months of 1958 the six bases reported a total down-time of 6,023 hours, resulting from 726 malfunctions. Of these reported problems, the fuel systems presented the principal source of difficulty with a total of 1984.2 hours. In addition, 1462.2 hours were reported as downtime resulting from fuel systems leaks. (u)

Survey of these problems, month by month, showed a sharp reduction from a high of 24 reported in August to a low of 12 in December.

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- 19 Msg, 16AF to 2AF, DM-3330, "(U) Condition of Alert Force Aircraft," 3 Nov. 1958 (~~SECRET~~), see Exhibit 49.
- 20 Alert reliability was based on total amount of time down as outlined in 2 SAC-VI report, compared to hours required for 6 aircraft at each base to be on alert for 24-hours.
- 21 Ref. Note 18, above. Extract, Alert Phase, Cockhours and Malfunction - Command, Jan-Dec 1958 (~~SECRET~~), see Exhibit 50.

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Summarized by base and by month, malfunctions were as follows: ²² (u)

(u)

ALERT PHASE, TOTAL MALFUNCTIONS, 16TH AIR FORCE July - December 1953							
Base	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Average
16th AF Average	22	24	20	20	20	12	20
<u>Spanish Bases</u>							
Moron Air Base	6	13	9	17	17	19	13
Torrejon Air Base	7	25	7	24	22	24	18
Zaragoza Air Base	10	9	10	2	8	2	7
<u>Moroccan Bases</u>							
Ben Guerir Air Base	58	61	40	21	6	11	33
Nouasseur Air Base	35	24	31	51	38	7	31
Sidi Slimane Air Base	19	11	23	6	28	10	16

Here again complete details of all phases of these problems was not available for the entire six months, but procedures had been established for obtaining additional information. It was possible that high temperatures encountered at some of the bases was a contributing factor, as well as such other measurable items as: number of maintenance personnel available, training levels, availability of parts, and the recorded maintenance history of the aircraft concerned. Non-measurable items contributing to aircraft capability then could include interest in the work, morale, and relationship between the Reflex forces and the base personnel. (UNCLASSIFIED)

From the available data the alert reliability averaged, for the six months period, 97.4 per cent, with the lowest average at Ben Guerir

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in September - 92.3 per cent, and the highest at Zaragoza in October 23
99.9 per cent. Summarized by months, reliability was as follows: (u)

(u)

ALERT RELIABILITY, 16TH AIR FORCE July - December 1958							
Base	Per Cent Time Available						
	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Average
16th Air Force Average	98.0	96.3	97.4	97.7	97.0	98.5	97.4
<u>Spanish Bases</u>							
Moron Air Base	99.8	96.9	99.5	97.7	96.9	97.2	98.0
Torrejon Air Base	98.5	94.8	98.0	95.8	96.3	97.7	96.8
Zaragoza Air Base	98.9	99.3	99.2	99.9	96.9	99.8	99.0
<u>Moroccan Air Bases</u>							
Ben Guerir Air Base	96.2	93.1	92.3	97.6	99.3	98.5	96.1
Nouasseur Air Base	98.2	95.1	96.9	95.4	97.1	99.0	96.9
Sidi Slimane Air Base	96.2	98.5	98.7	98.8	95.3	99.0	97.9

Support Facilities

The support requirements for Reflex forces were outlined in detail by SAC in their Manual 27-1, Planning Factors Manual on Alert, in August 1958, which formalized the criteria that had been published in various messages from July 1957 to mid-1958. Compliance at base level has been stressed by the appointing of a special assistance team from the Sixteenth's staff to inspect each base to determine

22 Ref. Note 18, above.

23 Ibid.

24 SACM 27-1, Planning Factors Manual on Alert, Aug. 1958 (SECRET), on file, Historical Division, 16AF.

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what additional support each site needed to fulfill requirements. ²⁵

In general, full cooperation was given throughout the command and emphasis was made on following directives. (U)

A meeting of this team, known as the "Reflex Action Facilities Review Panel," was held on 30 July, to discuss the action necessary to improve alert facilities, services and equipment. From this came a programming plan outlining the responsibilities for each portion of the staff. A few of the items considered as important at this first

²⁶
meeting were: (UNCLASSIFIED)

All possible effort will be made to provide reflex alert personnel with air conditioned facilities. (U)

Scheduled transportation will be provided to and from rail stations, towns and other designated points in accordance with provisions of Joint Travel Regulations. Government transportation, although available to individuals and groups, cannot be assigned to an individual or group as personal transportation during off duty periods. In insolated areas aircraft may be utilized to transport reflex crews to cities where recreational facilities are available. (U)

Alert quarters will be furnished comfortably. Recreation rooms, day rooms, etc., will be adequately furnished to provide for relaxation, games, radios, and letter writing facilities. (U)

Washers and dryers will be provided. (U)

Maid and janitorial service will be provided for all reflex quarters. (U)

To support this program, i.e., to provide for air conditioning quarters, provide recreational facilities, and make the necessary

25 Msg, 16AF to SAC, Personal Gen. Powers from Maj. Gen. Mooney, C-1895, "(U) Alert Crew Facilities," 20 June 1958 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~), see Exhibit 51.

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building modifications, a total of \$468,673 was requested from SAC. This represented 14 direct and 8 indirect support projects. Of these, 73 per cent involved air conditioning of the quarters and of support facilities. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Following aggressive action by the various base commanders, it was possible to considerably improve base facilities and living conditions for these personnel by the end of the year. At Moron, for example, quarters were being improved; at Torrejon they were considered as excellent; and at Nouasseur two house trailers were being made ready for occupancy by the crews at the flight line. A comprehensive personnel service program was started at each base, and orders for the necessary furniture and recreation type items had been included in the second revision to the FY-59 Financial Plan. Messing facilities for crews were considered as good at all sites, and at most bases special menus were available. (U)

The primary difficulty in the support field was in providing adequate transportation on base. The crews on alert at Sidi Slimane,

- 26 16AF Programming Plan 12-58, "Reflex Facilities, Services and Equipment," 5 Aug. 1958 (UNCLASSIFIED-NO FOREIGN), on file, Historical Division, 16AF.
- 27 16AF Monthly Analysis, Aug. 1958, pg. 3 (SECRET), on file, 16AF, Historical Division.
- 28 Msg, Reflex Det. Comdr, Moron to 2AF, Zippo 01-271, "B-27 Report Period " 5 Oct 58 to 31 Jan 59," 31 Jan. 1959 (SECRET), see Exhibit 52.
- 29 Msg, Reflex Commander, Torrejon, Zippo 02-271, "M-27 16AF Opord 1959 (SECRET), see Exhibit 53.
- 30 Msg, Comdr RTF Nouasseur to SAC, ZIPPO 01-243, "M-27/8AF/96-58," 30 Jan. 1959 (SECRET), see Exhibit 54.
- 31 D/Comptroller, Progress Evaluation Report (Programming Plan 12-58), Nov. 1958, 16AF (NO FOREIGN), see Exhibit 55.

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Ben Guerir, and Zaragoza all reported that available vehicles were hard to start, and did not provide sufficient protection during inclement weather. This problem area could only be solved upon receipt of additional vehicles which were not expected until the spring of 1959. ³⁵ (u)

The limited number of aircraft available within the Sixteenth tended, at times, to be inadequate for the desired rest and recreation flights for alert personnel. The Operations Directorate of the Sixteenth stated, in a message to SAC early in 1959, that the assignment of additional transport aircraft would permit an increase in such flights. ³⁶ (u)

Whenever possible, problems that arose within the Sixteenth's area, when reported by the various Task Force Commanders, were solved as rapidly as possible. ³⁷ (UNCLASSIFIED)

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- 32 Msg, Reflex Action, Sidi Slimane to SAC, Zuoci-01-390, "M-27 Report, " 31 Jan. 1959 (SECRET), see Exhibit 56.
- 33 Msg, Comdr, RTF, Ben Guerir, to SAC, ZIPPO-01-235, "M-27 30 Jan. 1959 (SECRET); Msg, RTF Ben Guerir to 16AF, ZIPPO-01-236, "Final Mission Report (M-27) for 3926th Air Base Group, 16AF Opord 96-58, 30 Jan. 1959 (SECRET), see Exhibit 57.
- 34 Msg, 3974ABG, Zaragoza, to 8AF, ZIPPO 01-260, "M-27 Report, Reflex Det. Zaragoza AB Spain, for period 5 October 1958 through 31 January 1959," 31 Jan. 1959 (SECRET), see Exhibit 58.
- 35 SAC letter, 27 Jan. 1959, indicated that 16AF would receive 530 new vehicles; estimated arrival was April-May 1959.
- 36 Msg, 16AF to SAC, DOM-1328, "Survey of Transport Type Aircraft," 18 Nov. 1958, on file, D/Operations, 16AF.
- 37 Msg, 16AF to SAC, DO-322, "(U) Reflex Action M-28 Report (1 July through 2 August 1958)," 19 Aug. 1958 (SECRET), see Exhibit 59. Msg, 16AF to SAC, DO-3099, "(U) Reflex Action M-28 Report, 4 Aug. through 4 Oct. 1958), " 14 Oct. 1958 (SECRET), see Exhibit 60. Msg, 16AF to SAC, DO-1352, "(U) Reflex Action M-28 Report (1 Oct. through 31 Jan. 1959)," 6 Feb. 1959 (SECRET), see Exhibit 61.

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Refueling Support

KC-97 rotations from the ZI to the European and North African theatre were planned to provide refueling support from Lajes in the Azores, as well as strip alert capability in Morocco, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The first of the two operations occurring during the last half of 1958 was Operation Black Duck, with an effective date of 1 July 1958. This involved the redeployment of the 308th Air Refueling Squadron (308AREFS) from Lajes to Hunter AFB, and deployment of the 19th Air Refueling Squadron (19AREFS). In early October, the 19AREFS redeployed on Operation Sand Paper, and was replaced by the 70th Air Refueling Squadron (70AREFS). This latter squadron remained in place until early January 1959 when it, in turn, redeployed, following movement of the 340th Air Refueling Squadron (340AREFS) to Lajes on Operation Shady Lane. (u)

Basically, the various operations were very similar. The parent unit prepared the orders that called for movement of these units. However, upon arrival at the overseas sites the aircraft came under operational control of the Sixteenth, with the exception of the two alert aircraft on duty in the United Kingdom, which were under control of the Seventh Air Division. (u)

Operation Black Duck

With an X-Day of 1 July 1958, the 308AREFS and the 19AREFS were allotted the task of maintaining a strip alert continuity during

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Operation Black Duck, with the 19AREFS deploying 17 aircraft to Lajes and two each to Torrejon (Spain), Sidi Slimane (Morecco), and Brize-³⁸ Norton (United Kingdom). Personnel limit was placed at 514 to Lajes,³⁹ and 30 to each of the other sites. Cargo requirements were placed at 115.0 tons to be airlifted by the refueling squadron's aircraft, as well as 35.1 tons to be lifted by MATS.⁴⁰ (Data on the actual execution of this mission was not available in Directorate of Operations files to permit inclusion of descriptive information for this report.) (u)

Operation Sandpaper

The return of the 19AREFS to its ZI base, following the arrival of the replacement, the 70AREFS, was provided for in Operation Sandpaper. Seventeen KC-97's were scheduled in at Lajes from Little Rock AFB on 1 October, with the aircraft of the 19AREFS departing the following day. The planes for the other three bases were scheduled to arrive on 1 October, with the 19AREFS departing on 3 October.⁴¹ (u)

Following the schedule, the six alert aircraft for the two bases of the Sixteenth and for Brize-Norton left Little Rock AFB on 30 September. They were followed on 1 October by the 17 for Lajes. Augmenting this force were two KC-97's from the 308AREFS at Hunter. Personnel deployed totaled 546, of which 115 were officers and 431 were airmen. No provision was made for the deployment of additional maintenance personnel for the two aircraft to the 308AREFS. (u)

³⁸ 16AF Operations Order 337-58, "(U) Black Duck," to support SAC/2AF Operations Directive 16-1-58 to SAC/2AF Operation Plan 16-58, 6 June 1958 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~), see Exhibit 62.

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While the squadron successfully participated in all missions required to support Reflex operations, problems were encountered when last minute changes were made in refueling areas, particularly at Lajes. Santa Maria Air Traffic Control Center required a 48-hour advance notice, but would grant changes, when necessary, to 24-hours prior to utilization of the areas. One example of such a change occurred when scheduled B-47 deployments planned for 10-12 December were progressively delayed. From the normal 3-6-3 aircraft on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, the flights were changed to 0-9-3, then to 0-0-11, and finally all slipped to Saturday. Each change necessitated negotiations with the Santa Maria center to permit refueling. During December alone there were 69 deviations in scheduling, with a contributing factor being high surface winds at Lajes, and high enroute winds for receiver aircraft over a 12-day period. ⁴² (u)

During this tour at Lajes, the KC-97's took part in 434 sorties, totaling 3199 hours. Deployment of this organization was accomplished on 11 and 12 January 1959, following a 24-hour delay due to high winds. (u)

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- 39 The 308AREFS was to redeploy 630 personnel. (CONFIDENTIAL)
40 Cargo redeployment was placed at 112.1 tons by the returning 308AREFS; plus 49.4 tons by MATS. (CONFIDENTIAL)
41 Msg, SAC, DOPO-3143, "(U) Tanker Rotation," 13 March 1958 (S); Operation Order 16-58, 70th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, 19th Bomb Wing, Operations Directive 2 to 2AF Operation Order 16-58, 2AF DODT-11298, Operation Sandpaper (SECRET), on file, 16AF.
42 Ltr, 825 ADiv, 70ARS; "Letter of Transmittal (M-27 Report on Operation Sandpaper)", 28 Jan. 1959; see Exhibit 63.

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Alert Operation

During August the Facilities Review Panel conducted a survey of Lajes Field to determine the feasibility of operating a Reflex type alert with KC-97 tankers. It was found that the Lajes force was operationally prepared to implement a four crew/aircraft alert schedule on 1 September, and that time/study tests had established a capability for a 20 minute launch time. The only deterrant was a short delay for installation of the Klaxon horn alerting system. The first of the tankers on alert was accomplished 9 January 1959. (U)

Support facilities to permit compliance with the 20-minute alert schedule were considered as inadequate as billeting facilities were not available adjacent to the flight line. However, trailers were planned for the runway area for maintenance personnel, but in the meantime temporary quarters would be used in the SAC hangar. At this time, i.e., the end of August, a permanent squadron operations building was being constructed, and with minor modifications would be suitable for alert crew facilities.⁴³ (U)

By the end of the year the 70AREFS reported, with reference to⁴⁴ billeting, the following: (U)

Officers quarters (Building T-163) were considered to be inadequate. The non-commissioned officers quarters (Building 420) were adequate, but the building was in a bad state of repair. However, funds have been requested from 16th AF to rehabilitate this building. The airmen and Staff Sergeants quarters (Quonset Huts in the 500 area)

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- 43 Msg, 16AF to SAC, DO-2609, "(U) Alert Requirements for Lajes Rotational Tanker Squadron," 28 Aug. 1958 (~~SECRET~~), see Exhibit 64.
- 44 Ref. Note 42, above.

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were definitely not adequate. The building leaked, drinking water was not available in the buildings, lartines were too small and galvanized tin fixtures could not be kept free from rust and the stoves were too small and old to provide sufficient heating. These inadequacies were written up each month during the Base Medical Inspection. MATS has let a contract to rehabilitate this area, and the estimated completion date is 30 May 1959. (U)

In addition to the steps taken by MATS to improve living conditions, the Sixteenth ordered the required furniture and accessories to permit comfortable living for the alert crews. This included such items as beds, desks, tables, and some recreational items. These had been delivered by the end of the year.⁴⁵ (U)

The 70AREFS found that personnel giving support from both maintenance and supply cooperated to the fullest extent. However, supply time between Nouasseur to Lajes was found to be lengthy, with AOCF (aircraft out of commission for parts) and ANFE (aircraft not fully equipped) parts being delivered in about ten days. Vehicles from the Seadweed stocks were considered as sub-standard, and seven men from the 70AREFS were assigned to repair them. The base motor maintenance supervisors were very cooperative, but the parts necessary to repair the machines were not available.⁴⁶ (U)

Operation Alarm Bell

War planning called for the staging of B-52 aircraft at two Moroccan bases: Ben Guerir and Nouasseur, and at Moron, in Spain.

45 Msg, 16AF to SAC, DM-3820, "Alert Facility Furnishings," 31 Dec. 1958 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~); see Exhibit 65.

46 Ref. Note 42, above.

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For this reason, SAC directed that B-52 aircraft be rotated through these bases to familiarize personnel with the Maintenance and Munitions Loading of the plane. Such rotation also would permit crews scheduled for post-strike or recovery in these areas to become familiar with available facilities. Each B-52 was to remain for a 72-hour period (excluding Sundays), once each month. In November the Fifteenth Air Force was to provide one B-52 the second week of each month to Nouasseur, with the Eighth Air Force sending one to Ben Guerir the fourth week of the month. The Second Air Force was scheduled to send one to Moron the third week in January 1959. ⁴⁷ (u)

In addition to the regular air crew, the sending organization was to supply a crew chief and a fully qualified maintenance officer or a senior non-commissioned maintenance officer with the aircraft. ⁴⁸ The base was then to select key supervisors and other responsible maintenance personnel to receive the training. Each base prepared a reception and working plan to permit full utilization of the hours that the aircraft was on the ground. ⁴⁹ (u)

Reported training data from the Ben Guerir and Nouasseur maintenance personnel varied widely so that comparison of training hours was not possible. For example, Ben Guerir reported that weapons loading teams received 1080 hours training in the November exercise, while Nouasseur reported 9 hours in their December exercise. With such data it was not possible to determine the areas of training that

⁴⁷ Msg, 15AF to 16AF, DOOT-4295, "(S) Exercise of Moroccan and Spanish Bases by B-52 Aircraft, 25 Oct. 1958 (SECRET), see Exhibit 66.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

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needed further emphasis. The 28th Bombardment Wing (Heavy) personnel⁵² exercised Nouasseur in December and reported that: (u)

While at Nouasseur Air Base, the aircraft crew chief conducted extensive training for local support personnel, i.e., refueling, inspections of aircraft systems and major components. This training was very difficult for the following reasons: (1) The one assigned crew chief was busy preparing the aircraft for launch, thus could not devote adequate time to local maintenance personnel, and (2) no training aids were available. (u)

Sufficient numbers of maintenance personnel are in place at Nouasseur to launch several aircraft. These people are anxious and willing to be of assistance in any way possible; however, they are not qualified on B-52 aircraft. (u)

There are no B-52 parts available at Nouasseur Air Base. A B-52 tow bar, several aircrafts, and MD-3 power units were available.

No qualified armament personnel were available. (u)

Transportation, base installations, aircraft POL, and base facilities are considered adequate for the recovery and launch of a B-52 wing. (u)

Due to the lack of sufficient training aids and equipment, it was recommended that this material be made available to the base. In addition, it was felt that an expanded B-52 flyaway kit maintained at the site would be of assistance. (u)

- 49 Msg, 16AF to 3922, 3926, 3973, ABG, DMW4-3337, ~~(S)~~ Exercise of Moroccan and Spanish Bases by B-52 Aircraft," 4 Nov. 1958, see Exhibit 67. ~~(SECRET)~~
- 50 Msg, 3926ABG to 16AF, CAMS 11-589, "Exercise of Moroccan Bases by B-52 Aircraft," 25 Nov. 1958, ~~(SECRET)~~; Msg, 3926ABG to 16AF, CAMS 12-640, "Exercise of Moroccan Bases by B-52 Aircraft," 22 Dec. 1958 ~~(SECRET)~~; see Exhibit 68.
- 51 Msg, 3922ABG to 16AF, DD-16-12-U-315, "Project Alarm Bell," 16 Dec. 1958 ~~(SECRET)~~; see Exhibit 69.
- 52 Ltr, Hdq, 28th Bombardment Wing, Heavy (SAC) to 15AF, "Final Mission Report (M-27)," 12 Jan. 1959 ~~(SECRET)~~, on file, D/Materiel, 16AF.

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Deployment, Redeployment Routes

In mid-September the Sixteenth notified the Second Air Force that complaints had been received from both Prestwick and Gander control centers regarding B-47's redeployment flights. It developed that on occasion only two B-47's utilized the block altitude reservations originally requested for three aircraft. It was felt that such flights violated Second's directives concerning the requirement that groups of three or more aircraft utilize block reservations, and that one or two aircraft should file individual flight plans. However, it was pointed out at that time that since an abort usually occurred after engine starts, or after the aircraft were actually airborne, it was impractical to cancel the block reservation and then file individual plans. ⁵³ (UNCLASSIFIED)

SAC advised that when altitude reservation were approved by either center for three or more aircraft, and then when only one or two appeared, the reservations were automatically cancelled. Prestwick stated that, in those cases, individual flight plans had to be filed. Failure to accomplish this would, in the future, result in violations being filed on such aircraft. ⁵⁴ (UNCLASSIFIED)

Until a firm plan could be worked out, SAC requested that action be taken to assure that altitude reservations requests would not be submitted for less than three aircraft. Additionally, when sufficient time (approximately three hours) existed prior to scheduled departure -

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- 53 Msg, 16AF to 2AF, DOO-1-1205, "Reflex Action Altitude Reservations, 16 Sept. 1958 (UNCLASSIFIED); on file, Operations, 16AF.
54 Msg, SAC to 16AF, DOOPF-23948, "Reflex Altitude Reservations," 17 Sept. 1958 (UNCLASSIFIED); on file, Operations, 16AF.

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with a known schedule of less than three aircraft - the request would be cancelled and individual flight plans filed. Such plans were then in accordance with ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) procedures. (UNCLASSIFIED)

On the same day that SAC forwarded the above instructions, two aircraft departed Zaragoza, Spain, for MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The Shannon-Prestwick center advised the 7370th Flight Service Squadron that no ICAO flight plan had been filed. As a result, Gander control advised the refueling squadron that no B-47's were on their way. This error was later corrected and refueling for the aircraft was accomplished.⁵⁵ (UNCLASSIFIED)

A week later, on 24 September, SAC instructed that flights of less than three aircraft would cancel altitude reservations when this circumstance was known prior to receipt of reservation information. Then, individual flight plans could be filed. However, if the reservation had already been received, the aircraft would depart and all required ICAO position reports would be mandatory. The route, call sign, and timing were to remain as filed in the original requests.⁵⁶ (UNCLASSIFIED)

Additional instructions came a few days later. The above outlined plans were expanded by stating that if the two aircraft did not wish to maintain formation, the additional flight levels could be requested enroute. Prestwick center had recommended a similar procedure, but also

55 1st Ind., Det. 1, 7370th Flight Service Sq., to 16AF, "Incident Report," 26 Sept. 1958 (UNCLASSIFIED); on file, Operations, 16AF.

56 Msg, SAC to 16AF, DOOPF-24986, "Reflex Altitude Reservations, 24 Sept. 1958 (UNCLASSIFIED); on file, Operations, 16AF.

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indicated that altitude reservations must be cancelled if it became known, prior to departure, that less than three aircraft could operate.

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On 9 October two east-bound and two west-bound B-47's were reported by the Flight Service Squadron for alleged violations within the Shannon-Prestwick area on 24-25 September. On east-bound flight was enroute from Loring to Torrejon and failed to report as required at 30° west. Since it was due there at 0819, and alert was declared at 0920. It was not until 1012 that the alert was secured following notification from Ocean Station that word had been received from the aircraft and that it was safe. It had reported on UHF rather than on the required HF. The two west-bound flights, enroute from Zaragoza to Harmon involved flight plans received by phone from the USAF center at Uxbridge, England. However, the center had not received a request for a formation flight of two aircraft, or for a block configuration. Then, nearly two hours after departing Spain they reported as flying at 45° North, 10° West, at 28,500 feet. They were then cleared as a formation flight at that level. About an hour later, when they had reached 20° West they reported to the center that they were climbing to 30,000 feet. This was done, however, without clearance, and was into a level not authorized for west-bound flights. The third incident involved a Loring-Brize Norton flight, east-bound, with the pilot failing to contact, on HF, the Shannon-Prestwick control center,

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57 Msg, SAC to 16AF, DOOPR-27679, "Reflex Altitude Reservations," 29 Sept. 1958 (UNCLASSIFIED); on file, Operations, 16AF.

58 Ltr, Det. 1, 7370th Flight Service Squadron to CO, MacDill AFB, "Incident Report," 9 Oct. 1958 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~); on file, Operations, 16AF.

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with the result that a violation report was filed by the Scottish Air Traffic Control Center. ⁵⁹ (u)

Subsequent directives from SAC stressed that flight reservation altitudes must be maintained unless approval of ICAO control agencies was received. In the event of communication failures, the minimum quadrantal heading for the direction of flight for each leg of the approved altitude reservation was to be adhered to. If, for safety of flight reasons, and during communications outage, it was necessary to change altitudes, the pilot was required to report this as soon as possible. ⁶⁰ (UNCLASSIFIED)

In mid-October US Navy operations personnel became concerned with uncorrelated radar returns in refueling areas. It was recommended by the Chief, Liaison Team, Lajes Air Base, that redeploying B-47's include name and estimated time they expected to be in the refueling areas in their position reports. ⁶¹ At the same time the Santa Maria (Azores) Oceanic Control Center stated that B-47's were not reporting on HF radio, and were not securing permission to descend to refueling altitudes. ⁶² It was pointed out in both cases that in event of failure of HF communications facilities in the bombers, other frequencies were available to permit relaying to the Center the necessary information through either picket ships or through the airborne tankers. (u)

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- 59 Ltr, Det. 1, 7370th Flight Service Squadron, to Co, Hunter AFB, "Incident Report," 9 Oct. 1958 (CONFIDENTIAL); on file, Operations, 16AF.
- 60 Msg, SAC to 16AF, DOOPF-31319, "Reflex Altitude Reservations," 10 Oct. 1958 (UNCLASSIFIED); on file, Operations, 16AF.

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At this time a meeting was held at SAC to discuss the problems arising in crossing the Atlantic in the ICAO areas. One of the recommendations included a change to SACM 55-12, Air Operations - Peacetime, to require HF position reporting for all Reflex flights. This action was carried out by message on 7 November and required all flights to report, regardless of whether or not they were on block altitude clearance or on individual ICAO flight plans.⁶³ Additionally, such aircraft were to preflight and have an operating HF radio prior to departure.⁶⁴ (UNCLASSIFIED)

By the end of the year the problems of altitude reservations and of conformance to flight plans had been alleviated. Such action was necessary in view of the increasing number of civilian jet aircraft operating in the areas formerly utilized solely by military planes, and compliance with east-and west-bound altitude levels of flight required by ICAO served as a measure of protection for both types of flight. Additionally, regular reporting would obviate the requirement for needlessly alerting of air rescue service, conserving utilization of this protective facilities for emergency only. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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- 61 Msg, Chief, SAC Liaison Team, Lajes to 16AF, SLP-10-045, "Conversation with Commander, Barrier Atlantic," 15 Oct. 1958 (~~SECRET~~), on file, Operations, 16AF.
- 62 Msg, Chief, SAC Liaison Team, Lajes to 16AF, SLP-10-09, "Reflex Altitude Reservations," 15 Oct. 1958 (UNCLASSIFIED); on file, Operations, 16AF.
- 63 Msg, SAC to 16AF, DO-40895, "HF Position Reporting on Reflex Action Missions," 7 Nov. 1958 (UNCLASSIFIED), on file, Operations, 16AF.
- 64 Msg, SAC to 16AF, DO-1B-0938, "HF Reporting on Reflex Action," 18 Nov. 1958 (UNCLASSIFIED); on file, Operations, 16AF.

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Local Reactions to July Alert

Spanish

Madrid's reaction to the American landings was that of general approval, although some concern was evidenced as to the delay in accomplishing what was generally considered as necessary. The military attaches of Turkey and Italy expressed satisfaction with the move, and other diplomats seemed to follow along. However, comments at times appeared to be somewhat guarded. ⁶⁵ (u)

Further approval came when the Spanish Foreign Minister, Sr. Castiella, had the approval of Generalissimo Franco to state that Spain approved the use of American bases within the country for support of the troops in Lebanon. The Spanish Navy furnished 200 Marines for guard duty after operations at the American Naval installation at Rota were increased, based on a request from the American Forces. ⁶⁶ (u)

As time went on some impatience was voiced in the controlled Spanish press as to why the US had not wielded a heavier hand. One paper called our actions as "appeasement," while another stated that the middle east nations found it more dangerous to lean to the West than to the East. ⁶⁷ (u)

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- 65 Msg, 16AF to SAC, DIC-2209, "16AF Weekly Military/Political/Economic Report," 23 July 1958 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~); on file, D/Intelligence, 16AF.
- 66 Msg, 16AF to SAC, DIC-2248, "Spanish Relation to Utilization of US Bases in Support of Lebanon Operations," 25 July 1958, (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~); on file, D/Intelligence, 16AF.
- 67 Msg, 16AF to SAC, DIC-2450, "16AF Weekly Military/Political/Economic Report," 17 August 1958 (~~CONFIDENTIAL - NO FOREIGN~~), on file, D/Intelligence, 16AF.

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Spanish solidarity with the US was further evidenced by Foreign Minister Castiella's statement to US Ambassador Lodge in late August. He said that Spain would support US proposals as outlined by President Eisenhower in his address before the United Nations. He also volunteered the information that the Egyptian Ambassador had called on him and asked if it was known that the Americans were using Spanish bases to support the Lebanon landings. The Minister informed him that this was known, and that it was considered as an appropriate use of the Spanish sites. ⁶⁸ (u)

Moroccan

Intelligence sources indicated that most Moroccans viewed the coup in Iraq with approval and regarded it "as a logical step towards freedom of the Middle East from colonialist domination and consolidation with the United Arab Republic." ⁶⁹ All levels of the Moroccan public appeared to be hostile to American and British interventions, and considered that such action underlined the United States' dedication to colonial policies. However, no anti-American incidents were reported within a week after the crisis occurred. ⁷⁰ (u)

An official Moroccan statement was presented at a press conference on 20 July, with the stand that it was considered that the Lebanon situation was an internal matter. Thus, it was deemed as "hostile"

68 Msg, 16AF to SAC, DIC-2487, "16AF Weekly Military/Political / Economic Report," 26 Aug. 1958 (~~CONFIDENTIAL - NO FOREIGN~~), on file, D/Intelligence, 16AF.

69 Moroccans appeared to regard the mid-east events as further proof of Nasser's power, and of the Arab's determination to unite. Background information on Morocco has been published in earlier histories of the 5th Air Division and the 16th Air Force.

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for foreign intervention to occur. It was also reported by Mr. Boucetta, Morocco's Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, to US Embassy personnel, that the use of Moroccan bases for staging troops was political dynamite and requested that no publicity be given if such activity took place. ⁷² (u)

On 21 July both French and Moroccan papers reprinted an exclusive interview granted to a Tunisian correspondent by Prime Minister Ahmed Balafrej. He reiterated Moroccan opposition to foreign intervention in the mid-east and stated that the West was wrong to extend the zone of conflict. At the same time he brought out that the American bases had been established in Morocco without the permission of the Moroccans. He also stated that American personnel were enjoying status and privileges considered to be exorbitant, and added that "it is practically an extra-territorial regime which we will not permit much longer." (u)

The next day brought another act emphasizing the anti-intervention stand of the Moroccans. A ship, under the Dutch flag, the Linjbaan, arrived at the port of Safi to unload a cargo of bombs destined for the American bases. Since no prior arrangements had been made to meet it at the dock, US Army personnel of the Transportation Detachment were not present. The Army's Casablanca office issued

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- 70 Msg, 16AF to SAC, DIC-2130, "Intelligence Information Situation Report on Morocco," 17 July 1958 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~), on file, D/Intelligence, 16AF.
- 71 Msg, 16AF to SAC, DIC-2180, "Transmittal of Intelligence Information from OSI Dist, 6 " 21 July 1958 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~), on file, D/Intelligence, 16AF.
- 72 Ibid.

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instructions for this ship to drop anchor outside the harbor to wait entry authorization. On 23^July they returned to port only to be met by a crowd of local workers, armed with sticks, who refused to unload ammunitions to be used against their "brethren in the Middle East." This group was dispersed by some 50 soldiers of the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA), but the vessel still was not permitted to unload. It was instructed by MSTIS to return to Leghorn, Italy, on 25 July. ⁷³ (U)

The first few days in August found a complete lull in the talk against intervention activities. The significance of this silence was unknown. ⁷⁴ However, on 11 August the US Flag commercial ship, the African Patriot was not granted diplomatic clearance to unload munitions and the Moroccan Government requested diversion because of a threatened strike. General cargo shipments at Casablanca, and the off-loading of petroleum products at Fedala were not affected, and some other 23 US ships and about 60 foreign ships were in and out of Casablanca during July without experiencing difficulties. ⁷⁵ (U)

The ban on military shipments continued, even after the mid-east situation had settled down, and by the end of the year there was no indication that the embargo would be lifted. (U)

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- 73 Msg, 16AF to SAC, DIC,-2249, "Intelligence Information from OSI District 6, Rabat," 25 July 1958 (~~CONFIDENTIAL - NO FOREIGN~~), see Exhibit 70.
- 74- Msg, 16AF to SAC, DIC-2403, "Transmittal of Intelligence Information from OSI Sources," 7 August 1958 (~~CONFIDENTIAL - NO FOREIGN~~), on file, D/Intelligence, 16AF.
- 75 Msg, 26AF to SAC, DIC-2435, "Diversion of SS African Patriot," 12 Aug. 1958 (~~SECRET~~), on file, D/Intelligence, 16AF.

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Summary

The expansion of the Reflex alert force to six of the 16th Air Force bases in Spain and Morocco permitted a total of 36 B-47's to be on 24-hour, 7-day a week alert. A gradual settling of both Reflex and base personnel into fairly routine operational methods resulted in a high alert reliability factor being obtained during the last six months of 1958. In addition, the placing of supporting tanker forces on an alert status, similar to that required for the bomber aircraft, gave an added measure of protection for accomplishment of emergency action. (u)

Study of the cause of an alert reliability reduction through mechanical malfunctions was accomplished, and was being given increasing emphasis at the end of the year. Along with this went continued emphasis on providing adequate facilities for alert crews and maintenance personnel required for the full time ready status. (u)

The mid-east crisis had brought out the national reactions to police actions, at least insofar as any intervention in essentially Moslem regions of the world were concerned. The Spanish accepted the action as necessary, and condoned use of the three sites within their borders. On the other hand, to the Moroccans the American and British landings were an affront to their newly acquired independence, and they considered them as indicating approval of colonialism. Their reaction placed in jeopardy the ocean supply lines for the Moroccan sites, and at the same time required that aerial support be kept to a minimum lest it indicate utilization of the bases to support troop actions considered as undesirable by the local Government. (u)

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STAFF, HEADQUARTERS, SIXTEENTH AIR FORCE, 30 June 1958

Commander: Major General H. K. Mooney, USAF, 589A

Deputy Commander: Colonel Ernest C. Hardin Jr, USAF, 8211A

Chief of Staff: Colonel Kenneth E. Marts, USAF, 4416A

Administrative Services: Lieutenant Colonel Edolyne J. Reynolds, USAF,
AO1297429

Chaplain: Colonel Alphonse B. Slivinski, USAF, 18756A

Comptroller: Colonel George T. Bland, USAF, 859A

Information Services: Lieutenant Colonel George Schenkein, USAF, 9643A

Inspector General: Colonel Bernard V. Ogas, USAF, 4518A

Installations Engineering: Colonel John T. Trotter, USAF, 3012A

Intelligence: Colonel Paul J. Heran, USAF, 6018A

Judge Advocate: Colonel Arnold Lebell, USAF, 2659A

Materiel: Colonel Michael J. Galer, USAF, 5272A

Operations: Colonel Alan F. Adams, USAF, 4429A

Personnel: Colonel Antonio N. LaGrippo, USAF, 2391A

Plans: Colonel Martin C. McWilliams, USAF, 4322A

Safety: Lieutenant Colonel Clarence A. Lakin, USAF, AO429077

Surgeon: Colonel Andres G. Oliver, USAF(MC), 19127A

(For changes during the period of 1 January through 30 June 1958, see
Exhibit 3.)

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