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October 9, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Henry A. Kissinger Military Alerts (5) Electron Military Alerts

SUBJECT:

Attached is a memorandum from Defense which outlines a series of concept actions which could be executed as early as October 13th in order to convey the impression of increased U.S. readiness to the Soviets. There are seven conceptual operations suggested which include:

- Implementation of a period of radio and communication silence in selected commands.
- 48-hour stand-down of strategic and combat aircraft in selected commands.
- 3. Increased surveillance of Soviet ships enroute to North Vietnam.
- Increased reconnaissance sorties around the periphery of the Soviet Union.
- 5. Increased ground alert rate of SAC bombers and tankers.
- Dispersal of SAC aircraft with nuclear weapons and Air Defense aircraft to their military dispersal bases.
- Alert or dispatch to sea of nuclear submarines currently in port.

Of the above proposals, I would recommend that we implement, starting next week and phased appropriately through the week, the measures listed above as follows: 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6.

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Authority EU 958

Sy MN NARA Date Official

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
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RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the implementation of the readiness measures listed above, starting as early as October 13th, and to be completed on October 25.

Approve	Disapprove	
		and the same of th

Attachment







OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

8 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG

SUBJECT: Significant Military Actions

In response to your request, a number of concepts for military actions are outlined below which would, in our judgment, be considered by the Soviets as unusual and significant. The following criteria were employed in developing these potential actions:

- a. Ease of detection by the Soviet Union.
- b. High probability of being considered unusual and significant.
 - c. Low public exposure in the United States.
- d. Feasible of execution as early as 13 October, or as soon thereafter as possible.
 - e. Lasting sufficiently long to be convincing.

Concepts meeting these criteria would include:

- a. Implementation of radio and/or other communications silence in selected areas or commands, e.g., in SAC and POLARIS forces.
- b. Stand-down of flying of combat aircraft in selected areas or commands, e.g., for 48 hours in SAC and EUCOM.
- c. Increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North Vietnam.
- d. Increased reconnaissance sorties around the periphery of the Soviet Union.
 - e. Increased ground alert rate of SAC bombers and tankers.

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- Dispersal of SAC aircraft with nuclear weapons to only military dispersal bases, with or without dispersal of CONAD forces.
- g. Alerting or sending to sea of SSBNs currently in port or by tender.

Modification of the SNOW TIME 70-2-E joint SAC/NORAD exercise has been considered, but does not appear to qualify under the given criteria.

The significance of the costs and risks entailed by the military actions outlined above must be related to the over-all effect desired, which is not known at this time. In absolute terms, neither the costs nor the risks seem to be high.

> Robert E. Pursley Colonel, USAF Military Assistant

This is ben - bones stuff tright . I have eshed

the grit steff to anylify lack of the alternatives listed above and provide me a follow-on paper in the morning.

B.61.

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