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## NOTES ON BERLIN MILITARY PLANNING

1. U. S. military force levels, both for men and materiel, have been based on NSC Directives which, in effect, have stated that nuclear weapons will be used at the start of any conflict with the Soviet Union. 1/ Our NATO allies have built their forces on similar assumptions.
  2. Consistent with such directives, neither U. S. nor NATO forces are capable of engaging in combat with the Sino-Soviet bloc in Europe, today, without using nuclear weapons shortly after the start of combat.
  3. In the event the U. S. or its allies propose to use military power to reopen access to Berlin, if such access is denied by action of the East Germans and/or Soviet Union, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended:
    - a. A probe of the Soviet intentions -- the probe to be carried out by approximately 1200 men.
    - b. An attack on approximately six East German airfields, using nuclear bombs timed for air bursts, in the event the probe is stopped.
  4. If the NSC Directive were to be changed so that it read: "Except in response to a nuclear attack upon the West, it is the policy of the U. S. and its allies to place main reliance on non-nuclear weapons during the early stages of any conflict with the Sino-Soviet bloc":
    - a. How many men should be assigned to NATO (compared to its present strength) at the start of a military action to reopen access to Berlin?
    - b. What portion of the increase in force should be supplied by the U. S.?
    - c. What materiel inventories do the U. S. and its allies now possess in relation to the requirements for the initial equipping of the expanded force and the support of such forces in combat?
- 1/ NSC Directive 5906/1 states, "It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons..." In a memorandum supporting the ROAD Program, the Army stated "It has been assumed that tactical nuclear weapons would be the mainstay of ground combat operations." The "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" states, "In no case is there a NATO concept of limited 1. e., non-nuclear war with the Soviets."

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d. What time schedule should be followed by the U. S. and its allies in mobilizing the additional men and materiel required? (List the major manpower moves and the major items of materiel to be procured and the potential sources of supply.)

e. How much would be spent by the U. S. for

- (1) the additional personnel, and
- (2) the additional equipment for the additional personnel?

Of this latter amount, how much could be obtained by re-programming within the 1962 Budget? In the event the use of force failed to materialize, how much of the materiel procured could be considered as an "early procurement" of materiel that would have been purchased later in any event?

f. How might the Soviet Union react to NATO's mobilization plans, and how would their reaction affect NATO's force requirements?

RMcN  
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