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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

ISP in CIA

5 November 1985

The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Cap,

Here's a paper I promised you on the various concepts for the sharing of SDI which the President talks about.

Yours,

Bill

William J. Casey

Attachment

This document can be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED when TOP SECRET attachment is removed

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1 November 1985

Sharing SDI Technology with the Soviets

o Four distinct levels of co-operation possible (details below):

1.)"Open laboratories"
2.)Periodic meetings of a joint US-Soviet working group
3.)Permanent sitting US-Soviet working groups
4.)Joint control of deployed systems

o Open labs: Would permit visits to each others' SDI research centers. Our own labs (such as Livermore) are already visited by Soviet and other foreign scientists; we, however, do not get comparable access to Soviet facilities. Several ways to implement an "open labs" proposal:

-- Exchange of visits by scientists.
-- Exchange of personnel for specified periods of time.
-- Jointly-operated laboratories, specially set up.
-- Jointly-run R&D programs at established labs.

o Periodic meetings of a joint US-Soviet working group: Would meet on a regular basis (2-3 times a year), functioning much like the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which was established following the first SALT agreements. Could be used to:

-- Discuss transition to defensive regime.
-- Discuss progress in research.
-- Raise concerns about developments viewed as threatening.

o Permanent sitting US-Soviet working group(s): Would involve a newly-established permanent bilateral institution, which could:

-- Meet in one country or another, in both simultaneously, or in a neutral third country.
-- Be staffed by both US and Soviet political, military, and scientific personnel.
-- Provide a framework for continuing inspection of research centers, test facilities.

o Joint Control of Deployed Systems: Could encompass a variety of possible arrangements, including jointly-manned control complexes. Could also include participation by third parties.

-- Unlike first three options, which could be put into effect in near-term, and extend through R&D phases of SDI, this option applies only to a later time frame (10-15 years hence).

o Models for Possible US-Soviet Cooperation on SDI:

-- NORAD: US-Canadian, fully-integrated joint command: the forces and equipment that make it up are drawn from both countries; operations are conducted jointly; the Commander-in-Chief reports to the chief executives of both Canada and the US, and intelligence is shared at the command on a daily basis. (See Attachment A).

-- Apollo-Soyuz Test Program: Officially begun after 1972 summit meeting. NASA took lead, had prime responsibility for the US, working directly with Soviet counterparts in Academy of Sciences. State played backseat role. Soviets had access to NASA's system for program documentation, training, technology and industrial support. US given more limited access to Soviet facilities. (See Attachment B).

-- US-Soviet Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreements: Twelve separate agreements resulted from 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit, covering broad spectrum of S&T. Administered by many USG agencies, with weak coordination. Soviets emphasized technology exchange, US sought to focus on scientific exchange to minimize risk of technology transfer. (See Attachment C).

-- "Risk Reduction Centers": Senators Nunn and Warner have proposed creation of these centers in Washington and Moscow; they do not currently exist, so we have no experience with this sort of arrangement. Functions could include exchange of information, administrative support for high-level meetings, annual meetings to review operations. (See Attachment D).

o Of these, Apollo-Soyuz probably provides best model for next 5-10 years, during the technology development phase of SDI program.

-- Example of high-technology sharing program involving real hardware. Soviets probably got better deal (90-10, their favor), even though we did not share our best, most advanced space technology.

-- Political success for both sides (more so for Soviets).

-- Soviets still cite as a model for future cooperation in space.

o US offers to share technology with the Soviets are not unprecedented (See Attachment E):

-- Baruch Plan (1946): proposal to put virtually all nuclear activity under the aegis of an international authority. Rejected by Soviets, who went on to develop their own atomic weapons.

-- "Atoms for Peace" (1952): Eisenhower proposal which evolved into International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors (with mixed results) production and movement of nuclear materials in order to prevent their diversion to military purposes.

-- "Open Skies" (1955): proposal by Eisenhower at Summit with Khrushchev, in advance of U-2 maiden flight, to exchange blueprints of military bases and allow reciprocal overflights without interference. Russians dismissed as "a bald espionage plot".

o Tactical considerations:

-- Proposals could be linked to previous proposals for on-site inspection; in this case, though, we are not just verifying that there is no illegal activity going on.

-- Could also be linked to Canadian and French proposals for international verification of arms control (e.g. "PAXSAT").

-- Could tie "open labs" plan for SDI technology to proposals for renewed co-operation in space. High-level Soviet scientists have been pushing idea of joint space ventures (See Attachment F).

-- One approach might be to turn tables on the Soviets: Ask them what they need from us to convince them we are serious about SDI technology sharing.

o Other thoughts:

-- We will have to deal with the apparent disconnect between SDI technology sharing and COCOM controls, which could create problems with the Allies.

-- Problems of monitoring and verification will still exist.