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M E M O R A N D U M

*EUK - [unclear]  
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Think you will  
be interested in  
this. Russ*

TO: RA - Mr. *Forsenden*  
FROM: RA - Raymond J. Albright  
SUBJECT: Visit to SAC Headquarters, November 27, 1961 -- Highlights  
Which Relate to Possible Discussions in Paris During NATO  
Ministerial Meeting

*[unclear]  
RM/R*

I was a member of a party from the Department which during November 26-29, 1961 visited SAC and NORAD headquarters, the Air Force Academy and two airfields where SAC and NORAD planes are on alert status. Although I shall submit a fuller report on the trip highlights, certain observations from the trip appeared to be appropriate for separate reporting in light of their relation to topics which might be discussed in Paris during this month's NATO Ministerial Meeting.

US-UK "Special Relationship"

Cooperation between the USAF and UK Air Forces is very close in a number of areas which relate to mounting strategic air operations. This close cooperation is a strong contributing factor to maintaining the "special relationship" desired by the UK in relations with the US -- as opposed to US relations with its other allies.

1. SAC briefing officers noted the importance of the BMEWS system for obtaining warning of ballistic missile attack against North America in time to alert SAC units (those not on airborne alert) and avoid their destruction on the ground. They noted that a BMEWS facility was located in the UK and that information from the system would be provided to the UK to alert UK bomber forces. The briefing officers also noted the importance of tropo scatter facilities in the UK to maintaining effective communications with SAC units overseas, and particularly with SAC and UK Bomber Command in the UK, in an emergency.
2. It is clear that SAC is firmly supporting the SKYBOLT program for its own US forces, which, in accord with a US-UK agreement, means that this weapon will be available for UK Bomber Command also in the future.
3. SAC cooperation with UK Bomber Command on targeting includes staff meetings twice each year (one in UK and one in Omaha) on the subject. Furthermore, all of the complex computations of missile trajectories (which must be updated constantly in light of changing intelligence and improving geographic surveys) for the THOR IRBM's made available to the UK by the US are developed for the UK on the IBM machines at SAC headquarters. Presumably, SAC would also run the computations for the UK SKYBOLT weapons which are to have a 1,000 mile range after launch from airborne bombers. (Incidentally, the computations for the JUPITER IRBM's in Italy and Turkey are also developed by SAC).

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The NSC

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The NSC policy directive of April 21, 1961 calls for US policy to discourage the UK from opposing or staying apart from the movement toward European integration by hopes of a "special" relation with the US. Although this policy guidance does not relate primarily to defense matters, the achievement of this US policy objective will inevitably be retarded by the types of active bilateral defense cooperation between the US and UK described above.

The NSC policy directive also notes that over the long run it would be desirable if the UK phased out of an independent nuclear deterrent capability. The directive states that if the development of SKYBOLT is not warranted for US purposes alone, the US should not prolong the life of the UK V-bomber force by this or other means. The trend noted above toward continued US assistance to the UK on obtaining SKYBOLT and continued US performance of targeting functions for the UK Bomber Command run contrary to the NSC policy if extended indefinitely.

US Integrated Targeting Procedures for Nuclear Strikes in Event of Global War

Located at SAC headquarters is the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff which has prepared a single integrated operational plan (SIOP) for initial US retaliatory nuclear strikes in the event of global war. The Staff is headed by General Power, CINCSAC, but is responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The SIOP developed by this Staff sets forth target and weapon system assignments for each Service of the US armed forces and includes all types of strategic systems -- bombers, attack fighters, land-based missiles, air-launched missiles and missile-armed naval vessels and submarines. The objective of SIOP, which is under constant review now that the first plan is in force, is to insure most efficient targeting and employment of the various forces.

The Staff is composed of personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, and representatives are assigned from the staffs of CINCEUR, CINCLANT, CINCPAC and CINCPAC as well as SAC. In order to coordinate NATO targeting with the US SIOP, US personnel at CINCEUR maintain liaison between SHAPE at Paris and the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at SAC headquarters in Omaha. Presumably, liaison could be maintained through CINCLANT and CINCEUR representatives for coordinating the targeting of POLARIS - launched missiles with NATO planning when POLARIS submarines are committed to NATO.

cc: BNA - Mr. Sweeney  
G/PM - Col. Robinson

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12/7/61

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