

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND969045

Distribution App'd in S/S-S 4/9/71

~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS~~ 8-2-78

7105087

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

ACDA/IR:Daaron:ems
4/7/71

Memorandum of Conversation

ACDA-4852
Cg 1A

DATE: March 2, 1971

SUBJECT: US-UK Bilateral Consultations on SALT (U)

3/2/71

PARTICIPANTS: (See attached list)

COMPLETE DISTRIBUTION
MADE BY CMS 4/9/71.

EO25x1 CIA

Declassified Authority: 32229
By: Dorothy Johnson Date:
03-25-2015

COPIES TO:	S	PM	OSD/ISA-Col. Randall
	U	INR	NSC - Mrs. Davis
	J	EUR/SOV	US Mission NATO
	C	JCS/ACSAN	USDEL SALT IV
	S/S	DOD/OSD-Dr. Tucker	Amembassy LONDON
	ACDA (6)	CIA	Amembassy MOSCOW
	EUR/BMI	S/PC	

POL UK-25 XP
DEF 18

This is a summary report of the SALT discussions held with the British group in Washington March 2, 1971.

The discussion focused principally on ABM radar limitations, the forward-based systems issue, and NATO consultations on SALT.

The discussion of ABM radars centered on our proposed limitations on Soviet Hen House radars. The British had the mistaken impression that the US was more concerned about Soviet Hen House radars in regard to ABM limitations than about Dog House radars. The British were of the view that the Hen House radar was not inherently an ABM radar but agreed that it had tracking capabilities which go beyond the requirements for an early warning radar. After we explained our concern about possible further deployment of Hen House radars in connection with the SAM upgrade problem and the possibility of quick ABM deployment, the British appeared to accept the rationale underlying our position.

In general, however, the British appeared to question the need for Hen House radar limits as strict as those in the U.S. proposal. On the other hand, they indicated that it would be desirable to preclude 360° radar coverage for the Soviet system.

ACDA-1
2-62 GP-7

~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS~~

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

GPO 925635-1

NW#: 32229

DocId: 446750

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND969045~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS~~

-2-

The British dwelled at some length on tactics for penetrating the Soviet ABM system -- particularly the problems of an attack by small nuclear forces. The British appear to believe that the Soviets would use a shoot-look-shoot tactic which would reduce the footprint of the USSR ABM system substantially but which would make it more difficult to penetrate to Moscow as a target. The British provided a paper analyzing the Soviet ABM defense.

On FBS, the British thought a basic problem in developing a general formula on non-central systems was to avoid being so precise as to lose our freedom of action, while not being so vague as to invite Soviet interference in allied force planning decisions. After considerable discussion, they seemed to accept Mr. Farley's viewpoint that at present the Soviets could try to interfere in alliance planning if they want to; under a SALT agreement they might be discouraged from mischief-making efforts to exploit a general formula out of a desire not to undermine the over-all agreement.

The British pressed for the specifics of a generalized formula. They also wanted to know whether we would engage the Soviets in the basic principles underlying our formula before we actually advance it. We explained that we may need to know about Soviet views on limitations on central strategic systems before we could adequately develop a formula on non-limited systems. The British appeared satisfied with our explanation of the basic non-circumvention principle underlying our approach and with our statement that we had reached no decision on a specific formulation.

The British were gratified that the US was looking at the problem of non-limited systems in the context of the overall military balance between East and West and not solely in terms of the US-USSR strategic balance. The British also drew attention to the relationship of the FBS question to MBFR. They thought that this forum might be useful for addressing FBS and related problems.

In connection with FBS, the analogous issue of a no-transfer formula also arose. The officials from London did not appear to be aware of the fact that we had advanced, in SALT, a formula to cover this problem, but UK Embassy officials present made clear that substantial discussions of this subject had taken place between US officials and the UK Embassy.

~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS~~

NW#: 32229 DocId: 446750

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND969045~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS~~

-3-

On the issue of NATO consultation, the British asked whether we had in mind any modification to the current procedure. They had considered possible alternative forms of allied consultation and found that they all had more disadvantages than advantages. We explained that we had no new ideas on this subject, but that we would of course consider allied suggestions.

~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS~~

NW#: 32229

DocId: 446750

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND969045

21

PARTICIPANTS:

US

- Mr. Philip J. Farley, Acting Director, ACDA
- Mr. Albert Carnesale, ACDA/ST
- Mr. Joel B. Resnick, ACDA/ST
- Mr. David Aaron, ACDA/IR
- Mr. John P. Shaw, Director, PM/DCS
- Mr. Thomas F. Timberman, PM.DCA
- Col. Burr Randall, OSD/ISA
- Col. Paul Von Ins, JCS/SAAC

[Redacted]

CIA
CIA

EO25x1 CIA

REL
NR-15

UK

- Mr. V. Macklen, Deputy Chief Adviser, Ministry of Defense
- Dr. Robert Press, Cabinet Office
- Mr. W. Mumford, Defense Secretariat
- Mr. R. Tesh, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- Mr. Guy Millard, Minister, Embassy of Great Britain
- Mr. Lawrence Middleton, First Secretary, Embassy of Great Britain

NW#: 32229

DocId: 446750