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<th>NIO/NP (Mr. Despres)</th>
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**REMARKS:**

EO 13526 3.5(c)

**FILE #: B-226**
National Intelligence Officers

29 March 1979

NOTE TO: DDCI

FROM: NIO/NP

SUBJECT: PRC Meeting on Pakistan, Wednesday, March 28, 1979

Please review the attached draft memorandum for the record and let me have your comments. Aside from its tedium and indecisiveness, the meeting was most notable for its neglect of Pakistan's main security problem—perceived threats due to conventionally armed Indian forces, disputed territories, and mutual animosities. Do you have any suggestions for appropriate follow ups?

John Despres

Attachment:
MR on PRC mtg, 29 Mar 79
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: PRC Meeting on Alternative Approaches to the Pakistani Proliferation Problem

TIME AND PLACE: 1500-1640, White House Situation Room

PARTICIPANTS:

State
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary
David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Gerard Smith, US Special Representative for Nonproliferation Matters
Arthur Hummel, Ambassador to Pakistan

Defense
David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for Developing Nations

Energy
Holsey Handyside, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs

OMB
Randy Jayne, Associate Director for Security and International Affairs

JCS
LTG William Y. Smith

ACDA
Spurgeon Keeny
Charles Van Doren

CIA
Frank Carlucci
John Despres

White House
David Aaron
Following a special session for principals only, Christopher opened the discussion of policy toward the Pakistani nuclear proliferation problem. He outlined steps underway to implement a sequenced program of compliance with the Symington Amendment, to consult with key members of Congress, and to correspond with heads of State as well as Prime Minister Desai. Ambassador Smith and, in turn, I was asked to assess actions undertaken and options available to deny Pakistan foreign support for its fissile material production efforts; this course of action has been vigorously pursued and additional opportunities will be explored but the costs and delays it imposes on Pakistan are inherently limited. The cooperation of foreign suppliers and Saudi Arabia's ambivalent position were noted.

Discussion then turned to Pakistan's new security concerns raised by Soviet complaints about cross-border operations of Pakistan-based Afghan insurgents. Ambassador Carlucci cited the complete lack of evidence on Pakistani support for such operations and subsequently also cited the difficulty of suppressing them. It was generally agreed that Pakistani leaders would now be more interested than before in what the US would be prepared to do pursuant to the US-Pakistan agreement of 1959 (an Executive Agreement supported by a Congressional Resolution). So instructions are to be prepared for Ambassador Hummel again to offer positive inducements for a suspension of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development efforts. The specific actions proposed were:

- a port call at Karachi by the US carrier now off Socotra;
- expansion of the 1959 bilateral agreement to cover attacks by Communist-dominated as well as Communist states;
- a US intelligence and security briefing on regional conditions.

McGiffert suggested that there was a need for a fuller study of possible US or international guarantees against nuclear attack by non-Communist states. Hummel noted the very limited prospects for positive results and the likelihood that Pakistan would simply ask for further elaboration of US intentions, plans, and commitments. So Aaron stated that the US must soon decide under what conditions it would or would not deploy forces on Pakistan's behalf.

In lieu of draft letters to the "Guadeloupe IV" that focused on possible international sanctions against Pakistan, there was a consensus for initiating broader consultations with these allied leaders on Pakistani security problems, the stability of the region, and common concerns in dealing with the risks of nuclear proliferation, not only in Pakistan.
Nuclear security guarantees to Pakistan and India and mutual pledges of no production or use of nuclear weapons were considered worth pursuing. A long shot, at best; there seems to be no harm in trying. India's primary nuclear (and general) security concern with China was recognized as a serious complicating factor.

The gradual, and perhaps sensational, publicization of Pakistan's drive toward nuclear power was considered inevitable, potentially valuable in restricting foreign supplies to its nuclear program, but possibly damaging to broader US relations and interests. Frank Carlucci mentioned the current mood and possible adverse response of anti-US political forces in the Arab, Muslim, and non-aligned movements. So, the US should refrain from initiating or amplifying the public response to successive disclosures of information and allegations on Pakistan's nuclear weapons development efforts. It was also decided to defer any approaches to the Soviets on Pakistan's nuclear policy pending a relaxation of tensions over Afghanistan. Ambassador Smith suggested that these tensions might be exacerbated were the Soviet Union allowed the initiative in raising Pakistan's nuclear ambitions as an issue for the UN Security Council, given its behavior in the South African case. In sum, though, Christopher set aside Smith's case for exposing Pakistan's efforts to the "sunshine" of international publicity after consulting privately with the Soviets.

Finally, Owen, Smith, and McGiffert emphasized the importance of developing more effective means of containing the effects of the Pakistani case on proliferation elsewhere. Further work along these lines was called for, but no specific study proposals were accepted.