MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

April 9, 1979

The attached telegram instructing Ambassador Hummel was not cleared with me -- although it deals with the most important nonproliferation issue yet faced by President Carter. I urge reconsideration of the "straddle" policy which it adopts. This policy attempts the impossible -- to keep proliferation separate from Pakistan security -- by dealing with these issues on "two levels."

The Eisenhower doctrine which the 1959 agreement implemented never contemplated security guarantees for a prospectively nuclear armed Pakistan.

We have been willing to put sharp strains on relations with the Federal Republic, Japan and other allies in efforts to get them to alter their clearly peaceful nuclear programs. We even embargoed the European Community for a short period. Here, we have discovered a Pakistani covert weapons program based on stolen designs. Our reaction seems mild by comparison. Even the aid cutoff seems cast as an action which we have to take because of Congress and we are even willing to discuss with the Pakistanis "the question of the strategic value of a nuclear weapons capacity." Our nonproliferation policy thus becomes in the language used in the instruction a matter of "degree," not principle.

I think our best chance to turn the Pakistanis around -- and to sustain Congressional and domestic political support for a U.S. role in Pakistan -- is to make clear that in the last analysis its nuclear policy puts our whole relation at stake. I recommend that Ambassador Hummel's instructions be changed accordingly.

cc: - D - Mr. Christopher
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