

Aside from  
mandate re

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

April 9, 1979

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Christopher  
Mr. Newsom  
Mr. Saunders  
Mr. Kreisberg  
Ambassador Pickering  
Ambassador Smith  
Mr. Gelb  
Ambassador Hummel

FROM: Arnie Raphel *AR*

SUBJECT: Policy Toward Pakistan

*mess*  
*to persuade*  
*GR*  
*RK*  
*eye, eye, see*  
*9/4*

*Even before*  
*getting results*  
*before consult.*  
*but UK etc.*  
*Thursday*

During a meeting with Ambassador Hummel on April 5, the Secretary outlined the following priorities in our policy toward Pakistan.

-- Our policy is not driven by intelligence concerns. Pakistan could have intelligence value, but there are other, and potentially more valuable, verification possibilities.

-- Although we have expressed our regret over the Bhutto execution, we will not let it be a long-term irritant in our relationship with Islamabad.

-- We should not let actions we take with Pakistan cause excessive hazards to our relationship with India.

We, consequently, have two major foreign policy priorities with Pakistan -- our security relationship and the nuclear non-proliferation issue. Our difficulties in implementing our policy toward Pakistan over the weeks and months ahead reflect the fact that the means of attaining our objectives on these two issues often conflict. The instructions for Ambassador Hummel's meeting with General Zia are based on the considerations noted above and reflect the facts that:

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-- There are real legal and political constraints on what we can do for and with Pakistan if they continue to develop a nuclear weapons potential;

-- We recognize the validity of the 1959 Bilateral, the potential threat posed to Pakistan from events in Afghanistan and the consequent instability it could cause in South Asia. We consequently have a real and immediate interest in cooperating with Pakistan to oppose that threat;

-- We also realize that we may well be unable to dissuade Pakistan from proceeding down the nuclear road and may well be faced, within the next two to five years, with a nuclear Pakistan; *(and India, et al)*

-- Over the short term, we should attempt to maximize our chances to be successful in both the nuclear and security areas, even though we realize inherent conflicts exist. *which gets priority*

The Secretary said that we should proceed expeditiously with the planned PL 480 Title III program in Pakistan. He asked Mr. Newsom to pursue this issue with Henry Owen.

We should be alert to possible changes in the leadership of Pakistan, and closely watch the political trends within the country.

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