OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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SECRET

Release in Part
25X1, 25X6
Declass 12/31/2029

INFO UTC-81 AUS-60 1001 m

UNAFTED BY NEA/MARISJACOBY/PHUSALLUCCI
APPROVED BY DIACRISTENSEN
P/NISGUM
S/ASS:SWTH  S/S: JPEWNY
TELEBISUM
UES:TPICKERING
DCS:JACLESANGEN
NSC:TTMURANT
S/P:PKHEISBERG
AG:ACLYNHERN
PSC:DOUSHAME
LNM:REITTAUEN
INM:ISGEL
JG:PHUSNGES
NEARNSAUNDERS
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FM SECSTATE MASDOC
TO AM EMBASSY ISLAMABAD NIACIT IMMEDIATE
INFO AM EMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
AM EMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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C/O 12005 GUS 4/13/05 (CHRISTENSEN, RAYMON)
TASS: PAAH, NNUC, PA.
SUBJECT: PROPOSAL FOR DEALING WITH NUCLEAR ISSUE
SECRET

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: Marvin Russell,
Senior Reviewer
1. (SPECIAL TEXT)

2. WE ARE PLEASED THAT YOUR MEETING WITH ZIA APPEARS TO HAVE KEPT OUR SOMO UP FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN ALL AREAS. WE AGREE THAT IT IS WORTH EXPLORING THE IDEA (REF B) OF A FREEZE ON ENRICHMENT ACTIVITIES AND FULL APPLICATION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS TO ALL NEPHELOUS ACTIVITIES. MEANWHILE, PAKISTAN AND OTHER CONCERNED COUNTRIES CAN ATTEMPT TO CONSTRUCT BROADER AND MORE PERMANENT NON-PROLIFERATION ARRANGEMENTS THAT CAN PROVIDE ADEQUATE REASSURANCE TO PAKISTAN, INDIA AND PERHAPS OTHERS. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES OUTLINED BELOW, WE IN TURN WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEEK PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER OF SYMINGTON AFTER PROPER CONSULTATIONS ON THE MILL IN ORDER TO RESTORE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE. (FYI - BOTH HOUSES ARE OUT ON EASTER RECESS AND RETURN APRIL 23, BUT IF PAKS INDICATE AN INTEREST IN THIS IDEA, WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO MOVE AHEAD WITH INITIAL MANNERS CONSULTATIONS PROMPTLY.)

3. WE ARE SENDING DOG BALLIGGI WITH PHOTOS AND BASIC DATA. WE LEAVE TO YOU WHETHER YOU HAVE HIM ACCOMPANY YOU FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH ZIA. WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE HIS EXPERTISE WOULD BE HELPFUL IN PRESENTATION TO ZIA.

4. AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF SLEHAMU IS NOT GOM AND USG HANDLE PUBLIC ASPECTS OF SUCH A STEP. WE ARE PREPARED TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE, BUT REALISTICALLY WE DOUBT THAT HE COULD AVOID PUBLICITY ON AT LEAST THE BROAD FRAMEWORK OF ANY SUCH ARRANGEMENTS, SINCE RESUMPTION OF AID WILL BE SECRET.
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ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE US THE NECESSARY TIME TO WORK ON A LONGER TERM SOLUTION IN A CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE.

-- SUCH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT SHOULD ALSO PERMIT US TO RESUME AID TO PAKISTAN AND PROVIDE MORE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT IN OTHER AREAS.

-- YOUR PROPOSAL IS BASED ON YOUR STATEMENTS IN OUR LAST CONVERSATION THAT YOU ARE KEENLY INTERESTED IN A LONG TERM SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PROLIFERATION ON THE SUB-CONTINENT, THAT PAKISTAN'S INTENTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD ARE ENTIRELY PEACEFUL, AND THAT YOU ARE ONLY ENGAGED IN CARRYING OUT A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR RESEARCH PROGRAM.

-- TO MEET THE WAIVER REQUIREMENTS OF OUR LEGISLATION, WE WOULD NEED YOUR ASSURANCE THAT PAKISTAN WILL NOT ACQUIRE OR DEVELOP NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES OR ASSIST OTHER NATIONS IN DOING SO. (FYI - WE WOULD GREATLY PREFER TO HAVE THIS ASSURANCE -- AS WELL AS THE OTHERS DETAILLED BELOW -- IN WRITING, BUT SUCH MODALITIES CAN BE DETERMINED LATER IF THE PAKS EXHIBIT INTEREST IN OUR PROPOSAL. END FYI).

-- I MUST NOW BE VERY EXPLICIT ABOUT THE KINDS OF SENSITIVE ACTIVITIES THAT CONCERN US AND THE NATURE OF ASSURANCES THAT MIGHT PERMIT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

-- WITH RESPECT TO URANIUM ENRICHMENT, IN OUR LAST MEETING, YOU INDICATED THAT PAKISTAN IS ENGAGED IN A RESEARCH PROGRAM CONCERNING ONLY PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND HAS NO INTENTION OF DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE, AND YOU SUGGESTED THAT PAKISTAN IS NOT IN A POSITION TO ENRICH SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF URANIUM. I
I would like to outline a specific understanding of this point that would be essential to resolving our difficulties.

According to our information and analysis, there are facilities in Pakistan where work related to your enrichment program is underway or planned.

We have been aware for some time of your country's efforts.

The level of activity at the site is consistent with a research effort into the gas centrifuge technology of the magnitude you have suggested. Other than that Pakistan has plans to build a production scale facility.
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--- IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING THAT IS NOT OPEN TO FUTURE MISINTERPRETATION, ONE THAT WILL SUSTAIN OUR GOOD RELATIONS WHILE WE LOOK FOR A LONG TERM SOLUTION, AND ONE THAT WILL SUPPORT THE RESUMPTION OF OUR ASSISTANCE, WE WILL NEED YOUR FORMAL ASSURANCE, CONSISTENT WITH YOUR EARLIER STATEMENT, THAT PAKISTAN'S ACTIVITY IN THE AREA OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO A SEARCH EFFORT AT THE LABORATORY SCALE AND THAT THE EFFORT IS DIRECTED EXCLUSIVELY AT DEVELOPING PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.

--- (THE FOLLOWING POINT WHICH IS VERY TECHNICAL, SHOULD BE USED AT YOUR DISCRETION, BUT THESE SPECIFICS WILL NEED TO BE CONVEYED TO ZIA OR HIS STAFF AT SOME TIME IN THE COURSE OF MAKING U1 THIS STEP. WE LEAVE IT UP TO YOU TO DECIDE WHEN AND HOW TO DO THIS.) THIS WOULD MEAN THAT (1) NO URANIUM WILL BE ENRICHED TO MORE THAN FIVE (5) PERCENT IN THE ISOTOPE U235, (2) NO MORE THAN ONE LAB SCALE FACILITY WILL BE CONSTRUCTED; THAT FACILITY WOULD PRODUCE NO MORE THAN A TOTAL OF 50 KILOGRAMS OF SEPARATIVE WORK UNITS (SWUs) PER YEAR, (3) THE AMOUNT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL UTILIZED WILL NOT EXCEED THE AMOUNT AUTHORIZED BY THE IAEA FOR RESEARCH APPLICATIONS WITHOUT A REQUIREMENT FOR SAFEGUARDS (KNOWN AS '1 EFFECTIVE KILOGRAM').

--- IF THIS IS AGREABLE, AND TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS WE WOULD EXPECT THAT YOU WOULD NOT BUY OR IMPORT ANY FURTHER ENRICHMENT MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY AND PROMPTLY CEASE ALL ACTIVITY AT THE SITES, AND ANYTHING ELSE OTHER THAN THAT URANIUM ENRICHMENT WORK MAY BE UNDERWAY.

--- AS YOU KNOW WE HAVE ALSO BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT PARIS SECRET.

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TAN'S ACTIVITY IN THE SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY OF REPROCESSING. WE BELIEVE THIS ISSUE CAN BE ADDRESSED IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF MUTUAL ASSURANCE AND RESTRANL INVOLVING OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.

-- PENDING SUCH RESOLUTION, WE WOULD NEED YOUR ASSURANCE THAT PAKISTAN WILL ABIDE BY THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IAEA, FRANCE AND PAKISTAN OF MARCH 18, 1975, (SEE REF C). WE UNDERSTAND THAT UNDER THAT AGREEMENT ANY REPROCESSING FACILITY OR EQUIPMENT IN EXISTENCE OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN PAKISTAN IS SUBJECT TO SAFEGUARDS, AND PAKISTAN IS OBLIGED TO INFORM THE IAEA OF ITS EXISTENCE.

-- THIS MEANS THAT THE AGENCY MUST BE NOTIFIED OF THE EXISTING REPROCESSING CAPABILITY AT YOUR RESEARCH CENTER TO AND NORTH OF THE FACILITY UNDER CONSTRUCTION. AS WELL AS ANY OTHER REPROCESSING ACTIVITY IN PAKISTAN. YOU MAY WANT TO SUBMIT DRAWINGS OF FACILITY UNDER CONSTRUCTION, IF NECESSARY.

-- AS YOU MAY KNOW, THE US LAW THAT PROHIBITS NEW COMMITMENTS OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN RELATES TO BOTH ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING. YOUR ASSURANCE THAT PAKISTAN WILL NOT IMPORT REPROCESSING MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY AND THAT IT WILL ABIDE BY THE MARCH 18, 1975 SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT MENTIONED ABOVE IS ALSO ESSENTIAL TO OUR UNDERSTANDING.

-- THIS ASSURANCE TOGETHER WITH PAKISTAN'S PROMPT NOTIFICATION TO THE AGENCY AS REQUIRED BY ITS TRILATERAL AGREEMENT WILL ALLOUS US TO PUT THIS ISSUE ASIDE FOR NOW.

-- A FINAL AND CRITICAL POINT TO YOUR ASSURANCE TO US SECRET

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THAT PAKISTAN HAS NO INTENTION OF DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE MATA
IN WHICH SUCH AN ASSURANCE WOULD RELATE TO WORK, FOR
INSTANCE, AT LOCATIONS SUCH AS THE

WE WOULD VIEW THE CONTINUANCE OF SUCH WORK AND IMPORTS AS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
ASSURANCE NOT TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES WHICH WE
ARE ASKING FROM YOU.

-- WE HOPE HE CAN QUICKLY REACH AGREEMENT ON THESE POINTS

I HAVE MENTIONED ANY FURTHER SO THAT THERE CAN BE A CLEAN
UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE MEANING OF YOUR ASSURANCES THAT
PAKISTAN WILL NOT ACQUIRE OR DEVELOP NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
OR ASSIST OTHER NATIONS IN DOING SO. UNDER THESE CIRCUM-
STANCES, WE THINK WE WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE THE NECESSARY
ACTION UNDER OUR LAW TO RESUME ASSISTANCE, AND WE CAN
MORE EFFECTIVELY WORK TOGETHER TO DEVELOP ARRANGEMENTS TO
ADDRESS THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF YOUR
COUNTRY AND OTHERS IN THE REGION. END TEXT.

7. FPO ONLY: IF A DISCUSSION OF THE ENRICHMENT PROGRAM
IS PROVOKED BY YOUR POINTS, AND THE PAKISTANIS APPEAR TO
ATTACH EXTRAORDINARY VALUE TO THE OPERATION OF

YOU MAY INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO SEEK WASHINGTON'S
VIEWS ON THE CONTINUATION OF SPECIFIED ACTIVE AT THAT

PROVIDED ASSURANCES ARE RECEIVED THAT SUCH

TOGETHER WITH THE ACTIVITY AT

WOULD REMAIN

WITHIN THE PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES RELATING TO ENRICHMENT.
WE ARE NOT DISPOSED TO DO SO AT THIS STAGE AND DO NOT
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WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION NOW THAT WE ARE READY TO DO THIS. END FYI ONLY.

8. YOU SHOULD DISCOURAGE ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE US WAIT SIX MONTHS FOR ELECTIONS BEFORE SEEKING AGREEMENT ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT THE US COULD NOT RESUME AID DURING THIS PERIOD, THAT AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE COULD BECOME MUCH MORE DIFFICULT IF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM PROCEEDED DURING THIS PERIOD, AND THAT THE POSSIBILIT Y OF DEVELOPING A REGIONAL SOLUTION INVOLVING ASSURANCES AND RESTR AINT WOULD BE GREATLY DIMINISHED.

9. FYI, WE ARE SENDING USG BALLUCCI OF 3/P TO ISLAMABAD TO CARRY URMINGS AND PHOTOS AND TO BE WITH YOU FOR ANY ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL ADVICE ON ASSISTANCE IN EVENT A NEED FOR SUCH SHOULD ARISE IN YOUR TALKS WITH ZIA. OUR THOUGHT IS ALSO THAT HE COULD BE HELPFUL SHOULD ZIA AGAIN VOLUNTEER THE IDEA OF A SITE VISIT IN REACTION TO YOUR POINTS NAMING THESE. OUR FIRST PREFERENCE WOULD STILL BE TO FIELD A TEAM TO VISIT SITES, BUT LEAVE THE TACTICS OF THIS TO YOUR BEST JUDGMENT. END FYI.

10. WE WOULD LIKE BALLUCCI TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON ASAP AND WOULD NOT ENVISAGE HIS REMAINING IN ISLAMABAD MORE THAN A DAY OR TWO UNLESS SITE INSPECTION OPTION OPENS UNEXPECTEDLY. HE MAY WANT BALLUCCI TO VISIT NEW DELHI AFTER ISLAMABAD TO DISCUSS WITH AMBASSADOR GORENNUXURAL ASPECT OF FOREIGN MINISTER VAJPAYEE VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

11. WE ARE STILL COORDINATING THIS APPROACH WITH THE BRITISH AND WILL NOT HAVE THEIR VIEWS UNTIL AFTER THE LONG EASTER WEEKEND. YOU SHOULD TAKE NO ACTION ON SEEKING APPOINTMENT WITH ZIA UNTIL YOU HAVE Word FROM US WHICH WILL COME NO EARLIER THAN TUESDAY APRIL 19.

CHRISTOPHER
SECRET

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