

SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS

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ABSTRACT

This Paper consists of two distinct but related parts. An introductory section reviews and standardizes the terminology to be used throughout, and outlines the configuration of a typical remote-access, multi-user resource-sharing computer system, identifying its vulnerabilities to the accidental or deliberate divulgence of information. The main portion of the Paper then compares the security and privacy situations, suggesting design considerations for protecting private information handled by computer systems.

The privacy problem is really a spectrum of problems which ultimately must be assessed as an engineering

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trade-off question: the value of private information to an outsider determining the resources he is willing to expend for acquisition; the value of the information to its owner determining what he is willing to pay for protection.

Computer systems operating with classified military information and those handling private or sensitive information are contrasted in terms of: controlling user access; incentives to penetration; hardware requirements; file access and protection; overall philosophy of system organization; certifying authorities; magnitude and seriousness of penetration efforts; security and protection of communication circuits. Generally speaking, similar hardware-software and systems precautions must be taken. The essential distinctions are in the legal framework, value of information, magnitude of resources for both protection and penetration, and in communications security. The all-important difference is that the users of a computer-private network may not be subject to a common authority and discipline, or that these forces may be inadequate to deter deliberate attempts at penetration.

I. INFORMATION LEAKAGE IN A RESOURCE-SHARING
COMPUTER SYSTEM

With the advent of computer systems which share the resources of the configuration among several users or several problems, there is the risk that information from one user (or computer program) will be coupled to another user (or program). In many cases, the information in question will bear a military classification or be sensitive for some reason, and safeguards must be provided to guard against the leakage of information. This session is concerned with accidents or deliberate attempts which divulge computer-resident information to unauthorized parties.

Espionage attempts to obtain military or defense information regularly appear in the news. Computer systems are now widely used in military and defense installations, and deliberate attempts to penetrate such computer systems must be anticipated. There can be no doubt that safeguards must be conceived which will protect the information in such computer systems. There is a corresponding situation in the industrial world. Much business information is company-confidential because it relates to proprietary processes or technology, or to the success, failure, or state-of-health of the company. One can

imagine a circumstance in which it would be profitable for one company to mount an industrial espionage attack against the computer system of a competitor. Similarly, one can imagine scenarios in which confidential information on individuals which is kept within a computer is potentially profitable to a party not authorized to have the information. Hence, we can expect that penetrations will be attempted against computer systems which contain non-military information.

This session will not debate the existence of espionage attempts against resource-sharing systems. Rather, it is assumed that the problem exists, at least in principle if not in fact, and our papers will be devoted to discussing technological aspects of the problem and possible approaches to safeguards.

First of all, clarification of terminology is in order. For the military or defense situation, the jargon is well established. We speak of "classified information," "military security," and "secure computer installations." There are rules and regulations governing the use and divulgence of military-classified information, and we need not dwell further on the issue. In the non-military area, terminology is not established. The phrase

"industrial security" includes such things as protecting proprietary designs and business information; but it also covers the physical protection of plants and facilities. For our purposes, the term is too broad. In most circles, the problem which will concern us is being called the "privacy problem."

The words "private" and "privacy" are normally associated with an individual in a personal sense, but Webster's Third New International Dictionary also provides the following definitions:

Private:intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person, or group, or class of persons; not freely available to the public

Privacy:isolation, seclusion, or freedom from unauthorized oversight or observation.

We are talking about restricting information within a computer for the use of a specified group of persons; we do not want the information freely available to the public. We want to isolate the information from unauthorized observation. Hence, the terminology appears appropriate enough, although one might hope that new terms will be found that do not already have strongly

established connotations. For our purposes today, "security" and "classified" will refer to military or defense information or situations; "private" or "privacy," to the corresponding industrial, or non-military governmental situations. In each case, the individual authorized to receive the information will have "need to know" or "access authorization."

We will do the following in this session. In order to bring all of us to a common level of perspective on resource-sharing computer systems, I will briefly review the configuration of such systems and identify the major vulnerabilities to penetration and to leakage of information. The following paper by Mr. Peters will describe the security safeguards provided for a multi-programmed remote-access computer system. Then I will contrast the security and privacy situations, identifying similarities and differences. The final paper by Dr. Petersen and Dr. Turn will discuss technical aspects of security and privacy safeguards. Finally, we have a panel of three individuals who have faced the privacy problem in real-life systems; each will describe his views toward the problem, and his approach to a solution. In the end, it will fall upon each of you to conceive and implement satisfactory safeguards for the situation which concerns you.

A priori, we can not be certain how dangerous a given vulnerability might be. Things which are serious for some computer systems may be only a nuisance for others. Let us take the point of view that we will not prejudge the risk associated with a given vulnerability or threat to privacy. Rather, let us try only to suggest some of the ways in which a computer system might divulge information to an unauthorized party in either the security or the privacy situation. We'll leave for discussion in the context of particular installations the question of how much protection we want to provide, what explicit safeguards must be provided, and how serious any particular vulnerability might be.

The hardware configuration of a typical resource-sharing computer system is shown in Fig. 1. There is a central processor to which are attached computer-based files and a communication network for linking to remote users via a switching center. We observe first of all that the files may contain information of different levels of sensitivity or military classification; therefore, access to these files by users must be controlled. Improper or unauthorized access to a file can divulge information to the wrong person. Certainly, the file can




Fig. 1--Typical configuration of resource-sharing computer system

also be stolen--a rather drastic divulgence of information. On the other hand, an unauthorized copy of a file might be made using the computer itself, and the copy revealed to unauthorized persons.

The central processor has both hardware and software components. So far as hardware is concerned, the circuits for such protections as bound registers, memory read-write protect, or privileged mode might fail and permit information to leak to improper destinations. A large variety of hardware failures might contribute to software failures which, in turn, lead to divulgence. Since the processor consists of high-speed electronic circuits, it can be expected that large quantities of electromagnetic energy will radiate; conceivably an eavesdropping third party might acquire sensitive information. Failure of the software may disable such protection features as access control, user identification, or memory bounds control, leading to improper routing of information.

Intimately involved with the central computer are three types of personnel: operators, programmers, and maintenance engineers. The operator who is responsible for minute-by-minute functioning of the system might reveal information by doing such things as replacing the

correct monitor with a non-protecting one of his own, or perhaps with a rigged monitor which has special "ins" for unauthorized parties. Also, he might reveal to unauthorized parties some of the protective measures which are designed into the system. A co-operative effort between a clever programmer and an engineer could "bug" a machine for their own gain in such a sophisticated manner that it might remain unnoticed for an extended period. ("Bug" as just used does not refer to an error in a program, but to some computer equivalent of the famous transmitter in a martini olive.) Bugging of a machine could very easily appear innocent and open.

Operator-less machine systems are practical, and in principle one might conjecture that a machine could be bugged by an apparently casual passerby. There are subtle risks associated with the maintenance process. While attempting to diagnose a system failure, information could

easily be generated which would reveal to the maintenance man how the software protections are coded. From that point, it might be easy to rewire the machine so that certain instructions appeared to behave normally, whereas in fact, the protective mechanisms could be bypassed.

While some of the things that I've just proposed require deliberate acts, others could happen by accident.

Thus, so far as the computing central itself is concerned, we have potential vulnerabilities in control of access to files; in radiation from the hardware; in hardware, software, or combined hardware-software failures; and in deliberate acts of penetration or accidental mistakes by the system personnel.

The communication links from the central processor to the switching center, and from the switching center to the remote consoles are similarly vulnerable. Any of the usual wiretapping methods might be employed to steal information from the lines. Since some communications will involve relatively high-frequency signals, electromagnetic radiation might be intercepted by an eavesdropper. Also, crosstalk between communication links might possibly reveal information to unauthorized individuals. Furthermore, the switching central itself might have a radiation or crosstalk

vulnerability; it might fail to make the right connection and so link the machine to an incorrect user.

A remote console might also have a radiation vulnerability. Moreover, there is the possibility that recording devices of various kinds might be attached to the console to pirate information. Consideration might have to be given to destroying the ribbon in the printing mechanism, or designing the platen so that impressions could not be read from it.

Finally, there is the user of the system. Since his link to the computer is via a switching center, the central processor must make certain with whom it is conversing. Thus, there must be means for properly identifying the user; and this means must be proof against recording devices, pirating, unauthorized use, etc. Even after a user has satisfactorily established his identify, there remains the problem of verifying his right to have access to certain files, and possibly to certain components of the configuration. There must be a means for authenticating the requests which he will make of the system, and this means must be proof against bugging, recorders, pirating, unauthorized usage, etc. Finally, there is the ingenious user who skillfully invades the software system sufficiently

to ascertain its structure, and to make changes which are not apparent to the operators or to the systems programmers, but which give him "ins" to normally unavailable information.

To summarize, there are human vulnerabilities throughout; individual acts can accidentally or deliberately jeopardize the protection of information in a system. Hardware vulnerabilities are shared among the computer, the communications system, and the consoles. There are software vulnerabilities; and vulnerabilities in the system's organization, e.g., access control, user identification and authentication. How serious any one of these might be depends on the sensitivity of the information being handled, the class of users, the operating environment, and certainly on the skill with which the network has been designed. In the most restrictive case, the network might have to be protected against all the types of invasions which have been suggested plus many readily conceivable.

This discussion, although not an exhaustive consideration of all the ways in which a resource-sharing computer system might be either accidentally or deliberately penetrated for the purposes of unauthorized acquisition of information, has attempted to outline some of the major vulnerabilities which exist in modern computing systems.

Succeeding papers in this session will address themselves to a more detailed examination of these vulnerabilities and to a discussion of possible solutions.

II. SECURITY AND PRIVACY: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

For the purposes of this Paper we will use the term "security" when speaking about computer systems which handle classified defense information, and "privacy" in regard to those computer systems which handle non-defense information which nonetheless must be protected because it is in some respect sensitive. It should be noted at the outset that the context in which security must be considered is quite different from that which can be applied to the privacy question. With respect to classified military information there are federal regulations which establish authority, and discipline to govern the conduct of people who work with such information. Moreover, there is an established set of categories into which information is classified. Once information is classified Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret, there are well-defined requirements for its protection, for controlling access to it, and for transmitting it from place to place. In the privacy situation, the analogous situation may exist only in part or not at all.

There are indeed Federal and State statutes which protect the so-called "secrecy of communication." But it remains to be established that these laws can be extended to cover or interpreted as applicable to the unauthorized

acquisition of information from computer equipment. There are also laws against thievery; and at least one case involving a programmer and theft of privileged information has been tried. The telephone companies have formulated regulations governing the conduct of employees (who are subject to "secrecy of communication" laws) who may intrude on the privacy of individuals; perhaps this experience can be drawn upon by the computer field.

Though there apparently exist fragments of law and some precedents bearing on the protection of information, nonetheless the privacy situation is not so neatly circumscribed and tidy as the security situation. Privacy simply is not so tightly controlled. Within computer networks serving many companies, organizations, or agencies, there may be no uniform governing authority; an incomplete legal framework; no established discipline, or perhaps not even a code of ethics among users. At present there is not even a commonly accepted set of categories to describe levels of sensitivity for private information.

Great quantities of private information are being accumulated in computer files; and the incentives to penetrate the safeguards to privacy are bound to increase. Existing laws may prove inadequate, or may need more vigorous

enforcement. There may be need for a monitoring and enforcement establishment analogous to that in the security situation. In any event, it can not be taken for granted that there now exist adequate legal and ethical umbrellas for the protection of private information.

The privacy problem is really a spectrum of problems. At one end, it may be necessary to provide only a very low level of protection to the information for only a very short time; at the opposite end, it may be necessary to invoke the most sophisticated techniques to guarantee protection of information for extended periods of time. Federal regulations state explicitly what aspect of national defense will be compromised by unauthorized divulgence of each category of classified information. There is no corresponding particularization of the privacy situation; the potential damage from revealing private information is nowhere described in such absolute terms. It may be that a small volume of information leaked from a private file may involve inconsequential risk. For example, the individual names of a company's employees is probably not even sensitive, whereas the complete file of employees could well be restricted. Certainly the "big brother" spectre raised by recent Congressional hearings on "invasion

of privacy" via massive computer files is strongly related to the volume of information at risk.

Because of the diverse spread in the privacy situation, the appearance of the problem may be quite different from its reality. One would argue on principle that maximum protection should be given to all information labeled private; but if privacy of information is not protected by law and authority, we can expect that the owner of sensitive information will require a system designed to guarantee protection only against the threat as he sees it. Thus, while we might imagine very sophisticated attacks against private files, the reality of the situation may be that much simpler levels of protection will be accepted by the owners of the information.

In the end, an engineering trade-off question must be assessed. The value of private information to an outsider will determine the resources he is willing to expend to acquire it. In turn, the value of the information to its owner is related to what he is willing to pay to protect it. Perhaps this game-like situation can be played out to arrive at a rational basis for establishing the level of protection. Perhaps a company or governmental agency-- or a group of companies or agencies, or the operating

agent of a multi-access computer service--will have to establish its own set of regulations for handling private information. Further, a company or agency may have to establish penalties for infractions of these regulations, and perhaps even provide extra remuneration for those assuming the extraordinary responsibility of protecting private information.

The security measures deemed necessary for a multi-processing remote terminal computer system operating in a military classified environment have been discussed elsewhere.* This paper will compare the security situation with the privacy situation, and suggest issues to be considered when designing a computer system for guarding private information. Technology which can be applied against the design problem is described elsewhere.†

First of all, note that the privacy problem is to some extent present whenever and wherever sharing of the structures of a computer system takes place. A time-sharing system slices time in such a way that each user gets a small amount of attention on some periodic basis. More

*Peters, B., "Security Considerations in a Multi-Programmed System," presented at this session, 67 SJCC.

†Petersen, H. E., and R. Turn, Systems Implications of Privacy," presented at this session, 67 SJCC.

than one user program is resident in the central storage at one time; and hence, there are obvious opportunities for leakage of information from one program to another, although the problem is alleviated to some extent in systems operating in an interpretive software mode. In a multi-programmed computer system it is also true that more than one user program is normally resident in the core store at a time. Usually, a given program is not executed without interruption; it must share the central storage and perhaps other levels of storage with other programs. Even in the traditional batch-operated system there can be a privacy problem. Although only one program is usually resident in storage at a time, parts of other programs reside on magnetic tape or discs; in principle, the currently executing program might accidentally reference others, or cause parts of previous programs contained on partially re-used magnetic tape to be outputted.

Thus, unless a computer system is completely stripped of other programs--and this means clearing or removing access to all levels of storage--privacy infractions are possible and might permit divulgence of information from one program to another.

Let us now reconsider the points raised in the Peters^{*} paper and extend the discussion to include the privacy situation.

1) The problem of controlling user access to the resource-sharing computer system is similar in both the security and privacy situations. It has been suggested that one-time passwords are necessary to satisfactorily identify and authenticate the user in the security situation. In some university time-sharing systems, permanently assigned passwords are considered acceptable for user identification. Even though printing of a password at the console can be suppressed, it is easy to ascertain such a password by covert means; hence, repeatedly used passwords may prove unwise for the privacy situation.

2) The incentive to penetrate the system is present in both the security and privacy circumstances. Revelation of military information can degrade the country's defense capabilities. Likewise, divulgence of sensitive information can to some extent damage other parties or organizations. Private information will always have some value to an outside party, and it must be expected that

^{*}Peters, B., loc cit.

penetrations will be attempted against computer systems handling such information. It is conceivable that the legal liability for unauthorized leaking of sensitive information may become as severe as for divulging classified material.

3) The computer hardware requirements appear to be the same for the privacy and security situations. Such features as memory read-write protection, bounds registers, privileged instructions, and a privileged mode of operation are required to protect information, be it classified or sensitive. Also, overall software requirements seem similar, although certain details may differ in the privacy situation because of communications matters or difference in user discipline.

4) The file access and protection problem is similar under both circumstances. Not all users of a shared computer-private system will be authorized access to all files in the system, just as not all users of a secure computer system will be authorized access to all files. Hence, there must be some combination of hardware and software features which controls access to the on-line classified files in conformance with security levels and need-to-know restrictions and in conformance with corresponding attributes in the privacy situation. As

mentioned earlier, there may be a minor difference relative to volume. In classified files, denial of access must be absolute, whereas in private files access to a small quantity of sensitive information might be an acceptable risk.

5) The philosophy of the overall system organization will probably have to be different in the privacy situation. In the classified defense environment, users are indoctrinated in security measures and their personal responsibility can be considered as part of the system design. Just as the individual who finds a classified document in a hallway is expected to return it, so the man who accidentally receives classified information at his console is expected to report it. The users in a classified system are subject to the regulations, authority, and discipline of a governmental agency. Similar restrictions may not prevail in a commercial or industrial resource-sharing computer network, nor in government agencies that do not operate within the framework of government classifications. In general, it would appear that one cannot exploit the good will of users as part of a privacy system's design. On the other hand, the co-operation of users may be part of the design philosophy if it proves possible to impose a uniform code of

ethics, authority, and discipline within a multi-access system. Uniform rules of behavior might be possible if all users are members of the same organization, but quite difficult or impossible if the users are from many companies or agencies.

6) The certifying authority is certainly different in the two situations. It is easy to demonstrate that the total number of internal states of a computer is so enormous that some of them will never prevail in the lifetime of the machine. It is equally easy to demonstrate that large computer programs have a huge number of internal paths, which implies the potential existence of error conditions which may appear rarely or even only once. Monitor programs governing the internal scheduling and operation of multi-programmed time-sharing or batch-operated machines are likely to be extensive and complex; and if security or privacy is to be guaranteed, some authority must certify that the monitor is properly programmed and checked out. Similarly, the hardware must also be certified to possess appropriate protective devices.

In a security situation, a security officer is responsible for establishing and implementing measures for

the control of classified information. Granted that he may have to take the word of computer experts or become a computer expert himself, and granted that of itself his presence does not solve the computer security problem, there is nonetheless at least an assigned, identifiable responsible authority. In the case of the commercial or industrial system, who is the authority? Must the businessman take the word of the computer manufacturer who supplied the software? If so, how does he assure himself that the manufacturer hasn't provided "ins" to the system that only he, the manufacturer, knows about? Must the businessman create his own analog of defense security practices?

7) Privacy and security situations are certainly similar in that deliberate penetrations must be anticipated, if not expected; but industrial espionage against computers may be less serious. On the other hand, industrial penetrations against computers could be very profitable and perhaps safer from a legal viewpoint.

It would probably be difficult for a potential penetrator to mount the magnitude of effort against an industrial resource-sharing computer system that foreign agents are presumed to mount against secrecy systems of other governments. To protect against large-scale efforts,

an industry-established agency could keep track of major computing installations and know where penetration efforts requiring heavy computer support might originate. On the other hand, the resourceful and insightful individual can be as great a threat to the privacy of a system. If one can estimate the nature and extent of the penetration effort expected against an industrial system, perhaps it can be used as a design parameter to establish the level of protection for sensitive information.

8) The security and privacy situations are certainly similar in that each demands secure communication circuits. For the most part, methods for assuring the security of communication channels have been the exclusive domain of the military and government. What about the non-government user? Could the specifications levied on common carriers in their implied warranty of a private circuit be extended? Does the problem become one for the common carriers? Must they develop communication security equipment? If the problem is left to the users, does each do as he pleases? Might it be feasible to use the central computer itself to encode information prior to transmission? If so, the console will require special equipment for decoding the messages.

9) Levels of protection for communications are possibly different in the two situations. If one believes that a massive effort at penetration could not be mounted against a commercial private network, a relatively low-quality protection for communications would be sufficient. On the other hand, computer networks will inevitably go international. Then what? A foreign industry might find it advantageous to tap the traffic of U.S. companies operating an international and presumably private computer network. Might it be that for reasons of national interest we will someday find the professional cryptoanalytic effort of a foreign government focused on the privacy-protecting measures of a computer network?

If control of international trade were to become an important instrument of government policy, then any international communications network involved with industrial or commercial computer-private systems will need the best protection that can be provided.

This Paper has attempted to identify and briefly discuss the differences and similarities between computer systems operating with classified military information and computer systems handling private or sensitive information.

Similar hardware and software and systems precautions must be taken. In most respects, the differences between the two situations are only of degree. However, there are a few aspects in which the two situations genuinely differ in kind, and on these points designers of a system must take special note. The essential differences between the two situations appear to be the following:

- 1) Legal foundations for protecting classified information are well established, whereas in the privacy situation, a uniform authority over the users and penalty structure for infractions is lacking. We may not be able to count on the good will and disciplined behavior of users as part of the protective measures.
- 2) While penetrations can be expected against both classified and sensitive information, the worth of the material at risk in the two situations can be quite different, not only to the owner of the data but also to other parties and to society.
- 3) The magnitude of the resources available for protection and for penetration are markedly smaller in the privacy situation.

- 4) While secure communications are required in both situations, there are significant differences in details. In the defense environment, protected communications are the responsibility of a government agency, appropriate equipment is available, and the importance of protection overrides economic considerations. In the privacy circumstance, secure satisfactory communication equipment is generally not available, and the economics of protecting communications is likely to be more carefully assessed.
- 5) Some software details have to be handled differently in the privacy situation to accommodate differences in the security of communications.

It must be remembered that since the Federal authority and regulations for handling classified military information do not function for private or sensitive information, it does not automatically follow that a computer network designed to safely protect classified information will equally well protect sensitive information. The all important difference is that the users of a computer-private network may not be subject to a common authority

and discipline. But even if they are, the strength of the authority may not be adequate to deter deliberate attempts at penetration.