

LCH

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

January 16, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: S/S - Mr. Brubeck

FROM: INR - Thomas L. Hughes

SUBJECT: Current Deprivations and the Consequences

In our conversation Monday I again brought up INR's recurring problem of fulfilling its duties when highly significant "eyes only" material continues to be withheld. You suggested that we send a bill of particulars. Hence here are some current examples of how this practice is now interfering with INR's work:

1. INR is preparing its contribution to the NIE on the likelihood and consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons systems. It will be impossible usefully to estimate the Soviet attitude on the question when we are not informed of the current state of US-Soviet negotiations (Rusk-Dobrynin).

2. In preparing its new contribution to the NIE on Cuba, INR has been handicapped by not having available for subsequent reference a number of items made available previously on a "show" basis, as well as by never having seen a number of important items at all. The most recent of the latter were the memoranda of Kuznetsov's conversations with the President and the Secretary.

3. INR is frequently called upon (as in the case of the NATO standing group paper or for the Berlin Task Force) for general assessments of Soviet foreign policy. A really useful reading of Soviet intentions with respect to one problem will depend on an assessment of Soviet posture in other matters. At present we are without any information about Khrushchev's demarche on nuclear weapons testing, the establishment of the New York forum, the instructions to our delegations and the memoranda of conversations. We understand that there was a Khrushchev letter to the President on 19 December, a reply on 27 December, and another Soviet message on January 7. INR has not been informed. (Incidentally Max Frankel apparently has been briefed

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

SECRET

on the testing issue as have the readers of his article in the Boston Herald.)

4. We understand that a recent letter from the President to Chancellor Adenauer gave a particularly lucid and authoritative exposition of U.S. policy toward Germany. Again background on this question will be important for a new German estimate on which we are now engaged.

Bill, I appreciate all the inhibitions under which you operate. I hope, however, that we will not have to fall into a requirement of individual appeals and justifications like the above. Even these are only possible once the rumors or the newspapers alert us to the things of which we are being deprived. And it costs us a lot in terms of time and misdirected effort to find out what is going on in Washington as well as the rest of the world.

I would be grateful for anything which you can do to help.

SECRET